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A Treatise of the Greek Prepositions

A

TREATISE

ON, THE

GREEK PREPOSITIONS,

AND ON THE

CASES OF NOUNS

WITH WHICH THESE ARE USED.

BY

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PREFACE.

IN the daily instruction of the Greek classes in the University of Virginia, for many years committed to his hands, as well as in the more systematic course of lectures on the grammar of the Greek language, which it was his custom to deliver annually, the author of the treatise here offered to the public found no little difficulty and embarrassment in the treatment of the prepositions. Although he had a long time since obtained a distinct notion, as he thinks, of the general office of this class of words, and of their relations to other words in discourse, yet he met with constantly recurring perplexity in the interpretation of individual members of it. The various significations attributed to a preposition would, in some cases, present seemingly irreconcilable inconsistencies; and, in others, the meanings, though not wholly inconsistent, did not appear to be capable of being combined into a rational system pervaded by one common idea. Pressed by these difficulties, and feeling, on the one hand, that a proper understanding of this class of words was hardly second in importance to that of any other in the language, and having some confidence, on the other, that a more careful and thorough investigation might overcome the difficulties adverted to, he set about the task of reviewing the whole subject. This was done, it may be proper to say, not with any view to writing for the public, but solely for his own satisfaction, and for the benefit of his classes.

As he advanced in the work of investigation which he had assigned himself, he found more and more encouragement to go

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on. Besides the obtaining other results that amply rewarded the labor of research, a few principles of interpretation, which, though simple and obvious, and of the most satisfactory application, had been wanting to make possible a complete explanation of the prepositions, developed themselves to his mind as the occasion required, or, rather, were brought to light by the scrutiny of facts as they came under examination. And though often checked in his progress, and baffled time after time in the search for an adequate solution of some enigma, being sometimes obliged to spend days upon days in pondering a single use of a single preposition, he was gratified at being able to arrive at length at a satisfactory issue of his inquiries.

Having reached the conclusion that, by employing proper methods, the meanings and uses of the prepositions of the Greek language might be set forth and explained so as to leave on the mind no serious doubt of their interpretation, that, in fact, these particles were capable of being reduced to a simple and consistent theory, he decided, after first submitting his views to the practical test of the lecture-room and to the judgment of competent scholars, to write out for others the result of his labors, and, at the same time, to set forth the process by which it had been obtained. He naturally thought, or, it may be, fondly fancied, that what had caused himself the perplexity of an insoluble problem might have caused the same perplexity to others; and that they might share the satisfaction he felt in finding that phenomena in language so numerous and important, and that yet seemed so often confused and discordant, were really, when fairly interpreted, capable of being reduced to the highest degree of order and harmony.

Of the method adopted in presenting these investigations to the reader, it is not deemed necessary to speak at length in this place. It may be remarked, however, that the work was not designed to be a mere exhibition of doctrines that had obtained the author's credence, whether with or without authority. It was intended, on the contrary, to present, together with the conclusions reached, the process by which they had been arrived

at, so that the reader might at each step form for himself a just opinion of the truth of the doctrine proposed. It is an attempt to apply to a difficult and complicated problem or series of problems, embracing a great multitude and variety of facts and groups of facts, the strictest method of induction. Consequently, the object being to set down in their turn the doctrines or principles resulting from the examination of facts in succession, it could not but happen that, in proportion as progress was made towards a satisfactory generalization, there would be a frequent recurrence and repetition of the same doctrine or principle. And such repetition, being due to the number of successive inductions and to the method pursued of presenting these one after the other as they were reached, so far from being a just ground of objection, is, if the author may venture to express the opinion, among the few and humble claims that the work may possibly have to the reader's attention. For, to the learner who seeks to derive the greatest benefit from the study of language, it will be found far more profitable to exercise himself in the simple but effective methods of strict philosophizing than to store his memory, however richly, with the mere results of learned labor without attending to the processes by which they have been obtained.

For the helps which he has used, the author has striven to make everywhere suitable acknowledgment in the text. It may be proper to state, however, that in the chapter on the cases of nouns he has availed himself chiefly of Kühner's *Ausführliche Grammatik*, and made reference to it almost exclusively. This course seemed preferable to citing various authorities, both for other reasons, and because the grammar just mentioned has been employed, as others equally must have been, almost solely as a collection of materials, no use being had for its author's theory.

In the treatment of the prepositions in detail, the largest use has been made of Passow's *Handwörterbuch der Griechischen Sprache*. And, while the author could not adopt Passow's explanation of the use of the prepositions, he has a grateful

pleasure in avowing that, without the aid afforded by this excellent work, he could never, with his limited time, have accomplished the task of reviewing the doctrine of these particles.

In conclusion, the author submits the work to the candid judgment of the reader, asking a liberal indulgence for the many imperfections which it will doubtless be found to have. Some of these, he may be pardoned for saying, may justly be charged to the necessity of preparing the work at such intervals of time only as could be spared from the daily burden of exhausting labor. Others may not unfairly be referred to the nature of the subject, demanding as it does for its perfect exhibition, not only an amount of patient and attentive consideration that leisurely study alone can afford, but a degree of nice discrimination and of sound judgment to which the writer cannot pretend to lay claim. But, however this may be, it is due to himself to say that he has not set down any doctrine without having weighed it as carefully as he could, nor without a full conviction of its truth. Where he had doubts remaining, he has not failed to express them.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, May 1, 1858.

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THE
GREEK PREPOSITIONS.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE OF THE PREPOSITIONS, AND OF THE METHOD
OF INVESTIGATING THEIR SIGNIFICATION AND USE.

THE various actions, motions, and states which may be affirmed of an object require often to be qualified as to their manner, extent, relative position, and direction with regard to other objects. Thus, when it is said of a house, *οἶκος*, that it is built in the village, *ἐν τῇ κώμῃ οἰκοδομεῖται*, *ἐν τῇ κώμῃ*, 'in the village' is added to *οἰκοδομεῖται*, 'is built,' by way of more definite qualification, to show the position of the building relatively. When it is said of any persons that 'they reached their destination quickly,' *τάχα ἀφίχοντο*, the term 'quickly,' *τάχα*, is added to the action contained in the expression 'they reached their destination,' *ἀφίχοντο*, to show the manner of their arriving. When it is said, 'he built a house,' *οἶκον ὡκοδόμησε*, the accusative *οἶκον*, in the Greek, is added to *ὡκοδόμησε* to set forth the actual extent in which the act of building is to be taken, namely, 'as far as a house goes.' To certain of these added qualifications of the actions, motions, and states expressed by the verbs, the grammarians have agreed in giving the name of adverbs, as indicating that they are attached to verbs chiefly and qualify them. They include, for the Greek language, in the class of adverbs, words that are seemingly without inflection; as *τάχα*, 'quickly,' *ὥκύ*, 'swiftly,' *ἀμαχῆτι*, 'without battle,' and that describe the manner of the verb's action or motion with regard to

time, place, &c. Very many, however, of the words in Greek called adverbs are really cases of nouns; as *τάχα, ταχύ, ὧκύ, ἀμαχῆτι*; and the same is probably true of the rest. But it is only important to the present purpose to observe that the adverbs are in sense immediately attached to the substantive idea of the verb; that is, to its action, motion, or state, qualifying it in regard to its manner, extent, time, place, &c.

To certain other words, introduced likewise to qualify the action, motion, or state expressed by verbs, the grammarians give the name of prepositions, this name being suggested by their ordinary position before the nouns, which, with them, wait upon the verbs to qualify their substantive idea. Thus, *ἐς Τύρον ἐπλευσα*, 'I sailed into Tyre;' that is, 'I sailed in . . . as regards Tyre;' *παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ὁδοιπορίαν ἐποίησε*, 'he made a journey alongside . . . as regards the river.' This class of words also, and with more seeming propriety, though not, perhaps, with sufficient reason, is regarded commonly as being without inflection; as, *εἰς, πρός, ἐπί*. For the rest, they have a more arbitrary definition in the grammars, it being difficult to separate the prepositions from the other words in the language by applying the description given of them; namely, that they are without inflection, and stand before nouns to aid in expressing the relations conveyed by the cases. A more careful inspection of the list of words referred to this class, say in the Greek language, will show that they too attend upon verbs to define their action, motion, or state, and specifically by giving its direction and relative position. Thus, in the phrase *ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν*, 'he came into the city,' the action of 'coming' contained in *ἦλθεν* is qualified by *εἰς*, 'in,' and shows that, with regard to the city, the coming is 'in,' 'within.' The noun that follows the verb in the proper case does likewise go to define its action, motion, or state, by marking its extent, position, final object, &c.; but this does not alter the relation of the preposition to the verb, nor show that the cases are supplemented by the prepositions. It only renders the qualifications attached to the verb more varied and complete.

Sometimes, also, the noun depends more immediately upon the preposition itself rather than upon other words in the sentence, marking the object affected by the proper sense of the preposition, as in some cases of the use of *ἐπί, σύν*, &c.

The prepositions, so regarded as has been just set forth, are, in their general features, of the same nature with the adverbs, and differ from them in this alone, that, while the adverb qualifies the action, motion, or state of the verb as to its manner, extent, place, time, &c., generally, the preposition denotes specifically its direction and relative position. The prepositions and adverbs having so much in common, it cannot be surprising that the same word should sometimes be referred to both classes, and be called a preposition or an adverb according to its present use or to the view of the writer. At the same time, this absence of entire distinctness in the classification is not a matter of much moment, beyond the mere application of a name; since the word, whether called a preposition or an adverb, will be attached in sense to the substantive idea of the verb; and, if a noun follow the verb, its case will be determined in the same way, whether the particle qualifying the verb be accounted a preposition or an adverb. And, notwithstanding the occasional confusion in the use of the terms adverb and preposition to which reference has just been made, it is possible to distinguish a number of words as having the character above attributed to the prepositions, and to agree upon a list for the Greek language which, with few exceptions, all will admit. The following enumeration admits a few, the claims of which to a place among the prepositions may be questioned, but which could hardly be omitted in a discussion of the prepositions without needlessly encountering commonly-received opinions; as, *ἀνευ, ἔνεκα, πλὴν*, and *ὥς*. "*Ἀμα, ἀμφί, ἀνά, ἀνευ?, ἀντί, ἀπό, διὰ, εἰς, ἐκ, ἐν, ἔνεκα?, ἐπί, κατά, μετά, ὀπίσθεν, παρά, περί, πλὴν?, πρό, πρόσ, πρόσθεν, σύν* and *ξύν, ὑπέρ, ὑπό, ὥς?*"

This, then, being the nature and office of the prepositions, to mark the direction and relative position of the

action, motion, or other substantive idea expressed by the verb; and considering the almost endless modifications which the action or other substantive idea of the verb may undergo in regard to these particulars of direction and relative position; it is manifest that the words which in any language are destined to express these must constitute a very important part of its means of distinct representation. If it be added that of the Greek prepositions some, in virtue of their own signification of 'upon,' 'under,' 'about,' 'with,' *ἐπί, ὑπό, ἀμφί, σύν*, may have nouns immediately depending upon them, being added to mark the objects affected by the sense which they express; just as other words, as *ἴσος*, 'equal,' *ὅμοιος*, 'like,' are followed by nouns in the proper case to express the objects affected by the notions of equality, likeness, &c., conveyed by them; it will appear yet more evidently that these words have a just claim to a large share of attention in the study of the language.

The same considerations would of themselves suggest also the difficulty likely to attend the investigation of the meaning of these particles, and of the proper interpretation of their uses. But they do not reveal the whole of it: and it may be worth while to consider more nearly the elements that enter into a question concerning the signification and use of a preposition with the case of a noun following.

First, the proper or primary signification of the preposition itself is to be ascertained, and then its secondary or derivative significations; for it will be found upon examination that the preposition, with the same case even, appears at one time in one signification and at another time in another. Thus, *ἐπί* with the dative signifies 'on,' 'upon;' as, *ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσι*, 'on the mountains,' *ἐφ' ἵππῳ*, 'on horseback;' but it has also, with the same case, the meaning of 'for,' 'on the ground of;' as, *ἐπ' ἀρετῇ ἐπαίνεται*, 'he is commended for, on the ground of, his virtue;' *παρά* with the accusative signifies 'alongside of;' as, *παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν*, 'along the river;' but it also means 'against,' 'contrary to;' as, *παρ' ἐλπίδα*, 'contrary to expectation.'

And, generally, the merely sensible and local meaning may become more or less changed by its metaphorical application. Thus, *ὑπό* signifies 'under' in a local sense, and *περί*, 'around;' but the former obtains the sense of 'under subjection to,' and the latter that of 'about,' with the idea of a loose computation; as, *περὶ μυρίους*, 'about ten thousand;' and of 'concerning;' as, *λέγειν περὶ τούτων*, 'to speak about, concerning, these things.'

Secondly, connecting, as they do, the action, motion, or state contained in the verb with the different cases of nouns, according to the peculiar relations in which the nouns stand to the substantive idea of the verb, it can hardly fail to happen that the prepositions will be apparently affected in their meaning, and really altered in their rendering into English, by the conjunction. Thus, *κατὰ* with the genitive case is translated either 'down upon' or 'down from,' according to the circumstances in which it is employed; but with the accusative case it has, apparently at least, and so as to require explanation, the sense of 'according to,' and 'by the measure of;' e.g. *κατ' Οὐλύμπιο καμήνων*, 'down from the heights of Olympus,' *κατὰ τοὺς νόμους*, 'according to the laws,' *κατὰ φύλα*, 'by tribes,' where the difference is owing, however, not to any change in the meaning of the preposition, but to the predominant influence of the case.

Accordingly, it is requisite to a proper interpretation of the prepositions as used in connection with the cases of nouns to mark the exact sense of the cases also, and to distinguish not only which one of the several meanings of the preposition is involved, but which also of the significations of the case. Thus, for example, to determine what is the proper interpretation of the expression *παρ' ἐλπίδα*; 'contrary to expectation,' it must be noted which of the significations of *παρά* is present, and, further, which of the significations of the accusative case. If *παρά* signify 'alongside of,' and nothing more, and the accusative case mark only the extent of an action, then the phrase is beyond solution; for these two notions, however combined, can never give the sense of 'contrary to' expectation.

Nor will it answer the ends of a scientific inquiry to say at once, cutting the knot, that *παρὰ* signifies both 'along-side of' and 'contrary to;' for this is to give, without explanation, two seemingly opposite meanings to the same preposition. Here the problem becomes complicated and difficult, as may be seen, if no other proof offer itself, in the total failure of the grammars and lexicons to explain such phenomena so often occurring in the use of the prepositions.

Again, the difficulty of interpreting the use of the prepositions does not end here. It will sometimes be found that, after the various significations of the preposition and of the case have been carefully determined and all their possible combinations examined, the just interpretation of the preposition as used with the case eludes the search, and the question seems to admit of no solution. When found, as it may yet be by close and patient attention, it will be detected by searching narrowly into the mutual relations in which the parties to the action of the verb which the preposition qualifies stand to each other and to this action. Thus, what possible combination of any one of the significations of *μετά*, and of any one of those of the accusative case, can afford even a plausible explanation of the use of this preposition with the accusative in the sense of 'after'? If the grammars and lexicons be consulted, they give no answer, contenting themselves with asserting, what, in any strict sense, is not true, that *μετά* signifies 'after,' or render one that is, to say the least, unintelligible. Yet, as will be seen in the proper place, if, together with the appropriate sense of the preposition and of the case, the relations which the parties to the action have to each other and to the action be considered, nothing can be simpler nor more certain than the explanation of this phenomenon that may be given consistently with the usual meaning of both *μετά* and the accusative.

Considering, then, all these sources of difficulty in the interpretation of the use of the prepositions as they stand connected with the cases of nouns, it would be surprising if it were found less perplexing than it is. It is rather a

proof of the remarkable accuracy and perspicacity of the Greek mind, as preserved in the language, that, amid all the changes of meaning which the prepositions have undergone by daily use, there remain perhaps no examples in which these particles admit not of a satisfactory explanation by the application of proper methods.

In seeking to determine the proper or primary signification of a preposition itself, it is necessary to gather up its various meanings, not only in all its uses with and without cases of nouns, but also as it occurs in composition, as with verbs, nouns, adjectives, &c., and in its derivatives, if it have any; and then, by a careful comparison of all these, separating what properly belongs to the preposition and what to the case or to the other member of the compound or derivative, to endeavor to arrive at the simple and primary notion of the preposition. This may be recognised by more marks than one, chiefly by its being a sense to which all the rest may be referred as derivatives; or, what it is more proper to say in this view, a sense which is obtained by finding that in which all the others essentially agree, and which, therefore, enters into them all, and is characteristic of them all. Commonly, this meaning will be the expression of sensible or local direction or position, and will relate to material objects. Thus, *μετά*, which has a variety of seemingly very different meanings, 'among,' 'with,' 'after' in two senses, will be found, by such a course of investigation, to have one meaning, that of 'amid,' that enters as the chief element into all the rest, and gives them their characteristic sense; a meaning that is as truly present in *μετά*, 'after,' as in *μετά*, 'with,' 'among.' It was purposely said that, in seeking to determine the proper meaning of a preposition, its use in compound and derivative words, and where it stands without a case, must be studied, as well as its use with cases; for it will be found that, in these latter circumstances, the preposition is retained in its original sense, or in one little removed from this, even more frequently than when occurring in connection with the cases. The reason of this is obvious. On the one hand, it is not complicated with the

meaning of the case, and may be more easily separated from what is foreign to it; and, on the other hand, by being united in a compound of larger import, or augmented by derivative syllables, it has often escaped the changes of signification to which otherwise, and standing apart, it would have been exposed; just as the fragments of ancient art have sometimes owed their preservation to their having been built into some strong wall. Accordingly, the compound and derivative words of which the prepositions form a part, and the examples in which these particles are used adverbially, as it is expressed, that is, without cases of nouns, may be studied with very great advantage, as being likely to furnish the primary signification of the preposition, when it would not be seen, or seen less distinctly, in connection with the cases; or as aiding, at least, by the additional light which they afford, in deciding what is the true primary sense. Thus, in the case of *ἀμφί*, that its primary signification is 'on both sides' may be pretty well determined by its meaning as it occurs in *ἀμφιδέξιος* and other compounds, when it would be rather difficult to ascertain it from its use with the cases of nouns; and in regard to *δί*, *ἐπί*, &c., what is seen to be their primary signification from considering their use with the cases is abundantly confirmed by observing their obvious force in many compounds. It is because of the more common occurrence of the adverbial use of the prepositions in Homer that the 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey' are so valuable a help in searching for the primary meanings of the prepositions.

Besides the means afforded by the records of the Greek language itself for ascertaining the primary signification of its prepositions, another of considerable value is to be found in the prepositions, and other words of the same origin, met with in kindred languages. Thus, the proper meaning of *μετά* is more readily determined by comparing it, not only with the Greek *μέτος*, but with the Latin *medius*, the German *mit*, and the English *mid*, &c. It should be remembered, however, that this auxiliary can be of real service in so far only as the related forms in other

languages exhibit at the same time kindred meanings, so as to add to our knowledge of the signification of the word under investigation. This it may do sometimes by affording additional illustrations of meanings already ascertained, and supplying a wanting link to connect significations that would otherwise appear to be too widely separated to have a common origin; and sometimes by furnishing the primary sense, which could else be hardly so much as divined. The common sense of 'to desire' belonging to the Greek *ὀρέσθαι*, and that of 'king' and 'kingdom' belonging to the Latin *rex* and *regnum*, could hardly be connected together, notwithstanding the acknowledgment of a common origin in the radical *reg*, without the signification of stretching out in a straight line, and hence of a straight line, or being in a straight line, furnished by the English *reach*. The mere fact of words occurring in different languages, that belong maybe to regions widely removed from each other, is both curious, and, for certain purposes in etymology, highly useful to observe; but, in such an investigation as is here under consideration, little is gained unless the comparative etymology yield something more, and unless, by showing that the same radical has like or related additional meanings, it bring the object of inquiry more clearly into view, and reveal it under new aspects. Whether the fault lie in the actual incapacity of comparative etymology to aid efficiently and in large measure in the interpretation of the signification and use of the Greek prepositions, or in the fact that the etymologists have too much contented themselves with searching into the mere correspondence of form, and attended too little to the likeness in signification and use, it must be admitted that this science has made but small contributions comparatively to the better apprehension of the doctrine of the Greek prepositions. This may be taken for granted: that he who aims at gaining a distinct notion of the proper sense of these words, and at finding a right interpretation of their uses, cannot dispense with the strictest scrutiny of the actual phenomena of the Greek language itself, relying upon what kindred languages may furnish only so far as

they contribute concurring facts both of form and of signification.

In arranging the secondary meanings of the prepositions, no less than in determining the primary sense of each, much care is of course demanded in order that each signification may hold its appropriate place. The importance of a just arrangement of the primary and secondary meanings of the prepositions can hardly fail to be seen, if it be considered how almost countless in variety are in some instances the uses of these words, and how indispensable to a right understanding of these is a natural and orderly disposition of the meanings which they bear; and, further, how great a relief to the memory of the student it must be, as well as an indispensable aid to a proper apprehension of the relations which one signification has to another, to afford him the opportunity of seeing the several meanings of a preposition set forth in such order that the mind may pass from one to another naturally and with comparatively little effort. Add to this, that in nothing is the study of language more beneficial as a discipline of the mind than in training the learner to trace the often delicate connections which bind together the different significations of words. It may perhaps be permitted to say that, in this particular of the just arrangement of the meanings of the prepositions, there is much to be desired in even the larger grammars and lexicons. Such, in too large proportion, is the arrangement they give, that not only is that sometimes set down as primary which is really secondary, but, not uncommonly, meanings are made to follow each other that do not naturally stand in this connection, while others are placed widely asunder between which there exists the closest affinity. As a consequence, the student labors in vain to take in a complete and satisfactory view of all the uses of those prepositions that are most multifarious in their applications, of most constant recurrence, and most important to be understood. To remove this defect, in some measure at least, if not completely, much labor has been bestowed in this treatise. Taking the preposition apart from any influence of the case, its meanings

have been set down, as nearly as it could be determined, in their logical sequence. And that this might the better be ascertained, the investigation, in every case, was begun by collecting together as complete a list as could be made, with the means at command, of all the important and characteristic uses of the preposition. Having, by a diligent comparison of these, with the aid of whatever light could be derived from auxiliary sources, determined the primary sense, the other and secondary meanings were set down, as nearly as might be, in the order in which they appeared to be related to the primary sense and to each other. When two meanings seemed to be parallel, they were placed immediately one after the other, but with some suitable recognition of their equal proximity to the primary sense. It may be added that, when once this order was determined, it was of course followed in the after-explanation of the uses of the preposition with cases. If this method shall have failed in securing entire accuracy in the arrangement of the meanings of each preposition, the want of success, it will be agreed, should be attributed to want of skill in applying it, and not to any defect in the method itself.

To overcome the difficulty arising from the complication of the meaning of the preposition with that of the case with which it is brought into connection, it is requisite, after ascertaining the meanings of the preposition apart from the cases, to mark also the significations of the cases, in order that, when the two are brought together, the exact force of each may be measured. Without this, indeed, it is not reasonable to expect that it can be explained what part each contributes to the sense which sometimes results from the two combined, nor how this has arisen. It has been necessary, accordingly, to bestow all possible care to ascertain the true signification of the cases, that it may be separated by the mind from the complex meaning which has arisen from the combination of the notion of the preposition with that of the case, and that so it may be made possible to account for the origin of this complex sense. By adopting this method, and by impartially assigning to

the preposition and to the case each its own value, many uses of the preposition, it is believed, admit of a satisfactory explanation that would otherwise remain enigmas too perplexing to solve. Among the instances more especially requiring this method of proceeding may be mentioned those in which the sense of the case either largely or wholly predominates, leaving to the preposition hardly any other office than that of marking, in a very general way, the direction or relative position which an action or motion originally had with regard to the object introduced by the case, but which has been lost sight of through the prevalence of the meaning of the case. Thus, in the example of *ἀνὰ* and *κατά* used with the accusative case to mark distribution according to a standard of measure, the accusative case became so far predominant that the two prepositions came to be used indifferently, and this though they are properly of opposite significations, and though neither contains the idea of distribution, any more than that of a standard of measure.

It may not be improper to add, that to be able to assign right values to the cases as found in connection with the prepositions, it is necessary to bear in mind continually that, besides their office of qualifying the ideas conveyed by nouns, adjectives, &c., the cases are to be considered as introduced, very commonly at least, to define the sense of the action, motion, or other substantive idea of the verb or verbal upon which the preposition also attends; and this sometimes without, but oftener with, regard to the qualification which it has already received from the preposition. Thus, for example, in the phrase *εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἦλθεν*, 'he came into the city,' *πόλιν* is to be regarded as defining more exactly the notion of 'coming' contained in *ἦλθεν*, 'he came,' or, perhaps more accurately, the sense of 'coming in or within' expressed by *ἦλθεν* as qualified by *εἰς*; for the meaning of this example is, 'he came in or within . . . as regards the city.' Yet it must be equally borne in mind that there are instances in which the case is employed to mark an object affected by the peculiar sense of the preposition itself. This will be seen in some examples of the use of *ἐπὶ* and *οὖν* with the dative. It is in such cases alone

that it may be allowable to say that the case depends upon, or, as it is sometimes expressed, is governed by, the preposition.

Lastly, reference must be made to the method used in this treatise of dealing with a peculiar difficulty, above alluded to as attending the interpretation of some examples of prepositions with cases; examples, namely, in which no satisfactory explanation of the sense in which the preposition is used with the case could be given by the application of all the means hitherto enumerated. As, for instance, repeating an illustration before employed, in the use of *μετά* with the accusative and dative in the sense of 'after.' Here, neither the preposition nor the case supplying the sense of 'after,' and it being afforded by no conceivable combination of the two, some other and adequate source of it must be found, or the interpretation must be abandoned as beyond reach. It seemed probable that, in such cases, some aid towards the solution of the question might be found by carefully examining the history of the circumstances in which these very peculiar meanings of prepositions occur; to see, namely, if the nature of the action contained in the verb, and its relations to the object attending it and introduced by the case, or the relations of the subject of the verb to its object, might not furnish the interpretation of the apparently anomalous sense borne by the preposition. That such an examination might possibly prove useful in regard to obscurer cases also seemed to be rendered probable by the fact that, in some instances belonging to this class, this proceeding was palpably available and almost forced upon the inquirer. Thus, *πρός* signifying 'before,' and having with the accusative the meaning of 'to,' in a qualified sense, comes to signify 'against,' whenever the subject of the verb's affirmation and the object of its action stand in the relation of enmity; and so of *παρά*, *εἰς*, and *ἐπὶ*. And if, in cases like this, the preposition *πρός* obtained an entirely new sense, one in no wise involved in either the preposition or the case, nor in any combination of the two, why might not *μετά* have obtained the sense of 'after' from something to be found in the peculiar circumstances in which this

meaning occurs? Upon trial, the result answered to the reasonable conjecture, and *μετά*, for example, was found to have obtained the meaning of 'after' from the natural and obvious relations which the subject of the proposition in which it stood held to the object pointed to by *μετά*. And thus vanished at once the only remaining, and seemingly insurmountable, obstacle in the way of a consistent theory of the prepositions of the Greek language.

The proper meaning of the cases with which prepositions are used being necessary to be known, according to the preceding views, in order to the satisfactory interpretation of the signification and use of the prepositions, the ensuing chapter will be devoted to a detailed examination of these cases, with a view to determine their exact meanings, both primary and secondary.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE CASES WITH WHICH PREPOSITIONS ARE USED.

I. OF THE GENITIVE CASE.

1. THE simplest case, apparently at least, of the use of the genitive in Greek is that in which, corresponding to the English 'of,' it is employed to qualify the meaning of a preceding noun, and to show in what more definite sense it is to be taken; e.g. *τὰ τοῦ δένδρου φύλλα*, 'the leaves of the tree.' The term *φύλλα*, if left unqualified, may be understood of all possible kinds of leaves; but, so soon as *τοῦ δένδρου* is added, it is restricted to a particular kind, that of the tree. And so in Xen. Anab. I. i. 1, *ἐπώπτεε τελευτήν τοῦ βίου*, 'he was apprehending an end of his life,' the word *τελευτήν* is limited by the addition of *τοῦ βίου* to a specific object, so as to mean not any end indifferently, but definitely an end of his life. The genitive, it is true, does not here express, as in the case of *τοῦ δένδρου*, a particular variety of the object qualified, but the specific thing with reference to which it is to be understood, the different character of the qualification which the genitive introduces depending upon the different nature of the noun which it adds. Again, in the phrase *τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα*, 'the affairs of men,' the expression *τὰ πράγματα*, if left unqualified, may include all possible affairs, as those of the state, of the king, &c.; but, when *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* is added, it is restricted to one of its many possible applications, the affairs, namely, of men. In such cases, then, as the above, the genitive names an object to which the term which it qualifies is to be restricted in its sense, so as to refer to it exclusively, and thus to be distinguished from all other possible varieties and aspects of the same term. And the

nature of the qualification made by the genitive, whether it shall mark a particular variety of the term which it defines, or some other natural restriction, will depend upon the nature of the noun introduced by this case.

It is important to observe, in order that, when the genitive is spoken of as limiting a term in its meaning by restricting it to its relations with a specific object, it may not be confounded with the accusative case, which also is used to set bounds to a preceding action or statement, that the limitation marked by the genitive is not one of measure or extent, but consists merely in noting the object to which the term defined is to be referred for a more exact determination of its meaning. The accusative marks how far an action, motion, or statement goes, what point it reaches, what object it comprehends, or as to which it is affirmed, and so is, in various ways, the measure of its extent; the genitive introduces the specific object among many possible objects to which a preceding term, whether it be the name of an object, or of a quality, state, or any other substantive idea, is to be confined, so as to distinguish it from the same term as related to other objects, and hence to give it a specific character and relation.

Again, it should be observed that the noun in the genitive case added to a term by way of more exact specification of its actual character and relation must needs have some obvious point of affinity with the term defined. Thus, there is a natural relationship between the terms *φύλλα* and *τοῦ δένδρου*, such that the former may properly be referred for its specification to the latter; and so between *τὰ πράγματα* and *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, between *τελεύτην* and *τοῦ βίου*. And, although the same thing may be said in some sense of the relation between the accusative and the action, motion, &c. which it measures, it is by no means true in the same way, nor to the same extent.

It may be added here, as belonging to the interpretation of the particular use of the genitive under consideration, that the distinction between the genitive of the subject and the genitive of the object, or what is sometimes called the subjective and the objective genitive, does not result, pro-

perly speaking, from any thing different in the nature of the genitive itself in the two cases, but from the obvious relations in which, by the circumstances, the genitive and the noun which it qualifies are made to stand to each other. The genitive marks only that the two terms have the relation of the thing qualified and of the object by which it is specifically characterized, and thus shows that they have different relations; but it goes no further, and does not express whether the object which it introduces is the subject of any influence residing in the substantive idea conveyed by the term which it qualifies, or an object from which such influence proceeds. Thus, in the phrase, Eurip. *Androm.* 1060, *γυναικὸς αἰχμαλωτίδος φόβος*, 'the fear of a captive woman,' that is, 'the fear entertained of a captive woman,' the genitive *γυναικὸς αἰχμαλωτίδος* simply qualifies *φόβος* by marking the object to which it is to be referred, and thereby restricted in its acceptation, by which it is to be characterized, excluding every other relation of *φόβος*, and making it to mean 'fear,' not in any other possible sense, but specifically 'the fear that refers to a captive woman.' But whether it shall mean the fear which a captive woman feels, or the fear which a captive woman inspires, is not indicated by the genitive: it is gathered from the obvious relations in which *φόβος* stands in the text, and which show that it is a feeling dwelling in the mind of another, and not in that of *γυναικὸς αἰχμαλωτίδος*; that the captive woman is the object and not the subject of the feeling of fear. So, again, Soph. *Antig.* 1185, in *εὐγμᾶτα Παλλᾶδος*, 'vows made to Pallas,' the genitive *Παλλᾶδος* does no more, by its proper office, than mark the term *εὐγμᾶτα*, 'vows,' as having this specific character or distinctive relation, that they are 'vows having reference to Pallas,' and no other vows. Whether they shall be understood to mean 'vows made to Pallas,' or 'vows made by Pallas,' may be gathered, indeed, from the obvious relations of the objects *εὐγμᾶτα* and *Παλλᾶδος* themselves, or from the connection which *εὐγμᾶτα* has with some other object; but it is not expressed by the genitive. But if this be so, then it cannot be said that the genitive does in itself

contain the idea of the origin or source from which a thing springs, any more than that it expresses in itself the object upon which any action or feeling exerts itself. If the genitive expresses the one notion, it must also be admitted to express the other. According to the examples it expresses neither; and to assign to this case the idea of origin or source is to assume as the proper sense of the genitive that which is suggested wholly by the natural relations of the thing qualified and that by which it is qualified; to say nothing of its making that to be the cause which, by the same reasoning, must also be the effect.

2. *a.* But the genitive is employed in other cases in which the sense above assigned to it is hardly so obvious. Thus, where it is used after the verbs *εἶναι*, 'to be,' and *γίγνεσθαι*, 'to become,' with their subjects, to explain the precise sense in which they are to be taken; e.g. *Od. iv. 611, αἵματος ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ*, 'you are of noble race.' The phrase to be more exactly defined is *ἐξ*, 'you are,' and the qualification is *αἵματος ἀγαθοῦ*, 'of noble race.' The genitive, of itself, merely denotes the object to which the person described by *ἐξ*, 'you are,' is referred, as being thereby characterized, or distinguished from the same person under other aspects. For any thing expressed by the genitive, this person may bear to *αἷματος*, 'blood' or 'race,' any relation that is in the nature of things allowable; but, *αἵματος* being here used figuratively for 'race,' 'stock,' there is suggested by the term the natural and most obvious relation between the person and the qualifying noun, namely, that of descent or family; and the former, by being referred through the genitive sign to this term of 'race' or 'stock,' with its attributive *ἀγαθοῦ*, 'good,' is in fact characterized as being 'of a noble stock,' and so distinguished from the same person viewed in other relations. According to this view, the notion of descent is contained in something apart from the genitive, and is not to be referred to the case. And if so, the genitive has here also the same force essentially as in the simple case mentioned above, namely, that of marking the object to which a term is referred for its specific distinction, whether as to

kind, race, descent, or any other characteristic. And the difference between the character or distinctive description given by the genitive in one case and in another lies not in the case, but in the nature of the idea expressed by the noun which it introduces.

So, again, in *Eurip. Or. 725, εἰκότως κακῆς γυναικὸς ἄνδρα γίγνεσθαι κακόν*, 'it is proper that a bad man should be born of a bad woman,' the genitive *κακῆς γυναικὸς* does not, of itself, express the idea of descent from, but only refers the phrase *ἄνδρα γίγνεσθαι κακόν*, 'a bad man's being born' or 'coming into being,' to a specific object, *κακῆς γυναικὸς*, 'a bad woman,' to show that it is to be taken in this and no other relation; so that 'a bad man's being born' or 'coming into being' shall be understood with specific reference to 'a bad woman,' and confined to this exclusively. But the most obvious relation between the idea of 'a man being born' and 'a woman,' when the former is referred to the latter for its more exact sense, is that of 'a man being born of a woman.' Here, then, as before, the notion of origin or source, which has been attributed to the genitive, is not to be found in the case itself, but in the natural relations existing between the qualifying term and the term which it qualifies; and the genitive has the same sense as in the preceding cases, namely, that of marking the object to which another is referred for its specific character and relation. The same remark applies to the genitive used after *φυτεύεσθαι*, 'to be born,' properly, 'to be planted.'

b. In like manner, the genitive is used with *εἶναι*, 'to be,' to mark the object to which some action, practice, or habit is to be referred as belonging to it, as a thing of its duty, capacity, office, &c., where in English we say 'it belongs to,' 'is the part, property, duty, &c. of a person.' E.g. *Eur. Hec. 844, ἐσθλοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τῇ δίκῃ θ' ὑπηρετεῖν*, 'it is the part of a good man to promote justice,' or 'the promoting justice is the part of a good man.' Here the proposition *τῇ δίκῃ θ' ὑπηρετεῖν* is qualified by *ἐσθλοῦ ἀνδρὸς*, added to show to whom distinctively this practice of promoting justice is to be referred, and with respect to whom, therefore, it is to be understood; the sense being, that 'the practice of pro-

moting justice,' as here introduced, is not to be taken absolutely and without any qualification, but as specifically confined to, or spoken exclusively of, 'a good man.' The idea which is here conveyed, that this practice is the part, property, or duty of a good man, is suggested by the mutually corresponding character of the action or habit qualified and of the object by which it is qualified. As the one is a being capable of moral actions, and the other an action having a moral quality, the latter can hardly be specifically referred to the former, that is, it can hardly be said, for example, that the promotion of justice is a thing affirmed exclusively of a good man, without giving rise to the notion that it forms a part of his character or duty.

c. In yet other instances, the notion suggested by the mutual relation of the action or practice, and of the qualifying noun introduced by the genitive, will be rather that of a faculty or a capacity, belonging to the latter. Thus, Demosth. Ol. iii. 13, 26, τὸ μὲν ἐπιτιμᾶν, ἴσως φῆσαι τις ἀν, ῥᾶδιον καὶ παντὶ εἶναι, 'some one will, perchance, say that to censure is easy, and a faculty or capacity belonging to every one.' Here, again, the genitive παντὶ would, properly speaking, merely show to whom the 'act of censuring' is to be referred, so that it should be understood to be an act affirmed with respect to 'every man.' But from the corresponding character of the term ἐπιτιμᾶν, 'to censure,' and of the object παντὶ, 'every man,' to which it is referred, the former being a variety of the expression of moral judgments or sentiments of approval or disapproval, and the latter a being accounted capable of such judgments, there is suggested, under the circumstances, the idea that the act of censuring is to be regarded as a faculty or a capacity of an object of which it may be suitably affirmed. That this notion is suggested by the mutual correspondence of the noun in the genitive and of the action which it qualifies may be seen by observing that it belongs distinctly to neither, if taken apart. The term ἐπιτιμᾶν expresses no more than the act or habit of censuring, and the genitive no more than that the object which it introduces is that to which this act is referred or belongs; and neither,

therefore, conveys the idea of an act regarded as a faculty or a capacity of an object. And yet this idea is expressed by the two conjoined, and must result from their mutual relations. It may be repeated, therefore, that in such instances of the use of the genitive as those above examined, this case simply serves to mark the object to which a term is referred as being that with respect to which it is to be taken, and which gives a more exact specification of its meaning.

d. In other examples, the notion conveyed by the reference of an action to a particular object by means of the genitive case is that of what is appropriate to, to be expected of it, as suited to its character or office; e.g. Dem. p. 54, init. κακούργου μὲν γὰρ ἔστι χρεῖν ἀποθανεῖν, στρατηγοῦ δὲ μαχόμενον τοῖς πολεμίοις, 'it belongs to, is befitting the character of, a robber, to die under sentence of condemnation, of a military officer (to die) fighting with the enemy.' Here χρεῖν ἀποθανεῖν, 'to die under sentence of condemnation,' is referred to κακούργου, 'a robber,' as the object of which exclusively it is to be understood, and μαχόμενον τοῖς πολεμίοις (ἀποθανεῖν), 'to die fighting with the enemy,' is referred to στρατηγοῦ, as the object of which exclusively it is to be understood; and there arises, from the natural relation of the actions and the objects to which they are respectively referred, the idea of a suitability, of a mutual adaptation, and so of what is reasonably to be expected. In the same sense nearly the genitive is used in Demosth. Ol. i. p. 18, 2, ἔστι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων, πόλεων, . . . ὧν ἡμὲν ποτε κύριοι, φαίνεσθαι προεϊμένους, 'it is to be counted among shameful things, nay, rather, among the things that are most shameful, that we should be seen to surrender cities of which we were once masters.' In this case, the fact of 'surrendering cities of which the Athenians were once masters' is referred by the orator for its more exact character to the term αἰσχρῶν, 'things that are shameful,' and, upon second thought, to τῶν αἰσχίστων, 'the things that are most shameful;' and it is plain from the nature of the things brought together, and from the circumstances in which they are introduced, that the design is to represent

the fact of 'surrendering cities of which the Athenians were once masters' as fit, deserving, to be counted among or classed with 'things that are shameful, and even most shameful.' That is, there is suggested by the natural relation between the action characterized and the noun introduced by the genitive to characterize it, and by the circumstances in which they stand, the idea that the action is fit or deserving to be counted among or classed with the objects named by the genitive.

c. The genitive just mentioned strongly resembles that which is used with the superlative, and other genitives marking the class to which an object is referred; and this resemblance may be noticed as showing how nearly related, in fact, is this use of the genitive to that met with in other instances which appear to be very different. The same thing may be said of the case in which the idea arising from the peculiar character of the noun in the genitive, and from its relation to the action qualified or characterized, is that of a natural effect or result involved in it, or of a necessary concomitant. E.g. Demosth. de Chers. p. 102, 48, *δοκεῖ ταῦτα καὶ δαπάνης μεγάλης καὶ πόνων πολλῶν καὶ πραγματείας εἶναι*, 'these seem to be matters involving both great expense, and much toil and trouble.' For the genitive, in such a case, does really only refer an action to an object that names the category to which it belongs; and the sense of natural result, or of the necessary attendant circumstances, is due to the character of the noun brought in by the genitive, considered as it stands related to the thing qualified.

f. The genitive is used with *εἶναι*, 'to be,' and *γίγνεσθαι*, 'to become,' 'to be,' in cases apparently different from those already noticed, but having essentially the same interpretation; e.g. Thuc. i. 113, *δοιοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν*, 'all that were of the same opinion.' Here the genitive *τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης* qualifies the proposition *δοιοι ἦσαν*, 'all that were,' by marking with reference to what specific object it is to be understood, showing that they are persons to be taken not in any conceivable character, but specifically in that of persons 'of the same opinion.' In this case, also, the genitive is very like that used with the superlative, and elsewhere,

to indicate the class to which an object belongs; and the explanation is the same.

g. In the preceding instances, the genitive with *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι* is used to define a term more exactly by giving its precise relation, and so, through the mutual connection of the object qualified and that qualifying it, to express its character, &c. And it has been noticed that, in some of these, there is a deal of resemblance to the genitive used to mark the class or category to which an object belongs. There are other examples of this case employed with *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*, in which it more distinctly denotes the class to which a term is referred. Thus, Herod. iii. 141, *ἀπέστειλε στρατηγὸν Ὀτάνεα ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ γενόμενον*, 'who was of the seven men.' In this example, the genitive *ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ τὰ* defines *Ὀτάνεα γενόμενον*, 'Otanee who was,' by referring the person thus named to the class or category of 'the seven men.'

In the same way is to be explained the genitive used with *τιθέναι*, *τίθεσθαι*, *ποιεῖσθαι*, 'to consider,' 'to account;' e.g. Plat. Rep. ii. p. 376, E. *μουσικῆς, δ' εἶπον, τίθης λόγους;* 'do you, said they, account arguments to belong to music?' Here the genitive *μουσικῆς* denotes the class or category of things to which *λόγους* belongs or is to be referred.

h. Of the same nature is the genitive occurring in such examples as Il. xiv. 121, *Ἀδρήστοιο δ' ἔγχευ θυγατρῶν*, 'he married one of the daughters of Adrastus;' Herod. i. 67, *ἐς οὗ δὴ Λίχης τῶν ἀγαθοεργῶν καλεσμένων Σπαρτιατέων ἀνεῦρε*, 'one of the Spartans called well-doers found out.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. Gr. § 518, 3.) In the former example, the proposition *ἔγχευ*, 'he married,' is qualified by referring it to *Ἀδρήστοιο θυγατρῶν*, 'the daughters of Adrastus,' that is, to a class of persons corresponding in sense, and with respect to whom it is to be understood. The sense is that he married, and that this statement is to be taken, not absolutely, but with reference to the daughters of Adrastus. The mind readily supplies the rest; namely, that he married one of this class of persons. Although the English language might hardly admit the expression 'he married of the daughters

of Adrastus,' yet it has similar uses; as, 'he took of the flowers.'

i. With the superlative degree, also, the genitive is used in the same way; e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 2, *Περσῶν μὲν πολὺ κάλλιστος ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ*, 'my father is far the handsomest of the Persians.' The genitive here marks the class of objects to which the preceding affirmation, *πολὺ κάλλιστος ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ*, is to be taken as referred, namely, that 'of the Persians.'

k. Here belongs the genitive employed to mark the material of which a thing is made; e.g. Herod. v. 82, *χαλκοῦ ποιεῖνται τὰ ἀγάλματα*, 'they make their statues of brass.' The phrase *ποιεῖνται τὰ ἀγάλματα* is not left to be taken in the absolute sense of 'they make their statues,' but is limited in its application by the genitive *χαλκοῦ* so as to refer to a particular metal, that of 'brass,' and so that the statues made are described as belonging to this metal and not to another; and this is, in fact, to assign them to a particular class or category; for the two things can hardly occur together, namely, the fact of statues being made, and the reference of them to a particular metal, 'brass,' without giving origin to the idea of their being connected as the thing made and the material of which it is made. The proper use of the genitive case in such examples need not be perplexed by the fact that the verb of 'making' precedes, nor by the fact that the prepositions *ἀπό*, 'from,' *ἐκ*, 'out,' and *διὰ*, 'through,' 'with the interval of,' are frequently added to the verb of making; for it is plain that the genitive, in the absence of the preposition, qualifies, strictly speaking, not the act of making, but the thing made; that is, that the material stands related to the object fashioned, and not to the mere act of fashioning; and, further, that if the preposition be added, the sense of the genitive will be nearly the same, only it will now be the qualification of the preposition, or of the compound expression of which it forms part, instead of describing, as it did before, the thing made. The sense, with the preposition, would be, 'they made their statues from, out of, intermediately, . . . said with respect to brass,' the genitive still marking the material to which

the thing made from, out of, &c. is to be referred. Either way, the genitive serves the single purpose of placing the material within view and alongside, as it were, of the thing made, or of this object after it has been qualified by the additional indexes of reference furnished by *ἀπό*, *ἐκ*, *διὰ*, and of showing that to this specifically it is to be referred.

l. Here may be mentioned, also, the genitive of price, or of exchangeable value, occurring with a number of verbs of buying, selling, exchanging, valuing, reckoning, &c., as *ἀνείσθαι*, *ἀλλάττειν*, *τιμᾶν*, *ποιεῖσθαι*, and with some adjectives and nouns, as *ἄξιος*, *ἀντάλλαγμα*, &c. e.g. Herod. v. 6, *ἀνέονται τὰς γυναῖκας χρημάτων μεγάλων*, 'they purchase their wives for large sums of money;' Soph. Od. Col. 905, *εἰ μὲν δι' ὀργῆς ἦκον, ἥς ὅδ' ἄξιος*, 'if I indulged the anger that this man deserves,' or 'of which he is deserving.' This genitive, as in the example from Herodotus, does of itself no more than mark the object with respect to which specifically the buying is to be understood as affirmed; and, accordingly, the sense would be, 'they buy their wives . . . this buying to be taken with exclusive reference to large sums of money;' or, which is the same thing in substance, the genitive adds a qualification of *ἀνέονται τὰς γυναῖκας*, by which it is shown that the buying their wives is to be taken in a specific and not in an absolute sense, as a buying that respects, or belongs to, the case of large sums of money; just as in the phrase *τὰ τοῦ δένδρου φύλλα*, 'the leaves of the tree,' the genitive *τοῦ δένδρου* qualifies the term *τὰ φύλλα*, by showing that it is to be taken in a specific sense and with exclusive reference to this object. But the noun which is added by the genitive to the verb of buying as its qualification corresponds in its nature to that of the verb which it qualifies; the term *χρημάτων*, 'money,' answers to the action of 'buying' in *ἀνείσθαι*; that is, the medium of exchange is connected with the act of purchasing by being made, through the genitive sign, the object to which it is referred for its exact specification. And then the notion of price or exchangeable value arises, not from the genitive alone, this having no more than its usual power of denoting the object to which the act of purchasing is to be exclusively referred;

nor from the term *χρημάτων* considered apart from its genitive form, this expressing, not the price or exchangeable value, but the medium of exchange; but properly, and naturally, from the mutual relations of the things thus brought together; that is to say, of the act of purchasing and the medium of exchange, the former being made, by the means of the genitive form, to refer to the latter. And what is true of this particular example is true of the rest of this class. The notions of buying, selling, exchanging, valuing, are naturally defined by referring them to the names of the usual mediums of exchange or denominations of value, either particular, as gold, money, &c., or general, as much, little, &c.; and these, taken with reference to the actions of buying, selling, and the like, become, from the mutual relation between them, expressions of price. When it is said, *ὁ υἱὸς μείζων ἐστὶ τοῦ πατρὸς*, 'the son is larger than his father,' the term *μείζων* is referred for its qualification to *πατρός*; and when it is said, *πάντων σοφώτατός ἐστι*, 'he is the wisest of all,' that is, 'with respect to all,' the term *σοφώτατος* is qualified by referring it, by means of the genitive, to the class *πάντων*; and so, when it is said, *ἀνεόνται τὰς γυναῖκας χρημάτων μεγάλων*, 'they purchase their wives for large sums of money,' that is, 'with respect to, in view of, much money,' the purchase is qualified by referring it to the specific case of 'much money.' But in the last case the genitive introduces, not simply an individual object, nor a class of objects of the same kind, which in the two former cases was a sufficiently definite qualification, but a denomination of value exactly answering to the antecedent idea of purchasing. And, there being thus introduced a denomination of value to which the idea of purchasing is referred and by which it is defined, there naturally arises the notion of price or equivalent exchange; so that to purchase, sell, &c. with reference to much money, as marked by the genitive, is the same thing as to purchase, sell, &c. for much money, or at the price of much money. In one word, the genitive with verbs of buying, selling, and the like, qualifies them, and marks the price, by referring their action to a denomination of value, the idea of price arising from the

mutual relations in which the act of purchasing, selling, &c. and the sign of value are placed to each other. And, if so, this genitive entirely accords in its meaning and office with the other instances of the same case already examined.

8. But besides these and other like cases, which hardly require separate examination, in which the genitive with nouns, and with the verbs *εἶναι*, *γίγνεσθαι*, &c., marks the specific relation in which a term or action is to be understood as standing, by adding an individual object, or a class or category, or a denomination of value, as that to which it is to be distinctively referred, this case is further used in the definition of a variety of actions, motions, states of mind, &c., by introducing an object with respect to which specifically it is intended that their sense shall be admitted.

a. Thus, with verbs that express motion: e.g. *Il. i. 359, ἀνέδν πολέης δόλος*, 'she went up from the hoary sea;' properly, 'she went up . . . with respect to the hoary sea.' That the genitive signifies merely that the going up is to be understood as qualified in its sense by this special reference to the sea, and does not in itself contain the notion of 'from,' which is to be gathered rather from the circumstances of the case, may be seen plainly enough in the fact that, with a like genitive after a verb of motion, *κατὰ* is used both in the sense of 'down from' and in that of 'down upon,' according to the circumstances. If the genitive signified 'from,' *κατὰ* and the genitive used with a verb of motion should always mean 'down from;' but, as just observed, it signifies also 'down upon;' and this can only be on the supposition that either *κατὰ* or the genitive signifies 'upon,' which no one pretends. Allowing that the genitive has merely the meaning of 'with respect to,' which is essentially that which it has been thus far found to have, then nothing is easier than to see how *κατὰ* with the genitive, used with a verb of motion, may have both the senses above mentioned, and how, in the same way, when the genitive is used with a verb of motion, as in the example given, the notion of 'from' arises from the circumstances in which it stands.

b. In the same way may be explained the genitive used

with such verbs as *ἀρχεῖν*, *ἀρχεσθαι*, 'to begin,' *παύειν*, *παύεσθαι*, 'to cause to cease,' 'to cease,' *εἴργειν*, 'to keep away,' 'to restrain,' &c. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 512, 2, and § 513.) E.g. Od. i. 28, *τοῖσι δὲ μύθων ἤρχε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*, 'began to speak,' properly, 'began,' or 'was at the beginning,' for *ἀρχεῖν*, *ἀρχεσθαι*, mean no more, . . . 'with respect to his words;' Il. ii. 595, *Μοῦσαι . . . θάμνριν . . . παῦσαν δαιδῆς*, 'caused to cease from singing,' that is, 'caused to cease . . . with respect to singing.'

c. And so with many adjectives having the notions of freedom, separation, emptiness, fulness, difference, and the like, as *ἐλεύθερος*, *μόνος*, *κενός*, *πλήρης*, *ἔρημος*, *διάφορος*, *ἀλλότριος*, *ἀλλοῖος*; with nouns of similar meaning, as *ἡσυχία*, 'quiet,' 'repose,' *λύσις*, 'release,' 'exemption;' and with adverbs, such as *ἀνευ*, *ἄτερ*, and *ἄτερθε*, 'without,' *ἀπάνευθε*, 'apart,' (see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 513, 4 and 5,) the genitive is used to mark in what respect the sense is to be taken. E.g. Herod. i. 32, *ἀπαθῆς κακῶν*, 'free from, unaffected by, ills,' that is, 'without suffering . . . with respect to ills;' Id. vii. 237, *πρόσω ἀρετῆς ἀνέχειν*, 'to be far advanced, to have made good progress in virtue,' that is, 'with respect to virtue;' Plat. Apol. p. 38, c., *πρόρῳ ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς*, 'far advanced in life, and nigh to death,' that is, 'with respect to life,' 'with respect to death.' In this, and in the preceding case, it is plain that, when the genitive is to be rendered by 'from,' as after *ἐλεύθερος*, this sense is not due to the case, but is attributable to the nature of the term which it qualifies.

d. Rarely the genitive alone, the preposition *ἀπὸ* or *ἐκ* being commonly added, is employed to mark the period of time, whether before or after, to which an event is referred for its more exact specification; e.g. Herod. vi. 40, *τρίτῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔτει τούτων Σκύθας ἐκφεύγει*, 'the third year . . . with reference to these events,' that is, as the connection shows, 'before these events;' Id. vi. 46, *δευτέρῳ ἔτει τούτων*, 'the second year . . . with respect to these events,' that is, 'after these events.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 514.) Here the genitive simply marks the period to which an event is referred, it may be indifferently before or after: this is to

be determined by the context. And if *ἀπὸ* or *ἐκ* be present, the proper sense of the genitive remains unaltered.

e. Of the same nature, so far as the genitive itself is concerned, are the examples in which this case is employed to mark the time to which an event is referred by introducing various denominations of time, as *νυκτός*, 'by night,' *ἡμέρας*, 'by day,' *δείλης*, 'in the evening,' *δωρῆς*, 'in the autumn,' *θέρους*, 'in the summer,' *χειμῶνος*, 'in the winter,' &c. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gram. § 524.) E.g. Od. vii. 117-18, *οὐδ' ἀπολείπει | κείματος, οὐδὲ θέρεος, ἐπετήσιος*, 'fails not, either winter or summer;' Herod. iv. 48, *Ἰστρος ἴσος αἰεὶ αὐτὸς ἐωυτῷ ῥέει καὶ θέρεος καὶ χειμῶνος*, 'both summer and winter.' And so, likewise, with some more general expressions of time; e.g. Herod. vi. 12, *τοῦ λοιποῦ μὴ πειθώμεθα αὐτοῦ*, 'for the future, let us not obey him.' The noun in the genitive, in such examples, marks a period or denomination of time to which an action is referred for its determination, so that it shall either belong to it generally, and be thus embraced by it, or fall distinctly within it, as the case may be. In the latter case, as when we say *χειμῶνος*, 'in the winter,' *δωρῆς*, 'in the autumn,' the meaning is that the action or event defined belongs to the period or denomination of time, and may properly enough be said to occur 'in' or 'within' the space which it comprises; and yet it would hardly be accurate to say, without qualification, that the noun in the genitive case marks the period within which an event occurs. For this it does only incidentally, and because, the denomination employed in the genitive as a definition comprising a space of greater or less extent, it is very likely that an action referred to it, and thus marked as belonging to it, will fall within its limits. So that it may be said that the proper office of the genitive case, in such examples, is merely to introduce the denomination of time to which an action is referred as belonging to and embraced in it, and that in a secondary sense, and incidentally, it conveys the notion of 'within.' This view will make it practicable to distinguish the genitive case, as here used to denote the period of time to which an event is referred, from *ἐν* with the ablative (locativus) in expressions of time, although this

latter is translated by the same terms; as *ἐν νυκτί*, 'in the night.' In this use of *ἐν* with the ablative, the leading idea is to mark that an action occurs in or within a period of time, that being the proper force of the preposition; while, on the other hand, *ἐν νυκτί* cannot convey the sense which the genitive is properly fitted to express, namely, that an action is referred to a period of time as belonging to it, and not as being necessarily within it, although this latter meaning may incidentally arise. The distinction here intended to be made between the genitive *νυκτός*, for example, and *ἐν νυκτί*, may perhaps be made more obvious by observing, that it is precisely of the same nature with that which is seen to exist between the genitive and *ἐν* with the ablative (locativus) of names of places; as in such phrases as *οἱ τῆς πόλεως οἶκοι*, 'the houses of the city,' and *οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἶκοι*, 'the houses in or within the city.' In the former case, the houses, *οἶκοι*, are defined by *τῆς πόλεως* and referred to it, so that they belong to it, and are really within it; but this is not the sense mainly intended, however certainly it is incidentally conveyed; while, in the latter case, the very object of using *ἐν* with the ablative *πόλει* is to mark this precise relation of 'within.'

Between the genitive as above used, and the ablative (locativus) of time, for example, between *νυκτός*, 'by night,' and *νυκτί*, 'at night,' the distinction may be made by observing, that while the genitive, as has been repeatedly stated, shows the period to which an action is referred, and to which it may be said to belong, the ablative (locativus) introduces the period, whether large or small, as the point of time at which an event occurs, just as the ablative of place (locativus) marks the point in space at which any thing is. Thus, when it is said, *νυκτός ἀπῆλθεν*, 'he went away by night,' or 'in the night,' the going away is referred to the period of night, and may be considered as occurring within its limits, as above explained; but when it is said, *νυκτί ἀπῆλθεν*, 'he went away at night,' the period of night is regarded as a point of time, and the action as occurring at this point. Observing the caution above given, it might not be erroneous to say that the genitive marks the denomi-

nation of time to which an action is referred, as belonging to it and occurring within its limits, the ablative (locativus) the point of time at which an action is placed, the denomination of time, in the latter case, being always regarded as a point.

It can hardly be a matter of difficulty to distinguish between the genitive, as used to mark the time of an event, and the accusative, as employed in expressions of time, the latter usually denoting the extent of time occupied by an action. Thus, *νυκτός ἀπέπλευσεν* would mean 'he sailed away by night,' or 'in the night,' but *τὴν νύκτα ἀπέπλευσεν*, 'he sailed away during the night,' or 'throughout the night.' But see below, under the accusative, § a.

f. Of the same character is the genitive employed in such expressions as *ἀριστερᾶς*, 'on the left hand,' *λαίᾶς*, 'on the left hand,' *δεξιᾶς*, 'on the right hand,' that is, to mark the direction by reference to which the position of an object is determined; e.g. Herod. v. 77, *τὸ δὲ ἀριστερῆς χειρὸς ἔστηκε*, 'this stands on the left hand.' The genitive *ἀριστερῆς χειρὸς* defines the term *ἔστηκε* by marking a known point or direction to which an object is referred in order to fix its position: 'it stands, has its position, . . . with respect to the left hand.' Or, which is the same thing in another aspect, the genitive restricts the position to a specific view or direction; shows that the position is not any one indifferently, but one that belongs to or is referred to 'the left hand.' Such genitives have the same meaning with respect to space that the genitives *νυκτός*, &c. have with the respect to time, and have essentially the same interpretation.

It may be observed, further, that such genitives as *ἀριστερᾶς*, 'on the left hand,' are to be explained in the same way with those used after *κεῖσθαι*, 'to lie,' 'to be situated,' *ἀπέχειν*, 'to be away,' 'to be distant,' &c., (see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 512,) with and without the prepositions *ἀπό*, *ἐκ*, *παρά*, *πρός*. E.g. Herod. vi. 139, *ἣ γὰρ Ἀττικὴ πρὸς νότον κέεται πολλὸν τῆς Ἀθήνων*, 'Attica lies towards the south, at a great distance from Lemnos;' Id. vi. 22, *ἣ δὲ καλὴ αὐτῇ Ἀκτὴ καλεομένη ἔστι μὲν Σικελῶν, πρὸς δὲ Τυρσηνὴν τετραμμένη τῆς Σικέ-*

λίγς, 'and looks towards Tyrsenia from Sicily,' that is, 'with reference to Sicily.'

Here belongs, also, the genitive, used, almost exclusively in poetry, to mark the place to which an action is referred for its more exact definition as to position, and rendered in English by 'in' or 'on'; e.g. Il. xvii. 372, νέφος δ' οὐ φαίνεται πάσης | γαίης, οὐδ' ὀρέων, 'and a cloud appeared not on all the land, nor on the mountains;' Plat. Symp. p. 182, β, τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας, καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται, 'in Ionia, and in many places elsewhere, it is considered disgraceful.' So likewise the genitive which occurs with verbs of motion, especially in epic poetry, to denote the space with reference to which the motion is to be taken; e.g. Il. iv. 244, ἔκαμον πολέος πεδίοιο θέουσαι, 'they were weary with running over the vast plain;' properly, 'with reference to the vast plain,' the running being restricted by the genitive to this specific case in which it has reference to the plain. Il. ii. 801, ἔρχονται πεδίοιο, 'they are coming through the plain,' that is, 'they are coming,' and this coming is to be understood with reference to the plain: whether the direction is one through the plain, or over it, or some other, can be gathered only from the attending circumstances.

g. To the same class with the preceding cases belongs the genitive as it occurs with a number of adverbs: (a) of place, direction, &c., as, εὐθύ, 'straight on,' μέχρι, 'as far as,' 'up to,' ἀντα, ἀντην, 'against,' 'over against,' ποῦ; 'where?' πού, 'somewhere,' πῇ; 'in what way?' πόθεν; 'whence?' οὐ, 'where,' ἥ, 'in what way,' ἴνα, 'where,' οὐδαμοῦ, 'nowhere,' πανταχῇ, 'in every way,' &c.; (b) of time; as, ὀφεί, 'late,' πρωί, 'early,' αὐτίκα, 'presently,' 'immediately,' &c. E.g. Od. i. 170, τίς, πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν, 'who are you, and from what people?' that is, 'whence . . . with respect to men?' Herod. ii. 48, οὐδαμῇ Αἰγύπτου, 'nowhere in Egypt,' that is, 'nowhere . . . with respect to Egypt.' Theocr. ii. 119, ἡνθον γάρ . . . αὐτίκα νυκτός, 'I came as soon as ever it was night,' that is, 'immediately . . . said with respect to night.' Herod. iv. 120, ἐδίωκον τοὺς Πέρσας ἰθὺ τοῦ Ἰστροῦ, 'they pursued the Persians straight to the Ister,' that is, 'right on . . . said with re-

spect to the Ister.' The preposition ἐπί, which is sometimes introduced with ἰθύ or εὐθύ, &c., does not alter the signification of the genitive. And it is plain that this case has the same meaning here as in the preceding instances, confining the sense of the preceding term to the particular view indicated by the noun in the genitive. (For the list of adverbs, and for the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 519, 3.c.)

The same explanation applies to the genitive used after εὖ, καλῶς, μετρίως, ὡς, πῶς; ὅπως, ἥ, ὅπη, οὕτως, ὥδε, ὡσαύτως, with ἔχειν, ἔχειν, κείσθαι, and sometimes with εἶναι, in the sense of 'to be in a good condition,' 'to be well advanced,' &c. E.g. Herod. vi. 116, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον, τάχιστα ἐβοήθειον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, 'the Athenians, on the instant, marched to the succor of the city,' that is, literally, 'just as they were . . . with respect to their feet,' 'just as they stood,' *statim*, said of any thing done without so much delay as a man would require to change his position. Id. vi. 62, χρημάτων εὖ ἔχοντες, 'prosperous in wealth,' that is, 'well advanced . . . with respect to, in the matter of, wealth;' Thuc. i. 36, καλῶς παράπλου κείσθαι, 'to be favorably situated for the passage,' that is, 'with respect to the passage.' (For the list of adverbs, and for the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 537.)

The adverbs themselves that have the genitive form, as the relatives οὐ, ὅπου, 'where,' the interrogative ποῦ; 'where?' the indefinite πού, 'somewhere,' and the compounds οὐδαμοῦ, 'nowhere,' πολλαχοῦ, 'in many places,' &c., belong to this class, marking position by referring the things to be defined to a place denoted in the peculiar manner of the pronouns to which these adverbs severally belong. Thus, ποῦ οἰκοῦσαι; 'where do they dwell?' means, properly, 'with respect to what place do they have their home?'

h. The genitive has the same sense in a very large proportion, to say the least, of the cases in which it is used with prepositions, whether these be considered as immediately connected with verbs or as standing separately from them; namely, it marks with respect to what object specifically the relative position or direction expressed by the

preposition is to be understood; e.g. Thuc. i. 46, *ἔστι δὲ λιμὴν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κεῖται*, 'there is a harbor, and a city lies above it,' that is, 'above . . . with respect to it.' But so many occasions of illustrating this use of the genitive case will occur in the special treatment of the prepositions that it is not necessary to adduce other examples in this place.

i. The genitive has the same meaning when used, both with and without interjections, in exclamations of pain, surprise, &c., to show with respect to what special object the feeling thus indicated is to be understood as experienced. E.g. Eurip. Or. 412, *οἷμοι διωγμῶν*, 'alas! for my persecutions,' that is, 'ah me, alas! . . . said with respect to my persecutions.' When the interjection is present, it is an index merely to the feelings of pain, &c. which the genitive defines. When it is omitted, the use of the genitive is precisely the same, only the mind has to supply from the context what the feeling is of which the genitive brings in the qualification. E.g. Eurip. Med. 1051, *ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κἀκῆς*, 'but, shame on my weakness.' Aristoph. Av. 61, *Ἀπολλὼν ἀποτρόπαιε, τοῦ χασμῆματος*, 'Apollo, averter of evil, what a yawn!' (See, for other examples, Matth. Gr. Gr. § 371.) In such cases, and equally where an adjective precedes, as, *τῶν*, &c., the genitive restricts the feeling expressed by the adjective and interjection, or suggested by the interjection, or inferred from the context, to a definite object; that is, shows in what particular respect it is to be understood that it is uttered.

4. The genitive is employed, furthermore, with a large number of verbs, chiefly intransitive, and middle or passive, in the same sense as in the preceding cases, that of marking the specific object with respect to which exclusively the action or other substantive idea of the verb is affirmed.

a. Thus, with the verb *ἐπὶ ὀνομαζέσθαι*, having the sense of 'being named after or for a person.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 516, i. b.) The proper meaning of *ἐπὶ ὀνομαζέσθαι* is 'to have given to one a name that is a superaddition to (*ἐπὶ*) the name of another,' 'to have a superadded name,' or, 'to be named in addition to or after;' and the genitive adds the object with reference to which the name is an added or

after-name. The same explanation belongs to the genitive used with *ἐπώνυμος*, 'having a name from,' 'called from;' e.g. Eurip. Phœn. 650, *νεκρῶν ἐπώνυμος*. (See Matth. Gr. Gr. § 375, Obs. 3.)

b. With verbs such as *μετέχειν*, *μέτεστί μοι*, 'to share,' 'to have in common,' &c.; e.g. Eurip. Med. 302, *τῆσδε κοινωνῶ τύχης*, 'I share, take part in, this misfortune;' properly, 'I am a partaker . . . with respect to this misfortune;' Id. Or. 439, *μετὰδος φίλοισι σοῖσι τῆς εὐπραξίας*, 'give your friends a part in your prosperity;' that is, 'give your friends a share with you . . . with respect to, in the matter of, your prosperity.' It may be observed with regard to the compounds of *μετά*, that the use of the genitive depends chiefly on the sense of community expressed by the preposition. (See, for the list of verbs, and for examples, Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 519, 1.)

c. With verbs signifying 'to obtain,' as *λαγχάνειν*, 'to obtain by lot,' properly, 'to have an allotment,' *τυγχάνειν*, 'to obtain,' 'to meet with,' properly, 'to have a piece of fortune,' *κληρονομεῖν*, 'to inherit,' 'to be an heir,' *κυρεῖν*, 'to obtain,' properly, 'to be the master,' *προσθήκει μοι*, 'there belongs to me,' properly, 'there has come to, or reached, me,' 'there appertains to me.' E.g. Il. xxiv. 76, *ὥς κεν Ἀχιλλεύς δῶρων ἐκ Ἡριέμοιο λάχῃ*, 'that Achilles may get presents from Priam,' properly, 'that Achilles may have an allotment of gifts,' that is, 'may have an allotment . . . with respect to gifts.' If the proper sense of such verbs be regarded, it is not difficult to see the force of the genitive, how it defines the substantive idea of the verb by naming the object to which it is to be specifically referred in its application. (For the list of verbs, and for examples, see Kühn. § 521, c.)

d. With verbs which signify 'to touch,' &c.; as *θιγγάνειν*, 'to touch,' *φαύειν*, 'to touch lightly,' 'to graze,' *ἄπτεσθαι*, 'to touch,' properly, 'to be fastened to,' *λαμβάνεσθαι*, and, in poetry, *λαμβάνειν*, *λάζυσθαι*, 'to lay hold of,' 'to take to one's self,' *ἔχεσθαι*, 'to cling to,' 'to be next to,' 'to be like.' E.g. Herod. vi. 13, *προφάσιος ἐπιλαβόμενοι*, 'laying hold of a pretext;' Il. iv. 463, *τὸν δὲ πεσόντα ποδῶν ἔλαβεν*, 'he took hold of him by the feet;' Herod. i. 93, *λίμνη δ' ἔχεται τοῦ σήματος μεγάλη*, 'next to the monument is a large lake;' Il. xxiv. 357,

γούνων ἀψάμενοι, 'touching the knees.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 520, b.)

The difficulty of interpreting the genitive, in such examples, lies in rightly apprehending the precise sense of the verbs λαμβάνειν, &c., as here used. Ἐχεσθαι signifies, properly, 'to hold fast,' or 'to hold one's self fast,' and hence 'to cling to,' 'to be next,' 'to be like.' Thus understood, it may properly enough be followed by the genitive case to show with reference to what object a person or thing holds this relation.

Λαμβάνειν signifies 'to lay hold of,' 'to catch,' 'to get,' and λαμβάνεσθαι 'to lay hold of for one's self;' and while, in poetry, the former also is used with the genitive of the part laid hold of, in Attic prose the latter alone has the genitive of the part laid hold of, the active voice being followed by the accusative of what is laid hold of, and hence gotten. The probability is, that, while the accusative represents the object laid hold of, the genitive, whenever introduced, is added rather as the qualification of the object itself laid hold of, than directly of the action of the verb; so that the meaning will always be 'to lay hold of an object,' not in an unqualified sense, but specifically 'with reference to this or that part.' Thus, Xen. Anab. i. 6, 10, ἔλαβον τῆς ζώνης τὸν Ὀρόντην, 'they laid hold of Orontes by the girdle;' that is, 'they laid hold of Orontes,' not absolutely, but 'with respect to his girdle.' (For a different opinion, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 520, Anm. 2.)

Ἀπτεσθαι is properly passive or middle, and signifies 'to be fastened,' 'to be attached to,' or 'to attach one's self to,' 'to touch;' and, taken in this sense, may properly be followed by the genitive to show to what definite object this relative condition is to be referred.

c. With verbs which signify 'to aim for,' as the poetical word ἐπιμαίεσθαι; e.g. Od. xii. 220, σκοπέλου ἐπιμαίεο, 'aim for a rock,' that is, 'aim, make efforts, . . . with reference to a rock;' 'to desire,' as δρέγεσθαι, properly a middle verb, 'to reach forward,' 'to stretch one's self forward,' and hence 'to be eager,' 'to have a desire.' Compare the Latin radical *reg* in *reg-o*, and the English 'reach.' E.g. Il. vi. 466, παῖδός δρέξατο παιδίμος Ἐκτωρ, 'reached, stretched himself forward

. . . with reference to his child.' And, of course, after this verb, in the derivative sense of 'to be eager,' 'to be desirous,' the genitive will have the same sense. (For other examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 522, a.)

To the same class may be referred the genitive with verbs signifying 'to hasten on,' 'to be urgent,' 'to be eager for;' e.g. Il. xix. 142, Ἄργος ἐπεγόμενος, 'eager for battle,' that is, 'with respect to the battle;' ὀρμαῖν, used intransitively, and ὀρμαῖσθαι, 'to rush on,' 'to be eager;' e.g. Il. xxii. 194, ὅσάκις δ' ὀρμήσειε πυλάων, 'whenever he rushed for the gates,' that is, 'urged himself forward . . . with reference to the gates;' ἐφίεσθαι, 'to desire,' properly, 'to let one's self loose,' 'to give one's self up,' 'to send one's self upon a thing,' hence 'to be eager,' and, the genitive following, 'to be eager or desirous . . . with respect to a thing.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 3, αἰσχροῦ ἔργου ἐφίεσθαι, 'to desire a base deed,' properly, 'to let one's self loose,' 'to give one's self the rein . . . with respect to a base deed.' (For other verbs of like sense, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. 522, b.)

f. With the verbs τοξεύειν, 'to shoot the arrow,' ἀκοντίζειν, 'to throw the dart,' στοχάζεσθαι, 'to aim at,' βδύλλειν, 'to throw,' ἵέναι, 'to send,' &c. E.g. Il. xvii. 304, Ἐκτωρ δ' αὖτ' Αἴαντος ἀκόντισε δουρὶ φαεινῷ, 'Hector, again, threw at Aias with his glittering spear.' (See, for other examples, Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 522, c.) These verbs express the act of shooting an arrow, or the being an archer, throwing a dart, &c., absolutely; and the genitive qualifies it by adding the particular object to which it is to be referred. Thus, in the example above given, Hector is represented as throwing his spear, ἀκόντισε, and the genitive Αἴαντος shows that the throwing has exclusively reference to Aias: 'he threw with his spear . . . with reference to Aias,' which is expressed in English by 'he threw his spear at Aias.' So, Il. iv. 100, δίστευσον Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο, 'shoot at noble Menelaus,' that is, 'be an archer, shoot the arrow, . . . with reference to noble Menelaus.'

g. With verbs signifying 'to meet,' as ἀντᾶν, properly, 'to be over against,' and its compounds; and with those meaning 'to approach,' 'come near,' as πελάζειν, πλησιάζειν, ἐγγίζειν, &c. E.g. Il. xvi. 433, ἀντήσω γὰρ ἐγὼ τοῦδ' ἀνέρος, 'for I will

meet this man,' that is, 'I will be over against . . . with respect to this man.' (See, for other examples, Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 522, d.) Taking these verbs in their proper sense, the use of the genitive with them appears to be, as in the preceding cases, to mark the specific object to which the substantive idea of the verb is to be restricted. When the dative case is used with these verbs, as it very commonly is in the Attic writers, it is easy to see that it is introduced altogether consistently with the proper meaning of this case, and that there is nothing herein opposed to the use of the genitive as well, each case having its appropriate sense in connection with these verbs, and neither standing in contradiction to the other.

h. With verbs such as *πλήθειν*, *πληροῦν*, *πιμπλάναι*, *μεστῶν*, 'to fill,' 'to make full,' *γέμειν*, 'to be full,' *σάττειν*, 'to laden,' &c. E.g. Il. ix. 224, *πλησάμενος δ' οἶνοιο δέπας*, 'having filled a cup with wine,' that is, 'having made a cup full . . . said with reference to wine;' Plat. Apol. p. 26, v, *τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία . . . γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων*, 'the books of Anaxagoras are full of these discourses,' that is, 'are full . . . with respect to, said with reference to, these discourses;' the genitive qualifying the notion of fulness contained in the verb, and showing with reference to what specific object it is to be taken. (For other examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 525.)

In the same way the genitive stands after the adjectives *πλέος*, *πλήρης*, 'full,' &c. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 525, 1, bb.)

i. With verbs such as *ἐσθίειν*, 'to eat,' *φαγεῖν*, 'to devour,' *πίνειν*, 'to drink,' the accusative and genitive cases are both employed; the latter to express that of which one eats; e.g. Od. ix. 102, *μήπω τις λωτοῖο φαγῶν νόστοιο λάθοιτο*, 'lest any one should eat of the lotus, and forget the return home.' The genitive is said to denote that of which only a part is eaten, drunk, &c., while the accusative marks the object entirely eaten, &c. And this statement may be accepted as practically true, in part at least; yet without admitting that it furnishes a satisfactory explanation of the ground of difference in the use of the genitive and accusative cases with such verbs as those above named. The accusative marks

the extent of the act of eating or drinking, either without the article, by showing to what object among many it reaches, as, for example, Od. ix. 347, *Κύκλωψ, τῇ, πίε οἶνον, ἐπεὶ φάγες ἀνδρόμεα κρέα*, 'come, Cyclops, drink wine, since you have eaten human flesh;' or with the article, by showing how far the object eaten or drunk is involved, namely, to its entire amount, the accusative of the object, already separated from the other objects of its class by the article, being the measure of the action; e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 8, 9, *οὐκ ἐκπίομαι αὐτὸς τὸν οἶνον*, 'I do not myself drink up the wine.' In the former case, the accusative *οἶνον* does not express the amount of the wine drunk, whether the whole or the part, but that the drinking reaches to or embraces wine, and not other proper objects of drinking, and so distinguishes it from these; just as *ἀνδρόμεα κρέα* after *φάγες* shows that the eating embraces only human flesh, and not other proper objects of eating, and so distinguishes it from these. In the latter case, the accusative *τὸν οἶνον* does mark the extent to which the drinking goes with regard to a particular supply of wine, already separated from other supplies of wine by the article; and as the measure of the drinking is the object drunk, as marked by the accusative, it results that the whole of the wine is embraced in the drinking. The genitive merely refers the eating or drinking to a special object, distinguishing it thereby from all other cases of eating or drinking; so that, when it is said, *μήπω τις λωτοῖο φαγῶν*, the object of introducing the genitive is to give a more exact specification of the eating, referring it to a particular object, the lotus, and causing it to be understood exclusively of this. In such case, the genitive does not directly express that only a part of the lotus is eaten: it does no more than show with respect to what the eating is alleged; and this is equivalent to the English expression 'to eat of a thing;' but this sense of a part of the thing being eaten is inferred from the nature of the reference expressed by the genitive. When a man's eating is qualified by referring it to a particular kind of food, say the lotus, no one would think of it as including all the lotus in the world.

The genitive, as used with these verbs, and the accusa-

tive, in the former of the two ways in which it is employed with them, although capable of being clearly distinguished by regarding attentively the proper sense of each case, are confounded more or less in the English rendering, and really express very nearly the same meaning, only reached in a different way.

Here may be mentioned the verbs *ὀζειν*, 'to smell,' or 'to have an odor,' *πνέειν*, 'to reek,' 'to give forth an odor,' followed by the genitive of that of which a thing smells; e.g. Aristoph. Ran. 341, *ὥς ἡδύ μοι προσέπνευσε χοιρειῶν κρεῶν*, 'how sweetly to me it smelt of swine's flesh!' Id. Acharn. 190, *ὄζουσι πίττης καὶ παρασκευῆς*, 'they smell of pitch and naval stores.' Here, again, observing that the verbs are neuter, the genitive qualifies the substantive idea of the verb, the notion of a scent or odor which it expresses, and refers it for its exact character to a specific object having properties suited to the general sense of the verb, so that this shall be described, not as any odor indifferently, but as a peculiar odor, for example, of pitch, of swine's flesh, &c. (For other examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 527, d.)

k. With the verbs *σπένδειν*, 'to make libations,' *προπίνειν*, 'to drink to one's health,' *ἐπιχεῖσθαι*, 'to cause wine to be poured out,' and, hence, 'to drink to,' followed by the genitive to mark the person to whom, in whose honor, one pours out wine, drinks, &c. E.g. Aristoph. Eq. 106, *σπονδὴν λαβὲ δὴ, καὶ σπείσων ἀγαθοῦ Δαίμονος*, 'make a libation to the good dæmon.' Here the genitive *ἀγαθοῦ Δαίμονος* qualifies the substantive idea of libation contained in *σπείσων*, and shows the object to which it is to be specifically referred, to which it exclusively pertains; so that it shall not be a libation taken absolutely, but one relating to, made with respect to, 'the good dæmon.' It would be expressed in English, though not without ambiguity, by 'a libation of the good dæmon,' and is precisely the same genitive that is used objectively, as the grammars say; as in *εὐγμᾶτα Παλλᾶδος*, 'vows to Pallas,' that is, 'vows that have reference to Pallas,' of which Pallas is the object. It is the same genitive, essentially, that occurs after many adverbs and prepositions; as Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 29, *μὴ πρόσω τοῦ ποταμοῦ*

προβαίνειν, 'not to advance forwards in the river,' that is, 'with respect to the river.' (For other examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 537, a.)

l. With verbs expressing the internal and external perceptions, acts of attention, &c.; as *ἀκοῦειν*, 'to hear,' *ἀκροῦσθαι*, 'to hear,' *κλύειν*, 'to hear,' 'to hearken to,' *ἀποδέχεσθαι*, 'to heed,' properly, 'to receive from a person what he enjoins,' *πυνθάνεσθαι*, 'to learn,' *αἰσθάνεσθαι*, 'to perceive,' *γινώσκειν*, 'to perceive,' commonly used with the accusative, *ὀσφραίνεσθαι*, 'to smell,' *μανθάνειν*, 'to learn,' *συνιέναι*, 'to understand,' 'to be conscious.' These are generally followed by the genitive case to mark the object with reference to which the action of the verb is performed, and which in English is considered as the direct object. E.g. Il. i. 27, *κλυθὶ μεν*, 'hear me;' Soph. Aj. 1161, *αἰσχιστον κλύειν ἀνδρὸς ματαίου φλαῦρ' ἔπη μυθουμένου*, 'it is most shameful to hearken to a man that speaks what is foolish;' Herod. i. 47, *καὶ κωφοῦ συνίημι καὶ οὐ φωνεῦντος ἀκούω*, 'I both understand the deaf and hear the dumb.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 528, e.)

It should be remarked that some of these verbs have the accusative also, some, as those of 'seeing,' *ὁρᾶν*, &c., almost exclusively; and that the accusative and genitive are both capable of being employed to express either persons or things. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 528, Aum. 3.)

In such examples as Od. xii. 389, *ταῦτα δ' ἐγὼν ἤκουσα Καλυψοῦς ὑψόμοιο*, 'I heard this from Calypso,' there is no difficulty in seeing that the accusative *ταῦτα* is used, not simply because it refers to things and not to persons, but either because it is the direct object of *ἤκουσα* used transitively, or, which is more probably true, because it bears to the act of hearing the relation expressed by 'as to,' 'as regards,' and shows in what extent the term *ἤκουσα* is to be taken; 'I heard . . . as regards these things.' And as to the genitive, in this and similar examples, it is introduced to qualify *ταῦτα ἤκουσα* by showing the person to whom the matter stated is to be referred, so as that it shall be a hearing that respects Calypso, and not another; in the same way that in *εὐγμᾶτα Παλλᾶδος*, 'the vows of Pallas,' that is,

'the vows made to Pallas,' *Παλλᾶδος* indicates the object to which *εὔγματα* is to be referred. That the genitive *Καλυφούς* means the person from whom a thing is heard, is no more shown by the genitive alone than it is distinctly expressed by the genitive *Παλλᾶδος* that the goddess is the object to whom vows are made; in both cases alike, the exact connection in which the object introduced by the genitive stands to that which it qualifies is to be gathered from the circumstances, and not from any thing contained in the genitive itself. So in Xen. Cyrop. iii. 1, 1, *ὡς ἤκουσε τοῦ ἀγγέλου τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Κύρου, ἐξεπλήγη*, 'when he heard from the messenger the message from Cyrus, he was alarmed,' the accusative *τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Κύρου* denotes the things heard, that is, properly speaking, the objects with regard to which he was a hearer; and *τοῦ ἀγγέλου* expresses that by which the hearing, as it here stands, is distinguished from any other hearing, namely, marks it as referring to the messenger, and, having regard to the character and office of such a person, as being derived from him. According to this view, the genitive with verbs of this class is used in the same sense that it has hitherto presented, and obtains the peculiarity that makes it seem to differ from the circumstances in which it stands, that is, from the obvious relations existing between the noun introduced by the genitive and the term which it qualifies.

m. The genitive is used also with such verbs as *κρίνειν*, 'to judge,' 'to decide,' *ἐξετάζειν*, 'to investigate,' *εἰπεῖν*, *φράζειν*, *φάναι*, 'to say,' 'to tell,' *δηλοῦν*, 'to make manifest,' and serves to denote the object about, or concerning which, the 'judging,' &c. is performed. E.g. Od. xi. 174, *εἰπέ δέ μοι πατὴρ τέ καὶ υἱός, ὃν κατέλειπον*, 'tell me of, that is, about, concerning, with respect to, my father, and my son, whom I left behind;' Soph. Trach. 1122, *τῆς μητρὸς ἤκω τῆς ἐμῆς φράσω, ἐν οἷς νῦν ἐστίν*, 'I am come to tell you of, that is, with respect to, my mother, in what circumstances she now is.' The entire similarity of the Greek and English construction, in some of the cases embraced in this paragraph, makes it easy to admit that the genitive case, as here employed, conforms to what has hitherto been seen to be

its proper office, namely, to qualify the expression upon which it attends by referring it to a particular object or set of objects, so that it shall be understood as used with respect to it exclusively.

The preposition *περί* is frequently added to verbs of this class; but it does not alter the proper sense of the genitive, which is then transferred as a definition from the substantive idea of the verb to the preposition, or, at least, to the substantive idea of the verb as qualified by the preposition. (For the list of verbs, and for examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 458, f.)

n. In the same way the genitive is used with such verbs as *τίσασθαι*, *τιμωρεῖσθαι*, and, in the tragic writers, *τιμωρεῖν*, 'to requite,' 'to take vengeance,' to mark the object for, on account of which, vengeance is taken. E.g. Od. iii. 206, *τίσασθαι μνηστῆρας ὑπερβασίης ἀλγυνῆς*, 'to punish or requite the suitors for their grievous insolence;' Herod. iii. 145, *τοὺς ἐπικούρους . . . τιμωρήσομαι τῆς ἐνθάδε ἀπίστου*, 'I will requite their helpers for (that is, with respect to) their coming hither.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 536.)

o. In like manner the genitive is used with a number of verbs employed as law terms, such as *αἰτιάσθαι*, 'to bring a charge against,' *διώκειν*, 'to prosecute,' *ἐπεξίέναι*, 'to charge against,' *εἰσαγγεῖν*, *ὑπάγειν*, 'to prosecute,' 'to impeach,' *γροφασθαι*, 'to enter a charge or accusation,' *φεύγειν*, 'to be a defendant,' *δικάζειν*, 'to decide as judge,' rarely with the genitive, *κρίνειν*, 'to judge,' 'decide between,' *αἰρεῖν*, 'to gain a suit,' *ἀλῶναι*, 'to be cast in a suit.' With such verbs the genitive is used to mark the crime of which one is accused, that for which he is condemned, &c. E.g. Herod. vi. 104, (*Μιλτιάδεα*) *οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐδίωξαν τυραννίδος τῆς ἐν Χερσονήσῳ*, 'his enemies prosecuted Miltiades for his tyranny in the Chersonesus;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 7, *δικάζουσι δὲ καὶ ἐγκλήματος . . . ἀχαριστίας*, 'they pronounce judgment also on the charge of ingratitude.' That is, 'his enemies prosecuted Miltiades . . . with respect to, in the matter of, his tyranny;' 'they pronounce judgment . . . with respect to, in the matter of, the charge of ingratitude.' When *περί* or *ἐνεκα* is employed after these verbs, and *ἀντί* after verbs sig-

nifying 'to requite,' they do not alter the sense of the genitive, properly speaking, but its office of definition is transferred, as was remarked above, from the substantive idea of the verb to the preposition, or to the substantive idea of the verb as qualified by the preposition.

Further, the genitive is used with these verbs of accusing &c., to denote the penalty to which a person is condemned; e.g. Plat. Rep. vii. p. 558, Α, ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς, 'men condemned to death or exile;' that is, 'condemned . . . with respect to, with reference to, death or exile,' the genitive confining the condemnation to a specific thing, which is the penalty. The Latin employs the ablative instead, as, *capite, fortunis damnatus*, 'condemned to the loss of life and fortune,' this case showing wherein the condemnation consists. The genitive as here used differs from the same case denoting the subject-matter of the accusation, &c., only in the notion conveyed by the noun which it introduces in either instance, and in the natural relations which this holds to the verb of accusing, &c. To condemn . . . with respect to death, that is, to make a condemnation which is characterized as having reference to death, or which is to be understood as affirmed in this respect exclusively, is the same thing as to condemn to death; just as to accuse . . . with respect to tyranny, that is, to make an accusation which is to be taken as having specific reference to tyranny, is the same thing as to accuse of tyranny.

ρ. The genitive is used with verbs which signify the having dominion, and the exercising various offices; as, κυριεύειν, 'to be master,' κοιρανεῖν, 'to be lord or master,' δεσπόζειν, 'to be master,' τυραννεῖν, τυραννεύειν, 'to be a tyrannus,' στρατηγεῖν, 'to be a commander,' στρατηλατεῖν, 'to be the leader of an army,' ἐπιτροπεύειν, 'to be an overseer or guardian,' ἀνδασσειν, 'to be a king,' αἰσυμνᾶν, 'to be an æsynnus,' θεμιστεύειν, 'to be a ruler,' βασιλεύειν, 'to be a king,' ἄρχειν, ἀρχεύειν, 'to be a ruler,' ἐπιστατεῖν, 'to be a master,' &c., ἡγεμονεύειν, ἡγεῖσθαι, 'to be a guide or leader,' χορηγεῖν, 'to be a choragus,' κρατεῖν, 'to have the mastery over,' properly, 'to be strong;' also with the adjectives

ἐγκρατής, 'having the mastery or control,' and ἀκρατής, 'without the mastery or control.'

With such words the genitive is employed to mark the precise object with respect to which one is master, tyrannus, &c. E.g. Il. i. 38, Τενέδοιο ἔφι ἀνδασσεις, 'who dost with might rule over Tenedos,' that is, 'who art ruler . . . with respect to Tenedos;' Herod. vii. 97, τοῦ δὲ ναυτικοῦ ἐστρατήγεον οἶδε, 'of the naval armament the following were the commanders.' (For the list of verbs, and for the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 538.)

The dative also, consistently with its proper sense, is sometimes employed with these verbs. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 538, Anm. 2, who incorrectly interprets it as the locativus, on the insufficient ground that the prepositions ἐν and μετὰ are sometimes found conjoined with this dative.)

q. Obviously requiring the same interpretation is the genitive used with such verbs as προέχειν, υπερφέρειν, υπερβᾶλlein, ἐπερέχειν, 'to excel;' περὶ γίνεσθαι, περιεῖναι, 'to have the advantage,' 'to prevail,' 'to survive;' πρωτεύειν, ἀριστεύειν, κρατιστεύειν, 'to have the pre-eminence,' properly, 'to be first,' &c.; καλλιστεύειν, 'to surpass in beauty;' and with verbs expressing the opposite states to these, as, ἡττῶσθαι, μειοῦσθαι, νικῶσθαι, ὑστερεῖν, ὑστερίζειν, ὑστερον εἶναι, κρατεῖσθαι, ἐλαττωῦσθαι, μειονεκτεῖν, &c., 'to be inferior,' &c. E.g. Od. xviii. 248, ἐπεὶ περίεσαι γυναικῶν | εἰδός τε μέγεθός τε, 'since you surpass women both in beauty and stature;' Xen. Cyrop. iii. 1, 19, τάχει . . . περιεγένου αὐτοῦ, 'you excelled him in speed,' that is, 'you came off superior in speed . . . with respect to him, in the case of him.' (For the list of verbs, and for other examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 539.)

In such cases as the above, as in so many preceding, the genitive is introduced to give a more exact definition of the substantive idea contained in the verb, by marking the object with respect to which exclusively it is affirmed. When it is said, περίεσαι, 'you are superior,' the expression is absolute; when it is added, γυναικῶν, 'with respect to women,' the sense is qualified by having introduced after it by the genitive case a specific object, or class of objects, with reference to which it is to be taken.

r. In connection with the foregoing instances of the use of the genitive may be mentioned its employment with verbs and adjectives expressing various acts, states, and feelings of the mind, as *μυμήσκειν*, *μυμήσκεσθαι*, *μνημονεύειν*, *μνῆσθαι*, 'to remember,' &c.; *λανθάνεσθαι*, 'to forget;' *ἐπιθυμεῖν*, 'to desire;' *ἐρᾶν*, *ἐρασθαι*, *ἠμεῖρεν*, *ἠμεῖρεσθαι*, 'to long for;' *ποθεῖν*, 'to regret;' *οἰκτεῖρεν*, *ἀλγεῖν*, *δδύρεσθαι*, *ὀλοφύρεσθαι*, 'to pity,' 'to grieve,' 'to be sorry,' 'to bewail;' *χολοῦσθαι*, *χῶεσθαι*, *μηνίειν*, *θυμοῦσθαι*, *κοτεῖν*, *ἀχθεσθαι*, *χαλεπαίνειν*, 'to be angry,' 'to be enraged,' 'to be vexed,' &c.; *φθονεῖν*, *μεγαῖρεν*, 'to envy;' *τάλας*, *σχέτλιος*, *μέλεος*, 'wretched;' also with verbs signifying 'to care for,' 'to disregard,' &c., that is, such as imply an earnest direction of one's thoughts to a thing, and their opposites; as, *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, and *ἐπιμέλεισθαι*, *φροντίζειν*, *κῆδεσθαι*, 'to care for,' &c.; *μέλει μοι*, 'it concerns me,' 'I am concerned,' *μεταμέλει μοι*, 'I repent,' *ἀμέλειν*, 'to neglect,' *ὀλιγωρεῖν*, 'to count of little value,' 'to contemn;' *φυλάττεσθαι*, 'to be on one's guard,' *φρίδεσθαι*, 'to spare,' &c.; also verbs giving expression to various sentiments, as, *θαυμάζειν*, *ἀγασθαι*, 'to admire,' *ἐπαινεῖν*, 'to praise,' *μέμφεσθαι*, 'to blame,' *αἰσχύνεσθαι*, 'to be ashamed,' *ὀνειδίζειν*, 'to reproach,' which, in prose, has the accusative. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. §§ 529, 532, 534, 535.)

With all these verbs and adjectives the genitive is employed to qualify the feelings &c. which they express, by referring them to a specific object with respect to which they are entertained; e.g. Pl. xvi. 357, *οἱ δὲ φόβου|διςσελ-ἀδου μνήσαντο*, *λαθόντο τε θούριδος ἀλγῆς*, 'but they remembered fearful flight, and forgot impetuous bravery,' that is, 'they were mindful . . . with respect to fearful flight, and were forgetful . . . with respect to impetuous bravery;' Thucyd. i. 84, *τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον*, *δ μέμφονται μάιστα ἡμῶν*, *μη αἰσχύνεσθε*, 'which most of all they blame in us,' that is, 'which they blame, or find fault with, . . . with respect to us,' or 'in our case;' Xen. Ages. ii. 7, *τὰδ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαμαι*, 'I admire these following things in him,' that is, 'with respect to him;' Plat. Rep. iv. p. 438, A, *οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ*, 'no one desires drink. but good drink,' that

is, 'no one is desirous . . . with respect to drink, but . . . with respect to good drink.'

It may be observed that the accusative also is used with some of these verbs; but in a different sense from the genitive; namely, to mark how far the feeling goes; as in the example above cited from Thucydides, *τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον*, *μη αἰσχύνεσθε*, 'be not ashamed of our slowness and delay,' that is, 'as regards, as far as is concerned, our slowness and delay;' while the genitive *ἡμῶν* used with *μέμφονται* merely shows the object with respect to which, as distinguished from other objects, the sentiment of blame is expressed, and is equivalent to 'with respect to us,' 'in our case.' And so, in the example from Xenophon, *τὰδ' ἀγαμαι*, 'I admire these following things,' that is, 'I admire . . . as regards these following things,' 'as far as go these following things;' but *αὐτοῦ*, 'with reference to him,' 'in his case.'

s. To this same class may be referred the genitive used with certain adjectives expressing the having capacities or endowments, and their opposites; as, *ἐμπειρος*, 'practised,' 'having experience,' *ἀπειρος*, 'inexperienced,' *ἐπιστήμων*, *ἐπιστάμενος*, 'knowing,' 'having acquaintance with,' *ἀνεπιστήμων*, 'without acquaintance with,' &c.; also the genitive used with the verb *πειρᾶσθαι*, 'to make trial of.' E.g. Herod. ii. 49, *τῆς θυσίης ταύτης οὐκ . . . ἀδωῆς, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρός*, 'not unacquainted with this sacrifice, but familiar with it,' that is, 'with respect to it.' (For the list of adjectives, and for examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 530.)

t. Here may be mentioned also the genitive used with verbs and adjectives expressing difference, as *διαφέρειν*, *διὰφορος*, *ἄλλος*, *ἀλλότριος*, *ἕτερος*, and what is opposed, as, *ἐναντίος*; also *ἐμπάλιν*, 'back,' 'contrariwise.' To such verbs and adjectives the genitive is added to show with respect to what specific object the difference exists; e.g. Thucyd. i. 28, *φίλους ποιεῖσθαι . . . ἑτέρους τῶν νῦν ὄντων*, 'to acquire as friends other parties than those who are now so,' that is, 'other or different parties . . . said with respect to those who are now so;' Plat. Menon. p. 87, c, *πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετὴ, ἢ ἄλλοιόν τῆς ἐπιστήμης*; 'is virtue knowledge, or is it a different thing from, that is, with respect to, know-

ledge?' That *διαφέρειν* admits also other constructions, as *εἰς τι*, and *τι*, (see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 557, Anm. 1.) does not affect the explanation of the genitive case when it occurs with it; and these other constructions may be easily explained.

u. To this place may be referred, as being of the same nature, the genitive case used with the comparative form of the adjective, which may be considered as forming with *εἶναι* an intransitive verb similar to many of the preceding. E.g. Eurip. Med. 965, *χρυσὸς δὲ κρείσσων μυρίων λόγων βροτοῖς*, 'but with men gold is more potent than ten thousand arguments;' that is, 'more potent . . . considered with respect to ten thousand arguments.' It is plain that the genitive is added to *κρείσσων* to qualify the sense in which it is to be taken, by marking an object or group of objects with reference to which specifically it is affirmed, so that it shall mean 'more potent,' not in any conceivable sense, but definitely in this one, *μυρίων λόγων*, 'with respect to ten thousand arguments.' To mark this limitation of the sense of the comparative adjective, the English employs *than*, which, like the Latin *quam*, is an accusative of measure, showing, as in the example above given, the extent up to which the proposition 'gold is more potent' is to be understood as true. That is, it effects the object of confining the preceding statement within definite limits by a different method; just as the Greek language also attains somewhat the same end in another way, by employing *ἤ*, 'than,' which is probably the same particle that is elsewhere translated by 'or.'

The same explanation applies to the genitive case employed with certain adjectives, such as *διπλάσιος*, 'twice-told,' *τριπλάσιος*, 'three times as many,' *δωπλοῦς*, 'twofold,' *τριπλοῦς*, 'threefold,' *περισσός*, 'over and above,' 'more than enough,' *δις τόσος*, 'twice as much,' &c. E.g. Herod. vii. 48, *τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν στράτευμα φαίνεται πολλαπλήσιον εἶσθαι τοῦ ἡμετέρου*, 'it seems that the Greek army will be many times greater than our army,' that is, 'greater . . . considered with respect to our army,' 'in the case of our army.' So the genitive with *ἡμόλιος*; e.g. Xen. Anab. i. 3, 21, *ὑπισχνέται ἡμόλιον πῶσι δώσειν οὐ πρότερον ἔφερον*, 'half as much

again as they received before,' that is, 'half as much again . . . considered with respect to what they received before.' (For the list of adjectives, and for examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 540, b.)

v. In Homer and Hesiod, even the verbs *ἔλθεῖν*, 'to come,' *οἶχνεῖν*, 'to go,' *πωλεῖσθαι*, 'to frequent,' are attended by the genitive case to denote the object to which the act of coming, &c. is to be referred as pertaining to it, and which thus becomes its object; e.g. Il. xiii. 252, *ἦέ τευ ἀγγελίης μετ' ἐμ' ἥλυθες*; 'or have you come for me to bring some message?' that is, 'with a view to, with the purpose of, some message?' The genitive shows that the coming is to be referred to a specific object, that it is a coming that has respect to a message; and that this is the object had in view in the coming is readily inferred from the circumstances. (For the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 537, b.)

w. Of the same nature with the genitive just mentioned is that which occurs in the construction of *τοῦ* and the infinitive to express the object or purpose of the action which it qualifies. E.g. Thuc. i. 4, *Μίνως τὸ ληστικὸν καθήρει ἐκ τῆς θαλασσης τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἰέναι αὐτῷ*, 'to the end that his revenues might the better come in to him;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 4, *τοῦ μὴ διαφεύγειν τὸν λόγων ἐκ τῶν δικτύων σκόπους . . . καθίστης*, 'you station look-outs in order that the hare may not escape through the toils.' In the latter example, the genitive *τοῦ μὴ διαφεύγειν* qualifies the statement *σκόπους καθίστης*, so that the stationing look-outs shall be understood to be made, not absolutely, but with a specific reference, namely, 'with reference to the hare's not escaping through the toils.' And the circumstances of the statement show that this is equivalent to the object had in view. For it should be continually borne in mind, that when once the genitive is added to show in what precise view, or with what exact reference, a term or statement is to be taken, the qualification will include whatever is suggested by the natural relations of the object qualifying and the thing qualified. Thus, when a huntsman spreads nets and drives hares into them, and sets watchers with a reference to the hare's not escaping from the nets, it is obvious,

from the proper office of watchers or look-outs, and from the nature of the action with reference to or with a view to which they are stationed, that this latter is the object or purpose of their being stationed; that is, that they are stationed in order that the hare may not escape. So that it may be said that when the genitive, as above used, serves to denote the object or purpose of an action, it effects this end by introducing merely an object to which specifically the action is to be considered as having reference, and not by virtue of any notion of purpose contained in the genitive itself; and that, consequently, the idea of purpose is left to be suggested by the natural relations existing between the action qualified and the term by which it is qualified; and, lastly, that the genitive performs here no more than its common office.

x. The genitive with the participle, called the genitive absolute, affords another instance of the signification of this case so frequently mentioned, the object of the genitive, in this construction, being to define an action by introducing another action or state to mark the circumstances of time, the occasion, ground, reason, or condition, under which it occurs. E.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 17, *πορευομένων δ' αὐτῶν ἀντιπαρήσαν αἱ τάξεις τῶν ἵππέων*, 'while they were proceeding on their march, the companies of horsemen moved along abreast of them on the other side.' The chief proposition, that which is to be qualified, is *ἀντιπαρήσαν αἱ τάξεις τῶν ἵππέων*, 'the companies of horsemen moved along abreast on the other side,' and the genitive *πορευομένων δ' αὐτῶν* marks the circumstances of time, or, perhaps, the occasion, under or upon which this was done; 'the companies of horsemen moved along abreast on the other side . . . while they were proceeding on their march.' The genitive does not of itself express the notions of time, occasion, ground or reason, and condition, these being due to the attributive sense of the participle; but is confined to the simple office of pointing out the participle and its noun as the object to which the action is referred for its qualification. In the above example, the genitive shows that the statement that 'the companies of horsemen moved

along abreast on the other side' is to be taken with the qualification expressed by the terms *πορευομένων δ' αὐτῶν*, 'as they were proceeding on their march;' just as in the example *αἱ ὄχθαι τοῦ ποταμοῦ*, 'the banks of the river,' the genitive *τοῦ ποταμοῦ* is added to show that the term *αἱ ὄχθαι* is to be restricted to a particular case, so as to mean, not the banks generally, but specifically the banks of the river. Now, what this specification shall be depends upon the nature of the qualifying term. As the participle comprises in its meaning, first, the action or other substantive idea of the verb, and, secondly, an attributive sense, equivalent to 'when,' 'while,' 'in,' 'as,' 'since,' 'because,' 'if,' 'though,' that is, to time, occasion, ground, reason, and condition, the specific case to which a previous statement is restricted, when the participle is introduced by the genitive as its qualification, will be that of time, occasion, ground, reason, or condition of the action expressed by the participle. And, as a result, it may be said that the genitive, in this construction of the genitive absolute, does not differ at all from the genitive as elsewhere used, the seeming difference between this and other cases of the use of the genitive lying wholly in the nature of the participle or qualifying term.

The construction of the genitive with the participle, as above explained, furnishes a very striking proof of the fact, that the variety of meanings which this case seemingly bears is wholly due to the nature of the qualifying term and to its obvious relations to the term qualified, and not to any thing in the genitive itself. For here, fortunately, the very peculiarity which distinguishes this from other qualifications made by the genitive, namely, the indication of the circumstances generally, of the time, occasion, ground, reason, or condition of the action qualified, can be shown to belong to the participle itself, being equally present when the participle is used in other cases besides the genitive, and absent from the genitive when the participle is not used, saving only the instances in which the genitive expresses time by introducing a denomination of time, and those in which like attributive notions are conveyed by other adjective forms, or by a noun used attributively.

5. *General View*.—Thus it has been seen from an examination in detail of the actual uses of the genitive case, no variety having been designedly omitted, that it has one uniform office, namely, that of defining a preceding term or statement by introducing an object or class of objects to which specifically it is to be referred for a more exact qualification of its sense; that the precise character of the specification introduced by the genitive case depends upon the nature of the term used as a qualification, considered relatively to the term which it defines; that, hence, this specification will present many varieties, while the genitive itself has one and the same meaning. Thus, to recite some of the chief of these varieties, due to the nature of the object introduced by the genitive and to its obvious relations to the thing qualified, and not to the genitive itself:

a. The more exact definition made by the genitive may amount to no more than a mere indication of the object with respect to which exclusively an action, a state of mind, a position in space, &c. is to be understood as affirmed; as where the genitive stands after many intransitive and middle verbs, adjectives, prepositions, adverbs, the comparative form of the adjective, &c.

b. The more exact definition introduced by the genitive serves to mark the class or category to which the term qualified is to be referred; as where it attends the superlative degree, where it denotes the nation to which a person or custom belongs, the material of which a thing is made, the price at which it is valued, &c.

c. The more exact definition made by the genitive gives the characterization of an object with respect to birth, capacity, faculty, office, &c.; as where, after the verbs *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*, such genitives as *ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ*, *βασιλείως*, *δεινοῦ ῥήτορος*, are used to show that an action or state is the property, duty, &c. of a certain character, office, and the like.

d. The more exact definition made by the genitive case serves to designate what particular kind or variety is intended of a thing capable of having many kinds or varieties;

as where the genitive is used as the qualification of many nouns; e.g. *τὰ τοῦ δένδρου φύλλα*, 'the leaves of the tree,' *αἱ ὄχθαι τοῦ ποταμοῦ*, 'the banks of the river.'

e. The more exact definition, or specific reference, made by the genitive case serves to denote the time, space, or relative position of an action or object; as where the objects introduced by this case are denominations of time, names of places, or expressions of relative position, such as *ἀριστερῶς*, *δεξιῶς*, *οὐ*, *πρὸς*;

f. The more exact definition made by the genitive marks either the circumstances generally, or the time, occasion, ground, reason, or condition, of the action qualified; as where the genitive case of a noun, with a participle agreeing, or the genitive absolute, as it is called, is employed as the qualifying term.

g. The more exact definition made by the genitive denotes the object had in view in any action; as where *τοῦ* with the infinitive is used after an action to state its purpose.

Lastly, it may be added, that it has been seen that the genitive differs from the accusative, in the cases where they are likely to be confounded, in this, that while the latter limits a term by marking the extent to which it reaches, whether it thereby shows the point up to which an object is affected, or that an action reaches one object and not others of a number, the former does no more than name that object out of many with reference to which the qualified term or statement is to be understood.

II. OF THE DATIVE CASE.

The dative case, being more simple in its meaning, and ordinarily, at least, of obvious interpretation, will require rather briefer notice. It will be necessary, however, for the present purpose, to examine its principal uses in the language, and, by ascertaining its meaning in each, to determine as accurately as may be its proper sense.

It may be observed, beforehand, that it has been considered right to separate the dative proper and its uses from the ablative; that is, from the case which, having the same form with the dative, contains the sense of the instrumentalis

and locativus. This, indeed, is requisite, in order to avoid the confusion and error which almost inevitably result from blending them under one head.

1. The dative is commonly used of a personal object, a few cases comparatively occurring in which it is used of things. It is added to verbs, adjectives, nouns, adverbs, prepositions, interjections, and to whole phrases, and may commonly be rendered in English by 'to' or 'for,' but often requires other forms of expression. Thus, the dative occurs:

a. With verbs signifying 'to give,' 'to take away,' as, *δίδωμι τί τινι*, 'to give something to a person,' *δωρεῖσθαι τι τινί*, 'to present something to a person,' *ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τι τινί*, 'to take away something from a person,' *ἀρπάζειν τί τινι*, 'to rob a person of something.' E.g. *Od. i. 9*, *αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσιν ἀφείλετο νόστιμον ἡμῶν*, 'but he took away from them the day of return;' *Xen. Cyrop. iv. 6, 10*, *ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἔφη, ἐγὼ . . . δίδωμι τέ σοι τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ λαμβάνω τὴν σὴν δεξίαν*, 'upon these conditions, said he, I both give you my right hand and take yours.' (See Kühn. *Ausf. Gr.* § 577.) Here the dative marks the person to whom the giving or taking away a thing is referred as its final object, the person who is directly benefited or injured by it, and to whom the action may be said to accrue. When it is said, *ὁ τοῖσιν ἀφείλετο νόστιμον ἡμῶν*, 'he took away from them the day of return,' the sense obviously is, 'he took away the day of return . . . for them,' that is, the taking away the day of return is represented as having the person marked by the dative *τοῖσιν* for its ultimate aim or final object. And so, in the phrase *δίδωμι σοι τὴν ἐμὴν δεξίαν*, 'I give you my right hand,' the giving the right hand, or a pledge of good faith, is represented by the added dative *σοι* as having the personal object 'you' as that ultimately affected by it, that 'to' or 'for' which it is done, and which is to be considered, therefore, as its final object. The fact that the dative is in one case rendered by 'to,' and in the other apparently by 'from,' is owing to the nature of the action which it qualifies. In both cases alike the dative is the sign of a person standing in precisely the same relations.

b. With verbs signifying 'to contend,' 'to fight,' as, *ἐρίζειν*, *μάχεσθαι*, 'to be at law with,' *δικάζεσθαι*, &c. E.g. *Il. i. 277*, *ἐριζέμεναι βασιλῆϊ*, 'to contend with the king;' *Herod. vii. 104*, *ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε δέκα ἀνδράσι ὑπὸ σχομαι οἷός τε εἶναι μάχεσθαι*, *οὔτε δυοῖσι*, 'I neither undertake to be able to fight with ten men, nor with two.' Here the dative has the same sense as in the case just noticed, it being added to mark the personal object ultimately affected by the act of fighting or contending; that is, constituting its final aim. (For the list of verbs, and for examples, see Kühn. *Ausf. Gr.* § 574.)

c. With verbs signifying 'to meet,' 'to withstand,' &c.; as, *ἀντῶν*, *ἀντιῶν*, *ἀντιάζειν*, *ἀπαντῶν*, *ὑπαντῶν*, *ὑπαντιάζειν*, 'to meet,' *στῆναι* poetically used, *ὑποστῆναι*, *ὑφίστασθαι*, 'to withstand,' *πλησιάζειν*, *πελάζειν*, *ἐμπελάζεσθαι*, *ἐγγίζειν*, 'to approach,' 'to come near;' and with the verbs of the opposite sense, 'to give way,' 'to yield,' &c.; as, *εἵκειν*, *ὑπείκειν*, *χωρεῖν*, *παραχωρεῖν*. E.g. *Herod. vii. 18*, *οὐκ ἔων σε τὰ πάντα τῇ ἡλικίᾳ εἵκειν*, 'did not suffer you to give way in every thing to your youth,' that is, 'to indulge your youthful desires.' In this example, the dative *τῇ ἡλικίᾳ* denotes the object to which the yielding is referred as its final aim, that for the behoof of which it occurs. *Æsch. Agam. 1150*, *ἐμοὶ δὲ μίμνει σχισμὸς ἀμφήκει δορί*, 'me there awaits the being cleft with a two-edged sword,' that is, 'there remains for me, by which I am the object to be affected, the being cleft with a two-edged sword.' The dative here, as in the former case, marks the person to whom the action represented by *μίμνει σχισμὸς ἀμφήκει δορί* is referred as its final object, or in which it is to end. (For the list of verbs, and for examples, see Kühn. *Ausf. Gr.* § 574.)

The dative is used in the same sense with the adjectives and adverbs corresponding to the above-recited verbs, as, *πλησίος*, *ἐναντίος*, *ἐγγύς*, *πέλας*, *ἀγχῶν*, although they have also the genitive case in its proper signification. E.g. *Herod. vi. 77*, *ἴζοντο ἀντίοι τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι*, 'they sat opposite to the Lacedæmonians;' *Dem. Phil. ii. 72*, *βασιλεὺς γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἅπας ἐχθρὸς ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐναντίος*, 'for every king and despot is an enemy to liberty, and opposed to laws.' (See Kühn. *Ausf. Gr.* § 574, bb.)

d. The dative is used in the same way with verbs signifying 'to aid,' 'to defend,' 'to profit,' &c.; as, ἀρῆγειν, ἀμύνειν, ἀλέξειν, ἀλαλεῖν, βοηθεῖν, ἐπικουρεῖν; also with ἀπολογεῖσθαι, λυσitteλεῖν, ἐπαρκεῖν, χρασμεῖν, and with a number of verbs compounded with σύν, as συμφέρεειν, &c. E.g. Eur. Or. 512, ἀμυνῶ δ' ὅσον περ δυνατός εἰμι τῷ νόμῳ, 'I will aid the law as far as I can;' Id. ib. 912, ἡθέλησε τιμωρεῖν πατρί, 'he wished to assist his father;' Plat. Apol. p. 28, c, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλην τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον, 'if you will avenge the death of your comrade Patroclus.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 579.) It should be observed, however, that some verbs of like meaning are followed by the accusative case; as, ὠφελεῖν, 'to profit,' βλάπτειν, 'to injure,' λυμαίνεισθαι, λωβῶσθαι, 'to injure.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 579, Anm. 1.) But the employment of the accusative admits of explanation in accordance with the proper sense of this case, while to the dative as used with other verbs of this class is to be attributed its own appropriate signification: the latter denotes the object 'for' whom, or to affect whom ultimately, the action is performed, the former that 'as regards' whom it is affirmed.

e. The same meaning is attributable to the dative as employed with verbs signifying 'to follow,' 'to obey,' 'to disobey,' &c.; as, ἑπείσθαι, ἀκολουθεῖν, ὀπηθεῖν, and ὁμαρτεῖν, διαδέχεσθαι, πείθεσθαι, ὑπακούειν, ἀπειθεῖν, &c. E.g. Herod. iii. 88, Ἀράβιοι δὲ οὐδ' αὖ κατήκουσαν ἐπὶ δουλοσύνῃ Πέρσῃσι, 'the Arabians never obeyed the Persians so as to be in bondage;' that is, 'were never obedient . . . to or for the Persians.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 575.)

So, likewise, with adjectives and adverbs, and sometimes with nouns, of the like sense; as, ἀκόλουθος, ἐπομένως, διάδοχος, διαδοχή, ἑξῆς, ἐφεξῆς; e.g. Eurip. Androm. 803, κακὸν κακῷ διάδοχον, 'misfortune succeeding upon misfortune;' that is, 'succeeding, being a successor, . . . to or for misfortune,' the dative κακῷ marking the object to which the succession is referred as its final object, as that concerned or interested in it, or which is ultimately affected by it. So Plat. Cratyl. p. 399, d, δοκεῖ τοῦτοις ἑξῆς εἶναι, 'it seems to be suitably arranged for these.' (For the list of words, and for examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 575, dd.)

f. The dative, in the same way, is employed with verbs of 'commanding,' 'advising,' &c.; as, κελεύειν, προστάσσειν, ἐπιτέλλεσθαι, used in poetry, ἐντέλλεσθαι, ἐπιστέλλειν, παραινεῖν, παρεγγυᾶν, &c. E.g. Il. i. 295, ἄλλοισιν δὲ τῶν ἐπιτέλλοο, 'enjoin this upon others,' the dative ἄλλοισιν denoting the objects upon which the injunction is laid, who are affected by it, and who are its ultimate object. (For the list of verbs, and for examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 577, d.)

g. Here may be mentioned the dative which sometimes occurs with the impersonal verbs δεῖ and χρή, 'it behooves,' 'it is requisite,' 'it is necessary,' which more commonly have the accusative; e.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 35, δεῖ ἐπισάξαι τὸν ἵππον Πέρσῃ ἀνδρί, 'it is requisite for a Persian to saddle his horse,' that is, 'to saddle his horse is requisite . . . for a Persian;' Soph. Antig. 736, ἄλλῳ γὰρ ᾗ μοι χρή γε τῆσδε ἀρχεὺν χθόνος; 'is it then necessary for another rather than myself to rule this land?' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 579, 2, and § 551, Anm. 5.) When used with these verbs, the dative follows upon the notions of obligation and necessity contained in δεῖ and χρή, to show upon whom they are laid, in the same way that it follows upon verbs of commanding, &c. in Greek, and upon the verbal in *ndus* in Latin, called the future passive participle.

h. Of the same nature precisely is the dative of the person used with the verbal adjective in τέος, τέα, τέον. E.g. Dem. Ol. p. 14, 17, φημὶ δὴ . . . βοηθητέον εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι ὑμῖν, 'I say, then, that you must come to the aid of our affairs.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 587.) The verbal in τέος containing, as does the Latin verbal in *ndus*, the idea of obligation or necessity, the dative follows it, as above, to denote the object upon which the obligation is laid, and which is its final aim.

i. In the same sense the dative is employed with the verbs signifying 'it is becoming,' 'it suits,' 'it belongs or appertains to;' as, πρέπειν, ἀρμόττειν, προσήκειν; and with the adverbs προπόντως, ἀπρεπῶς, εἰκότως, and the phrase εἰκὸς ἐστι. E.g. Plat. Gorg. p. 479, ε, τοῦτ' προσήκει ἀδελφῷ εἶναι, 'it belongs to this man to be wretched;' Xen. Cyrop. vii. 5, 17, βασιλεῖ ἡγεῖτο πρέπειν, 'he supposed that it was

becoming for the king,' that is, βασιλεῖ expresses the personal object to which the quality of 'being becoming' contained in *πρέπειν* is referred as being concerned in it, as that for which it exists, and which may, accordingly, be regarded as its final object. Here, as in other instances, the sense in which the dative is the ultimate aim of the action or state which it qualifies becomes comparatively obscure, and is difficult to express without seeming exaggeration. There is a wide interval between the dative as used with *μάχεσθαι* and with *πρέπειν*; and yet we cannot but feel that, in both cases alike, the dative introduces the object to which the action of 'fighting' and the quality of 'being becoming,' contained in the verbs *μάχεσθαι* and *πρέπειν*, are referred as being their ultimate aim, or that which is to be affected by them.

k. In the same way the dative is used with verbs which signify 'to agree with,' 'to commend,' 'to find fault with,' 'to blame,' 'to censure,' 'to be angry with,' 'to envy,' &c. Some of these verbs are *ὁμολογεῖν*, *συναινεῖν*, *ἐπαινεῖν*, *μέμψεσθαι*, *ἐπιτιμᾶν*, *ἐγκαλεῖν*, (*τινί τι*), *ὀνειδίζειν*, *βασκαίνειν*. Very commonly these verbs have the accusative of the thing that is the subject of commendation, blame, &c., and the dative of the person upon whom it is bestowed. E.g. Herod. v. 33, *ἐσπέρχετο τῷ Ἀρισταγόρῃ*, 'he was angry with Aristagoras;' Id. iii. 142, *ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ τῷ πέλας ἐπαλήσσω ἀντὸς κατὰ δύναμιν οὐ ποῶσω*, 'what I blame in my neighbor I will not myself do, if I can help it;' Dem. Ol. p. 30, 5, *ἰνώχλει ἡμῶν ὁ Φίλιππος*, 'Philip was causing us disquiet.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 578.) Here, again, the dative marks the personal object to whom the action or state expressed by the verb is referred as being concerned in it, as that to affect whom it is or is done, or, in other words, as its final object.

It may be remarked that *μέμφομαι*, in the sense of 'to blame,' regularly has the accusative after it, while in that of 'to lay to one's charge,' 'to cast in one's teeth,' it has the dative. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 578, Anm. 1, and Passow's Lex. s. v.) It would not be practicable to see beforehand that such a distinction should exist. It could be

ascertained only by observation of the use of the language. But the accusative being used, or the dative being used, it is not difficult to see how either case is employed consistently with its own proper sense.

l. The dative has the same sense when used with verbs signifying 'to please;' as, *ἀνδάνειν*, *ἀρέσκειν*, *ἀρέσκεσθαι*, &c. E.g. Herod. ix. 79, *μὴ ἴδοιμι τοῖσι ταῦτα ἀρέσκειται*, 'may I not please those to whom this is agreeable.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 577.) The dative *τοῖσι*, in this example, denotes the persons to whom the 'giving pleasure,' contained in *ἀρέσκειται*, is referred as the objects affected by it, who are concerned in it, to whom it enures; and these may be considered as its final object or aim.

m. The same meaning must be attributed to the dative when used with verbs expressing 'community' of action, and 'intercourse' whether friendly or hostile, as, *ὁμιλεῖν*, *μίγνυσθαι*, *κοινοῦν*, &c., to name the object with which there is communion, intercourse, &c. E.g. Herod. iii. 131, *ὁ δὲ Δημοκλῆδης . . . Πολυκράτει ὠμίλησε*, 'Democedes was on terms of familiarity with Polycrates;' Id. vi. 21, *πόλεις γὰρ αὗται μάλιστα . . . ἀλλήλοισι ἐξενώθησαν*, 'for these cities most of all had friendly relations with each other.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 573, a.) Here, again, the dative expresses the personal objects to whom the action of the verb is referred as being concerned in it, to whose interest it appertains, who are its final object or aim.

So, likewise, with adjectives, adverbs, and even with nouns of similar signification with the above verbs, the dative is used in the same sense; as with *κοῖνος*, *σύντροφος*, *συμφώνος*, *συγγενῆς*, *μεταιίτιος*, &c.; with *μίγδα*, *σύμμιγα*; with *κοινωνία*, &c. E.g. Herod. vi. 58, *σύμμιγα τῇσι γυναῖξιν κοπιόνται τε τὰ μέτωπα*, 'in common with the women.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 573, aa.)

n. Here may be added the interrogative phrase *τί ἐστι μοί τι*; 'what have I to do with a person?' E.g. Herod. v. 33, *σοὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτοισι τοῖσι πράγμασι τί ἐστι*; 'what have you to do with these matters?' properly, 'what is there to you and to these matters?' 'what have you in common with these matters?' Both datives, *σοί* and *τούτοις*, appear to depend

upon *τι ἐστὶ*; 'what is there?' and to show the object interested or that is concerned in what this phrase expresses.

o. The dative is used with verbs, adjectives, nouns, and adverbs expressing similarity or dissimilarity, equality or inequality, identity or diversity; as, *ἐοικέναι*, *ὁμοιοῦν*, *ὁμοιοῦσθαι*, *ὅμοιος*, *ὁμοίως*, *ἴσος*, *ἴσως*, *ἐξ ἴσου*, *ἐν ἴσῳ*, *παραπλήσιος*, *ὁ αὐτός*, *ὡσαύτως*, *διάφορος*, *διαφονος*, *ἀδελφός*, and words compounded with *ὁμοῦ*, *σύν*, *μετά*, as *ὁμόγλωσσος*, &c. E.g. Soph. Antig. 644, *τὸν φίλον τιμῶσιν ἐξ ἴσου πατρί*, 'they honor their friend equally with a father;' Herod. vi. 69, *ἦλθέ μοι φάσμα εἰδόμενον Ἀρίστωνι*, 'there came to me an apparition like Ariston;' Xen. Cyr. vii. 1, 2, *ὠπλισμένοι δὲ πάντες ἦσαν . . . τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῷ Κύρῳ ὅπλοις*, 'they were all armed with the same arms with Cyrus.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. 576, b.)

In such use the dative marks the object with which the likeness, identity, &c. is represented as existing, and has really the same office as where it denotes more obviously the person to whose benefit an action or state enures, or for whom, as its ultimate aim, it is or is done. The only difference, probably, is to be found in the greater clearness with which we can trace, in the latter case, the connection between the action or state and the object affected by it for good or for evil. When *ἐχθρός* is followed by the dative *τινὶ*, the sense being 'inimical to a person,' it is easy to see that *τινὶ* is used in the dative case as expressing the person injuriously affected by the state of enmity contained in *ἐχθρός*, and as denoting, therefore, its aim or final object. It is more difficult, perhaps, to say that when *ὅμοιος*, 'like,' or *ἴσος*, 'equal,' is followed by *τινὶ*, giving the sense of 'like a person,' 'equal to a person,' *τινὶ* is used in the dative case as marking the person affected by the state of likeness and equality contained in *ὅμοιος* and *ἴσος*, or to whose interest it belongs; for, in fact, such expressions are too strong for the very faint sense in which the object introduced by the dative is affected by the notions of likeness and equality referred to it. And yet the relation which the dative *τινὶ* holds to *ὅμοιος*, *ἴσος*, &c., is hardly to be considered as at all different in nature from that in which it stands to *ἐχθρός*; for if it marks the object to which the state of

enmity expressed by *ἐχθρός* is referred as affecting or concerning it, so does it also mark the object to which the state of likeness and equality expressed by *ὅμοιος* and *ἴσος* is referred as affecting or concerning it, if only to the extent to which an object is affected by standing in the relation of likeness or equality to another. In both cases equally, though in the one more obviously than in the other, the dative denotes the final object of the state of enmity, likeness, and equality expressed by the adjective.

The pronoun *αὐτός*, without the article, conjoined with a noun in the dative, and agreeing with it as an adjective in gender, number, and case, obtains a peculiar sense, being rendered in English by 'together with,' &c. E.g. Il. ix. 541, *πολλὰ δ' ὄγε προθέλυμα χαμαὶ βάλε δένδρεα μακρὰ | αὐτῇσι ριζῇσι καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀνθεσι μήλων*, 'he cast upon the ground tall uprooted trees, together with their roots and the blossoms of the fruit-trees,' or 'roots and all,' 'blossoms of fruit-trees and all;' Eurip. Med. 164, *ὅν ποτ' ἐγὼ νύμφαν τ' εἰς ἰδοίμ' αὐτοῖς μελᾶδροις διακναομένους*, 'whom (Jason), and his bride too, may I some day behold ruined together with their house (family),' or 'house and all;' Herod. iii. 126, *ἀποκτείνας δὲ μὲν ἠφάνισε αὐτῷ ἵππῳ*, 'after killing him, he hid him away out of sight together with his horse,' or 'horse and all.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 568, 2 b.)

In such examples, *αὐτός*, containing the notion of sameness or identity, which it does notwithstanding the absence of the article, is properly followed by the dative case, just as *ὁ αὐτός*, *ὅμοιος*, *ἴσος*, and the like, are. And, accordingly, in the last example above given, *ἵππῳ* is in the dative depending upon *αὐτῷ*, 'the same,' the construction being *ἠφάνισε (μὲν) αὐτὸν (τῷ) ἵππῳ*, 'he hid him . . . the same with his horse,' that is, 'just as he hid his horse.' And then *αὐτόν*, or possibly it might be better to represent it by the neuter *αὐτό*, is attracted into the case of *ἵππῳ*, or into the gender, number, and case of the noun which follows it, if they be different from its own; so that the phrase reads *ἠφάνισε (μὲν) αὐτῷ ἵππῳ*, instead of *αὐτόν (τῷ) ἵππῳ*. That *αὐτός* may have the sense of 'the same,' even without the article prefixed, is to be admitted, not only from

this case of its use, but also from the nominative αὐτός, *ipse*, 'himself,' which is really equivalent to 'the same,' and from its composition. For αὐτός is plainly compounded of αὐ=αφ, a demonstrative radical seen also in αὖ, αὐθις, αὐτε, 'again,' and a second demonstrative τ-ός, in which ος, η, ο, being a mere adjective-ending, the essential part is τ, the same that occurs in the simple demonstrative or article τ-ό, gen. τοῦ, τῆς, τοῦ, &c., in the Latin *t-um*, *t-am*, *t-a-lis*, *t-an-tus*, &c., and in the English *th-e*, *th-a-t*, &c. But the demonstrative, by virtue of its proper power of pointing out a thing, obtains not only the sense of distinguishing an object from the rest of its class, and so, again, of contrasting it with them, as in the case of the article, but also that of repetition, as in αὖ, αὐθις, αὐτε, 'again,' and hence of identity, an object by pointing to it being identified with an object already named, as in αὐτός, 'himself,' that is, a person the same with the subject just named. The Latin *idem*, 'the same,' composed of the demonstrative *i* and a second demonstrative *dem*, essentially the same with *t* in *t-am*, and with *τ* in *τ-ός*, may also be adduced in proof that the notion of identity is conveyed by the demonstrative, and that αὐτός may itself contain this idea. In fact the article commonly added to αὐτός, when it is intended to mean 'the same,' is but the addition of a third demonstrative, the meaning of sameness requiring for its expression a very strong demonstrative, as is shown by this use, and by that of αὐτός, if admitted to have the sense here claimed for it, as well as by that of the Latin *idem*. With regard to the attraction here alleged to have taken place between αὐτός and the noun depending on it, compare the attraction of the Greek relative, of the Latin relative pronoun, of the gerund with its object, and that seen in the phrase *ante diem tertium Kalendas Januarias*. (See Exposition, p. 172.)

p. The dative is used also with a variety of expressions formed of adjectives and nouns with εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι, such as χρήσιμος, 'useful,' ἀγαθός, 'good,' ῥάδιος, 'easy,' χαλεπός, 'difficult,' ἐναντίος, 'opposed,' καλός, 'fair,' 'honorable,' αἰσχρός, 'base,' φίλος, 'friendly.' E.g. Eurip. Or. 782, ὄκνος γὰρ τοῖς φίλοις κακὸν μέγα, 'for cowardice is a great evil

to friends.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 579.) This is called specially in the grammars the *dativus commodi*. The dative, as here used, marks the object affected by the quality expressed by the adjective, that to which it is referred as its final object.

To this place may be referred the case in which the dative, occurring with εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι and a noun, is used to denote the personal object to whom whatever is expressed by εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι and the noun belongs or appertains. In rendering such phrases into English, the verbs εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι are commonly expressed by 'to have,' and the subject of this verb answers to the dative case of the Greek. E.g. Od. ix. 112, τοῖσιν (Κύκλωφιν) δ' οὐτ' ἀγοραὶ βουλευφόροι, οὔτε θέμστες (sc. εἰσίν,) 'they have neither assemblies for deliberation, nor judges;' Id. ib. 366, Οὐτις ἔμορ' ὄνομα, 'my name is Outis,' that is, 'to or for me the name is Outis;' Herod. i. 31, οἱ δέ σφι βόες, 'their oxen,' that is, 'the oxen (that are) to or for them.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 580.) This dative, which the grammars call the *dativus possessivus*, depends upon the noun and εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι, and not upon εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι alone. Thus, in the first example given, the proposition is οὐτ' ἀγοραὶ βουλευφόροι (εἰσίν), 'there are not assemblies for counsel,' and the dative τοῖσιν, 'to them' or 'for them,' is added to show the object to whom the fact stated is referred as being concerned in or affected by it, and which may be regarded as its final aim or object.

2. Among the uses of the dative case above considered, some have already been mentioned in which the object named by this case is only in a remote and more obscure way to be regarded as the end or aim of the action, state, or quality referred to it, or that for the behoof of which it is or is done. Other numerous examples exist in which this more indistinct relation between the dative and the term which it qualifies is to be seen. And it may be remarked, before noticing some of these, that in them all a sufficient ground for the use of the dative is found in the necessity there is felt to exist for some sign by which to indicate the object, mostly personal, that is concerned or

interested in an action or statement, whatever be the extent to which this interest reaches. It is enough, in order to the introduction of this case, that there be a person whose interest or feelings are involved in the action or statement, so that it shall be for him a subject of care or attention. The dative here had in view is capable of being variously rendered, not only by 'to' and 'for,' but by 'among,' 'with,' &c., according to the circumstances in which the person stands with regard to the action or statement in which he is interested. It does not follow, of course, that in such cases the dative has a different nature from that above attributed to it. It is, in fact, only a more refined application of the same sense, in which, from distinctly setting forth the proper end of the action or state which is referred to it, it becomes the sign of the object whom it only peculiarly concerns or interests. It is, therefore, for convenience, and not from any necessity arising from the different office of the case, that the examples of such more delicate use of the dative case are referred to a separate head.

a. To this class of the uses of the dative case may be referred that in which it marks, as frequently in Homer, the persons before whom, or in whose presence, an action is performed in which they are interested as parties concerned. E.g. Il. i. 247, τοῖσι δὲ Νέστωρ ἠδυεπὴς ἀνόρουσε, 'among, before, them arose Nestor of charming speech;' properly, 'for them arose Nestor.' The dative τοῖσι marks the persons to whom as its end the rising up of Nestor to speak is referred; so that although, under the circumstances, we may render this dative by 'among' or 'before,' it really means 'for them.' Il. ii. 433, τοῖς δ' ἄρα μύθων ἤρχε Γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ, 'among,' properly, 'for, them began his speech Geranian Nestor.' Od. xv. 227, ἀφνειὸς Πολίαισι μέγ' ἔξοχα δώματα ναίων, 'dwelling in very great houses among the Pylians;' that is, 'for the Pylians,' the dwelling in vast houses by a powerful and rich chief being referred to the Pylians as a matter in which they are concerned; and this reference being expressed in English, although with an imperfect rendering of the force of the dative, by

'among the Pylians.' Eurip. Hec. 595-7, ἀνδράποικος δ' αἰεὶ | ὁ μὲν πονηρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν καχός, | ὁ δ' ἑσθλὸς ἐσθλός, 'among, in the eyes of men, the bad man is naught but bad, the good man only good;' that is, 'for men,' 'in the view of men.' Id. Phæn. 17, ὦ θήβαιοι εὐίπποκος ἀναξ, 'O king of, or in, Thebes of noble steeds,' the dative θήβαιοι denoting the object for which exists this office of king described by ἀναξ, or which is interested in it. So also in prose; e.g. Herod. vi. 70, Λακεδαιμονίοισι συχνὰ ἔργοισι τε καὶ γνώμῃσι ἀπολαμπρυνθεῖς, 'frequently distinguished among the Lacedæmonians both by his deeds and counsels,' that is, 'for the Lacedæmonians.' Plat. Repub. iii. p. 389, E, οἷα καὶ Ὀμήρῳ Διομήδης λέγει, 'as in Homer also Diomedes says,' that is, 'in the poems of Homer,' Ὀμήρῳ naming the poet to whom Diomedes with his saying is referred as appertaining to him, the sense being wellnigh equivalent to saying 'the Diomedes of Homer.' Id. ib. iv. p. 421, E, ἕτερα . . . τοῖς φύλαξιν εὐρήχαμεν, 'we have found another or different set of things in the watchmen,' properly, 'for the watchmen,' they being the persons concerned in the statement ἕτερα εὐρήχαμεν, 'we have found another set of things.' (For the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 568, 2.)

b. In the same way the dative stands with various actions and motions to mark the object designed to be reached or affected, and which may properly be regarded as their end or aim. E.g. Il. xv. 369, πᾶσι θεοῖσι χεῖρας ἀνίσχοντας, 'lifting up their hands to all the gods;' that is, 'for all the gods,' the dative πᾶσι θεοῖσι being the objects to whom the lifting up the hands is referred as its final aim, or to affect whom it is done. Od. iv. 608, αἷδ' ἄλλ' ἐκκλίεται, 'and which are sloping or inclined towards the sea,' that is, which are sloping 'for the sea,' the dative ἄλλ' marking the sea as that which is aimed at, and is, in some sort, to be affected by the sloping of the ground towards it. Eurip. Or. 1415, νήματα δ' ἔτεο πέδῳ, 'and let fall upon the floor the threads she spun,' properly, 'let fall the threads for the floor,' the dative πέδῳ denoting that which received the threads as they were spun, and which may be considered as the ultimate object, in this connection, of the action expressed by

νύματα θ' ἴερο. It must be admitted that the notion of the end aimed at, as here conveyed by the dative, is very far from being so distinctly marked as in many other cases, and that the reference indicated by this case is so delicate that any terms by which it may be attempted to represent it in English will be almost necessarily exaggerations of it. And yet, to a Greek familiar with the employment of the dative to denote the ultimate object of any action, it would hardly be more obscure, in such instances as the above, than where it occurs with verbs of giving and the like. The following example from Eurip. Or. 88, may be of the same kind; πόσον χρόνον δὲ δεινίους πέπτωχ' ὄδε; 'how long time has this your brother fallen on the couch?' Here δεινίους, if regarded as the dative case, is to be explained in the same way with πέπτωχ above. But it is, seemingly, nearly as probable that it is an ablative of place, or locativus; and then, instead of denoting the object that constitutes, in this connection, the ultimate aim of the action, or which may be conceived as in some sort affected by it, it will be merely the sign of the place at or on which the falling occurs. That the former construction is to be preferred, may be argued from the use of the dative with the compounds of πίπτειν, as, ἐμπίπτειν κινδύνῳ, 'to fall into danger,' where the dative is certainly the case employed, and where it requires the same explanation that would justify the use of δεινίους as a dative in the above example. (For the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 571.)

Here belong also such examples as Thuc. i. 13, Ἀμεινοκλῆς Σαμίους ἦλθεν, 'Ameinocles came to the Samians,' properly, 'for the Samians;' it was for them that he came as ship-builder. (See, for the examples cited, Kühn. l. c.)

For practical purposes it should be remarked, that, in such cases as the above, prose writers commonly prefer to use εἰς, πρὸς, ἐπὶ, with the accusative. (See Kühn. l. c. Ann. 1, who refers to the fact that the Latins also sometimes employ the dative in such connections; as *cælo tollere manus*, 'to raise the hand toward heaven.')

c. In conjunction with the participle also, or involved in it, the dative of the person is used, in the same sense, to

denote the person in whose view or judgment, for whom in his position, a statement is to be admitted under the conditions or limitations expressed by the participle; or else to mark the person affected by the event described. In the latter case, the dative, obviously enough, is used to indicate the ultimate object of the action contained in the proposition upon which it follows; in the former, its office is more obscurely to point out the person in whose interest the statement is made, this interest, however, if so strong a term can be allowed, being limited to the fact that his view, judgment, or acts, expressed by the participle with which the personal object is associated, furnish the conditions under which the statement is admitted. E.g. Herod. i. 14, ἀληθεῖ δὲ λόγῳ χρωμένῳ, οὐ Κορινθίων τοῦ δημοσίου ἐστὶν ὁ θησαυρός, 'but if one speak truly,' that is, 'for a person that speaks truly, the treasury does not belong to the community of the Corinthians.' The statement is, that the treasury does not belong to the people of Corinth in common, and ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ χρωμένῳ is added to show, by virtue of the attributive sense of the participle, under what condition or limitation this is so; namely, 'if a person uses a true statement,' 'when a person speaks truly,' or, 'for a person that speaks truly.' And the dative form is given to the participle conveying this condition or limitation because it is the attributive of the person, whether expressed or to be supplied, to whom the statement qualified by the participle is referred as to the object concerned in it, for whom it is true under the conditions named by χρωμένῳ. So Herod. i. 51, ὁ μὲν . . . ἐκέετο ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ εἰσόντι, 'it lay on the right hand as you entered,' that is, 'for one who entered,' or, 'to one entering, it lay on the right hand;' Id. vi. 27, πασι γράμματα διδασχομένοισι ἐνέπεσε ἡ στέγη, 'on the children in the act of having their letters taught them the roof fell in;' that is, 'the roof fell in . . . for the children,' the dative πασι διδασχομένοισι indicating the object affected by the falling in of the roof; and Id. ix. 10, θυομένῳ δὲ οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ ὁ ἥλιος ἀμυνώθη, 'as he was sacrificing . . . the sun was obscured;' that is, 'for him, as he was sacrificing, the sun was obscured.'

The participles of certain verbs especially are used in this construction of the dative, such as *βουλομένῳ, ἡδομένῳ, δαμένῳ, ἐλπομένῳ, &c.*, and chiefly with *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*; e.g. Soph. Od. Col. 1505, *ποθοῦντι προῦφάνης*, 'you appeared when I was longing for you;' that is, 'for me, when I was longing for you, you appeared.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 581, b, c.)

d. Of the same character is the dative of the person which is employed, mostly with *ὥς*, to show the personal object to whom, as properly concerned in it, an action or statement is referred, where the English uses 'for,' 'in the case of.' E.g. Soph. Od. Col. 20, *μακρὰν γὰρ, ὥς γέροντι, προῦστὰλγος ὁδόν*, 'for you have come a long way, for an old man.' The dative, in this signification, is used also without *ὥς*; e.g. Eur. Med. 580, *ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοτὶς ἄδικος ὦν σοφὸς λέγειν | πέφυκε πλείστην ζημίαν ὀφλισκάνει*, 'for me,' that is, 'in my judgment.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 581, d.) The dative has the same sense in both the above instances; and the only difference is that *ὥς*, involving, as elsewhere, the correlative *τῶς*, which is seen in *οὕτως* and other compounds, supplies the comparison or correlation between the action as stated and the same action as found in the case of the noun marked by the dative; thus, *μακρὰν ὥς γέροντι προῦστὰλγος ὁδόν* means properly, 'you have come a long way, so counting the coming as is the coming in the case of an old man.'

e. To the same class may be referred the dative case occurring with a number of adjectives, as, *ἄξιος, αἷτιος, &c.* E.g. Il. i. 153, *ἐπεὶ οὔτε μοι αἷτιοὶ εἰσι*, 'since they are not to be blamed by me;' that is, 'since, for me, they are not chargeable with wrong.' Of not uncommon occurrence is the phrase *ἄξιός ἐμι τινός τινι*; e.g. Eurip. Hec. 309, *ἡμῖν δ' Ἀχιλλεύς ἄξιος τιμῆς*, 'Achilleus deserves honor at our hands;' that is, 'for us, as the persons interested therein, Achilleus is deserving of honor.' The dative, as here used, serving to mark the object concerned in the statement contained in *ἄξιος, αἷτιός ἐστι*, namely, the person 'for whom' or 'in whose case' it is affirmed as true, may be rightly regarded as its final object. (For other examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 581, e.)

f. Here belongs the dative of the first and second persons, *μοί, σοί*, introduced to mark the person whose feelings or interests are involved in an action, and to whom, accordingly, it is referred as its final object. E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 2, *ὦ μήτερ, ὥς καλὸς μοι ὁ πάππος*, 'O mother, how handsome my grandfather is!' Id. ib. § 15, *ὅταν ἐν Πέρσαις ὦ, οἱμαί σοι ἐκείνους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰ περὶ καὶ ῥηδίως νικήσεν*, 'I suppose that those brave men of yours I will easily beat in skill on foot;' that is, 'that those brave men I will for you easily beat in skill on foot,' the dative *σοί* showing the person to whose interest or gratification belongs the statement *τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰ περὶ καὶ ῥηδίως νικήσεν*; just as, in the former example, *μοί* introduces the boy that finds delight in his grandfather's handsome person. This dative may sometimes be rendered in English by the possessive adjectives 'my,' 'your,' and hence is called, improperly, the possessive dative. Often it hardly admits of being directly expressed in English, and can only be conveyed by some such phrase as 'I pray you.' (For examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 581, f.)

g. The last of the uses of the dative case to be mentioned as belonging to this class, is that in which it frequently attends the third person of the perfect passive especially, and often admits in English the translation of 'by.' E.g. Herod. vi. 123, *ὥς μοι πρότερον δεδήλωται*, 'as has been before set forth by me,' or 'as I have before shown;' Dem. c. Aphob. p. 844, 12, *θεῖ . . . διηγήσασθαι τὰ τοῦτῳ πεπραγμένα περὶ ἡμῶν*, 'I must relate what has been done by him touching us.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 582.) The dative, as here used, is not materially different from this case as above explained; for it marks the personal object to whom, as being concerned or having an interest in it, the action with which it is connected is referred. Thus, *ὥς μοι πρότερον δεδήλωται* properly means, 'as has been before set forth . . . on my part,' *μοί* showing that the act of setting forth expressed by *δεδήλωται* concerns me, or appertains to me.

3. As the result of the preceding investigation of the meaning of the dative case in its various uses, it may be stated that it is employed chiefly, but not wholly, of persons, to mark the ultimate object of any action or state of

things, that for which it is done or is, or to whose account it may be referred; that, in other terms, it denotes the final aim of the action or state with which it is connected; and that this sense of the dative is involved, not only where it names the object for whose benefit or injury a thing exists, but also in those instances of more remote and less obvious reference, where the dative is introduced merely to show the person whose feelings, opinions, character, or acts are involved in any action or statement, and who, to that extent at least, may be considered its final object. Of the former or more obvious sense, examples are found in such phrases as *ἔδωκέ μοι ἀργύριον*, 'he gave me silver,' the dative *μοί* showing that I am the final object of the giving; of the latter, or more obscure sense, in such sentences as *μακρὰν, ὡς γέροντι, προὔσταλῆς ὁδόν*, 'you have come a long way for an old man,' *γέροντι* denoting the object who is interested in the fact stated, *μακρὰν προὔσταλῆς ὁδόν*, 'you have come a long way,' so far as this, at least, that its truth and propriety depend upon his character and condition, namely, his period of life, so that he is made a party to it, and is in some sort affected by it. And, lastly, if these views be correct, that the use of the dative is one and uniform, namely, to mark the ultimate aim or object of an action or state, corresponding herein very nearly to the English 'for,' but capable of being rendered by other terms, such as 'to,' 'in case of,' 'among,' &c.

III. OF THE ABLATIVE CASE.

The same form of the noun, to which in the various uses above considered the name of the dative is given, has other significations different from that which belongs to the dative case, and incapable of being reconciled with it. These it is both more accurate and more convenient to consider separately from the proper sense of the dative; and as they are materially the same with those which in the Latin grammars are comprehended under the name of the ablative case, and as this name is already familiar to students of Greek, it is considered proper to retain it here, admitting, at the same time, that it has nothing in itself to recommend it.

The significations which it is proposed to separate from the dative are those which are expressed in English by 'in,' 'at,' 'on,' 'by,' 'with,' and which correspond generally to the cases bearing in the grammars of some languages, as Polish, Sanskrit, &c., the names of Locativus and Instrumentalis. These names, as being already in use among scholars, may with propriety be assigned respectively to the two classes of meanings comprehended under the name of the ablative.

a. Locativus.

Of the meanings of the ablative case a large proportion has its origin in the power which this case has of denoting position in space; and when used in any sense having this origin, the ablative may be distinguished by the name of Locativus, which is generally received.

1. a. This case is employed, almost exclusively in poetry, if certain names of places be excepted, to mark position in space, answering to the question 'where?' and expressed in English by 'at,' 'in,' 'on.' E.g. Il. ix. 663, *αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεύς εὐδὲ μυχῷ κλισίης εὐπήκτου*, 'but Achilles slept in the recess of his well-fashioned tent;' Il. xvi. 150-1, *τοὺς ἔτεκε Ζεφύρῳ ἀνέμῳ Ἄρπυια Ποδάργῃ, | βουσκομένη λειμῶνι παρὰ ῥόον Ὠκεανοῖο*, 'whom the Harpy Podarge bore to the Zephyr wind as she fed in a meadow by the stream of Ocean;' Ib. 231, *εὐχεται ἔπειτα στάς μέσῳ ἔρκεϊ*, 'after that he prayed, standing in the midst of the enclosure;' Ib. 756-7, . . . *λέονδ' ὦς, . . . | ὧτ' ὄρεος κορυφῇσι περὶ κταμένης ἐλάφοιο | . . . μάχεσθον*, 'like two lions, when, in the heights of a mountain, they fight about a hind that has been slain;' Il. xvii. 473, *τεύχεα δ' Ἐκτωρ αὐτὸς ἔχων ὤμοισιν ἀγάλλεται Αἰακίδαο*, 'having on his shoulders the arms of Æacides;' Soph. Trach. 171, *τὴν παλαιὰν φηγὸν αὐδῆσαι ποτε Δωδῶνι . . . ἔφη*, 'once spoke at Dodona;' Id. Od. Tyr. 817, *ὃ μὴ ξένων ἔξεστι μῆδ' ἀσπίων τινα | δόμοις δέχεσθαι*, 'to receive in his house.'

Here belong a number of names of places used in the ablative in prose as well as in poetry; as, *Ἐλευσίῃ*, 'at Eleusis,' *Ῥαμνοῦντι*, 'at Rhamnus,' *Πυθοῖ* or *Πυθῷ*, 'at Pytho,' *Σφηττοῖ*, 'at Sphettus,' *Ἰσθμοῖ*, 'at the Isthmus,' *Ἀθήνῃσι*, 'at Athens,' *Θήβῃσι*, 'at Thebes,' *Πλαταιαῖσι*, 'at Platææ,' *Ὀλυμπίῃσι*, 'at

Olympia,' *Μαραθῶν*, 'at Marathon'; also some other ablatives, called adverbs; as, *οἶκοι*, 'at home,' *χαμαί*, 'on the ground,' Latin *humī*, *πεζοί*, 'on the ground,' *ἐνταυθοῖ*, 'there,' *ἐκεῖ*, 'there,' *κεῖθε*, 'there.' With regard to the ablatives *ἧ*, 'where,' *πῇ*; 'where?' *τῇδε*, *ταύτῃ*, 'in this place,' it may be questioned whether they originally marked position in space, and whether, in fact, they should not rather be understood in the sense of 'in what way,' &c. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 568, 1, and Anm. 1; also § 571, Anm. 3.)

b. Of the same nature exactly is the use of this case to mark the point of time at which an event occurs, answering to the question 'when?' and rendered in English by 'at,' 'on,' &c. In this sense, the ablative or locativus introduces the various terms which express denominations of time, and considers them, however extended the space comprised, as merely points of time at which an action occurs. E.g. Il. xi. 707, *τρίτῃ ἡματι πάντες* | *ἦλθον*, 'the third day they all came;' Herod. iii. 131, *τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει ὑπερβόλετο τοὺς πρώτους ἰητρούς*, 'the first year he surpassed the first physicians.' And so in the common phrases *τῇδε τῇ νυκτί*, 'this night,' *ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ*, 'this day,' &c. E.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 1, *τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἀφίκοντο ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμόν*, 'the first day they reached the river.' In the same way the more general term *χρόνῳ*, 'at last;' e.g. Demosth. Ol. p. 14, 16, *περιέσται τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πολιορκουμένων*, 'will in time have the better of the besieged.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 569.)

Commonly in prose, and very frequently in poetry, the preposition *ἐν* is added to such ablatives; the sense, however, hardly being the same. *Ἐπὶ* with the dative is also used, the rendering in English being the same with that of the ablative (locativus); as, *ἐπ' ἡματι τῷδε*, 'on this day;' but neither in this case is the sense the same as where the ablative alone is used. (Cf. Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 569, Anm. 1.)

It is so perfectly obvious that the office of the case is the same in the designation of the point in space and of the point of time at which an event occurs, that it has been deemed unnecessary to do more than merely advert to the fact.

2. a. The locativus is employed also to mark the circum-

stances or conditions under which an action is performed, or a state of things exists; as when *στόλῳ*, *στρατῷ*, *πλήθει*, and other such terms, are employed with verbs of going, marching, sailing, &c. E.g. Herod. v. 99, *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ κέατο εἴκοσι νηυσί*, 'the Athenians arrived with twenty ships,' that is, the arrival of the Athenians was under certain circumstances or conditions, namely, 'with twenty ships;' Id. vi. 95, *ἔπλεον ἑξακοσίῃσι τράρησι ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίην*, 'they sailed to Ionia with sixty triremes;' Thuc. i. 102, *Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον πλήθει οὐκ ὀλίγῳ*, 'the Athenians came with a large force;' Id. ii. 21, *ἐσβαλὼν . . . στρατῷ Πελοποννησίων*, 'having made an invasion with an army of Peloponnesians.' (Cf. Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 568, 2, b.)

In a variety of other expressions, also, the ablative or locativus is employed to show under what circumstances an action is performed or an event occurs. E.g. Od. xiv. 253, *ἐπλέομεν βορέῃ ἀνέμῳ ἀκραεὶ καλῷ*, 'we sailed with a strong north wind and favorable;' Il. i. 418, *τῷ σε κακῇ αἴσῃ τέκον ἐν μεγάροισι*, 'therefore with evil destiny did I bear thee in my house;' Thuc. i. 84, *μόνοι . . . εὐπραγίᾳ τε οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν, καὶ συμφορῷς ἥσσον ἐτέρων εἶχομεν*, 'we alone are not insolent in prosperity, and in adversity yield to it less than others.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 570.)

That the ablative or locativus, in these examples, is to be understood as above explained, and not in the sense of the ablative of the instrument, might be inferred from the fact that *ἄμα* and *σύν* with the dative are frequently used in a very similar meaning, and so as to make it probable that the ablative merely introduces attending circumstances; e.g. Herod. vi. 118, *Δῦτις δὲ πορευόμενος ἄμα τῷ στρατῷ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίην . . . εἶδε ὕψιν ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ*. But still more decidedly is the interpretation here given confirmed by the greater appropriateness of the meaning it affords. In fact, to make *στόλῳ*, &c. ablatives of the instrument can hardly, in very many instances of their use with such verbs as those above mentioned, afford a tolerable sense. Thus, in the example from Thucydides i. 102, *Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον πλήθει οὐκ ὀλίγῳ*, 'the Athenians came with a large force,' it is very plain that the ablative *πλήθει οὐκ ὀλίγῳ* cannot be considered as

the means or instrument of the coming of the Athenians; while, on the other hand, it is entirely satisfactory to regard it as showing the attendant circumstances or condition of the action described by *ἤλθον*.

b. Of the same nature essentially is the ablative or locativus employed to denote the way or manner in which an action is performed. E.g. Il. iii. 2, *Τρῶες μὲν κλαγγῇ τ' ἐνοπῇ τ' ἴσαν*, 'the Trojans advanced with a shout and a cry;' Hesiod. Op. et D. 102-4, *νοῦσοι δ' ἀνδρώποισι ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ ἡδ' ἐπὶ νυκτὶ | αὐτόματοι φοιτῶσι κακὰ θνητοῖσι φέρουσαι | σιγῇ, ἐπεὶ φωνὴν ἐξείλετο μητίετα Ζεὺς*, 'day and night, unbidden, bringing evils to mortals, diseases come upon men, in silence, since Jupiter has deprived them of voice;' Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 49, *καταλιπὼν τὸν ἵππον ἐσπευδε πεζῇ*, 'leaving his horse behind, he would hurry forward on foot;' Id. ib. § 22, *ὄρος δ' αὐτὸ περιέχει ὄχυρόν καὶ ὑψηλὸν πάντῃ ἐκ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν*, 'a rough and steep mountain encloses it on every side (properly, 'in every way,) from sea to sea;' Id. ib. i. 4, 8, *οἶδα γὰρ δὴ πῶς οἴχονται*, 'for I know in what way they have gone off.'

In such examples, the ablative marks the circumstances in which an action occurs, and may properly be classed with the preceding use of this case. It may be observed, further, although too obvious to need explanation, that the sense of the ablative or locativus in which it expresses the circumstances or condition, and the way or manner in which an action occurs, is derived immediately from that in which it denotes position in space.

c. To this class of the uses of the locativus may be properly referred several expressions, such as *τῷ ὄντι*, 'in fact,' 'in reality,' *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*, 'in truth,' *τῷ λόγῳ*, 'in pretence,' *τῷ ἔργῳ*, 'in deed,' 'in reality.' See Herod. vi. 38, referred to by Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 586, e, *πληγέντα τὴν κεφαλὴν πελέκει . . . πρὸς ἀνδρὸς αὐτομόλου μὲν τῷ λόγῳ, πολεμίου δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ*, 'in pretence a deserter, but in reality an enemy.' The locativus here marks the circumstances or conditions under which an action is represented as affirmed, and thus serves to give it a distinctive character. In the example given, the person who dealt the blow is said to be a deserter; but

with certain conditions, or in a certain case only, is this affirmed, namely, if it be understood to be 'in word,' and not in deed. Kühner, § 586, e, from whom the example is borrowed, considers *τῷ λόγῳ* and like expressions to be examples of the instrumentalis.

3. To this sense of the ablative (locativus) belong the examples in which it is used to show, with regard to any quality or state affirmed to exist, in what case it is to be admitted. Thus:

a. With the comparative form of the adjective, and with like expressions, the ablative or locativus is used to point out wherein the excess in a quality, as represented by the comparative degree, lies; or, more accurately, the precise case or condition in which it is to be held as being affirmed. E.g. Herod. vi. 89, *ὁστέρισαν ἡμέρῃ μῆν τῆς συγκειμένης*, 'they came too late by one day for the time appointed;' that is, their coming too late, or that they came too late, is to be understood as affirmed in the precise case or condition expressed by *μῆν ἡμέρῃ*. And as, most naturally, the exact setting forth of the conditions of an excess in a quality will be made by some corresponding note of measure, such as 'much,' 'little,' 'how much,' and the like, the frequent use of such ablatives as *πολλῷ*, *ὀλίγῳ*, *ἀριθμῷ*, *δραμῇ*, with the comparative, is just what might be looked for. Again, the peculiar rendering of these terms in English, namely, by the expressions 'by much,' 'by a little,' 'by a number,' 'by how much,' does not stand in opposition to the explanation above given, any more than the fact that the Greeks used the accusative also after the comparative, as, *πολύ*, 'much,' *ὀλίγον*, 'a little.' But, if the interpretation here given of the ablative of difference, as it is called in the Latin grammars, occurring with the comparative degree, be true, it follows that this use of the ablative or locativus case is really the same with that in which it denotes the circumstances or condition wherein an action occurs, and has its origin in the notion of position in space.

b. The ablative or locativus is similarly used in other expressions: e.g. Herod. vi. 136, *ζημιώσαντες κατὰ τὴν ἀδικίην πενήνκοντα ταλάντοισι*, 'having fined him fifty talents,' that is,

'in (the sum of) fifty talents;' where, plainly, πεντήκοντα τάλαντοις is the ablative expressing the condition of the fining, or the case in which it is to be understood as being affirmed, 'in the sum of fifty talents,' or, simply, as may be said in English, using the same mode of representation, 'they fined him in fifty talents.' Thuc. iv. 73, τῷ βελτίστῳ τοῦ ὀπλικοῦ βλαφθεῖναι, 'to be injured in (in the case of) the best part of the heavy armed force.' (For the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 586, d.)

4. Here, possibly, may belong the case which follows χρῆσθαι, 'to use:' e.g. Eur. Med. 347, κείνους δὲ κλαίω συμφορᾷ κεχρησμένους, 'but I weep for them for that they have experienced misfortune;' Herod. iii. 117, οὗτοι ὦν, οἵπερ ἐμπροσθεν ἐώθεσαν χρῆσθαι τῷ ὕδατι, οὐκ ἔχοντες αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, συμφορῇ μεγάλῃ διαχρέωνται, 'those, then, who were before accustomed to use water, not having it to use, experienced a great affliction.' The difficulty in saying with certainty what is the meaning of the case used with χρῆσθαι lies in ascertaining exactly the original sense of the verb itself. Supposing it to be properly a passive or middle verb, and that it means 'to serve one's need,' as may be inferred from its connection with χρή, *necesse est*, and with χρήματα, 'things for use,' *opes*, the case attending it will either be the locativus, showing the particular case or thing in which the serving one's need is alleged, just as in some preceding instances; or else it will be the ablative of the means or instrument with which a person serves his need.

The case which is used with νομίζειν, 'to be accustomed,' is attended by less difficulty: e.g. Herod. ii. 50, νομίζουσι δ' ὦν Αἰγύπτιοι οὐδ' ἦρωσι οὐδέν, 'now the Egyptians are besides not at all accustomed to heroes;' properly, 'the Egyptians have no νόμος or custom at all in the case of heroes,' the ablative or locativus ἦρωσι showing wherein, or in what case precisely, it is asserted that the Egyptians have no νόμος or custom.

5. The ablative or locativus is employed, furthermore, with a number of verbs expressing various emotions, to mark the occasion of these, or, to speak more conformably to the proper meaning of the case, the circumstances in

which the emotions exist, the condition of things in which they occur. Thus, with verbs expressing the feelings of joy, pleasure, and the like, and their opposites, as, χαίρειν, ἡδεσθαι, ἀγάλλεσθαι, λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλγεῖν, &c.; with those denoting wonder and admiration, as, θαυμάζειν, and, more rarely, ἀγασθαι, 'to admire;' with verbs signifying 'to hope,' as, ἐλπίζειν; with those expressing satisfaction and dissatisfaction, as, στέργειν, στέργεσθαι, rarely, ἀγαπᾶν, ἀρκεῖσθαι, ἀγανακτεῖν, δυσχεραίνειν, χαλεπῶς φέρειν, ἀχθεσθαι; and with αἰσχύνεσθαι, 'to be ashamed.' E.g. Herod. vi. 67, ἀλήσας τῷ ἐπειρωτήματι εἶπε, 'grieved at his question, he said;' Thuc. iv. 85, θαυμάζω τῇ ἀποκλείσει μου τῶν πυλῶν, 'I wonder at the shutting of my gates;' Xen. Anab. i. 3, 3, χαλεπῶς φέρειν τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασι, 'that he is pained at the present condition of affairs.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 584, a.)

If these and such examples be examined, it will be found that the ablative or locativus indicates, as above stated, that particular case or condition of things in which the emotion expressed by the verb is experienced. Thus, in the last example cited, it is said of Cyrus that he was pained, and τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασι is added to show in what circumstances he felt pained. Accordingly, and because the ablative does not seem to admit of being suitably interpreted as denoting the means or instrument by which the feeling is procured, which is the only other sense that is at all probable, this use of the ablative has been placed under the locativus, as having its origin in the notion of position in space, from which springs, as was seen before, that of the circumstances or condition in which an action or state occurs.

It may be remarked that ἐπί with the dative is more commonly added to χαλεπῶς φέρειν, and that this rather confirms the interpretation above given; for the notion of condition, contained in the preposition as here used with the dative, is pretty nearly equivalent to that of the circumstances or condition in which an action or state occurs, as conveyed by the ablative or locativus. (Cf. Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 584, Anm. 1.)

6. Here belong the particles $\tau\omega$, 'then,' 'therefore,' and $\tau\omicron\iota$, 'then,' 'accordingly,' 'indeed,' with its various compounds. And as the latter especially is not quite obvious in its interpretation, while separately and in composition it is of very frequent occurrence, it may be pardonable to give to its explanation a larger space than may be strictly consistent with the plan of this work. To avoid, however, embarrassing the reader with the introduction here of a discussion necessarily extended, and that might seem irrelevant, it has been added as an appendix at the end of what is said of the ablative case. Such as may desire to examine the origin of the significations borne by $\tau\omicron\iota$, partly to be found in the locativus case, will, perhaps, readily excuse the introduction here of a discussion which they would rather expect to find in a treatise on the particles of the language; especially if they should be satisfied of the truth of the conclusions reached, and of the correctness of the process by which they are obtained. Others, who may feel less interest in such an inquiry, may readily pass it by as a digression.

b. Instrumentalis.

In the second class of examples in which the ablative is employed in Greek, it may be called the instrumentalis, as marking the instrument, means, or agent by which an action is performed.

1. The ablative or instrumentalis is used to denote the means or instrument by which an action is performed, where it is rendered in English by the prepositions 'by,' 'with.' E.g. Il. 199, $\tau\omicron\nu \sigma\acute{\eta}\pi\tau\rho\omega \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\sigma\kappa\epsilon$, 'drove him away with his sceptre;' Xen. Cyrop. iv. 3, 21, $\delta \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu (\text{ἰπποκένταυρος}) \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \delta\upsilon\omicron\iota\nu \delta\phi\theta\alpha\lambda\mu\omicron\iota\nu \pi\rho\omicron\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron$, $\kappa\alpha\iota \delta\upsilon\omicron\iota\nu \acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\iota\nu \text{-}\acute{\eta}\chi\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\nu$, $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega \delta\acute{\epsilon} \tau\acute{\epsilon}\tau\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\iota \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \delta\phi\theta\alpha\lambda\mu\omicron\iota\varsigma \tau\epsilon\chi\mu\alpha\iota\rho\omicron\upsilon\mu\alpha\iota$, $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\tau\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \acute{\omega}\sigma\iota \pi\rho\omicron\alpha\iota\sigma\text{-}\theta\acute{\eta}\sigma\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, 'I will see with two eyes, and hear with two ears,' &c. So likewise with adjectives, and even with nouns; as, $\pi\omicron\sigma\iota \tau\alpha\chi\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$, 'swift of foot,' properly, 'swift with the feet;' e.g. Plat. Polit. p. 280, ν , $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \beta\acute{\iota}\alpha \pi\rho\acute{\delta}\acute{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, 'violent deeds,' properly, 'deeds done by violence.'

Of the same nature is the ablative or instrumentalis used to mark the means by which a judgment is formed, as with

$\gamma\eta\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu$, 'to decide,' $\sigma\tau\alpha\delta\mu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, 'to judge,' $\epsilon\iota\acute{\kappa}\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$, 'to conjecture,' $\chi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$, 'to judge,' $\tau\epsilon\chi\mu\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, 'to form an opinion,' &c; e.g. Il. v. 182, $\delta\sigma\pi\acute{\iota}\delta\iota \gamma\eta\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu$, 'to decide by battle;' Herod. ii. 2, $\tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega \sigma\tau\alpha\delta\mu\eta\sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota \pi\rho\acute{\eta}\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\iota$, 'judging by such a fact.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 586, c.)

2. In the same way, the ablative or instrumentalis is used to denote the material with which, as a means, any thing is made: e.g. Herod. iii. 57, $\delta\gamma\omicron\rho\acute{\eta} \kappa\alpha\iota \tau\omicron \pi\rho\upsilon\tau\alpha\eta\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu \text{Παρίῳ λίθῳ} \acute{\eta}\sigma\kappa\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha$, 'made with Parian marble.'

APPENDIX TO THE LOCATIVUS.

OF $T\omega$ AND $T\omicron\iota$.

I. $T\omega$.

$T\omega$, 'then,' 'therefore,' is the locativus form of the simple demonstrative $\tau\omicron$, employed to connect a proposition with that which precedes it in such manner that it shall follow upon its admission as a natural consequence, or as a rational effect, only less formal than that expressed by $\upsilon\nu$. E.g. Il. ii. 371, seqq., $\alpha\acute{\iota} \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho . . . | \tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha \mu\omicron\iota \sigma\upsilon\mu\phi\rho\acute{\alpha}\delta\eta\mu\omicron\nu\epsilon\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\nu$ 'Αχαιῶν, | $\tau\omega \kappa\epsilon \tau\acute{\alpha}\chi' \acute{\eta}\mu\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota \pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\iota\varsigma \text{Πριάμοιο} \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\kappa\tau\omicron\varsigma | \chi\epsilon\rho\sigma\iota\nu \upsilon\phi'$ ἡμετέρῃσιν, 'if I had ten such counsellors of the Achæans, then (in that case) the city of king Priam would fall under our hands.' Here $\tau\omega$ admits or assumes the preceding proposition, and introduces the after-proposition as following upon it as a natural consequence. Il. ii. 252-4, $\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon} \tau\iota \pi\omega \sigma\acute{\alpha}\phi\alpha \acute{\iota}\delta\mu\epsilon\nu \delta\pi\omega\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota \tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\alpha$, | $\eta \epsilon\upsilon \eta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa\alpha\chi\acute{\omega}\varsigma \nu\omicron\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu \upsilon\acute{\iota}\epsilon\varsigma$ 'Αχαιῶν. | $T\omega \nu\upsilon\nu$ 'Ατρείδῃ 'Αγαμέμνονι, ποιμένι, λαῶν, | $\eta\sigma\alpha\iota \delta\upsilon\epsilon\iota\text{-}\delta\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega\nu$, $\delta\tau\iota \omicron\iota \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha} \delta\iota\delta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$ | $\eta\rho\omega\epsilon\varsigma \Delta\alpha\nu\alpha\omicron\iota$, 'we do not yet know certainly how this shall be, whether the sons of the Achivi shall return well or ill. You sit then (this being so) and reproach Agamemnon, son of Atreus, because the hero Danai bestow very much upon him.' Odysseus sets forth the circumstances in which Thersites utters reproaches against Agamemnon, and, to show how shamefully he acts, adds that in these circumstances, and because Agamemnon is honored, Thersites sits and reproaches him. $T\omega$ points

to and affirms the condition of things already set forth, and introduces the conduct of Thersites as following upon it. Ib. 250, τῷ οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμι' ἔχων ἀγαρεύουσ, 'therefore (seeing that of all that came to Ilium no one is inferior to you,) do not you harangue with the kings upon your lips.' Id. iv. 410, τῷ μή μοι πατέρας ποδ' ὁμοίῃ ἐνθεο τιμῇ, 'do not then (therefore) ever place our fathers in like honor with me.' In the previous part of his speech the son of Capaneus had asserted the superiority of the heroes of his day over their fathers, and, after alleging facts to sustain his assertion, says in conclusion, τῷ μή μοι κ.τ.λ., 'do not then (seeing this is so) place our fathers in like honor with me.' (Cf. Il. v. 894, vi. 224.)

This signification of 'then,' 'therefore,' with which τῷ occurs in the Attic poets also, and even in prose writers, (see Passow's Lex. s. v. ὅ, ἡ, τό,) is to be explained by reference both to its demonstrative form and to its case. For if the leading significations of the demonstrative be considered, they will be found to contain the notion of recalling, and thus of admitting or affirming a preceding proposition, which is involved in the sense of τῷ. The demonstrative, as seen in the article and elsewhere, conveys (a) the sense of pointing to a thing; (b) that of distinguishing an object, by pointing to it, from others of the same class or category, and so of separating it and giving it emphasis and eminence; as is seen in the use of the article, in the ordinal numerals and the superlative, in the Greek compound ὁδε, and in the Latin *iste* and *quidam*; (c) that of repeating an object and affirming its identity, an object already named or had in view being called up again by being pointed to instead of being named a second time; as seen in ὁ αὐτός, 'the same,' in the Latin *idem*, 'the same,' in αὖ, αὐθις, αὖτις, 'again,' in the Latin *autem*, 'again,' 'moreover,' and in αὐτός, 'himself;' and (d) that of admitting or affirming a thing; for, by being pointed to, a matter already named is recalled, repeated, and thus virtually admitted or affirmed; thus ταῦτα, in answer to a question, signifies 'that,' 'just so,' 'yes.' E.g. in Aristoph. Pax. 274-5, a person asks, οὐκ οὖν ἔτερόν γέ τι' ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος μέτει | ἀνύσας

τι; 'will you not quickly go for a second person from Lacedæmon?' and the answer is, ταῦτ' ὦ δέσποδ', 'yes, sir.' This same thing is effected in Latin by repeating the term that forms the subject of the question; e.g. *fecistine? feci*, 'did you do it? yes.' Thus it would seem that τῷ, by virtue of its demonstrative sense alone, is capable of pointing to, recalling, and thus admitting or affirming, a preceding proposition.

Further, assuming τῷ to be a locativus case, it would express, by its secondary meaning, the circumstances, condition, or case in which an action or state occurs. So that this particle, considered as a demonstrative, and as having the case of the locativus, would be equivalent to 'in that case,' 'admitting that,' 'that being so;' and, being employed to introduce a second proposition as following upon that admitted or affirmed by it, it would be represented in English by 'therefore' or by 'then,' according as this added proposition is more or less distinctly marked as a rational consequence.

II. Τοί.

The enclitic conjunction τοί, 'then,' 'accordingly then,' 'indeed,' is, in form, either a dative or locativus of the demonstrative τό, but from its meaning is to be referred to the locativus. It is, in fact, the same with τῷ, 'then,' 'therefore,' τοί being only the more ancient mode of writing the dative, locativus, and instrumentalis τῷ, just as οἶκος, 'at home,' is the old form of the locativus of οἶκος, and οἶ, 'whither,' ποί; 'whither?' are dative forms of ὅς and πός;

Τοί corresponds in sense to the English 'then,' 'accordingly then,' 'indeed,' and in the compounds μέντοι and καίτοι obtains that of 'however' and 'although,' the meaning varying with the relations which the member introduced by τοί bears to the preceding member. Properly speaking, τοί, in virtue of its demonstrative and locative sense, points to, recalls, admits, or affirms an immediately preceding term, proposition, or condition of things, upon the admission or allegation of which the proposition introduced by τοί follows. But, while τοί is thus made the sign that the statement which it introduces follows upon the admission

or allegation of something previous to which it points, it is true, as just suggested, that there is some variety in the relations between the added proposition and that upon which it follows. Thus, (a) the antecedent term or proposition is recalled, admitted, or affirmed, and the added proposition follows as simply in accordance with it; as where *τοί* is rendered by 'then,' 'accordingly then,' and sometimes, properly enough, by 'indeed,' this latter term, however, only indicating, as the former does, but with perhaps something more of emphasis, the recalling and affirmation of the preceding term or statement. (b.) With the like recalling and admission of what precedes, the added proposition is regarded as a rational consequence; as where, in the compound *τοίνυν*, and elsewhere, *τοί* has the sense of 'therefore.' (c.) In another set of examples, *τοί* marks the admission of what goes before, but the proposition that follows is, in some degree, in contrariety with it, so that the admission is made with the limitation and partial contradiction introduced by the added statement; as where, in the compounds *μέντοι* and *καίτοι*, and occasionally when standing alone, it is rendered by 'however' and 'although,' 'yet notwithstanding.' (d.) In some examples, again, *τοί* seems to be a mere emphatic repetition of a preceding term in its own member of sentence, being equivalent to the English 'I say,' 'that I say,' or to 'indeed.' E.g. Aristoph. Av. 406, *ὦ ἔποψ, σέ τοι καλῶ*, 'ho there, hoopoe! you, I say, I am calling;' Id. ib. 274, *οὗτος, ὦ σέ τοι*, 'you there, ho you, I say, (I am calling you);' Id. ib. 945, *ξύνες δ τοι λέγω*, 'you understand, then, what I say;' Xen. Memorab. ii. 1, 11, *ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστανπος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν αὐ ἐμνωτὸν τάττω, ἀλλ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ.*, 'well, neither indeed do I, said Aristippus, commit myself, on the other hand, to slavery.' But here, also, *τοί* has essentially the same office of recalling, and of repeating, or admitting a preceding term, or the substance of what goes before. In the two last examples cited, *τοί*, although apparently merely repeating *δ* and *ἐγὼ*, does really refer to the preceding discourse. In the two former of these examples, *τοί* does repeat with emphasis the term *σέ*; but it should be observed that *σέ* is itself a substitution, as it

were, for a preceding term, and that this accounts for the only peculiarity that distinguishes this use of *τοί*, apart from its referring to a single term, and not to a proposition. This peculiarity is, that the term which it repeats, by pointing to it, stands in the proposition introduced by *τοί* instead of in a preceding sentence; and this comes from the fact that the term which it repeats with emphasis is, as has just been stated, a substitution for a preceding term. Thus, in the first example cited, *ὦ ἔποψ, σέ τοι καλῶ*, 'ho there, hoopoe! you, I say, I am calling,' the term *ἔποψ* being called out, and the bird called not answering, the name of the second person is substituted, and in repeating this with emphasis *τοί* does virtually recall the foregoing term. The same is seen in the second example. Granting, however, that, in such examples, *τοί* is marked by the peculiarity of use above mentioned, it will not be different in its nature: as it elsewhere points to and recalls a proposition, so here it points to and recalls an individual term.

Assuming the above examples to be sufficient to illustrate the use of *τοί* as recalling and repeating with emphasis individual terms, it may be proper to add some instances of its more common occurrence as the means of indicating that the proposition which it introduces follows upon the recalling, admitting, or affirming a preceding proposition. Thus, Il. i. 423-25, *Ζεὺς γάρ ἐπ' Ὀφειανὸν μετ' ἀμύμονας Αἰδιοπῆας | χθιζὸς ἔβη κατὰ δαῖτα, θεοὶ δ' ἅμα πάντες ἔποντο. | δωδεκῆτῃ δέ τοι αὐτὶς ἐλεύσεται Ὀλύμπῳνδε*, 'for Zeus went yesterday to a feast; but on the twelfth day, then, (that being so,) he will return to Olympus.' Here there are two propositions connected by *τοί*. The former, that Zeus has gone to a feast, which is alleged by Thetis as a reason why she cannot immediately visit Olympus to represent the wrongs of Achilles to her father Zeus, is pointed to and admitted by *τοί*; and the second, that, on the other hand (*δὲ*), he will return on the twelfth day, when she will go to Olympus, follows upon this admission; and considering that, with reference to the proposed visit of Thetis, the two propositions stand in some contrariety to each other, *τοί* might properly be rendered by 'yet,' 'notwithstanding.' 'Admitting that he has gone to

a feast, yet, on the other hand, he will return the twelfth day to Olympus.'

Il. v. 263, seqq., *Αἰνείας δ' ἐπαίξει μεμνημένος ἵππων, | ἐκ δ' ἐλάσαι Τρώων μετ' εὐκνήμδας Ἀχαιοὺς. | τῆς γὰρ τοι γενεῆς, ἥς Τρωί περ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς | δῶχ'*, 'mindful rush upon the horses of Æneas, and drive them away from the Trojans into the midst of the Achæans; for they are, then, of the breed that wide-voiced Zeus gave to Tros.' Here are two propositions: the former, an injunction of Diomedes to seize and drive away the horses of Æneas; the latter, the declaration of a reason for so doing, namely, that they are of the noblest breed. *Τοί*, consistently with its demonstrative nature and with its locative sense, points to the former proposition, and, recalling or assuming it, that is, with the sense of 'in that case,' admitting or assuming the injunction given, introduces, as according with it, the reason contained in the latter proposition, that the horses are of the noblest breed.

Τοί is properly rendered, in this example, by 'then' or by 'indeed:' if by the latter, it will be only slightly different, as indicating that the former proposition is, in some sort, more positively and earnestly assumed as that for which the latter assigns a reason.

Il. iv. 404-5, *Ἀτρεΐδῃ, μὴ ψεύδε', ἐπιστάμενος σάφα εἰπεῖν. | ἡμεῖς τοι πατέρων μέγ' ἀμείμονες εὐχόμεθ' εἶναι*, 'Atreides, do not speak falsely, when you know how to speak truly. We, then, boast that we are greatly better men than our fathers.' The son of Capaneus is replying to a speech of Agamemnon, in which it is alleged that he is inferior as a warrior to his father. He first charges Agamemnon indirectly with speaking falsely when he knew the truth, and then declares that he and the heroes of his day boast of being far better warriors than their fathers. The latter proposition, or boast of superiority, assumes the former, or the charge of speaking falsely, to be true, and follows as a natural consequence. This is indicated by *τοί*, which points to, recalls, and affirms the preceding proposition, and is equivalent to 'then,' 'accordingly then,' 'indeed,' that is, to 'in that case,' 'that assumed or affirmed.'

Il. v. 800-1, *ἦ ὀλίγον οἱ παῖδα δοικότα γέιναιτο Τυδεύς. | Τυδεύς*

τοι μικρὸς μὲν ἔην δέμας, ἀλλὰ μαχητής, 'surely Tydeus begat a son little like himself. Tydeus, then (indeed), was small in person, but a warrior.' *Τοί* points to the former proposition, namely, that Tydeus begat a son little like himself, and assumes it to be true, the added proposition being in just accordance with it, and following as a natural consequence. It is equivalent to 'in that case,' 'that being so,' and may be rendered by 'then,' 'accordingly then,' 'indeed.'

Plat. Rep. i. p. 330, B, *ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐλάττω καταλίπω τοιτοῖσι, ἀλλὰ βραχεῖ γέ τι νε πλείω ἢ παρέλαβον. Οὐ τοι ἔνεκα ἡρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα*, 'but, on my part, if I leave my property to these not less than I inherited it, but some little greater, I am content. For this reason then (indeed), said I, I asked you the question, because you seemed to me to be not very fond of your money.' *Τοί* here shows that the former proposition, that the speaker was content if he left his property to his heirs as great as he inherited it, or only a little greater, is admitted or assumed to be true; and the added statement, that the question asked has this for its ground, is introduced as consequent upon and in accordance with this assumption. It has the meaning of 'in that case,' 'that being so,' and may be rendered by 'then,' or 'indeed.'

Id. Gorg. p. 447, B, *ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν*, 'for this very thing, then (indeed), are we here.' Callicles asks Chærephon if Socrates, with whom he has just come up, desires to hear Gorgias. Chærephon, referring by *τοί* to the substance of the question, and repeating and affirming it, adds, as being in accordance with the admitted fact, that he and Socrates were come for this very object. *Τοί*, then, is equivalent to 'that being so,' 'in that case,' and is properly rendered by 'then,' or 'indeed.'

Aristoph. Equit. 683, *πάντα τοι πέπραγας οἷα χρὴ τὸν εὐτυχόντα*, 'you have done, then, all that is required of a man of success.' The sausage-seller has made a long recital of his bold deeds, and the chorus, admitting or assuming this to be true, declares that, this being so, he has done all that is required of a successful man. Here, also, *τοί* has the sense of 'in that case,' 'that being so,' and may be properly

translated by 'then,' 'indeed.' Id. ib. 1354-5, (*Αγορ.*) οὗτος, τί κύπτεις; οὐχὶ κατὰ χώραν μενεῖς; | (*Δῆμ.*) αἰσχύνομαι τοι ταῖς πρότερον ῥησείοις. *Agorakr.* 'You, sir, why do you hang your head? will you not keep in your place?' *Dem.* 'I am, then, ashamed of my former sins.' By means of *τοί* the *Demus* points to, recalls, and admits the statement that he hangs his head, and adds, in accordance with this admission, and as furnishing the reason of the fact, that he is ashamed of his former sins. (Cf. Id. ib. 178-180.)

Eurip. Hecub. 747, εἴ τοί με βούλει τῶνδε μηδὲν εἰδέναι | ἐς ταῦτόν ῥηεις, 'if, then, (as I assume from your conduct to be true) you wish me to know nothing of this, you have reached the same end,' 'have attained your object quite as much.' *Agamemnon*, referring by *τοί* to the previously described condition of things, in which *Hecuba*, while she wishes to make a petition to him, yet hesitates to speak, and thus calling up this strange silence on her part, says, what is in accordance with it, and follows as a natural consequence, 'you accomplish, then, in being thus mute, just the same thing as if you wish me to know nothing at all of this matter of yours.'

Id. *Orest.* 544, ὦ γέρον, ἐγὼ τοι πρὸς σέ δειμαίνω λέγειν, 'I am, then (indeed, in the condition of things before exhibited), afraid, old man, to speak to you.' *Tyndareus* has been uttering just reproaches against the conduct of *Orestes*; and *Orestes*, referring to the state of *Tyndareus*' feelings thus manifested, pointing to and alleging it by means of *τοί*, says that, in accordance with this, and in consequence of it, he is afraid to speak to him.

Herod. i. 41, πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ καὶ σέ τοι χρεὼν ἐστὶ λέναι ἐνθα ἀπολαμβάνει τοῖσι ἔργοις, 'besides, it is proper, then, for you also to go where you will be distinguished by your deeds.' *Cræsus* had asked *Adrastus* to take charge of his son in the hunt and guard him from robbers; and then, pointing to and repeating by *τοί* what he had already alleged, says, 'and besides, it is proper, then, for you also, this being true, my reasons for the request made being such, to go where you will be distinguished by your deeds.' That is, 'admitting what has been said, and in accordance with it, it

is besides proper for you also to go where you will be distinguished.'

Soph. Philoct. 81, ἀλλ'—ἤδὲ γάρ τοι πτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν, | —τόλμα, 'nay, since, then (indeed), it is sweet to gain the victory, venture to do it.' *Odysseus* urges *Neoptolemus* to undertake the enterprise of getting possession of the arrows of *Philoctetes*, and adds, that in that case, assuming the undertaking the task, it is, then, sweet to gain the victory. *Τοί* points to, repeats, and assumes the fact of the action contained in *τόλμα*, and which is urged upon *Neoptolemus*, and in accordance with the assumed fact is the proposition added, namely, that the victory gained by venturing upon a difficult undertaking is sweet. The use of *τοί* in this place is remarkable only for this, that the action to which it points (*τόλμα*) comes after instead of going before; so that it can only be referred to by anticipation. (Cf. Id. *Phil.* 686, 823; *Xen. Cyrop.* i. 6, 9; *Plat. Gorg.* p. 458, B and E, and p. 484, C; *Eurip. Hecub.* 743; *Il.* xxi. 69-70.)

Aristoph. Av. 1437, νῦν τοι λέγων περὶ σε, 'now, then (indeed), will I by speaking give you wings.' In such examples *τοί* is to be interpreted just as in the preceding instances, it being unaffected by the immediately preceding word *νῦν*.

In the same way, again, *τοί* when following upon *καὶ γάρ*, so as to form the expression *καὶ γάρ τοι*, is unaffected by the terms *καὶ* and *γάρ*, these also retaining each its peculiar sense. That is, *τοί* has the sense of 'then,' 'indeed,' admitting or affirming the preceding proposition, and introducing a statement that is consequent upon, and in accordance with this admission or affirmation; *καὶ* is the sign of addition, and, according to the conditions of the addition, is to be rendered by 'and,' 'moreover,' 'besides,' 'even,' the Latin *et* and *autem*; and *γάρ* (= *γέ* + *ἄρ* or *ἄρα*) shows that the proposition which it introduces contains the rational ground of what precedes, answering to the English 'for'; or, having regard to its elements, gives the assent of the speaker to the antecedent statement (*γέ*), and expresses the conformity thereto of what follows (*ἄρα*), so that the whole expression is capable of being rendered in English by 'for more-

over then,' or 'for besides then.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 4. *καὶ γὰρ τοὶ τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων . . . ὥστε ὁ μὲν Σκύθης, κ.τ.λ.*, 'for besides, then, he so far surpassed all other kings, that the Scythian,' &c. The writer says that he came to the conclusion, from facts mentioned, that men were more difficult to govern than all other animals; but that, by the instance of Cyrus the Persian, who had very many nations willingly subject to him, he was forced to change his view, and to admit that to govern men was neither impossible nor difficult, provided it was done with competent skill. What follows, *τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων, κ.τ.λ.*, is shown by *καὶ* and *γὰρ* to be both an addition to what goes before, and a ground or reason for it, while *τοί* at the same time points to and affirms the preceding proposition, and introduces what follows as in accordance with it.

Looking, then, to the form, and to the signification and use of *τοί*, it may safely be affirmed to be the locativus case singular of the demonstrative *τό*, seen in the article and elsewhere. The way in which the demonstrative idea in *τοί* and that of the case conspire to give its usual sense of 'then,' 'accordingly then,' 'indeed,' 'therefore,' has been set forth under *τῷ*, and in the course of explaining the various examples had under consideration. Here it may be proper to add a summary of what has been said. 1. It has been shown that *τοί* as a demonstrative points to, recalls, or repeats, and thus assumes, admits, or affirms, a preceding term or proposition. That the precise sense in which the recalling or repeating a term or proposition by pointing to it is to be taken, is not always the same. At one time it will amount to a mere emphatic repetition of a term already used, at another to the assumption or admission, and still at another to the affirmation, of what goes before. That the demonstrative merely recalling or repeating a term or proposition by pointing to it, and thus involving its admission or affirmation, the precise one of its meanings that is to be attached to it in any particular case must be gathered from the context. That the proposition introduced by *τοί* presupposes the admission, assumption, or affirmation of the preceding proposition or term, and follows it as a

natural consequence, a matter of course, or as a rational inference, the relation between the two propositions being expressed in English by 'then,' 'accordingly then,' 'indeed,' or by 'therefore.' That the case in which *τοί* obtains the sense of 'although,' 'yet,' 'however,' is one in which there is a degree of real or apparent contrariety between the added and the former propositions; the peculiarity of meaning resulting, not from any thing in *τοί* itself, but from the natural relations of the matters affirmed in the two propositions, and from the necessary limitation which is put upon an admitted statement by connecting with it, as a sequence, another that stands in some degree of real or apparent contrariety.

That the casus locativus, to which *τοί* belongs, being used in a secondary sense, expresses the circumstances, condition, or case in which an action occurs or a statement is made; and that, considered in its conjunction with the demonstrative, it is equivalent to 'in the case stated,' 'that admitted,' 'that being so;' and, as having reference to a proposition that follows as a matter of course, or as a rational inference, is equivalent, again, to 'then,' 'accordingly then,' 'indeed,' 'therefore.'

This summary may be set forth as follows:

Τοί, locativus of τό.	1. Demonstrative=	a. pointing to; b. recalling, or repeating; c. admitting, assuming, affirming as true.	= 'In that case,' 'that admitted,' 'that being so;' + a proposition that follows:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. as a natural sequence = 'then,' 'accordingly then,' 'indeed.' b. as a rational inference = 'therefore.' c. with a degree of contrariety = 'yet,' 'although,' 'however.'
	2. Locativus=	the circumstances, condition, case, in which an action occurs, or a statement holds good.		

The same sense properly belongs to *τοί* when it occurs in compounds, and when it is conjoined with other particles, both where it comes after, as, *οὔτοι, μέντοι, καίτοι, ἤτοι, ἤτοι, οὐν τοί, καὶ γὰρ τοί*, and where it stands first, as, *τάρα (τοί ἄρα) and τάρα, (τοί ἄρα), τοιγάρ, τοιγάρτοι, τοιγαροῦν, τοίνυν*; and this, although it obtains in some of these a peculiar sense, arising from the contrariety in which the action affirmed in the after-proposition stands to that which goes before, as in *καίτοι*, 'although,' 'and yet,' and *μέντοι*, 'however.' This has

been shown in the case of *νῦν τοι* and of *καὶ γὰρ τοι*, above considered; and, to make the account of *τοί* in some measure complete, it is of course necessary to examine the remaining instances of its conjunction with other particles; for, otherwise, we cannot be sure of the correctness of its interpretation in the cases where it stands alone.

Οὗτοι.

In *οὗτοι* the sense of *τοί* is retained unchanged. E.g. Il. i. 298, *χερσὶ μὲν οὗτοι ἔγωγε μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα κόρης*, 'for my part, I will not then (indeed) fight with my hands for the virgin.' Achilles, being incensed against Agamemnon on account of the virgin Cryseis, declares that he will not yield to him in every thing, nor any longer obey him; and then adds that, while this is so, affirming the truth of what he has just said, he will not fight with his hands on account of the virgin, since she has been taken away from him by the Greeks after having been given to him; but that Agamemnon shall not take away from him any thing else of all that he has at his ship. The former proposition of the two, that declaring that he will not yield in every thing nor any longer obey, is pointed to by *τοί*, and thus recalled and affirmed, and the second or added proposition is introduced with the admission or allegation of the former, or, as it may here be understood, notwithstanding this admission; for the second proposition, that Agamemnon shall not take away any thing else that he has at his ship, is in some sort opposed to the preceding one upon which it follows, that he will not fight for the virgin who has been taken from him. *Τοί*, as indicating the connection existing between the two propositions, may be rendered by 'then,' 'indeed,' and, having regard to the apparent contrariety in which the second stands to the former, by 'yet,' 'notwithstanding.' *Οὐ*, the former part of *οὗτοι*, has its proper signification of the direct negative 'not,' and is connected with *μαχήσομαι*, having no effect upon the meaning of *τοί*.

Eurip. Hecub. 743, *οὗτοι πέφυκα μάντις ὥστε μὴ κλύων | ἐξιστορῆσαι σῶν ὁδὸν βουλευμάτων*, 'I am not, then (indeed), a diviner so as to find out the tenor of your designs without

hearing them.' Hecuba stands in the presence of Agamemnon, hesitating whether she will invoke his compassion. Agamemnon, pointing to and recalling this conduct of hers by means of *τοί*, adds, as following upon this condition of things, that he is not a diviner so as to find out her purposes while she keeps silent about them. *Τοί* has here the sense of 'then,' 'indeed,' and is unaffected by *οὐ*, which has its proper meaning, and is connected in sense with *πέφυκα μάντις*.

Eur. Orest. 262, *οὗτοι μεθήσω*, 'I will not then (indeed) let you go.' Orestes, in a fit of frenzy, struggles to release himself from his sister's hands. She, referring to his struggles and to his cries of horror, and recalling them by means of *τοί*, adds that, in this condition of things, this being so, she will not let him go. But, inasmuch as the action in the second proposition is not such as accords with what is referred to and recalled by *τοί*, but something to be done notwithstanding it, *τοί* is better rendered by 'yet,' 'notwithstanding.' The sense is, that Electra will not let her brother go, notwithstanding his cries and struggles. *Οὐ* does not affect the meaning of *τοί*.

Eur. Phœn. 452, *ἐπὶσχε· οὗτοι τὸ ταχὺ τὴν δίκην ἔχει*, 'hold; in haste, indeed, there is not justice.' Iocasta checks Eteocles in his impetuous haste, and bids him stay, adding, as consonant with this demand, to which *τοί* points, and which it repeats, that haste is not wont to be just. The command to hold and stay his haste, contained in the former proposition, being recalled and repeated by *τοί*, the added statement, that haste is not wont to be just, is rationally consistent with, and follows upon it.

Eurip. Phœn. 552, seqq., *ἢ πολλὰ μοχθεῖν πόλλ' ἔχων ἐν δώμασι | βούλει; τί δ' ἔστι τὸ πλεον; ὄνομα' ἔχει μόνον | ἐπεὶ τὰ γάρ κούνηδ' ἱκανὰ τοῖς γε σώφροσιν. | οὗτοι τὰ χρήματα ἴδια κέκτηνται βροτοί, | τὰ τῶν θεῶν δ' ἔχοντες ἐπιμελούμεθα*. Iocasta, having affirmed that excess of power and wealth are a mere name, and that men of moderation are content with what is sufficient for them, adds, pointing to and reaffirming this doctrine of moderation by means of *τοί*, that, consistently with the truth affirmed, mortals do not hold their possessions as t. eir

own, but as stewards of the gods: 'mortals, then, or indeed,' (this doctrine of moderation being admitted, in that case, and consistently with it,) do not hold their possessions as their own, but as stewards of the gods.' Here, again, as in the preceding examples, *τοί* is uninfluenced in its meaning by *οὐ*. (Cf. Aristoph. Equit. 235, 409, 698.)

Μέντοι.

In *μέντοι*, 'then,' 'indeed,' 'however,' *τοί* retains the signification which it had when not conjoined with *μέν*, and *μέν* has its usual force of giving emphasis to, and hence of sometimes setting in contrast, the word to which it is immediately attached. The power of *μέν*, which when rendered into English is equivalent to 'indeed,' is often incapable of being expressed otherwise than by the emphasis given to the term to which it belongs; and hence it occurs that *μέντοι* is so commonly to be translated precisely as *τοί* is when standing alone. The two significations of *μέντοι*, namely, that of 'then,' 'indeed,' and that of 'however,' 'yet however,' differ only in this, that, in the former, *τοί* points or refers to, recalls, and so admits, assumes, or asserts, the preceding proposition, the following statement being added as in accordance with it, or as rationally consistent with its admission or assertion; while, in the latter, the reference to and admission of the preceding proposition being the same, the added statement is made notwithstanding the admission or assertion of what goes before. Some examples will illustrate what has been here said.

Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 6, *Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος, μέμνημαι μέντοι ταῦτα δρούσας σου*, 'yes, of a truth, said Cyrus, I remember, then (indeed), that I heard this from you.' His father asks Cyrus whether he remembers certain precepts given him before. Cyrus, referring by *τοί* to the statement involved in his father's question, and so admitting it, 'that being so,' 'admitting the fact of the precepts having been given,' connects with this admission the declaration that he remembers having heard them from his father: 'I remember, indeed, then, having heard this from you.' Here it is

plain that *τοί* performs its common office, being equivalent to 'then,' 'that being so,' 'indeed,' and that *μέν* is attached to and gives emphasis to *μέμνημαι*, having no influence upon *τοί*.

Xen. Cyrop. i. 4, 20, *Αὐτὸς (ὁ Κῦρος) πρῶτος ἡγεῖτο ταχέως, καὶ ὁ Κυαξάρης μέντοι ἐφείπετο*, 'Cyrus himself foremost rapidly led the way, and Cyaxares, on his part (*μέν*) then (*τοί*), followed after.' Here *τοί* refers to, recalls, and alleges the previously stated fact of Cyrus leading the way, and then is connected with this, as according with and naturally attending it, the statement that Cyaxares on his part followed after. Consequently, *τοί* performs its usual part, while *μέν* is attached to the term *Κυαξάρης*, and gives to it a certain emphasis, whereby Cyaxares is set in contrast with Cyrus. Cf. Id. ib. § 22, *καὶ ὁ Κυαξάρης μέντοι ἐφείπετο*, 'and Cyaxares, on his part (*μέν*), this being so (*τοί*), followed after.'

Aristoph. Av. 1651, (*Ηρα.*) *ἐγὼ νόθος; τί λέγεις; (Πει.) σὺ μέντοι νῆ Δία, | ὦν γε ξένης γυναῖχος*: Era. 'I illegitimate? What do you say?' Peisth. 'You are, indeed (then), born as you are of a foreign woman.' Here, again, *μέν* in *μέντοι* is immediately attached to *σύ*, 'you indeed,' 'you, on your part,' and *τοί* is equivalent to 'then,' 'indeed,' recalling and asserting the statement involved in the previous question, while, in accordance with this assertion, is added the declaration 'you are, verily, being born of a foreign woman.' Cf. Aristoph. Equit. 167-8, (*Δῆμ.*) . . . (*στρατηγούς*) . . . *δῆσαις, φυλάξεις, ἐν πρυτανείῳ λαυκάσαις*. | (*Ἀλλάντ.*) *ἐγὼ; (Δῆμ.) σὺ μέντοι*. Dem. 'You will put commanders in chains, watch them, play the wanton in the prytaneum.' Sausage-seller. 'I?' Dem. 'You, I say,' 'you, indeed.' *Τοί* does not refer to *σύ*, to which *μέν* gives emphasis, but to the preceding assertion *δῆσαις, κ. τ. λ.*, the sense being, 'you, I say, will put the commanders in chains,' &c.

But more commonly *μέντοι* has the sense of 'however,' 'yet however,' *μέν* and *τοί* having each really the same sense, in themselves considered, as in the preceding examples, and that of 'however' arising in the way already explained.

E.g. Plat. Rep. i. p. 827, A, καλή μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἐδοξεν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ἦττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἢν οἱ θοῤῃες ἐπεμπον, 'to me the procession of the natives seemed to be handsome: not, however, less becoming appeared to be that conducted by the Thrakes.' Mention has been made of a handsome procession of the natives at the Piræus, and in the member of the sentence introduced by μέντοι an additional fact is affirmed, that the procession of the Thrakes appeared to the speaker not less handsome. Here μέν has its usual emphatic sense, and being attached to οὐ, and by consequence to ἦττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν, serves to put these words in contrast, 'the procession of the Thrakes, on its part, appeared not less handsome.' Τοί refers to the preceding statement of the procession of the natives being handsome, and by recalling admits it; so that it is equivalent to 'that being so,' 'admitting or affirming that,' and might be rendered by 'then,' 'indeed.' The sentence so understood would mean, 'the procession of the natives too appeared to me to be handsome: not less handsome, then (indeed), seemed to be that of the Thrakes.' But, in fact, the added assertion, that the procession of the Thrakes was not less handsome, while it is made with the admission of the preceding representation, as shown by τοί, is at the same time obviously in some measure at variance with it, and to be regarded as true notwithstanding such admission. So that from the natural relation of the added to the preceding and admitted statement arises the sense of 'however,' 'yet,' the Latin *tamen*, by which μέντοι may be rendered. Then the meaning of the sentence will be, 'to me the procession of the natives also seemed to be handsome: not less handsome, however, appeared to be that conducted by the Thrakes.'

Plat. Gorg. i. p. 447, A, τούτων μέντοι . . . αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὄδε, ἐν ἀγορῇ ἀνυγῆσας ἡμῶς διατρίψαι, 'of this, however, Chærephon here is the cause, in that he compelled me to tarry in the market-place.' Callicles had mentioned that Socrates was come too late for a beautiful display made by Gorgias, and Socrates, admitting his statement, adds as a reason for his being too late, that it was caused by Chærephon com-

elling him to tarry in the market-place. Here τοί refers to and admits as true what was alleged; but there is added, by way of explanation, a fact that is affirmed to be true, not simply in accordance with the admission, but notwithstanding it. So that τοί may properly be rendered by 'however,' 'yet notwithstanding.' Μέν is attached to τούτων with its usual emphatic sense. Cf. Eurip. Med. 790, ἐνταῦθα μέντοι τόνδ' ἀπαλλάσσω λόγον, 'here, however, I leave this argument.' Id. Hecub. 761.

Xen. Cyrop. i. 4, 23, ἐνταῦθα μέντοι δέισαντες μὴ καὶ ἐνέδρα τις μείζων ὑπείη, ἐπέσχον, 'thereupon, however, fearing lest some greater ambush might lie in the way, they halted.' Here μέντοι is equivalent to 'however,' obtaining this sense in the way above explained. Μέν is attached to ἐνταῦθα with its usual sense, and τοί refers to and admits as true the preceding fact of the pursuit and slaughter of the enemy, the added statement being, in some sort, contrary to such admission, and made notwithstanding it. See Id. ib. i. 4, 26, i. 6, 8, and §§ 24, 25, ii. 2, 5. Plat. Gorg. p. 453, B, Id. Gorg. p. 458, B, ἴσως μέντοι χοῦν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι πρὶν καὶ ὑμῶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδείκνυμι, 'may-be, however, we should consider the wishes of those present. For, some while since, indeed (then), before, in fact, you came, I gave many explanations to those who were present.'

Καίτοι.

In the compound καίτοι, also, the particle τοί retains its proper signification, namely, that of 'then,' 'indeed,' showing that a previous fact is admitted or affirmed, the statement introduced being consequent upon and in conformity with this admission or affirmation; or that of 'although,' 'yet,' the admission or affirmation being the same, but what is added in the proposition introduced by τοί being true, not as consequent upon and in accordance with that which goes before, but notwithstanding it. Καί in this compound has its proper meaning of addition, and has no influence upon that of τοί.

E.g. Plat. Gorg. p. 452, B, καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἱατρόν, κ.τ.λ., 'and moreover, then (indeed),

with this faculty of persuasion (*τῷ πείθειν*) you will have the physician as your slave,' &c. Gorgias had declared the art of persuasion to be the greatest good, namely, one by which a man is able to persuade by arguments the dicastæ in the halls of justice, &c., and then adds, that by this faculty one, furthermore, has the physician as his slave, and so of the teacher. *Καί*, 'and,' 'moreover,' shows that there is introduced something additional or superadded, and *τοί* that the additional statement is made upon the admission of what precedes, and in accordance with it. Cf. Id. ib. p. 486, A, 482, B.

Eurip. Med. 184, seqq., *δράσω τὰδ' ἀτὰρ φόβος εἰ πείσω | δέσποιναν ἐμὴν. | μόχθου δὲ χάριν τήνδ' ἐπιδώσω. | καίτοι τοκῶδες δέργμα λεαίνης | ἀποταυροῦται δμωσὶν, ὅταν τις | μῦθον προφέρων πέλας ὀρμαῖῃ*, 'I will do so; (namely, bring forth my mistress Medea from the house, as the chorus has urged me to do;) but I fear if I shall induce her to come forth; yet I will bestow upon you the favor of this effort; and, indeed, she casts at her servants, when any one comes near her and utters a word, the fierce glances of a lioness that has whelps.' The attendant of the children of Medea, after promising to bring forth their mother from the house at the instance of the chorus, and expressing the fear that he may not succeed, points to and affirms this fear by *τοί*, and at the same time adds, as in conformity with the fear expressed, that she gives signs of the most angry mood. It is plain that, in this example also, *τοί* has the sense of 'then' or 'indeed,' and that *καί* has its common sense of 'and.'

Aristoph. Nub. 1071, seqq., *σκέψαι γὰρ, ὦ μαιράκιον, ἐν τῷ σωφρονεῖν ἅπαντα | ἀνεστίν, ἡδονῶν δ' ὄσων μέλλεις ἀποστερεῖσθαι, | παίδων, γυναικῶν, κοττάβων, ὀφίων, πότων, κηχλισμῶν. | καίτοι τί σοι ζῆν ἄξιον τούτων ἐὰν στερηθῇς*, 'consider, young man, all the blessings there are in being wise, and how many pleasures you are going to be deprived of, children, wives, the *κότταβος*, meat, drink, *κηχλισμός*. And what, then, is it worth your while to live, if you be deprived of these things?' After a recital of the things that will be lost with the deprivation of the blessings of wisdom, there is the addition of the assertion, implied in the question, that without these

things life is of no worth, this assertion being introduced as consequent upon the admission of what goes before, and in conformity with it. The addition is marked by *καί*, and the introduction of a proposition as following upon the admission or allegation of what goes before is indicated by *τοί*; so that *καίτοι* is equivalent to 'and then,' or 'and indeed,' each member of the compound, if so it may be called, retaining separately its proper signification.

Aristoph. Nub. 1079, seqq., *μοιχὸς γὰρ ἦν τύχης ἁλούς, τὰδ' ἀντερεῖς πρὸς αὐτόν, | ὥς οὐδὲν ἡδίκησας· εἴτ' εἰς τὸν Δι' ἐπανεγχεῖν, | ἀκχεῖνος ὥς ἤττων ἐρωτὸς ἐστὶ καὶ γυναικῶν | καίτοι σὺ θνητὸς ὦν θεοῦ πῶς μεῖζον ἂν δύναο;* 'for if you chance to be caught in adultery, you will say, in answer, that you have done no wrong; and then lay it to the account of Jove, saying that he also is too weak for love and women; and, then (admitting that, that being so, *τοί*), how could you, mortal as you are, have more power than he?' Both *καί* and *τοί* have here, very obviously, the meaning hitherto attributed to them. *Τοί* refers to and recalls the statement just made, that Jupiter was too weak for love and women, and then is added, as consequent upon such admission, and in that case true, the proposition, conveyed in the shape of a question, that a mortal could not have more power against such seducers than he, *καί* being the sign of this addition.

But, in a majority of the examples in which *καίτοι* occurs, it has the sense of 'and yet,' 'although,' the difference between this meaning and that which *καίτοι* has above been seen to have, being due, not to any thing in *καίτοι* itself, but to the different relation held by the added statement to that which precedes, and which *τοί* points to and admits. *Καίτοι* has the force of 'and yet,' 'although,' where the proposition added is not simply adduced as true upon the admission of what goes before, but as affirmed notwithstanding this admission. And, to give this sense, it is necessary that there should be something in the nature of the added proposition apparently at least opposed to what precedes. It was seen above that *μέντοι* obtains the sense of 'however' in the same way, and that *τοί* itself sometimes has the same variation of meaning from the like cause.

E.g. Soph. Aj. 550, seqq., ὦ παῖ, γένοιτο πατὴρ εὐτυχέστερος, | τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ὁμοίως, καὶ γένοι' ἄν οὐ καχός. | καίτοι σε καὶ νῦν τοῦτό γε ζηλοῦν ἔχω, | ὁδ' οὐνεχ' οὐδὲν τῶνδ' ἐπαισθάνει κακῶν, 'O my son, may you be more fortunate than your father, but in other respects like him, and (then) you will be noble; although (and yet) even now I have to envy you this, that you are not aware at all of these misfortunes.' Here, as in former examples, καὶ marks that a fact is added, his having occasion, even then, to envy his child; and τοί introduces this fact with a previous admission of what goes before, namely, the substance of his prayer that he may be more fortunate than his father. Thus far the sense of τοί is that of 'then,' 'admitting this,' 'this being so.' But the added declaration, that even now, child as he is, the subject of prayer for his future well-being, and the son of an unfortunate father, he is to be envied on any account, is seemingly inconsistent with the condition of things referred to by τοί. Hence, what goes before and is admitted has a qualification or limitation in the contrariety of the added fact, which is stated as true notwithstanding the admission. This relation being expressed in English by 'although,' 'and yet,' καίτοι is rendered by these terms.

Aristoph. Acharn. 369-70, λέξω δ' ὑπὲρ Λακεδαιμονίων ἃ μοι δοκεῖ | καίτοι δέδοικα πολλά, 'I will say on behalf of the Lacedæmonians what I think; although (and yet) I am greatly afraid to do so.' Here καίτοι, having in itself the same sense as where it is rendered by 'and then,' 'and indeed,' 'and this being so,' obtains the meaning of 'and yet,' 'although,' 'notwithstanding,' from the fact that the statement added, that the person speaking is greatly afraid to say what he thinks, is apparently at variance with the previous assurance, repeated by τοί, that he is going to say what he thinks fit. Cf. Id. ib. 465-6, (Δικ.) ἀπέρχομαι, καίτοι τί ὁρᾶω;

Eurip. Orest. 75, seqq., προσφθέμασιν γὰρ οὐ μαίνομαι σέθεν, | ἐς Φοῦβον ἀναφέρουσα τὴν δμαρτίαν. | καίτοι στένω γε τὸν Κλυταίμνηστρας μόρον, 'for I am not polluted by speaking to you, since I lay your sin to the account of Phœbus. And yet I do lament the fate of Clytemnestra.' The sorrow ex-

pressed for the fate of Clytemnestra by her sister Helen is seemingly inconsistent with her acquitting of sin Orestes, who had murdered her, which τοί in καίτοι refers to and repeats. Consequently, the declaration of acquittal is made with the addition of an apparently opposing affirmation; or, the added feeling of sorrow for the murdered person is affirmed notwithstanding the admission of the innocence of the murderer. And thus καίτοι, here again, instead of the sense of 'and then,' 'and indeed,' has that of 'and yet,' 'although,' 'notwithstanding.'

Eurip. Alcest. 288, seqq., . . . οὐδ' ἐφεισάμην, | ἥβης ἔχουσα δῶρ', ἐν οἷς ἑτερόπληκτον. | καίτοι σ' ὁ φύσας χητέουσα προῦδοσαν, 'but I did not spare myself, when I had the blessings of youth. And yet your father and your mother abandoned you.' The same thing is seen here, καίτοι obtaining the sense of 'although,' 'and yet,' from the apparent incongruity, in the view of Alcestis, of her self-devotion, to which τοί refers, and the abandonment of Admetus by his father and mother. She affirms the fact of her own self-devotion under circumstances that made life dear to her, and in the face of, or notwithstanding, the fact that his father and mother abandoned Admetus under circumstances that should have made life less dear to them.

Isocr. Panath. c. 17, τεκμήριον δὲ μέγιστον ἀφελόμενοι γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ συγκαθιδνεύσαντες, τοῖς ἡμετέροις παρέδυσαν. Καίτοι τίνας ἂν τις κριτὰς ἰκανωτέρους ποιήσωτο τῶν τότεπραχθέντων ἢ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνους παραγενομένους; 'although (and yet), whom would one consider more capable judges of what was then done than those who witnessed the peril?' Καίτοι, in this example, recalls the preceding statement of the transfer of the hegemony to the Athenians, asserts it to be true under circumstances seemingly calculated to prevent it, and hence is equivalent to 'and yet,' 'although,' 'notwithstanding.' Cf. Isocr. Panegy. c. 19. After saying that the Spartans had the conduct of affairs for scarcely ten years, while the Athenians retained their dominion sixty-five years uninterruptedly, the orator adds, καίτοι πάντες ἴσους τὰς πόλεις ὑφ' ἑτέροις γενομένης ὅτι πλεῖστον χρόνον τούτοις παρυμένουσιν, ὑφ' ὧν ἂν ἐλάχιστα κακὰ πάσχουσιν

τοῖς πάντεσσι, 'although (and yet) all know that the states which were subject to the one and to the other, adhere the longest time to the party under whom they chance to suffer the least evils.' *Καίτοι* recalls and asserts the previous statement of the greatly longer duration of the Athenian power, with the addition of a fact that stood in opposition to such longer duration, and is thus equivalent to 'and yet,' 'although,' 'notwithstanding.' Cf. Plat. Gorg. p. 512, B and C.

ἢ Ἡτοι.

ἢ Ἡτοι, compounded of *ἢ*, 'or,' and *τοι*, 'then,' 'indeed,' has preserved distinctly the meaning of both elements of the compound. Thus, Plat. Gorg. p. 460, A, ἐνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκαια ἥτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ, 'if you make a person a rhetorician, he must needs know right and wrong, having then (in that case, *τοι*), learned this from you, either before or afterwards.' *ἢ H*, 'or,' in *ἦτοι*, being followed, as it here occurs, by another *ἢ*, is translated by 'either;' and *τοι* points to, and thus recalls, and admits or affirms, the statement in the preceding sentence, being equivalent to 'in that case,' 'that being so;' and, having regard to the introduction of a proposition that follows as true upon the admission or allegation of what goes before, to 'then,' 'indeed.' In this example, the proposition that goes before is, that 'if you make a person a rhetorician he must needs know right and wrong;' the statement introduced by *τοι* is, that 'he must have learned it from you either before or afterwards.' *Τοί*, pointing to and admitting the former, and at the same time bringing in the latter as following upon this admission, corresponds to the English 'then,' 'indeed.' Cf. Id. ib. p. 474, D, οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς δ' ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ἦ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα; 'for instance, with regard to bodies (objects) that are handsome, do you not say, then (it being so that your doctrine is true, admitting that), that they are beautiful, either according to their usefulness for the thing whereto they are severally adapted for use, or according to some pleasure they afford?' Plat. Rep.

p. 330, E, καὶ αὐτὸς, ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρωνος ἀσθενείας, ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεῖ, μᾶλλον τι καθορᾷ αὐτά.

ἢ Ἡτάρ.

ἢ Ἡτάρ, composed of *ἢ*, *τοι*, and *τάρ*, differs from *ἦτοι* only in having the addition of *τάρ* with its proper meaning of adaptedness or conformity of the matter which it introduces to what precedes, answering to the English 'accordingly,' 'so,' 'as is fitting.' E.g. Eurip. Hippol. 1025, seqq., νῦν δ' ὄρχισόν σοι Ζῆνα καὶ πέδον χθονὸς | ὀμνύμε τῶν σῶν μήποδ' ἀφασθαι γάμων, | μηδ' ἂν θελῆσαι, μηδ' ἂν ἐννοίαν λαβεῖν. | ἦτάρ ὁλοίμην ἀκλεῆς, ἀνώνυμος, 'and now I swear to you by Zeus, and by the soil of the land, that I never touched your spouse, nor would have even wished, nor had the disposition, to do it. Or (else, *ἢ*.) then (*τοι*, in case I did,) so (*τάρ*, as is fitting,) may I perish inglorious, without a name.'

ἢ Ἡτοι.

ἢ Ἡτοι, sometimes also written *ἦτοι*, is made up of the affirmative particle *ἢ*, 'surely,' 'indeed,' and *τοι*, the latter retaining its usual meaning; so that the compound is equivalent in English to 'surely then,' 'surely indeed;' that is, to a subjective affirmation of the proposition introduced by the compound, due to *ἢ*, and an objective (demonstrative) pointing to, and admission or affirmation, made by *τοι*, of an antecedent statement, upon the admission or affirmation of which follows what is brought in by *ἦτοι*. E.g. Il. i. 68, ἦτοι ὅγ' ὧς εἰπὼν κατ' ἄρ' ἔζετο, 'he then (upon that) sat down.' Il. ix. 697, ἀλλ' ἦτοι κτεῖνον μὲν ἑδόμεν. Il. i. 140, ἀλλ' ἦτοι μὲν ταῦτα μεταφρασόμεσθα καὶ αὐτίς, 'but,' says Agamemnon, after he has made certain threats against Achilles of what he will do, 'surely (*ἦ*) then (*τοι*, what I have said being so), we will speak of this again.'

In the compounds in which *τοι* is conjoined with another particle, itself occupying the first place, *τοι* retains its proper meaning quite as distinctly as in the compounds already examined. Such compounds may be here mentioned, as they afford additional instances in illustration of the use and signification of *τοι*.

Τοῖνον.

Τοῖνον occurs frequently with the sense of 'then,' 'accordingly then.' Thus, Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 2, πᾶσας τοῖνον ταῦτας τὰς ἀγέλας ἐδοκοῦμεν ὁρᾶν μᾶλλον ἐθελούσας πείθεσθαι τοῖς νομεῦσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἀρχουσι, 'accordingly, then, we thought that we saw all these flocks more willing to obey their shepherds than men their rulers.' The writer, having reference to the difficulty of governing men, has stated that he considers those who have the care of oxen or horses, and shepherds generally, to belong to the class of rulers; and then adds, that he thinks he has seen that flocks are more obedient to their shepherds than men to their rulers. This second statement, introduced by *τοῖνον*, is made upon the admission of the previous proposition, is in accordance with it, and depends upon it, rationally at least. It is asserted that shepherds and herdsmen are of the class of rulers; and, assuming this to be true, it affords a ground for the additional and accordant statement, that the writer thinks he has seen flocks more obedient to their shepherds than men to their rulers. This relation between the two propositions is expressed by *τοῖνον*, and may be rendered in English by 'then,' 'accordingly then.' That *τοῖνον* is suited to denote this relation may be seen from the signification of its elements, assuming *τοί* to have the sense which has been above attributed to it. For *τοί* points to, recalls, and admits or reaffirms the preceding proposition, and introduces a statement that is rationally dependent upon, or, at least, is in conformity with, such admission or affirmation, being equivalent to 'then,' 'accordingly then.' And the enclitic *νόν*, the same, of course, with the adverb of time *νύν*, but with a peculiar application, just as *quum*, 'when,' 'since,' is a varied application of *quum*, 'when,' referring to time, has its ordinary force, although not always capable of being separately rendered in English. It answers to the English enclitic 'now,' which is in fact the same word, as is also the Latin *nunc*, and to 'then,' 'accordingly then,' and is a sign by which a speaker or writer, before passing to a new proposition, or in concluding a narrative or statement, gives

notice that what is now stated is in accordance with the facts recited, and a conclusion from them. Thus, Herod. vi. 1, 'Ἀρισταγόρης μὲν νυν' Ἰωνίην ἀποστήσας, οὕτω τελευτᾷ, 'Aristagoras now, after having caused Ionia to revolt, thus came to his end.' Herodotus, having narrated the events belonging to the revolt of Ionia caused by Aristagoras, and his death, ends the story, before entering upon other events, by the words above cited, 'Aristagoras, now (then, accordingly), thus died,' a statement which is in accordance with, and a conclusion from, all that went before. Herod. vi. 22, Μίλητος μὲν νυν Μιλησίων ἐρήμωτο, 'Miletus, now (then), was emptied of Milesians.' The fact here stated is in just conformity with the previously narrated occurrences, and a conclusion from them. Cf. Id. vi. 84, init. The enclitic *νόν* may be said, then, to express a rational conclusion from previous facts or statements, including the idea of the conformity of what is immediately affirmed with what goes before. It marks a bringing up to the present moment of the speaker's narration the sum of what has been said, by employing an expression that is in conformity with the preceding statements, and, as it were, includes them. Allowing to *νόν*, in its connection with *τοί* in *τοῖνον*, the force here assigned to it, it would show that the statement which it introduces is fairly in accordance with what was before affirmed, and rationally following upon it. Thus, in the example under consideration, this particle, taken by itself, would show that the observation concerning the readier obedience of flocks to their shepherds than of men to their rulers, was in just accordance with, and rationally concluded from, the previous doctrine that shepherds and flocks had the same relation as rulers and men. The discourse being, at this point, about the difficulty of governing men, the writer proposes to illustrate this by contrasting the obedience of flocks with the want of obedience on the part of men. But first he assumes that herdsmen and shepherds belong to the category of rulers, else there would be no analogy; and then says that, accordingly, in conformity with this view, and following upon it, he sees flocks more obedient to their shepherds than men to their rulers. *Τοῖνον*,

taken together, would therefore show that the previous statement is assumed to be true, and that the proposition introduced by it is in accordance with this assumption, and a rational conclusion from it. This relation would be expressed in English by 'accordingly then,' which is the meaning of *τοίνυν*, although it may sometimes be sufficiently expressed, perhaps, by 'then,' or 'therefore.'

Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 2, *καὶ τοῖς καρποῖς τοίνυν, τοῖς γηνομένοις ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἕως τοὺς νομέας χρῆσθαι οὕτως ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται*, 'accordingly, then, they suffer their shepherds to use the profits also that arise from them in whatever way they choose.' The writer, having alleged the willing subjection of herds and flocks to their herdsmen and shepherds, adds, pointing to and assuming this to be true (*τοί*), that accordingly then (*τοίνυν*), they suffer their keepers to use the profits that arise from them in whatever way they choose.

Id. ib., *Ἔτι τοίνυν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἀγέλην ἡσθόμεθα συστῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸν νομέα*, 'accordingly, then, we have never yet at any time seen a flock in rebellion against its shepherd.' Here, again, the previous statement of the willing subjection of flocks to their shepherds, and of their consequently allowing them to use the profits arising from them as they choose, is assumed to be true, and then is added, as consequent upon this admission, and in accordance with it, the fact that flocks are never seen in rebellion against their shepherds. Cf. Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 5, i. 3, 16, i. 6, 35, v. 3, 28; Isocr. Nicocles, p. 34, Id. Paneg. p. 77, ed. Tauchn.

Tāra = (*τοί* + *ἀρα*).

Tāra is made up of *τοί* and *ἀρα*, its component elements retaining each its proper sense, and the whole being like the English 'so then.' *Τοί* refers to, and admits or assumes a foregoing statement, upon which follows another in accordance with and consequent upon it, being equivalent to the English 'then,' 'accordingly then.' *Ἀρα* marks that which it introduces as fitted or adapted to what goes before, in exact conformity with it, and is equivalent to 'as is fitting,' 'just so,' 'accordingly.' E.g. Aristoph. Av. 1446, *λόγοισι τὰρα καὶ περῶνται*; 'So, then, are they, in fact, winged with words?'

Here *τοί* refers to the promise that Peisthetærus had made to excite (lend wings to) Sykophantes with words, and to his allegation that the young men in the lounging-places, as the barber-shops, are excited by words, and admits what goes before. *Ἀρα* shows that the question asked is in just accordance with this admission.

Aristoph. Ran. 252, *δεινὰ τὰρα πεισόμεθα*, 'we shall then accordingly suffer terribly.' *Τοί* here refers to the immediately preceding recital, and by pointing to it recalls and admits it, and introduces a statement that is consequent upon this; *ἀρα* shows that this added statement is in just accordance with what goes before. Some prefer to write *τὰρα* in this place.

Τάρ, which occurs Il. i. 8, *τίς τάρ σφῶε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι*, may belong here; but some prefer to write *τ' ἀρ* for *τὲ* and *ἀρ*.

Τογάρ.

Τογάρ, 'accordingly then,' retains the proper sense of its elements *τοί* and *γάρ*, this latter, however, presenting rather the simpler notion of just accordance or conformity belonging to *ἀρα*, 'just so,' 'as is fitting,' than that of ground or reason, 'for,' which *γάρ* usually has. E.g. Il. i. 74, seqq., ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ, κέλευί με, Διὶ φίλε, μυθήσασθαι | μῆνιν Ἀπόλλωνος ἔκατ' ἡβέλετ' ἀνακτος | *τογάρ* ἐγὼν ἐρέω, 'you bid me speak of the wrath of Apollo. Accordingly then I will speak.' *Τοί* here refers to and assumes the previous command of Agamemnon, and introduces as a sequence the compliance of Nestor; *γάρ* shows that the act of compliance follows in accordance with the antecedent order, and, allowing for the force of *γέ* in *γάρ*, with the assent of the speaker. Od. i. 174-9, *καὶ μοι τοῦτ' ἀγόρευσον ἐτήτυμον, ὄφρ' εὖ εἰδῶ*. | . . . *τοιγάρ* ἐγὼ τοι (σοι) ταῦτα μάλ' ἀτρεχέως ἀγορεύσω. Telemachus makes inquiries of Mentès (Athene) how he came, and about other points suggested by the circumstances, and Mentès answers, 'accordingly then I will tell you of these things very accurately.' Add Od. i. 214, and Il. x. 413, *τογάρ* ἐγὼ τοι (σοι) ταῦτα μάλ' ἀτρεχέως καταλέξω, the latter referred to in Crusius' Lex. Hom.

Τογάρτοι.

Τογάρτοι has the sense of 'accordingly then, indeed,' 'therefore then, indeed;' e.g. Aristoph. Ach. 641-3 (cited by Hartung ii. p. 354), ταῦτα ποιήσας πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος ὑμῖν γεγένηται, | καὶ τοὺς δῆμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δείξας, ὡς δημοκρατοῦνται. | τογάρτοι νῦν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τὸν φόρον ὑμῖν ἀπάγοντες | ἔξουσιν, 'by so doing he has been the cause to you of many blessings, and by showing how the commonalties in the states are governed by the demos. Accordingly then, indeed, they will now come and bring the tribute to you.' The former part of the compound *τογάρ* has precisely the same force as in the preceding examples; and *τοί* at the end seems to be added by way of repeating merely what is expressed by *τογάρ*: so that the whole word is equivalent to 'accordingly then—then, or indeed,' that is, *τοί* super-added is to *τογάρ* what *τογάρ* is to the preceding sentence. Otherwise, the second *τοί* may be considered as lending an additional emphasis to the admission or affirmation already made by the first *τοί*, just as the second *quis* in *quisquis*, the second *quam* in *quamquam*, the second *ut* in *utut*. Thus regarded, it would be very suitably rendered by 'indeed.' Herod. iii. 3, τογάρτοι, ὧ μῆτερ, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ γένωμαι ἀνὴρ, Αἰγύπτου τὰ μὲν ἄνω κάτω θήσω. Cassandane has complained that, though she has borne to him such beautiful children, she is neglected by her husband Cyrus, who honors his Egyptian wife instead; and, upon hearing this complaint, Cambyses says, 'therefore then,' or 'for this reason then, whenever I become a man, I will turn Egypt upside down.' The sense of *τογάρτοι* is the same here as in the preceding example, except that while *τοί* admits the foregoing statement, and introduces what is consequent upon it, *γάρ* contains rather its usual sense of 'for;' so that, in conjunction with *τοί*, it may be properly rendered by 'therefore then.' Plat. Gorg. p. 494, D, ὡς ἀποπος εἰ, ὧ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημιουργός. Σωκ. τογάρτοι, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῆς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνδῆς, 'How unreasonable you are, Socrates, and an outright demagogue! Socr. Accordingly then, Cal-

icles, I confounded Polus and Gorgias, and made them ashamed; but you will not be confounded, nor even ashamed.'

Τογαροῦν.

Τογαροῦν may be rendered by 'wherefore,' or by 'accordingly then,' or 'therefore:' e.g. Xen. Memor. iii. 5, 11-12, οἳ δὴ καὶ λέγονται πολλὸν διενεγκεῖν τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀνδρώπων. . . . τογαροῦν πολλῶν μὲν μεταναστάσεων ἐν Ἑλλάδι γεγυνημένων, διέμειναν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν, 'accordingly therefore,' or 'wherefore then, though there were many changes of abode in Hellas, they remained in their own country.' Here *τοί* and *γάρ* have each the same sense as in *τογάρ*, above considered, and might properly be rendered by 'accordingly then;' and *οὖν* shows more distinctly that the proposition introduced by *τογαροῦν* is to be regarded as a rational conclusion from what precedes. Xen. Anab. i. 9, 18, ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τις γέ τι αὐτῷ προσαξάντι καλῶς ὑπηρετήσκειν, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἀχάριστον εἶσσε τὴν προθυμίαν. Τογαροῦν κράτιστοι δὴ ὑπηρεταὶ παντὸς ἔργου Κύρῳ ἐλέχθησαν γενέσθαι, 'and, indeed, if any one served him well, when he gave a commission to do any thing, he never allowed any man's zeal in his service to go unrequited. Accordingly then, for this reason, Cyrus is said to have had the best agents in every work.'

IV.—OF THE ACCUSATIVE CASE.

1. *a.* The accusative case is frequently employed in Homer, much more rarely in the later poets, and seldom in prose, to mark the object reached by motion, and, accordingly, attends verbs having this for their substantive idea. E.g. Hom. Od. iii. 162, οἱ μὲν ἀποστρέψαντες ἔβαν νέας ἀμφιελίσσας, 'they went to the ships;' Il. i. 317, κνίσση δ' οὐρανὸν ἵκεν, 'the odor went to heaven;' Soph. CEd. Tyr. 35, ἄστυ Καδμείων μολῶν, 'having come to the city of Cadmus;' Æsch. Prom. 703, γῆν πρὸ γῆς ἐλαύνομαι, 'I am driven from land to land;' Eur. Med. 7, Μήδεια πύργους γῆς ἐπλευσ' Ἰωλκίας, 'Medea sailed to the towers of the land of Iolcos;' Herod. ix. 26, ἡμέας ἰκνέεται, 'it reaches to us.' (See Kühner § 545.)

Although the above statement of the meaning of the accusative case, when thus used, may be accepted as practically

convenient, and in a general way true, yet it may be questioned whether it be strictly accurate; whether this accusative be simply the object reached by motion, or may not here also, as in so many other examples in which it occurs after actions and motions, especially where prepositions intervene, be more properly regarded as the measure of the extent to which the motion reaches, or the sign of the object to which it is to be limited. Thus, it may be doubted whether the phrase *δορυ Καδμείων μολών* means 'having come to the city of the Cadmeians,' or 'having come . . . as far as the city of the Cadmeians,' or, lastly, 'having come . . . as regards the city of the Cadmeians.' The first-named view, that the accusative denotes the object reached by motion, has the advantage, for practice at least, of being more simple; and, admitting it, the idea of the measure of the extent to which motion reaches, and that of the object to which the motion is to be limited, so immediately spring from it, or are so obviously equivalent to it, that it is difficult to set it aside. For, supposing the accusative to mark the object reached by motion, it follows of course that it will give the measure of the motion; and the denoting the object to which the motion is to be limited is but another way of measuring its extent. Yet, if it should be found that the prevalent sense of the accusative case is to mark the limit up to which an action or state is to be taken as reaching, it may seem not unreasonable to assign to it this force in those instances also in which it seems to express directly the object reached. On this supposition, the office of the accusative, when an action or motion is named, will be to connect an object with the action or motion by marking it as that with regard to which it is affirmed; so that the action or motion shall be understood as limited to this one among all possible objects.

In prose, and commonly in poetry also, the accusative which occurs with verbs of motion is attended by prepositions, which mark the relative direction of the motion, as by *εἰς*, *ἐπὶ*, *παρά*, *πρός*, *κατά*, &c. And then the accusative is plainly used in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' that is,

points out the object to which the motion into, upon, &c. is to be limited.

b. The accusative is employed with verbs expressing action, that is, with what are called transitive verbs, such as *κτείνω*, 'I kill,' *παίω*, 'I strike,' to mark the direct object, or that actually reached or immediately affected by the action; as, *παίω τὸν παῖδα*, 'I strike the boy.'

In such instances, as in the use of the accusative with verbs of motion, it is convenient for practice to consider the accusative as denoting the object actually reached, and so immediately affected, by the action. And yet it may be observed that, even here, the proper office of the accusative is so very closely related to that in which it gives the extent of the verb's action, or the limit to which it is to be understood as confined, that it can hardly be distinguished from it. When it is said, *παίω τὸν παῖδα*, 'I strike the boy,' the action of striking contained in *παίω* has *παῖδα* for its immediate object; but the true sense may be, 'I strike . . . as far as the boy is concerned,' that is, my striking is to be understood as having only this extent, or as being limited to this object, embracing no other; and, if so, the accusative is introduced to give the measure or extent of the verb's action, by marking the object to which it is confined, or as to which it is affirmed. Should this view be admitted, it will be much easier to explain the use of the accusative with many verbs, mostly intransitive, which, from their received meaning, would seem to require a dative case, or the aid of a preposition.

To this use of the accusative with active or transitive verbs belong a number of cases in which the verb is attended by two accusatives; but, as it will be convenient to notice these separately, they may be passed over for the present.

2. a. The accusative of nouns representing various denominations of weight and measure, and of general expressions of weight and measure, is used to mark the extent or amount of an action or motion. E.g. Herod. i. 81, *σταδίων δὲ πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα διαχομισάντες ἀπίκοντο ἐς τὸ ἱρὸν*, 'having gone forty-five stadia (that is, as far as, up to the

amount of, forty-five stadia), they arrived at the temple;' Id. vi. 119, ἀπέχειν δέκα καὶ δεκάσιους σταδίους, 'to be distant two hundred and ten stadia,' that is, 'to the amount of two hundred and ten stadia;' Id. iii. 89, τὸ δὲ Βαβυλώνιον τάλαντον δύναται Εὐβοϊδὸς ἐβδομήκοντα μνᾶς, 'the Babylonian talent is worth seventy Eubœic minæ,' that is, 'has worth or value to the amount of seventy Eubœic minæ.' (For examples, see Kühn. § 556.)

Here belong a number of general expressions of quantity, very commonly called adverbial; as, πολὺ, 'much,' πολλὰ, 'much,' 'often,' τὰ πολλὰ, 'for the most part,' μέγα, 'greatly,' ὀλίγον, 'a little,' μικρόν, 'a little,' ἴσον, 'equally,' τοσούτο, 'so much,' ὅσον, 'as,' &c. (See Kühn. A. Gr. § 556, Anm. 2.) And to this list may properly be added such expressions as τάχος, 'quickly,' that is, 'as far as quickness goes,' χράτος, 'powerfully,' that is, 'as far as strength goes.' (See Kühn. A. Gr. § 549, Anm. 2, 3.)

b. The accusative of the various denominations of time, and of general expressions of time, as, νύκτα, ἡμέραν, poet. ἡμαρ, χρόνον, &c., used in the same way to denote the amount of time occupied by an action or event, and rendered in English by 'during,' 'for,' or by the term itself without a preposition, is to be explained as the accusative of measure. E.g. Od. x. 142, ἐνθα τότε ἐκβάντες δύο τ' ἡματα καὶ δύο νύκτας | κείμεθα, 'then, having there disembarked, we lay two days and two nights,' or, 'for, during, two days and two nights;' Herod. vi. 127, ἥ δὲ Σύβαρις ἡκμαζε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, 'Sybaris flourished during this time,' or, 'for this space of time;' Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 24, καταλαμβάνει τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ χωμάρχου ἐννᾶτην ἡμέραν γεγαμημένην, 'married nine days,' properly, 'up to, as much as, the ninth day.' (For examples see Kühn. A. Gr. § 555.) Here belong, probably, several expressions called adverbial, as, ἐννῆμαρ, 'for nine days,' παντῆμαρ, 'for every day,' &c.

c. Most nearly akin to this sense of the accusative, although less obviously expressing measure or amount, is the case in which it attends upon verbs of motion to mark the object which the motion embraces, to which alone it is to be understood as applying, where it is sometimes said to denote

the way over which the motion passes. Thus with περᾶν, 'to pass,' ἔρπειν, 'to creep,' 'to go,' βαίνειν, 'to go,' πορεύεσθαι, 'to go on a journey,' 'to march,' &c. E.g. Od. iii. 71, πόθεν πλεῖθ' ὑγρά κέλευθα; 'whence sail ye on the watery paths?' (that is, 'on the sea?') properly, 'whence sail ye . . . as regards, as far as concerns, the watery paths?' It is indicated, by the introduction of the noun in the accusative case, that the sailing is to be understood, not as embracing any object indifferently, but as being restricted to the sea; for, as the action of sailing may have regard to other objects, as the air, rivers, &c., it is required that it shall be expressed distinctly to which one of such possible objects it is to be confined. And to express this restriction to some one object the accusative is fitted by virtue of its office of marking the measure or proper limits of an action. When the genitive was under consideration, it was shown how, in the phrase πίνειν ὕδωρ, 'to drink water,' the accusative is used to denote the particular object to which the act of drinking is to be understood as referred, as distinguished from other proper objects of drinking, by showing that it is to this object that it is limited, that it extends to this and to no other. It is precisely so with the accusative ὑγρά κέλευθα, in the above example, standing after πλεῖθ'; for it shows that the act of sailing is not to be taken as affirmed absolutely, but only in a limited sense, namely, as having regard to the sea. So Od. i. 330, κλίμαχα δ' ὑψηλὴν κατεβήσατο, 'he descended by the lofty stairway;' that is, his descending is to be taken in a limited sense, and as having regard only to 'the lofty stairway,' or as being affirmed in this extent only, and not generally. In like manner, Eurip. Med. 1067, ἀλλ' εἰμὲ γὰρ δὴ τλημονεστάτην ὁδόν, 'but—for I will go then the most wretched road;' that is, the going of which Medea speaks is to be regarded as affirmed in the precise extent denoted by the noun in the accusative case, and not absolutely. And, again, Herod. vi. 119, τρέπεται τριφασίας ὁδοῦς, 'it directs its course three different ways,' that is, the directing its course is to be understood as having a definite limit as to the objects which it embraces, as being affirmed only in regard to three different ways. Add Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 43,

ἄγειν (στρατιάν) ἢ στενὰς ἢ πλατεῖας ὁδοὺς, 'to lead an army either by narrow or by wide roads;' that is, the leading an army is restricted in its application to the definite objects introduced by the accusative, 'as far as concerns narrow or wide roads.' And Demosth. Phil. i. p. 49, 54, ἀγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλείοντας τὴν θάλατταν, 'plundering and carrying captive those who sail upon the sea.' (For examples, see Kühn. A. Gr. § 554.)

In such cases, therefore, the accusative introduced to mark the extent in which the action or motion is affirmed, differs from the common accusative of measure in the fact of its expressing the extent of the action or motion, not in any denomination of measure, noting how far it goes, but by showing what object among many possible ones it reaches or embraces. Thus, when it is said, πόθεν πλεῖδ' ὑγρὰ κέλευθα, 'whence sail ye on the watery ways?' the accusative ὑγρὰ κέλευθα does not show how far the sailing goes, as measured by days or leagues, but that it is limited in its application to a definite object named by the accusative, that it embraces, or is to be understood of, only a particular one among several appropriate objects, namely, 'the watery paths,' or 'the sea.' On the other hand, when it is said, ἐπλευσε πεντήκοντα σταδίους, 'he sailed fifty stadia,' the accusative πεντήκοντα σταδίους shows the extent of the sailing, how far it reaches, as expressed in a denomination of measure. In both cases equally, however, the accusative is one of measurē or extent, the only essential difference being found in the way in which the action or motion is measured or limited as to its extent. In the one case, regard is had to its extent as determined by some denomination of measure; in the other, to its extent as determined by its reaching to or embracing only one or more of several suitable objects.

Here belong a number of expressions, commonly called adverbial, as, τὴν ταχίστην (sc. ὁδόν), 'as quickly as possible,' properly, 'by the quickest way,' τὴν πρώτην, 'first,' 'as early as possible,' properly, 'by the first way,' τὴν εὐθεΐαν, 'straightway,' properly, 'by the direct road,' μακρὰν, 'a long way,' ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην, 'first one way and then another,'

'this way and that,' ἀντὶν, 'over against,' 'right opposite;' and so, ἀντιβίην, 'against,' ἀντίον, 'against,' πλησίον, 'near,' αὐτόδιον, 'straightway,' properly, 'by the selfsame way.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 554, Anm. 2.)

d. In the same way is to be explained the accusative which, in poetry, occurs even with verbs that do not express motion, as, κεῖσθαι, στήναι, ἥσθαι, θάσσειν, καθίζειν. E.g. Eurip. Or. 1243, στήθ' αἱ μὲν ὑμῶν τόνδ' ἑμαξήρη τρίβον, αἱ δ' ἄλλον ὁμιον, 'stand some of you in this chariot-way, others of you in another pathway.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 554, Anm. 3.) The accusative here shows that the substantive idea contained in the verb is to be understood as set forth with a regard to a certain way, and as confined to this; so that the 'standing' is described as limited in its character or condition by the term 'chariot-way,' or is a 'standing' that regards or is confined to a 'chariot-way.'

e. Of the same nature with the accusative of measure or extent, above considered, is this case as seen in the examples, occurring chiefly in poetic language, in which, with certain verbs, among which is δατράπτειν, 'to flash,' a noun of corresponding sense is added to show the character of the action by marking the object to which it is to be restricted. E.g. Æsch. Prom. 364, ἐξ ὀμμάτων δ' ἥστραπτε γοργωπὸν σέλας, 'and from his eyes sent forth flashes of terrible light,' the accusative γοργωπὸν σέλας marking that the flashes sent forth (ἥστραπτε) are to be taken as having for their measure, that is, for the object with regard to which they are to be considered, and hence for the expression of their fearful character, the terrible light of the gorgon's face. Eurip. Phœn. 233, ὦ λάμπουσα πέτρα πυρὸς διχόρυφον σέλας, 'O rock that shinest with forked blaze of fire!' Here the accusative διχόρυφον σέλας shows in what extent the term λάμπουσα is to be taken, and thereby describes its character, so that it shall be understood to be a shining that is limited to the peculiar appearance of a double-pointed or forked flame. (For these and other examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 548, 1 and 2.)

Here belongs also the case in which, after verbs signifying 'to look' or 'have an aspect,' as δέρκειν, the accusa-

tive is added to define the manner or character of the verb's action by restricting it to a particular object, and thus denoting with what compass of meaning it is to be taken. E.g. Od. xix. 446, *ὄς πῦρ ὀφθαλμοῖσι δεδορκώς*, 'a boar looking fire with his eyes,' that is, looking fiercely, as if his eyes were on fire. Here the accusative might seem, at first view, to be the direct object of the verb's substantive idea of looking, just as in English we say 'to look fire.' But, upon examining it more narrowly, it will be seen that the sense of *δέρκειν* is 'to have a look,' 'to have a certain aspect,' and that the accusative is added to describe in what extent this is to be taken; so that, when it is said of the boar that he has a certain look or aspect with his eyes, this sense is confined by the addition of the accusative *πῦρ* to the precise extent of this term. And by thus limiting an expression to the compass of a particular term, not allowing it to be taken absolutely, but within the boundary marked by it, the accusative does in fact give the characteristic property of such expression. By indicating that its meaning is to be accepted only in terms of a particular object, it excludes every other possible acceptance, and assigns to it a special and definite character. To have a look, for example, that is limited in the extent of its meaning by the term fire, so that it shall embrace this idea to the exclusion of all others, is to have a look distinguished from other looks by the character of fire. Just as in the phrase *πίνειν ὕδωρ*, 'to drink water,' the act of drinking is distinguished from other acts of drinking by being confined to *ὕδωρ*, 'water.' So in the expression *βλέπειν Ἄρην*, 'to look Ares,' 'to have the aspect of Ares,' the accusative *Ἄρην*, by confining the look or aspect to the precise compass marked by the term 'Ares,' does in effect give to it a peculiar character; and this may be expressed in English by saying 'to have the look or aspect of Ares.' (For other examples, including adjectives also, and for the accusative used in the same way with verbs of 'weeping,' see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 548, 3 and 4.)

3. a. The accusative case is used, although comparatively seldom, to mark the period of time to which an action or

event is referred. E.g. Herod. ii. 2, *τὴν ὥρην ἀπαγνέειν σφίσι αἰγας*, 'that at the fit time they should bring goats to them.' Here the accusative has, properly speaking, the sense of 'as regards' in English, that is, denotes the object with regard to which exclusively a proposition is to be taken. Thus, in the example cited, the proposition, when stated absolutely, is that king Psammetichus gave orders 'that they should bring goats to (for) them,' *ἀπαγνέειν σφίσι αἰγας*; the accusative *τὴν ὥρην* is added to show that this proposition is to be understood as being restricted to, as having exclusive regard to, 'the fit time;' so that the order to bring goats to the infants was not given absolutely, but with exclusive regard to a specified time. And this is, in fact, the same thing as to restrict the proposition within definite limits, or to mark its extent; and the accusative case, so employed, appears in its common office as heretofore exhibited. Aristoph. Acharn. 23, *ἄωριαν ἔχοντες*, 'having arrived too late;' that is, the arrival is spoken of 'with a regard to a time inopportune,' or is to be understood as having this limitation.

In the same way may be explained some expressions of time called adverbial, as, *τὸ τέλος*, 'at length,' 'finally,' 'in the end,' that is, 'as regards the end;' *τὸ τελευταῖον*, 'at last,' properly, 'as regards what is last;' *καιρόν*, 'opportune,' that is, 'as regards a fitting occasion.'

In such expressions of the time to which an event is referred, it is more usual to add a preposition, as *πρὸς ἡμέραν*, *ad lucem*, 'towards day,' *εἰς ἑσπέραν*, 'against evening.' But the accusative, even then, has the sense of 'as regards.' And it may be repeated, with respect to this sense of 'as regards,' so commonly borne by the accusative case, that it is but a more general way of expressing within what limits a statement is to be understood, or of assigning its measure or extent.

b. To this class of the significations of the accusative case, namely, that in which it has the meaning of 'as regards,' and marks in a more general way the limitation with which a statement is made or an action is set forth, belong the examples in which verbs, mostly intransitive,

are attended by the accusative of nouns of the same or of a like signification. E.g. Il. ix. 74, *ὅς κεν δρίστην | βουλὴν βουλεύσῃ*, 'whoever shall give (counsel) the best counsel;' Eurip. Med. 607, *ἀράς τυράννους ἀνοσίους ἀρωμένη*, 'imprecating impious curses upon the king;' Id. ib. 1041, *τί προσελάττε τὸν πανύστατον γέλων*; 'why do you laugh your last laugh of all?' And so, occasionally, after adjectives: e.g. Plat. Rep. vi. p. 490, D, *κακούς πᾶσαν κακίαν*, 'wicked with every wickedness.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 547, a, and Anm. 1.)

Here, as above suggested, the accusative has the sense of 'as regards,' and limits the substantive idea of the verb by marking the extent in which it is to be taken. Thus, in the first example cited, the action of 'counselling' contained in *βουλεύσῃ* is restricted by the accusative *δρίστην βουλὴν* to a particular case, 'whoever shall give counsel . . . as regards, as far as goes, the best counsel.' This is more manifest if the verb *βουλεύειν* be taken in its proper intransitive sense of 'to be an adviser or counsellor.' In the second example likewise, *ἀρωμένη* signifying 'making prayers or imprecations,' the accusative *ἀράς ἀνοσίους* shows in what restricted sense this is to be here understood, 'making prayers,' not in any possible sense or extent, but 'as regards,' 'as far as go, impious prayers or imprecations;' and the accusative *τυράννους*, again, adds another limitation, namely, by indicating the person with respect to whom the whole statement is made, that is, to whom it is to be limited; 'making impious imprecations . . . as regards the king.' The other examples require the same interpretation. And it may be observed that this interpretation receives confirmation from the examples in which such accusative cases as *οὐδέν*, 'not at all,' *ταῦτα*, 'so,' 'thus,' *τί*, 'somewhat,' *τί*; 'what?' &c. accompany verbs which otherwise have the accusative of nouns of the same or of a like sense. E.g. Herod. iii. 33, *ταῦτα μὲν ἐς τοὺς οἰκίους ὁ Καμβύσης ἐξεμύνε*, 'Cambyzes committed these acts of madness against the members of his own family;' properly, 'as regards these things, thus far, Cambyzes acted the madman towards (as regards) the members of his own family.' (For the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 547, Anm. 3.)

The explanation is the same where the idea contained in the noun in the accusative case, and that expressed by the verb upon which it follows, are not the same, but only kindred, or generally corresponding in sense. E.g. Thuc. i. 126, *Ὀλυμπία νενικηκότι*, 'as he had been victor in the Olympic games;' that is, 'as he had been victor . . . as regards, as far as concerns, the Olympic games;' Id. vii. 66, *τάς μὲν νενικήκατε ναυμαχίας*, 'you have conquered in some sea-fights.' (For the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 547, 2.)

To this place, more appropriately perhaps, belong examples such as those already considered under the accusative denoting the extent of meaning to be attributed to an action. (See above, 2, e.)

c. The accusative is used also with verbs of action or motion to express the object for which, or with a view to which, it is performed: e.g. Il. x. 195, *δοσοὶ κεκλήατο βούλῃν*, 'as many as were called to the council,' or, 'with a view to the council,' that is, 'for consultation;' Herod. vi. 85, *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δικαστήριον συναγαγόντες*, 'the Lacedæmonians having brought them together before the tribunal of justice.' (See Kühn. § 549.) In fact, however, the accusative, in such examples, has the sense of 'as regards,' 'so far as is concerned,' or limits the action of the verb to the object marked by the noun in the accusative case. Thus, in the first example cited above, the phrase *δοσοὶ κεκλήατο*, 'as many as were summoned,' is restricted in its sense, by the addition of *βούλῃν*, to a defined extent or specific application, so that the summoning shall be understood to have regard only to a council. The notion of the object had in view, so far as involved in the use of the accusative case, is derived from the circumstances in which it is employed, just as where the prepositions *μετά*, *εἰς*, &c. are introduced, (see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. ib. Anm. 1,) and just as the manner or character of an action, when expressed by the accusative, as above explained, is due to the proper relations between the noun introduced by it and the action of the verb. When it is said, *δικαστήριον συναγαγόντες*, 'having brought them together . . . as regards, or with regard to, a tribunal of justice,' the idea that the bringing persons together is with a view to trial before a

tribunal, is to be gathered only from the obvious relations of the parties brought together, and the proper office of a tribunal of justice. They being persons deemed guilty of offence against the laws, and the office of a tribunal of justice being to judge criminals, the bringing them together . . . with a regard to a tribunal of justice at once conveys the idea that they are brought together for trial before a tribunal of justice.

d. Besides the instances already mentioned, the accusative occurs in a number of cases without a verb or adjective upon which it might be said to depend, and where it is said to be used adverbially. Thus, *χάριν ἐμήν, σήν*, 'for my sake,' 'for your sake,' that is, 'as regards,' or 'with a regard to,' and hence, as just seen, 'with a view to my, to your, gratification;' *δωρεάν*, 'as a gratuity,' 'for nothing,' that is, 'regarded as a gratuity;' *δωρίην*, 'for nothing,' 'regarded as a gift;' *προίκα*, 'for nothing;' *μάτην*, 'in vain;' *τούτο*, *ταῦτα*, 'therefore,' that is, 'as regards this;' *τί;* 'why?' that is, 'as regards what?' *ὧ*, 'wherefore,' that is, 'as regards which.'

In the same way the accusative is employed in other phrases, such as *τούτον τὸν τρόπον*, 'in this manner,' that is, 'as regards this manner,' *δίχην*, 'like,' 'in the way or manner of,' that is, 'as regards the way or manner of.' (See Passow's Lex. s. v. *δίχη*, and Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 549, Anm. 2 and 3.)

Of the same nature essentially is the accusative in such expressions as *εὖρος*, 'in width,' that is, 'as regards width,' 'as far as width goes;' *ὕψος*, 'in height,' *μέγεθος*, 'in size,' *βάθος*, 'in depth,' *μήκος*, 'in length,' *πλήθος*, 'in number,' *ἀριθμόν*, 'in number,' *γένος*, 'in family,' *ὄνομα*, 'in name,' *μέρος*, 'in turn,' *πρόφασιν*, 'for a pretext,' *τὸ δ' ἀληθές*, 'and in truth,' *γνώμην ἐμήν*, 'in my opinion,' that is, 'as regards my opinion.' Add *τὸναντίον*, *τάναντία*, 'on the contrary,' *τᾶλλα*, 'for the rest,' *ἀμφοτέρων* and *ἀμφοτέρα*, 'both ways,' *τούτο μὲν . . . τούτο δέ*, 'in the first place . . . in the second place.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 557, Anm. 3 and 4.)

e. The accusative is used in the same sense with a number of verbs, mostly intransitive, where, at the first view, and

from the mode of rendering these verbs in English, this case seems to mark the direct object, or else to occupy the place of the dative case. Thus, with verbs signifying 'to help,' 'to profit,' *ὠφελεῖν*, *δυνάμει*, *δύνασθαι*; 'to harm,' *βλάπτειν*; 'to wrong,' *ἀδικεῖν*; 'to insult,' 'to act insolently,' *ὕβριζεν*, (followed also by *εἰς* and the accusative;) 'to hurt,' *λυμαίνεσθαι*, *λωβᾶσθαι*; 'to reverence,' 'to be reverential,' *εὐσεβεῖν*; 'to be irreverent,' *ἀσεβεῖν*; 'to lie in wait for,' *λόχῳ*; 'to punish,' 'to take revenge,' 'to avenge one's self,' *τιμωρεῖσθαι*, seldom *τιμωρεῖν*; 'to attend or wait upon,' *θεραπεύειν*; 'to attend as a body-guard,' *δορυφορεῖν*; 'to be a guardian,' *ἐπιτροπεύειν*; 'to flatter,' *κολακεύειν*; 'to wheedle,' *θωπεύειν*, and *θώπειν*; 'to do obeisance,' *προσκυνεῖν*; 'to persuade,' *πείθειν*; 'to answer,' *ἀμείβεσθαι*. E.g. Il. i. 394-5, *εἵποτε δὴ τι ἦ | ἔπει ὠνησας κραδίην Διὸς ἠὲ καὶ ἔργῳ*, 'if at any time now you have profited the heart of Jove either by word or deed;' that is, 'if you have been of profit . . . as regards the heart of Jove;' Æsch. Prom. 945, *θῶπτε τὸν κρατοῦντ' αἰεὶ*, 'flatter whoever is in power,' that is, 'be a flatterer . . . as regards him that is successively in power;' Thuc. i. 132, *Πλείστρχον . . . ἐπετρόπευεν (ὁ Πανσανίας)*, 'Pausanias was guardian of Pleistarchus;' Plat. Rep. i. p. 334, D, *ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους (δοκεῖ) ἢ δικαιοσύνην, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς*, 'justice seems to benefit one's friends, but to injure one's foes,' that is, 'to be of service . . . as regards one's friends, but to do hurt . . . as regards one's foes.' (For the list of verbs, and for the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 550.)

Although, in such cases, it is not possible, looking at the signification of most of these verbs from our point of view, and using our mode of expressing their meaning, to say beforehand that they should be followed by the accusative rather than the dative, so that much must be left to practice, and to an attentive observation of the actual use of the Greek authors, yet it is not difficult, if we carefully consider the proper meaning of the verbs, to see how the accusative, when employed, is to be interpreted. With regard to a number of these verbs, it is plain that they express a mere state or character, as, *ὠφελεῖν*, 'to be of service,' *ἀδικεῖν*, 'to be a wrong-doer;' and the same is probably true of them

all. Taking the verbs in this sense, the accusative naturally attends them to mark the object with regard to which the state or character expressed by the substantive idea of the verb is affirmed, that is, to which it is to be understood as limited; and so is widely different from the dative, which, however, might possibly have attended these verbs consistently with its own proper sense.

Some of these verbs actually have the dative case: thus, *ὠφελεῖν*, which in Attic prose has regularly the accusative, in the older Attic prose is occasionally used with the dative. But even in poetry the dative occurs with it but rarely: e.g. *Æsch. Pers.* 839, *τοῖς θανοῦσαι πλούτος οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ*; *Eur. Orest.* 655, *τοὺς φίλους ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρή τοῖς φίλοις ὠφελεῖν*. And so *βλάπτειν* *τινί*, in *Æsch. Eum.* 658; also *λυμαίνεισθαι*, *λωβῶσθαι*, *δορυφορεῖν*, and, in later writers, *προσκυνεῖν*. *Ἀσεβεῖν* and *ἀδικεῖν* have also *εἰς*, *πρός*, and *περί* with the accusative; and *ὕβριζεν* has *εἰς* and *πρός* with the accusative: e.g. *Plat. Symp.* p. 174, *Ὁμηρος μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύει οὐ μόνον διαφθεῖραι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕβρισαι εἰς ταύτην τὴν παροιμίαν*. (See Kühn. § 550, Anm. 1.)

It may be added that the dative case, when used with these verbs, has its proper sense of the final object of the state or character expressed by them, whereas the accusative defines the limits within which it is affirmed. And, again, that the accusative with the prepositions *εἰς*, &c. occurring with these verbs, is to be interpreted according to the sense above attributed to it, and which it has elsewhere with these same prepositions, and with so many other verbs.

f. The same interpretation is to be given to the accusative case occurring with verbs which signify 'to say or do good or evil,' as, *εὐεργετεῖν*, *κακουργεῖν*, *κακοποιεῖν*, *εὐλογεῖν*, *κακολογεῖν*, *εἰδ*, *καλῶς*, *κακῶς* *δρᾶν*, *λέγειν*, *εἰπεῖν*, and *ἀπαγορεύειν*, 'to forbid.' E.g. *Soph. Aj.* 1154, *ἀνδρῶπε, μὴ δρᾷ τοὺς τεθνηκότας κακῶς*, 'do not maltreat the dead,' that is, 'do not treat ill . . . as regards the dead,' 'as far as concerns the dead;' *Xen. Cyr.* i. 6, 29, *ἵνα . . . μὴ κακουργοίητε τοὺς φίλους*, 'that you might not do evil to your friends,' that is, 'that you might not be evil-doers . . . as regards your friends.' (For the list of verbs, and for the examples, see Kühn. § 561.)

g. The accusative case has the same office of marking the object 'as regards,' 'as to,' which an action or state is affirmed, that is, the limits within which it is to be understood, when it is employed with verbs signifying 'to stay,' *μένειν*, 'to await,' 'to abide,' *περιμένειν*, 'to be stout-hearted,' 'to be of good courage,' 'to be confident,' *θαρβεῖν*, 'to flee,' 'to be an exilo,' *φεύγειν*, 'to run away,' 'to escape,' *ἀποφεύγειν*, *ἀποδιδράσκειν*, 'to be a runaway,' *δραπτεῦεν*. E.g. *Demosth. Phil.* i. p. 50, extr., *οἱ δὲ τῶν πράγματων καιροὶ οὐ μένουσι τὴν ἡμετέραν βραδυτῆτά*, 'the fit junctures in affairs do not wait for our tardiness;' *Id. Ol.* ii. (al. iii.) p. 30, 7, *οὔτε Φίλιππος ἐθάρρει τούτους, οὔθ' οὗτοι Φίλιππον*, 'neither was Philip confident of these, nor were these confident of Philip,' that is, 'as regards these,' 'as regards Philip;' *Eurip. Med.* 561, *πένητα φεύγει πῶς τις ἐκποδῶν φίλος*, 'every friend flies a poor man,' that is, 'flies out of the way . . . as regards a poor man.' (For the list of verbs, and for the examples, see Kühn. A. Gr. § 551, 3, and Anm. 3.)

h. In the same sense the accusative is used with verbs signifying 'to escape notice,' *λανθάνειν*, 'to conceal,' 'to be concealed,' *κρύπτειν*, *κρύπτεσθαι*, *κεύθειν*: e.g. *Plat. Rep.* ii. p. 365, D, *θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιδασθαι δυνατόν*, 'it is not possible either to escape the notice of the gods, or to force them,' that is, 'to escape notice . . . as regards the gods.' And so when *κρύπτειν* has two accusatives; *κρύπτειν τινα τι*, 'to hide a thing from a person,' that is, 'to hide a thing . . . as regards a person;' where *τι* also may probably be used in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' and the meaning be, 'to make concealment . . . as regards a thing . . . so far as a person is concerned.' The construction of the accusative with *λανθάνειν* is still more evident, taking it in its proper sense of 'to be in a state of *λήθη*,' understood objectively, 'to be forgotten,' and so 'to escape observation.' (For the list of verbs, and for the examples, see Kühn. A. Gr. § 551, 4.)

i. So also the accusative is used with the verbs *φθάνειν*, 'to anticipate,' 'to be beforehand;' *λείπειν*, 'to leave,' *ἐπιλείπειν*, 'to fail:' e.g. *Herod. vi.* 115, *περιέπλων Σούνου βουλόμενοι φθῆναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπικόμενοι ἐς τὸ ἄστυ*, 'wishing

to be beforehand with the Athenians in reaching the city,' that is, 'to be beforehand . . . as regards the Athenians.' (See Kühn. § 551, 5.)

k. The accusative has the same meaning when used with verbs signifying 'to take away,' 'to deprive,' as, *ἀφαιρῆσθαι*, *στερεῖν*, &c.; 'to put on or off,' *ἐνδύειν*, *ἀμφιεσθῆναι*; 'to teach,' *διδάσκειν*. (See Kühn. § 551, 6, and below, under the double accusative.)

l. So likewise with *δεῖ*, *oportet*, 'it behooves,' and *χρή*, *necesse est*, 'it is required,' the accusative, when used, has the sense of 'as regards.' *Δεῖ*, in prose, is used with the dative also; but in connection with the infinitive this construction is rare. *Χρή* with the dative is rather poetical: e.g. Soph. Antig. 736, *ἀλλ' ἢ μοι χρὴ γέ τ' ἴσθ' ἄρχειν χθονός*; 'is it requisite for another than me to rule this land?' (See Kühn. A. Gr. § 551, 6, Anm. 5.)

m. In poetry, verbs of motion, as, *βαίνειν*, 'to go,' *ἀίσσειν*, 'to rush,' *περᾶν*, 'to go beyond,' *πλεῖν*, 'to sail,' *ῥέπειν*, 'to creep,' *σπεύδειν*, 'to hasten,' and others, are sometimes attended by the accusative to mark the object with regard to which definitely the motion is affirmed, or, which is materially the same thing, the limit within which a statement is to be taken. E.g. Soph. Antig. 1198, *τύχῃ καταρρέπει τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα*, 'fortune weighs down him that is fortunate,' that is, 'fortune weighs down (inclines the scale against) . . . as regards him that is fortunate;' Eurip. Phœn. 1427, *προβάς δὲ κῶλον δεξιόν*, 'advancing the right limb,' that is, 'advancing . . . so far as regards the right limb;' Eurip. Iph. Taur. 398, *ἔπλευσας νάϊον ὄχημα*, 'you sailed with a ship's conveyance,' that is, 'you sailed . . . as far as goes a ship's conveyance;' the accusative *νάϊον ὄχημα* showing that the act of sailing is to be limited in its sense, that it extends only to a particular means of conveyance, or embraces no other kind of conveyance, but is confined to this; Thuc. vi. 39, *κατὰ σπεύδειν*, 'to hasten on evils,' that is, 'to hasten on . . . as regards evils;' the accusative *κατὰ* showing that the hastening on, which might be otherwise understood of other things, or taken absolutely, is to be restricted to this par-

ticular. Herod. i. 206, *παῦσαι σπεύδων τὰ σπεύδεις*. (See Kühn. A. Gr. § 552, 7, and above, 2, c. p. 110.)

n. In the same way, verbs which signify 'to make a noise,' as *κροτεῖν*, *κροταλίζειν*, &c., have in poetry, and more rarely in prose, an accusative added to denote the object to which the noise is to be referred, and with regard to which exclusively it is affirmed. E.g. Il. xi. 160, *ἵπποι κείν' ὄχεα κροτάλιζον ἀνὰ πτολέμοιο γεφύρας*, 'the horses rattled with empty chariots throughout the lines of battle;' properly, 'the horses made a rattling noise . . . as regards the empty chariots,' or 'so far as were concerned the empty chariots.' The phrase *ἵπποι κροτάλιζον*, 'the horses made a rattling noise,' is restricted in its application by the addition of the accusative *κείν' ὄχεα*, 'empty chariots,' to definite objects, so that it is no longer declared absolutely that the horses made a rattling noise, but that they made a rattling noise only so far as empty chariots were concerned. And by thus referring the noise to a definite set of objects, and by restricting the affirmation of it to these, the accusative case does in fact qualify or describe it as having a specific character or origin, as being a rattling noise that belongs to or is made by empty chariots. In effect, the accusative here performs an office similar to that of the genitive, but without usurping its place, since it does it in a different way. With the above example compare Il. xv. 453, and Herod. vi. 58, *λέβητα κροτέουσι*, 'they beat, make a noise with, a kettle,' that is, they make a rattling noise, to be understood, not absolutely, but as having regard exclusively to a kettle, and as being determined in its character by being limited to it; 'they make a rattling noise . . . as far as a kettle goes.' (For the examples, see Kühn. § 552, 7.)

o. The accusative has the same sense of 'as regards' when used with such verbs as *χορεύειν*, 'to dance,' *ἐλίσσασθαι*, 'to whirl in the dance,' to mark the person in whose honor the dance is performed, as in solemn religious services. E.g. Pind. Isthm. i. 8, *Φοῖβον χορεύειν*, 'to perform choric dances in honor of Phœbus;' properly, 'to dance or perform a choric dance . . . with regard to Phœbus,' Phœbus being the object with regard to whom the action is affirmed, that

is, the accusative *Φοῖβον* having the effect of limiting the term *χορεύειν* to this precise extent. But to dance in a religious service with an exclusive regard to the divinity Phœbus can mean nothing else than to dance in honor of Phœbus. Eurip. Iph. in Aul. 1480, *ἔλσσει' ἀμφὶ ναόν, ἀμφὶ βωμόν Ἀρτεμιν*, 'dance around the temple, around the altar, in honor of Artemis,' that is, 'with a view to Artemis,' the accusative *Ἀρτεμιν*, 'with regard to Artemis,' denoting that the action of *ἔλσσει* is to be taken as having regard to her alone. (For the examples, see Kühn. A. Gr. § 552, 8.)

p. Again, the accusative is used in the sense of 'as regards,' or 'with regard to,' with the verbs which signify 'to swear,' as, *ὄμνουμε*, marking the object by which a person swears. E.g. Il. xiv. 271, *ὅμοσον ἄδατον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ*, 'swear by the inviolable water of Styx,' properly, 'swear . . . with a regard to, in view of, the inviolable water of Styx.' The accusative shows that the act of swearing is to be restricted in its application to the definite object *Στυγὸς ὕδωρ*, so as to have this alone in view. And so the accusative after *μὰ, οὐ μὰ, ναὶ μὰ, νῆ*. E.g. Il. i. 234, *ναὶ μὰ τόδε σκήπτρον*, 'yes, by this sceptre,' that is, 'with regard to, in view of, this sceptre;' Il. i. 86, *οὐ μὰ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνα*, 'no, by Apollo,' that is, 'with regard to Apollo,' 'in view of Apollo.' Cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 3, 6. (For the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 552, 9.)

q. The accusative has the same sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' when used with verbs expressing various emotions, to mark the objects with regard to which these emotions are felt; as, *φοβεῖσθαι, δέισαι*, 'to fear,' *αἰσχύνεσθαι*, 'to be ashamed,' *αἰδεῖσθαι*, 'to reverence,' 'to stand in awe,' *ἀλγεῖν*, 'to grieve,' *ἄχθεσθαι, ἄχυνσθαι*, 'to be vexed,' *δυσχεραίνειν*, 'to be painfully affected,' *χαίρειν*, 'to rejoice,' *ἡδεσθαι*, 'to be pleased,' *γῆθεῖν*, 'to be glad,' 'to be delighted,' *θάμβειν, ταρβέειν*, 'to be alarmed,' *ἐκπλήττεσθαι, καταπλήττεσθαι*, 'to be astounded,' 'to be terrified,' *οἰκτερεῖν, ἐλεεῖν*, 'to pity,' *ὀλοφύρεσθαι*, 'to bewail.' E.g. Od. ix. 130, *δείσαντες δλεδρον*, 'fearing destruction,' that is, 'having fear . . . as regards destruction;' Od. ix. 269, *ἀλλ' αἰδεῖο, φέριστε, θεούς*, 'reverence the gods,' that is, 'be reverential, stand in awe . . . as regards the gods;' Eurip. Hippol. 1355, *τοὺς γὰρ εὐσεβεῖς θεοὶ θνήσκοντας οὐ*

χαίρουσι, 'for the gods rejoice not at the death of the pious,' that is, 'the gods rejoice not . . . as regards the pious, when they die;' Xen. Rep. Lac. ii. 11, *αἰδεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀρχοντας*, 'to respect their rulers,' that is, 'to be respectful . . . as regards their rulers.' Here, manifestly, the accusative case sets a limit to the extent of the feeling expressed by the verb, by marking a particular object with regard to which exclusively it is to be understood as entertained. (For the list of verbs, and for the examples, see Kühn. § 553, 10.)

And so with respect to the accusative case employed with verbs that express actions by which grief is manifested; as, *κόπτεσθαι*, 'to cut one's self,' *τίλλεσθαι*, 'to pluck the beard,' *τύπτεσθαι*, 'to beat one's self.' E.g. Eurip. Troad. 628, *κόπτεσθαι νεκρόν*, 'to lament the dead,' properly, 'to cut one's self . . . with regard to a dead body;' Herod. ii. 132, *τύπτεσθαι τὸν θεόν*, 'to bewail the god,' properly, 'to beat one's self . . . with regard to the god.' (See Kühn. § 553, 10.)

The genitive case also occurs with verbs that express the emotions, as has been seen under that case; but, although rendered in English in the same way with the accusative, it is not to be confounded in sense with that case. The accusative marks the limit within which the emotion is to be considered as felt, by naming the object to which it extends, and to which it is to be confined; the genitive denotes the object with respect to which specifically it is affirmed, and by which it is characterized. The result is materially the same, the way by which it is reached is different.

r. Again, the accusative occurs with many neuter and passive verbs, besides those mentioned, and with a number of adjectives, to denote the object to which the action, state, or quality contained in these is to be considered as limited in its extent, being, here also, equivalent to the English 'as to,' 'as regards,' 'so far as is concerned,' and therefore, properly speaking, an accusative of measure. Thus:

a. With verbs: e.g. Od. i. 208-9, *αἰνῶς γὰρ κεφαλὴν τε καὶ ὄμματα καλὰ ἔοικας | κείνῳ*, 'for in your head and handsome eyes you are exceedingly like him,' that is, 'you are exceed-

ingly like him . . . as regards, so far as are concerned, your head and handsome eyes,' the resemblance being asserted with the limitation indicated by the accusative *κεφαλῇν* and *ὄμματα*. Soph. Aj. 934, *κλεινώπῳ θυμὸν ἐφθυρίζει πολέτλας ἀνὴρ*, 'the much-enduring man insults me with his dark wrath,' that is, 'is insolent . . . as regards, so far as goes, his dark wrath;' Herod. ii. 111, *τὸν δὲ βασιλέα λέγουσι . . . καμόντα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τυφλωθῆναι*, 'they say that the king, being afflicted in his eyes, became blind,' that is, 'being afflicted . . . as regards, so far as are concerned, his eyes;' Xen. Memor. i. 6, 6, *δὲ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τοὺς πόδας*, 'on account of my having pain in my feet,' that is, 'on account of my having pain . . . as regards my feet,' 'so far as my feet are concerned.'

β. With adjectives, such as *καλός*, *καχός*, *ἀγαθός*, *σοφός*, &c. E.g. Il. v. 801, *Τυδεὺς τοι μικρὸς ἐξὼν δέμας, ἀλλὰ μαχητῆς*, 'Tydeus, indeed, was small in person,' that is, 'was small . . . as regards his person, so far as his person was concerned;' Æsch. Pers. 27, *δεινοὶ μάχην*, 'terrible in battle,' that is, 'terrible . . . as regards battle;' Herod. iii. 4, *Φάνης καὶ γνώμῃν ἱκανὸς καὶ τὰ πολέμια ἀλκιμος*, 'Phanes was both capable in mind and brave in matters of war,' that is, 'capable . . . as regards his mind, and brave . . . as regards matters of war.' (See Kühn. § 557.)

Sometimes, besides the accusative introduced to limit the extent in which their meaning is to be taken, as just explained, such verbs and adjectives have a preposition also, as *εἰς*, *πρὸς*, *κατὰ*. E.g. Il. iii. 158, *αἰνῶς ἀθανάτῃσι θεῇς εἰς ὧπα ἔοικας*, 'thou art wonderfully like the immortal goddesses in countenance;' Plat. Apol. p. 35, A, *οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν*, 'those of the Athenians who excel in virtue;' Eurip. Orest. 539-40, *μακάριος πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ | πλὴν εἰς θυγατέρας*, 'I am a happy man, except as regards my daughters;' Plat. Gorg. p. 474, D, *τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα*; 'or do you not, indeed, say of beautiful bodies, that they are beautiful with regard to their usefulness, with reference to whatever each is useful for, or with regard to some pleasure?' Herod. i. 124, *κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τοῦτου προθυμίην τέθνηκας, τὸ δὲ κατὰ θεοῦς τε καὶ ἐμὲ*

περίεις, 'so far as regards this man's devotion, you are dead; but so far as the gods and I are concerned, you survive.' So *ἀδθυμῆν παρὰ τινα*, 'to be disheartened with regard to a person.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 557, Anm. 1.) In such examples, however, the accusative retains its sense of 'as regards,' 'as to,' and the office of the preposition alone demands explanation.

ς. To this variety of the significations of the accusative case belong, further, a number of adverbial expressions, as they are called, besides some already mentioned; as, *ἀρχῇν*, 'presently,' 'on the instant,' properly, 'as regards the very point of time;' *ἀρχῇν*, 'at first,' 'at all,' 'at the beginning,' that is, 'as regards the beginning;' *τέλος*, *τὸ τέλος*, 'finally,' 'at last,' properly, 'as regards the end;' *τὸ τελευταῖον*, 'at last,' that is, 'as regards what is final;' *πρότερον*, 'before,' that is, 'as regards a preceding thing;' *τὸ πρῶτον*, 'at first,' that is, 'as regards that which is first;' *τὸ πρὶν*, 'formerly,' that is, 'as regards what is before;' *τὸ αὐτίκα*, 'immediately,' 'on the instant,' *illico*, that is, 'as regards what is referred to the selfsame point,' *αὐτίκα* being a neuter accusative plural of *αὐτίκος*, composed of *αὐτ*, 'same,' and the adjective ending *ικός*, and hence meaning 'what has the property of selfsameness;' *ταῦν*, 'at the present time,' that is, 'as regards what is now;' *ἀρχαῖον*, 'originally,' properly, 'as regards what belongs to the beginning;' *καιρὸν*, 'opportune,' that is, 'as regards a fit moment;' *τὸ παλαιόν*, 'anciently,' that is, 'as regards what was long ago;' *τὸ λοιπόν*, 'for the rest,' 'for the future,' that is, 'as regards what is left or remaining,' *quod reliquum est*; *ὑστερον*, 'afterwards,' that is, 'as regards what is subsequent or later,' being formed from *ὕπο* in the sense of what is 'too late,' viz.: *ὑ(π)-σ-τερον*. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. 555, Anm. 2.)

τ. It may be here added, that in the example cited from Od. i. 274, seqq., *μνηστῆρας μὲν ἐπὶ σφέτερα σκιδνασθαι ἀνωχθί- | μητέρα δ' εἴ οἱ θυμὸς ἐφορμῶται γαμέεσθαι, | ἀψίτω ἐς μέγαρον πατρός μέγα δυναμένοιο*, 'bid the suitors disperse to their homes; and, for your mother, if her mind inclines her to wed, let her go back to the house of her mighty father,' the accusative *μητέρα* may, with greater probability, be con-

sidered as used in the sense of 'as regards,' 'as to,' so that the meaning shall be, 'as regards your mother,' 'as for your mother.' Yet there is some plausibility, at least, in the explanation which makes *μητέρα* to follow the construction of *μηστῆρας* by a sort of attraction. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 566.)

DOUBLE ACCUSATIVE.

4. With a number of verbs there occur two accusatives, the one of the person, and the other of the thing or inanimate object; e.g. *φιλιῶν μεγάλην φιλεῖν τινα*, 'to love a person with a great love.' In very many instances of this construction, the verb, either transitive or intransitive, is attended by a personal object with regard to whom the action or quality contained in the verb is affirmed, and by a noun representing the same or a like substantive idea with that of the verb; as in the example just cited. And it will be found, upon examination, that the accusative cases which attend upon these verbs require the same explanation that has been given above of accusatives occurring singly with verbs. They might, therefore, be left to the careful attention of the student, as being capable of explanation by the application of the doctrine of the accusative case already established. But, both for practical purposes, and because, the double use of the accusative with verbs always occupying a separate place in the grammars, the investigation of this case might seem to be incomplete if it were omitted, it may be proper to speak of it, even at the hazard of repetition.

a. A number of verbs, besides the accusative case of the personal object, are attended by the accusative case of a noun having the same substantive idea with the verbs themselves. E.g. Od. xv. 245-6, *ὃν πέρι κῆρι φιλεῖ Ζεὺς τ' αἰγίοχος καὶ Ἀπόλλων | παντοίην φιλότῃτα*, 'whom both Zeus ægis-bearer and Apollo love in their hearts with all manner of love;' that is, 'as regards whom Zeus ægis-bearer and Apollo are friendly or loving with all manner of love;' properly, 'as regards, as far as goes, all manner of love.' Soph. Electr. 1034, *τοσοῦτον ἔχθος ἐχθαίρω σε*, 'with such a hatred do I hate thee;' that is, 'as regards thee I have

hatred . . . as far as goes so great a hatred.' Herod. iii. 88, *γάμους τε τοὺς πρώτους ἐγάμει . . . ὁ Δαρεῖος Κύρου μὲν δύο θυγατέρας, Ἀτοσσάν τε καὶ Ἀρτυστώνην*, 'Darius contracted (married) the first (noblest) marriages, namely, with two daughters of Cyrus, Atossa and Artustone.' Here, if *γαμῶν* be regarded as followed by the accusative of the direct object, so that the construction shall be *ἐγάμει τοὺς πρώτους γάμους*, 'he married the first marriages,' then the accusative *δύο θυγατέρας* will have the same construction. It may be doubted, however, if *γαμῶν* have this active sense. It may rather mean 'to be in the state of a *γάμος* or husband,' and then the accusative *γάμους* which is added will have the sense of 'as regards,' and the accusative of the person will be interpreted in the same way. So that the true meaning will be 'Darius was or became a husband . . . as regards the noblest marriages (wives) . . . namely, as regards Atossa and Artustone.' Herod. iii. 154, *ἑωυτὸν λωβᾷται λώβην ἀνέχεστον*, 'he inflicted upon himself the most incurable hurt.' Here the accusative of the person has the sense of 'as regards,' that is, names the object to which the statement *λωβᾷται λώβην* is to be confined; and the accusative *λώβην* has essentially the same construction, showing in what extent the action of *λωβᾷται* is to be taken, 'as far as goes the most incurable hurt or outrage.' Thuc. viii. 75, *ᾤρκουσαν τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους*, 'they bound the soldiers with the most solemn oaths;' properly, 'as regards the soldiers . . . they bound with oaths . . . as far as go the most solemn oaths.' Here, of both accusatives the proper meaning is to mark the exact extent in which the sense of *ᾤρκουσαν* is to be taken; and, consequently, they are to be considered as being really accusatives of measure, the one showing that the oaths amounted to the most solemn oaths, and the other that they reached to or embraced the soldiers, not any persons indifferently.

The construction is the same where the verb is attended by the accusative case of a noun having a kindred substantive idea, and by another accusative showing the person to whom the statement made by the verb and kindred noun is to be confined. E.g. Soph. Aj. 1107, *τὰ σέμν' ἐπη κόλαζ'*

δεινους, 'punish them with your proud words,' that is, 'as regards them . . . inflict punishment . . . so far as go your proud words;' Id. Trach. 51-3, δέσποινα Δηάνειρα πολλά μὲν σ' ἐγὼ | κατεῖδον ἤδη πανδάκρυτ' ὀδύρματα | τὴν Ἡράκλειον ἔξοδον γοωμένην, 'O my mistress Deaneira, oftentimes already have I beheld you bewailing the absence of Herakles with lamentations full of tears;' properly, 'oftentimes have I beheld you . . . as regards the absence of Herakles . . . bewailing . . . as far as go lamentations full of tears.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 558, a, and b.)

The explanation is the same where, instead of an accusative of the thing, a pronoun attends the verb: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 10, ἅλλα μιμούμενος τὸν Σάκαν, 'in all other particulars imitating Sacas;' that is, 'imitating Sacas . . . as far as all other particulars were concerned.' The verb μιμεῖσθαι signifying properly 'to be a μῖμος or mimic,' the accusative Σάκαν is added to show that, in this instance, the being a μῖμος is to be understood only with regard to Sacas; and the other accusative ἅλλα, again, marks that the character expressed by the verb extends as far as this term goes, 'as far as to every other particular.' Xen. Anab. v. 7, 6, τοῦτο ὑμῶς ἐξαπατῆσαι, 'to deceive you in this,' properly, 'to deceive,' that is, 'to be a deceiver . . . as regards you . . . so far as this goes.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 558, Anm. 1.)

In the passive construction, the accusative of the thing is retained, the personal object becoming the subject: e.g. Herod. iii. 34, ὃ δέσποτα, τὰ μὲν ἅλλα πάντα μεγάλως ἐπαίνεαι, 'in every other respect you are greatly praised,' that is, 'you are greatly praised . . . as regards, so far as is concerned, every thing else.' (See Kühn. ib. Anm. 2.)

b. In such expressions as ποιεῖν τινα ἀγαθὰ or κακὰ, 'to do a person good or harm,' λέγειν τινα ἀγαθὰ or κακὰ, 'to speak good or evil of a person,' the verbs ποιεῖν and λέγειν are accompanied by the accusative both of the term expressing good or evil, namely, ἀγαθὰ and κακὰ, and of the person, with regard to whom the good or evil doing or speaking is affirmed. E.g. Herod. viii. 61, τότε δὲ δὴ ὁ θεμιστοκλέης κεινὸν τε καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους πολλά τε καὶ κακὰ ἔλεγε, 'and at that time,

then, Themistocles said many evil things of both him and the Corinthians.' Here, assuming κακὰ to be the direct object of ἔλεγε, the phrase πολλά τε καὶ κακὰ ἔλεγε is followed by the accusative case of the person in the sense of 'as regards;' 'Themistocles said many evil things . . . as regards him.' Xen. Cyrop. iii. 2, 15, οὐδεπώποτε ἐπαύοντο πολλά κακὰ ἡμῶς ποιοῦντες, 'they never yet at any time ceased from doing us many evils,' that is, 'from doing many evils . . . as regards us.' Ἐργάζεσθαι, εἰπεῖν, and some others, are used in the same way with two accusatives. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 559.)

c. Two accusatives occur also with verbs signifying 'to make,' 'to constitute,' ποιεῖν, τιθέναι; 'to choose,' αἰρεῖσθαι; 'to consider,' 'to esteem,' νομίζειν, ἡγεῖσθαι; 'to name,' 'to call,' 'to say of,' ὀνομάζειν, καλεῖν, λέγειν; 'to receive,' 'to accept,' παραλαβεῖν, δέχεσθαι, &c. E.g. II. xvi. 90, ἀτιμότερον δέ με θήσεις, 'you will make me more dishonored;' Eurip. Med. 374, (ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ) τρεῖς τῶν ἐμῶν ἐχθρῶν νεκρούς | θήσω, πατέρας τε καὶ κόρην πόσιν τ' ἐμόν, 'I will make three of my enemies dead bodies;' Xen. Cyrop. v. 2, 14, τὸν Γωβρύαν σύνδειπνον παρέλαβεν, 'he received Gobryas as his companion at table'; Plat. Gorg. p. 489, D, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίστους; 'what do you say of the best?' Demosth. de Chers. p. 106, 66, πόλεως γὰρ ἐγωγε πλουτοῦν ἡγοῦμαι συμμάχους, πίστιν, εὐνοίαν, 'for my part, at least, I regard as the wealth of a state her allies, confidence in her, and good-will for her.' (See Kühn. A. Gr. § 560.) In such examples the two accusatives may be considered as having the same construction, the second being a repetition of the first under another name or aspect, and being, therefore, of the nature of an apposition. Thus, in the example Γωβρύαν σύνδειπνον παρέλαβεν, the term σύνδειπνον, 'a companion at table,' is but another name for Gobryas under a peculiar aspect. So that if the first or chief accusative be considered as the immediate object of the verb's action, the second will have the same construction. (See Kühn. A. Gr. § 560, Anm. 5.)

Here belong also such expressions as θαῦμα ποιεῖσθαι, τίθεσθαι τι, &c., 'to account a thing a marvel,' &c.: e.g. Eurip. Orest. 1030, ὕβρισμα θέμενος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονος γόνον,

'insulting the offspring of Agamemnon.' (See Kühn. ib. Anm. 1.)

d. Two accusatives are used with verbs signifying 'to ask,' 'to demand,' 'to inquire,' &c., as, *αἰτεῖν, αἰτεῖσθαι, ἀπατεῖν, πρᾶττεν, πρᾶττεσθαι, εἰσπρᾶττεν, ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρέσθαι, ἐξετάζειν, ἱστορεῖν, ἀνιστορεῖν*. E.g. Od. ix. 364, *Κύκλωφ, ἐρωτᾷς μ' ὄνομα κλυτόν*; 'Cyclops, do you ask me for a famous name?' that is, 'do you ask a question of me (properly, 'as regards me, as far as I am concerned') . . . as to a famous name?' Here both accusatives are probably used in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' although, for practical purposes, that of the person is conveniently accounted the direct object. Herod. iii. 1, *πέμψας Καμβύσης ἐς Αἴγυπτον κήρυκα αἶττε "Αμασιν θυγατέρα*, 'Cambyzes asked Amasis for his daughter;' that is, 'made a demand of (properly, 'as regards') Amasis . . . as far as his daughter was concerned,' both accusatives being employed to mark the precise extent in which the term *αἶττε* is to be taken. Herod. iii. 58, *αὐτοὺς ἑκατὸν τάλαντα ἐπῆρξαν*, 'they exacted of them a hundred talents;' that is, 'they exacted . . . as regards them . . . as much as, to the amount of, a hundred talents.' In this example the accusative *αὐτοὺς* has the sense of 'as regards,' and *ἑκατὸν τάλαντα* is an accusative of measure, showing the amount of the exaction. In other words, the former of the two accusatives marks to what persons definitely the action in *ἐπῆρξαν* extended, the latter to what amount it reached. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 561.)

e. Two accusatives are used also with verbs signifying 'to teach,' 'to put in mind,' &c., as, *διδάσκειν, παιδεύειν, ἀναμνησκειν, ὑπομνησκειν*, the two latter, however, more commonly having the genitive of the thing of which a person is put in mind. E.g. Eurip. Hippol. 254, *πολλὰ δίδασκε γὰρ μ' ὁ πολὺς βίος*, 'for a long life teaches me many things;' that is, 'teaches many things (properly, to the extent of many things) . . . as regards me, as far as I am concerned.' Herod. vi. 140, *ἀναμνήσκων σφέας τὸ χρηστήριον*, 'reminding them of the oracle;' that is, 'as regards them, as far as they are concerned, . . . putting in mind . . . with regard to the oracle;' both accusatives, in this example,

having the sense of 'as regards.' It may be said, in fact, of both accusative cases, as well after *διδάσκειν* as after *ἀναμνησκειν*, that they are introduced to mark the limits within which the action of the verb is to be taken. The accusative of the thing taught, or of which one is put in mind, is added to the verb to point out with regard to what particular object its action is affirmed; *πολλὰ δίδασκει*, 'teaches, or gives instruction, is an instructor, . . . as regards, to the extent of, many things;' *ἀναμνήσκων τὸ χρηστήριον*, 'putting in mind . . . as regards the oracle, to the extent of the oracle.' The accusative of the person is added to the verb, thus qualified as to the extent of its action, to show that it is to be understood as reaching only to a definite personal object; *πολλὰ δίδασκε με*, 'teaches many things . . . as regards me, as far as I am concerned;' *ἀναμνήσκων σφέας τὸ χρηστήριον*, 'putting in mind of the oracle . . . as regards them, as far as they were concerned;' that is, the putting in mind of the oracle is to be understood as embracing them, and not others. (For the example, see Kühn. A. Gr. § 561, e.)

f. Again: two accusatives are used with verbs signifying 'to divide,' 'to distribute,' the one denoting the object divided or distributed, and the other the parts into which it is distributed. E.g. Herod. vii. 121, *τρεῖς μοῖρας ὁ Ξέρξης δασάμενος πάντα τὸν πεζὸν στρατόν*, 'Xerxes having divided the whole army of infantry into three parts.' For practical convenience alone, the accusative that marks the thing divided, *πάντα τὸν πεζὸν στρατόν*, 'the whole army of infantry,' may be regarded as the accusative of the direct object. It is really the accusative used in the sense of 'as regards;' that is, it points out the object as to which alone the division is affirmed; 'having made a division . . . as regards the whole army of infantry.' The accusative denoting the number of parts into which an object is divided is of the same nature essentially, differing in so far only as it expresses, not so much the object with regard to which an action is affirmed as the measure of the extent to which it goes, giving thus the limit up to which the dividing reaches; 'he made a division of (as regards) the whole army

of infantry . . . into three parts;' that is, 'up to, as far as, three parts.' Xen. Cyr. vii. 5, 13, *ὁ Κῦρος τὸ στρατεῦμα κατένευε δώδεκα μέρη*, 'Cyrus distributed his army into twelve parts;' that is, 'Cyrus made a distribution . . . as regards his army . . . (that reached) up to, as far as, twelve parts.' (For the examples, see Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 561, f.)

The preposition *εἰς* is sometimes introduced before the accusative that denotes the number of parts into which an object is divided: e.g. Herod. iv. 148, *σφέας αὐτοὺς εἰς ἕξ μοῖρας διέτλον*, 'they divided themselves into six parts.' In such cases, however, the accusative retains its proper signification, as above set forth, and the only question is as to the office of the preposition. (See Kühn. A. Gr. ib. Anm. 2.)

g. Two accusatives are used with verbs signifying 'to take away,' 'to deprive,' 'to plunder;' as, *ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, στερεῖν, ἀποστερεῖν, συλῶν*, &c. E.g. Il. i. 182, *ὥς ἔμ' ἀφαιρεῖται Χρυσήδα Φοῦβος Ἀπόλλων*, 'since Phœbus Apollo takes away from me the daughter of Chryses.' (See Kühn. A. Gr. § 561, g.) The one of these accusatives denotes the object taken away, the other the person from whom it is taken. The former, for convenience merely in practical use, may be regarded as the direct object of the verb's action; properly speaking, it marks the limits within which its action is to be understood as confined; 'Phœbus Apollo takes away . . . as far as goes the daughter of Chryses.' The latter accusative, or that introducing the name of the object from which a thing is taken away, is essentially of the same nature, being used to show the person with regard to whom alone the action of taking away is affirmed; that is, to mark how far it reaches, or within what limits it is to be considered as restricted; 'Phœbus Apollo takes away the daughter of Chryses from me;' properly, 'as regards me,' I being the object as to whom alone the taking away is affirmed. Xen. Cyr. iv. 6, 4, *τὸν μόνον μοι καὶ φίλον παῖδα ἀφείλετο τὴν ψυχὴν*, 'he took away his life from my only and beloved child.'

With *στερεῖν* and *ἀποστερεῖν*, that of which a person is

deprived is also expressed by the genitive case. But this use of the genitive case admits of easy explanation according to the doctrine of that case, and does not affect the above view of the meaning of the accusative, when the latter is used. It rather confirms it, in so far, at least, as it goes to show that the above verbs are not followed by the accusative of the direct object. (See Kühn. ib. Anm. 3.)

h. Two accusatives are used with verbs signifying 'to hide,' 'to conceal,' as, *κρύπτειν, κεύθειν*, the one to denote the thing concealed, the other the person from whom it is hidden or concealed. E.g. Eurip. Hippol. 912-13, *οὐ μὴν φίλους γε, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλους, | κρύπτειν δίκαιον σὰς, πάτερ, δυσπραξίας*, 'indeed, it is not right, father, that you should conceal your misfortunes from friends at least, and more than friends.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 561, h.) The accusative of the thing hidden may be regarded, practically at least, as the direct object, and the accusative of the person from whom it is hidden is employed in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards;' that is, marks the personal object with regard to whom alone the act of hiding is affirmed. Thus, in the above example, the sense is, 'it is not right to conceal your misfortunes . . . as regards your friends,' whatever may be true of the propriety of concealing them from others.

i. Two accusatives are used, also, with verbs signifying 'to persuade,' 'to incite,' 'to challenge,' 'to compel,' &c., as, *πείθειν, ἐποτρύνειν, ἐπαίρειν, προκαλεῖσθαι, ἀναγκάζειν*, &c., the one marking that which is the subject of persuasion, &c. or that to which one is persuaded, &c., the other the person who is persuaded, &c. E.g. Soph. Œd. Col. 797, *ἀλλ' οἶδα γὰρ σε ταῦτα μὴ πείθων, ἴθι*, 'but go, for I know that I do not persuade you of this.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 561, i.) Here, properly speaking, both accusatives are employed to denote the precise objects with regard to which the action of the verb is affirmed, or to show how far it reaches. Thus, in the example just cited, *ἀλλ' οἶδα γὰρ σε ταῦτα μὴ πείθων, ἴθι*, the sense is, 'but go, for I know that . . . as regards you, so far as concerns you, . . . I do not persuade (do not have credence) . . . as regards, touching, these things.' Eurip. Or.

279, *Δοξίᾳ δὲ μέμφομαι, | ὅστις μ' ἐπάρας ἔργον ἀνοσιώτατον, | τοῖς μὲν λόγος ᾗφρανε, τοῖς δ' ἔργοισιν οὐ,* 'but I blame Loxias, who, having urged me on to the most impious deed, gave me delight in word and not in deed,' that is, 'who having urged me on . . . as regards the most impious deed.' Here, taking *ἐπαίρειν* in its most obvious sense, the accusative of the person may be regarded as the direct object, and the accusative, denoting that to which he is incited, is used in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' 'touching,' or marks the object to which the action of the verb is represented as being limited. Plat. Rep. v. p. 473, A, *τοῦτο μὲν δὴ μὴ ἀνάγκασέ με,* 'as regards this, then, do not compel me.' Here, practically speaking, the accusative of the person may be considered as the direct object of the verb's action; but, in fact, *ἀναγκάζειν* may possibly have the proper sense of causing *ἀνάγκη*, or making a necessity, and then the accusative of the person would mean 'as regards,' 'as far as concerns.' Either way, the accusative *τοῦτο* will have the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards.'

The prepositions *εἰς* and *ἐπὶ* are sometimes added to the accusative denoting that to which one is persuaded, incited, &c.: e.g. Thuc. iv. 19, *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται εἰς σπονδάς,* 'the Lacedæmonians invite you to a truce.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. ib. Anm. 4.) In such cases, the accusative has the office of confining the verb's action, as qualified by the prepositions, to a definite object, or has the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' 'the Lacedæmonians invite you in . . . as regards a truce, as far as a truce goes.'

So likewise, when the passive or middle verb is employed, and the person becomes its subject, the accusative of that to which one is persuaded, &c. is plainly used in the sense of 'as to:' e.g. *διδάσκομαι μουσικὴν*, 'I have myself taught,' or 'I am taught music,' that is, 'I am taught . . . as regards music, as far as music goes.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. Anm. 5.)

k. Again, two accusatives are used with verbs signifying 'to put on,' 'to put off,' as, *ἐνδύειν, ἐκδύειν, ἀμφιεννύναι, περιβάλλειν*, one to mark the thing put on or off, the other the person on or off whom a thing is put. E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 17, *παῖς μέγας μικρὸν ἔχων χιτῶνα, ἕτερον παῖδα μικρὸν μέγαν*

ἔχοντα χιτῶνα, ἐκδύσας αὐτόν, τὸν μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχεινον ἡμφίεσε τὸν δὲ ἐκείνου αὐτὸς ἐνέδου, 'a large boy with a small coat, stripping off the coat from a small boy that had a large one, put on him his own coat, and himself put on the small boy's coat.' The word *ἐνδύειν* properly means 'to go into,' and 'to cause to go into,' and *ἐκδύειν*, 'to go out of,' and 'to cause to go out of,' being employed, just as *καταδύναι* is, both transitively and intransitively. (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 562, and Passow's Lex. s. v.) The accusative of the thing attends these verbs to show the object with regard to which their action is affirmed, so that *ἐκδύσας αὐτόν τὸν χιτῶνα* properly means 'having caused him to go out . . . as regards his coat, as far as his coat was concerned.' The accusative of the person is introduced to show in regard to whom the action of the verb thus qualified is set forth as occurring, or to whom it is to be understood as confined; so that *ἐκδύσας αὐτόν τὸν χιτῶνα* properly means 'having . . . as regards him . . . caused the going out of or putting off . . . as far as his coat was concerned.'

l. Among the instances of the use of two accusatives with verbs, although scarcely deserving to be thus classed, is cited the employment of two accusatives with *σιτέσθαι*, 'to feed upon,' where one accusative marks that on which any thing feeds, and the other the time or season during which it so feeds. E.g. Herod. i. 202, *σιτέονται μὲν ρίζας τὸ θέρος δρύσσοντες παντοίας καρπὸς δὲ σιτέσθαι τὴν χειμαρινήν,* 'in the summer they feed on roots, digging up all kinds of them; in the winter they feed on fruits.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 562, c.) The accusatives *τὸ θέρος, τὴν χειμαρινήν*, are used in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' marking the times or seasons to which the act of feeding is to be understood as restricted; 'they feed . . . as regards the summer, as regards the winter,' that is, 'in or during the summer, in or during the winter season.' The accusative cases *ρίζας* and *καρπὸς* follow on *σιτέονται* in nearly the same sense. In the expression *ρίζας σιτέονται*, 'they feed on roots,' *σιτέονται* really means 'they are fed,' or 'they feed themselves,' and *ρίζας* shows in what extent this act of being fed or of feeding themselves is to be taken, to what object among many

it reaches; that is, the being fed or feeding themselves is to be understood as affirmed only 'so far as roots are concerned.' Just as the accusative is used with *πίνειν*, 'to drink,' to show that the drinking is to be considered as reaching to or embracing only the object named by a noun in that case; so that *πίνειν ὕδωρ*, 'to drink water,' means that the drinking extends only to water, or embraces this alone.

m. Two accusatives, both the names of things, are found employed with a number of verbs, mostly compounds. E.g. Herod. i. 163, *ἐδίδου σφι χρήματα τεῖχος περιβαλέσθαι τὴν πόλιν*, 'he gave them money to surround their city with a wall.' (See Kühn. § 563.) Here the accusative *τεῖχος* might seem, at the first view, to be the immediate object of *περιβαλέσθαι*, the sense being, apparently, 'to cast a wall round about.' More accurately examined, however, *περιβαλέσθαι* has the sense of 'casting about one's self, or 'causing to be cast about,' or 'surrounding one's self;' and the accusative *τεῖχος* is added to show the extent in which the action of *περιβαλέσθαι* is to be taken, or, which is the same thing in substance, with regard to what object definitely it is to be understood; so that the meaning of *τεῖχος περιβαλέσθαι* is 'to cast about themselves,' or 'to cause to be cast about . . . as far as a wall goes;' that is, 'the surrounding themselves,' or 'causing to be cast round about,' is to be understood as extending only to *τεῖχος*, 'a wall,' and not to any other object. The accusative *τεῖχος*, if this explanation be true, is used with *περιβαλέσθαι* in the same way that *ρίζας* and *καρπούς* are employed with *σιτέονται*, as seen in the immediately preceding paragraph, and that *ὕδωρ* is added to *πίνειν*. The accusative *πόλιν* is introduced with *περιβαλέσθαι* *τεῖχος* to mark, in the same way, the extent in which this proposition is to be taken; 'to cast a wall round about . . . as regards their city, as far as their city was concerned.' Both accusatives, therefore, present only varieties of the same sense, marking the limit up to which an action or statement reaches. So Herod. iv. 75, *τὸ κατασπυγόμενον τοῦτο παχὺ ἐὼν καταπλάσσονται πᾶν τὸ σῶμα*, 'this that is rubbed to pieces, or pounded, being thick, they daub over the whole body;' that is, 'they daub themselves . . . as far as

goes the whole body,' and their daubing themselves embraces or extends to this material alone that is pounded. Thuc. iii. 81, *ὑπερνεγκόντες τὸν Λευκαδίων ἰσθμὸν τὰς ναῦς . . . ἀποκομίζονται*, 'having transported their ships over the Leucadian isthmus, they returned home;' that is, 'having carried their ships over . . . as regards the Leucadian isthmus, as far as the Leucadian isthmus is concerned.'

n. The two accusatives which occur in the construction called technically the *σχήμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος*, met with chiefly in epic, but also in dramatic poetry, seldom in prose, admit of easy explanation. E.g. Il. xi. 240, *τὸν δ' ἄορι πλῆξ' αὐχένα, λύσε δὲ γυῖα*, 'him he struck with his sword on the neck, and unstrung his limbs,' that is, 'he struck him with his sword . . . as regards his neck, as far as his neck went.' The accusative *τὸν* is the direct object of *πλῆξε*, or the object actually reached by its action of striking; and, so far, the statement is, that 'he struck him with his sword;' but the accusative *αὐχένα* being added limits the declaration that he struck him to the particular part of the body which it names. So that the sense is, 'he struck him . . . as far as the neck went.' Of course *αὐχένα* is, properly speaking, an accusative of measure, showing how far an action or statement is to be admitted as true. Soph. Œd. Col. 113, *καὶ σὺ μ' ἐξ ὁδοῦ πόδα κρύψου*, 'and do you hide my steps out of the road;' that is, 'hide me . . . as regards my steps.' (See, for the examples, Kühn. A. G. § 564.)

Summary.

5. In the preceding examination of the uses of the accusative case, it has been seen to have three meanings: namely, first, that in which it marks the object actually reached by an action or motion; secondly, that in which it gives the actual measure or extent of an action or motion, either as to time or space; and, thirdly, that in which it denotes the extent in which an action, state, or proposition is to be taken, or its compass, the limits within which it is to be understood as confined, answering to the English

phrases 'as to,' 'as regards,' 'as far as is concerned,' 'touching.'

But these meanings are nearly related, and have one common origin. If the first of them be admitted, the second is an immediate offspring of it, the measure or extent of an action or motion being marked by the object or point which it reaches. And the third is but a variety of the second, the difference being, that the former gives the measure or extent of an action or motion in denominations of measure applicable to time and space; while the latter denotes the measure or extent of an action, state, or proposition, by naming a definite object to which it is to be restricted, or beyond which it is not affirmed. So that the primary sense of the accusative, according to this view, is to mark the object reached by an action or motion; and its secondary sense to denote (*a*) the measure or extent of action or motion, and (*b*) the limits within which any expression is to be understood as confined, and this by naming a particular object to which alone among many possible ones it extends, or which it embraces.

Again, admitting the preceding view, and considering that the object actually reached by an action or motion is only another instance of setting bounds to the extent in which any expressed idea is to be taken; that when it is said, Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 17, ἐμὲ ἔπαισεν ὁ διδασκαλος, 'the master beat me,' the accusative ἐμὲ shows that 'the beating' is affirmed of this object alone or to the exclusion of all others that might possibly be embraced; and that the other meanings of this case, whether that of the specific measure of extent, or that of the more general designation of the limits within which any term or proposition is to be confined, are essentially the same; the accusative case may be said to have for its original meaning the marking the object to which exclusively an action, motion, state, term, or proposition, is restricted, of which it is affirmed to the exclusion of all other objects. And hence it marks (*a*) an object with regard to which exclusively an action or motion is affirmed, which alone it reaches; the accusative

being used, not because the action or motion reaches the object, but because it reaches it and not another; (*b*) the actual measure of an action or motion; that is, introduces some expression of measure or extent, to which the action, motion, or state is restricted; (*c*) in a more general way, the limits within which any term or proposition is to be taken, or the exact compass of its meaning.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE SEVERAL PREPOSITIONS.

°Αμα.

°Αμα, 'at the same time with,' 'together with,' has the same radical with the English *same*, the German *sammt*, *zu-sammen*, the Gothic *sama*, the Sanskrit prefix *sa-*, *sam-*, 'together with,' and with the Persian *hemân*, *idem*, 'the same,' and its kindred prefix *hem-*, all these having not only an obvious agreement in form, but also in sense. This sense is the coincidence of one thing with another, either absolutely and so as to give the notion of identity, as expressed by our word 'same,' or in point of time merely, as conveyed by *δμα*, 'at the same time with.' If, with Pott, this radical *δμ* be considered the same with *sem* in *semel*, 'once,' and with *δ* in *δπαξ*, 'once,' and *δπαντ*, 'all at once or together,' which is very probable, then the idea of 'oneness' contained in these forms will be the primary one, and the sense of 'at the same time with,' 'together with,' which *δμα* has, may be regarded as derivative from this. The notion of 'at the same time with,' that is, of the occurring of one action at the same time with another, really embraces that of 'oneness;' only it is used relatively, and applied only in a certain point of view, namely, to express oneness with another object in regard to time. So that the primary sense of *δμα*, and of the related forms, will be that of 'oneness;' and from this is obtained that of 'sameness' or identity, that is, of 'oneness with another;' and the peculiar application of this which *δμα* presents, namely, 'oneness with another in regard to the point of time,' 'at the same time with.'

If *δμ* in *δμως*, 'yet notwithstanding,' *δμοιος*, 'like,' and *sim* in *similis*, 'like,' be the same or a kindred radical with *δ*, *δμ*, which would be allowable, so far as the form is con-

cerned, the notion of 'likeness' belonging to *δμ* must be in some way connected with that of oneness and identity contained in *δμ*, *sem*, *δ*. But this would seem to be difficult, if not impossible. (See Pott Etym. Forsch. i. p. 128.)

The author just referred to regards the Polish *s* or *z*, which is prefixed as the sign of the instrumentalis, and is equivalent to the English 'with,' as being the same with *δ*, *δμ*, and believes that the same radical is found in the Latin *sem-per*, 'always,' compounded, according to Bopp, of *sem*, 'conjoined,' what is 'united' (*vereinten*), and hence 'totality' (*ganzen*), and *per*, 'through.' So that the meaning shall be 'throughout the whole,' or 'all through.' But, with regard to the former of these etymologies, admitting its possibility, so far as the form is concerned, it is by no means obvious to see how the notions of 'oneness,' 'sameness,' 'at the same time with,' have any thing in common with the notion of the instrument. At the least, it needed explanation, which has not been given. That it is not wholly improbable might be inferred from the use of the English 'with' both to express conjunction and to mark the instrument; as, 'he did it with his hand,' 'he walks with a friend.' And, again, from the use of the German *mit* in the sense of community, and as the sign of the instrument, as *mitgehen*, 'to go with,' *mit den Händen arbeiten*, 'to work with the hands.' From such facts it would appear that the mind passed from the idea of conjunction, or rather of community, to that of the instrument, this being regarded as conjoined with the agent in any action. And so it might be that it passed from the notion of 'oneness,' or from the secondary or applied sense of 'at the same time with,' to that of the instrument. Yet, both as to the matter of the form, and as to that of the sense, one may be permitted to entertain doubts of the connection of *δ*, *δμ*, *sem*, with the Polish *s* or *z*, the sign of the instrument. And, with regard to *sem-per*, if it be compounded as Bopp supposes, the former part *sem* cannot well signify 'totality,' which is hardly a possible meaning of 'oneness,' but would rather have the sense of 'at the same time with,' which, with *per*, 'quite,' 'thoroughly,' might perhaps furnish the meaning of 'always.' Thus,

semper in deorum conspectu versamur, 'we are ever in the sight of the gods,' would mean, 'we are in the sight of the gods, not merely and absolutely, but so that this condition is altogether (*per*) coincident with, at the same time with, accompanying (*sem*) us;' that is, the state of being in the sight of the gods and our life are coincident, and the one may properly be said to be 'always' present or existing with regard to the other.

Pott (Etym. Forsch. i. p. 128–30) is doubtful whether the radical in *ἅμα* ought to be considered the same with the Sanskrit *sa*, Gothic *sa*, Greek *ὁ, ἡ*, (English *he, she*;) and it would hardly be appropriate to enter upon the question here, even if it admitted of a satisfactory solution. It may be worth while to remark merely that the Latin word *idem*, 'the same,' very clearly derives this sense from the demonstrative idea, and that the Greek *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same,' and *αὐτός*, 'self,' obtain their meaning of selfsameness and identity from the same demonstrative idea, the pointing to a thing being, under certain conditions, an adequate means of expressing that it is the selfsame or identical with an object already named. So that no serious objection to considering *ἅμα* as having the same radical with the demonstrative could arise from the sense which they respectively bear, but only from the form, and from the absence of historical proofs.

Significations of ἅμα.

1. 'At the same time with.' Looking to its actual use in the language, *ἅμα* has for its proper office the marking that an action coincides with another in point of time, and is in so far identical with it. Its meaning is expressed in English by 'at the same time with.' E.g. Xen. Anab. ii. 3, 1, *ἅμα ἡλίου ανατέλλοντι χήρυκας ἐπεμψε περί σπονδῶν*, 'at sunrise he sent heralds,' the sending heralds concurring, in regard to the time, with the rising of the sun.

2. 'With,' 'together with,' 'equally with.' The sense of one thing accompanying another, which also *ἅμα* has, expressed in English by 'with,' 'together with,' and that of 'equally with,' are only slightly different. Thus, in the expression *ἅμα τινι ἐπείθαι*, 'to follow with a person,' the

proper sense is that of a person following another so as to concur with him in his progress, to be coincident in point of time and space. And so in Hom. Od. i. 96–8, *πέδιλα*, | . . . *τὰ μὲν φέρον* . . . | *ἅμα πνοῆς ἀνέμοιο*, 'which bore her like, as swiftly as, the blasts of the wind,' the same sense lies at the bottom. The swiftness of the wings of the goddess is made equal with that of the winds by representing them as being 'together with,' and therefore as accompanying and keeping pace with them.

Summary of the meanings of ἅμα.

1. 'At the same time with.'
2. 'Together with,' 'with.'
3. 'Equally with.'

Use of ἅμα as an adverb, and with its case.

1. *ἅμα* is sometimes employed without a noun, and is then called an adverb. E.g. Il. i. 417, *ἅμα ὠκύμορος καὶ διζυρός*, 'at the same time short-lived and sorrowful.' In the construction *ἅμα τε* — *καὶ*, 'as soon as,' 'the moment that,' (see Passow's Lex. s. v.,) *ἅμα* really retains its usual sense. E.g. Demosth. 50, 18, *ἅμα ἀκηκόαμεν τε καὶ τριηράρχους καθίσταμεν*, 'so soon as we heard of it, we appointed trierarchs,' or, 'we no sooner heard of it than we appointed trierarchs,' or, 'the moment we heard of it, we appointed trierarchs.' Properly, the sense is, 'we both heard of it and appointed trierarchs at the same time,' and there is conveyed the idea of an action following upon another so immediately that it may be represented as occurring simultaneously with it, or be referred to the same time.

2. But *ἅμα* is used also with a noun in the dative case, and is then called a preposition; as, *ἅμα ἡμέρᾳ ἀπῆλθεν*, 'he departed at dawn,' that is, 'he departed at the same time with (the coming of) day (light).' *ἅμα* with the dative case of a noun has the same signification as when used without a case, or adverbially, and presents the variety of significations attributed to it above when speaking generally of its meanings. Thus:

a. 'At the same time with,' 'together with,' 'with.' It has the sense of 'at the same time with,' 'together with:'

e.g. Il. xviii. 136, ᾗδ' οὖν γὰρ νεῦμαι δμ' ἡελίῳ ἀνίοντι, 'for I depart in the morning with, at the same time with, the rising sun;' Herod. iii. 86, δμ' ἡμέρῃ δὲ διαφωσκούσῃ οἱ εἴς κατὰ συνειδήσαντο παρήσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων, 'with the dawning of the day the six came on their horses;' Xen. Anab. i. 7, 2, δμα τῇ ἐπιούσῃ ἡμέρᾳ αὐτόμολοι . . . ἤκοντες ἀπήγγελλον περὶ τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς, 'with the dawn of the next day deserters arrived and reported.'

b. 'Together with,' 'with.' Slightly differing from the above proper sense of δμα is that of 'together with,' 'with,' where the coincidence in point of time, although really included, is not so distinctly seen: e.g. in such phrases as δμα τινι ἐπεσθαι, ἐλθεῖν, ἄγειν, πέμπειν, 'to follow, to come, to lead, to send along with, or together with, a person;' that is, properly, 'to follow, &c. at the same time with.' It is this, in fact, that makes the difference between δμα and σύν, the former meaning 'at the same time with,' the latter 'conjointly with,' 'in association with.'

c. 'Equally with,' 'as soon, as rapidly, &c. as.' Ἄμα has really the same sense of 'together with,' 'at the same time with,' although differently rendered in English, in such examples as Od. i. 96-8, ὡς εἰπούσ' ὑπὸ ποσσὶν ἐδήσατο καλὰ πέδιλα, | ἀμβρόσια, χρύσεια, τὰ μιν φέρων ἢ μὲν ἐφ' ὕγρην, | ἢ δ' ἐπ' ἀπείρουνα γαῖαν, δμα πνοῆς ἀνέμοιο, 'which bore her together with,' that is, 'at the same pace with, as rapidly as, the blasts of the wind.'

3. Ἄμα is used with the dative case alone. And this case is dependent for its use upon the signification of the preposition itself; that is, the dative follows upon the notion of coincidence conveyed by δμα, in the same way that it does upon the sense of likeness, equality, identity, opposition, &c., expressed by ὁμοιος, ἴσος, ὁ αὐτός, ἐναντίος.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF δμα WITH ITS CASE.

Significations of δμα.	Dative: 'to,' 'for.'
1. 'At the same time with.'	'At the same time with.'
2. 'Together with,' 'with.'	'At the moment of,' 'as soon as,' 'no sooner than.'
3. 'Equally with.'	'Together with,' 'with.'
	'Equally with,' 'as rapidly as,' &c.

Ἀμφί.

Ἀμφί has the same radical that is found in ἀμφω, in the Latin *ambo*, and the inseparable particle *amb* in *ambire*, &c., in the old German *umri*, and the German *um*, the Sanskrit *ubha*, (Dual, *ubhau*.) in the Polish *oba*, 'both,' and preposition *o*, 'about,' and possibly also in the Gothic *ba*, the German *beide*, and the English *both*. (See Liddell and Scott's Lex.)

Significations of ἀμφί.

1. 'On both sides.' The primary signification of ἀμφί, considering it to have these etymological connections, would be 'on both sides,' a sense which it actually has in some compounds, as, ἀμφιάλος, 'having the sea on both sides,' ἀμφίβιος, 'having a double life,' ἀμφιβολία, 'the state of being attacked on both sides,' ἀμφιδεξίος, 'ambidexter,' 'being right-handed on both sides,' ἀμφίπυλος, 'having double gates.'

2. 'About,' 'around.' Ἀμφί occurs in the local sense of 'about,' 'around;' and this might easily spring from the primary sense, that which is on both sides of an object being, with a little license, regarded as completely investing it. E.g. Il. i. 37, ὅς Χρύσην ἀμφιβέβηκας, 'who dost defend Chrysa,' that is, 'who goest about,' and so 'dost defend Chrysa.' So also in the compound ἀμφιέννυμι, 'I clothe,' 'cover with garments roundabout.' In this sense ἀμφί is scarcely distinguishable from περί, 'around,' 'round about,' although the primary sense of the two is so different. Περί, however, is more commonly employed in this meaning. In the signification of 'about,' 'around,' ἀμφί is met with not only in compounds, as, ἀμφιβώμιος, 'surrounding the altar,' ἀμφικαλύπτειν, 'to cover all round,' but also in conjunction with cases; as, Herod. viii. 104, ἀμφί ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, 'round about this city.'

3. 'All about,' 'quite about,' 'quite.' A merely intensive form of the sense just mentioned is that in which ἀμφί has the force of 'all about,' 'quite about,' 'quite:' e.g. ἀμφίβροχος, 'thoroughly wet,' ἀμφίδαυσος, 'quite shaggy,' ἀμφιελκτός, 'turned all round.' Thus, Od. xii. 74, νεφέλῃ ὅε μιν

ἀμφιβέβηκεν, 'and a cloud envelops it,' that is, 'goes all around it.'

4. Ἀμφί sometimes occurs in the sense of 'about,' 'near,' denoting, as we often do by the term 'about,' a less exact or merely general and approximate expression of the position of an object, or of its state as to number and time. Thus, (a) in regard to position in space: e.g. Il. ii. 461-2, Ἀσίῳ ἐν λευμῶνι, Καῦστρίου ἀμφὶ βέεθρα, | ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα ποτῶνται, 'fly here and there about the streams of Caÿster;' Il. xi. 705-6, ἀμφὶ δὲ δατυ | ἔρδομεν ἱρὰ θεοῖς, 'we sacrificed to the gods about the city,' properly, 'round about, as regards the city,' it being indicated that it is not designed to mark with exactness the place at which the sacrifice was performed. (b.) In regard to time and number: e.g. Xen. Anab. i. 2, 9, πελτασταὶ δὲ (ἐγένοντο) ἀμφὶ τοὺς διαχιλίους, 'there were about two thousand peltastae;' Id. Anab. i. 10, 17, καὶ ἀφικνούνται ἀμφὶ δόρυπιστον ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνάς, 'and they reached their tents about dusk.'

5. 'About,' 'of,' 'concerning,' the Latin *de*. Ἀμφί is employed also in the figurative sense of 'about,' 'of,' 'concerning,' corresponding to the very common use of the Latin *de*, and marking the object which an action concerns, or to which it relates. E.g. Od. viii. 266-7, αὐτὰρ ὁ φορμίζων ἀνεβδύλετο καλὸν δεῖδειν, | ἀμφ' Ἄρεος φιλότῃτος ἔϋστεφάνου τ' Ἀφροδίτης, 'began to sing beautifully about the love of Ares and Aphrodite;' Herod. iii. 32, ἀμφὶ δὲ τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτῆς δεῖδός . . . λέγεται λόγος, 'about her death two stories are told.' This meaning is, in fact, only another application of that just above mentioned. When it said of the bard Demodocus that he sang about or of the love of Ares and Aphrodite, his song is represented as having a certain relation to the love of Ares and Aphrodite, and it may be said to be connected with it precisely in the same way that the flying of the swans is with the streams of Caÿster; only the relation in the former case is a local, in the latter a figurative one.

6. 'About,' in the sense of 'for,' 'on account of.' Ἀμφί obtains, in some cases, a sense which is very like that of ἔνεκα, 'on account of,' 'for,' and which is borne also by the English

'about.' E.g. Il. xvi. 823-5, ὥς δ' ὅτε σὺν ἀδάμαντα λέων ἐβλήσατο χάριμνι, | ὥτ' ὄρεος κορυφῇσι μέγα φρονέοντε μάχεσθον, | πίδακος ἀμφ' ὀλίγης, 'fight about a small fountain,' that is, 'for a small fountain;' Il. iii. 69-70, αὐτὰρ ἔμ' ἐν μέσσω καὶ Ἀρηίφιλον Μενέλαον | συμβάλλετ' ἀμφ' Ἑλένη καὶ κτήμασι πᾶσι μάχεσθαι, 'to fight about,' that is, 'for, Helen.' It is obvious, upon a hasty examination even, that ἀμφί has here the same meaning, properly speaking, as in the preceding case, namely, that of 'about,' 'concerning,' and that the sense of 'for,' or the denoting the object of an action, is suggested by the circumstances in which the preposition is used; just as, in certain relations, the English word 'about' obtains the sense of 'for.'

Summary of the meanings of ἀμφί.

1. 'On' both sides.'
2. a. Locally; 'about,' 'around.'
- b. Intensively; 'all about,' 'quite about,' 'quite.'
- c. Approximate statement; 'about,' 'near.'
- d. Figuratively; 'about,' 'of,' 'concerning.'
- e. " 'about,' 'for,' 'on account of.'

Ἀμφί with cases of nouns.

Ἀμφί, having the significations above set forth, is used in conjunction with the genitive, dative, ablative (locativus), and accusative cases.

I. WITH THE GENITIVE.

Ἀμφί with the genitive occurs rarely in prose, but frequently in poetry.

1. 'About.' Ἀμφί is used with the genitive in the local sense of 'about:' e.g. Herod. viii. 104, ἐπεὶ τῷσι ἀμφιχτίοσι πᾶσι τοῖσι ἀμφὶ ταύτης οἰκέουσι τῆς πόλιος μέλλῃ τι ἐντὸς χρόνου ἵσασθαι χαλεπὸν, κ.τ.λ., 'to the dwellers about this city;' properly, 'to those who are dwellers about . . . with respect to this city.'

2. 'About,' 'concerning,' 'of,' the Latin *de*. With the genitive ἀμφί is more commonly met with in the sense of 'about,' 'concerning,' 'of:' e.g. Od. viii. 266-7, αὐτὰρ ὁ φορμίζων ἀνεβδύλετο καλὸν δεῖδειν, | ἀμφ' Ἄρεος φιλότῃτος ἔϋστε-

φάνου τ' Ἀφροδίτης, 'he began to sing beautifully of (about) the love of Ares and Aphrodite;' Herod. vi. 131, ἀμφὶ μὲν κρίσιος τῶν μνηστήρων τοσαῦτα ἐγένετο, 'concerning the decision between the suitors, thus much occurred;' Æsch. Agam. 1044, τί ταῦτ' ἀνωτόνυξας ἀμφὶ Λοξίου; 'why did you utter these exclamations about Loxias?' Xen. Cyrop. iii. 1, 8, εἰς καιρὸν ἦκεις, ἔφη, ὅπως σὺ τῆς δίκης ἀκούσης τῆς ἀμφὶ τοῦ πατρὸς, 'to hear the judgment concerning your father.'

3. 'About,' 'for;' e.g. Il. xvi. 824-5, ὥτ' ὄρεος κορυφῇσι μέγα φρονέοντε μάχεσθον | πίδακος ἀμφ' ὀλίγης, 'fight about, for, a small fountain;' Æsch. Agam. 62-6, πολυάνορος ἀμφὶ γυναικὸς | πολλὰ παλαισμάτα . . . | . . . θήσων Δαναοῖσι, 'going to cause the Danaï many struggles about, for, a woman of many husbands.'

In all the above uses of ἀμφὶ with the genitive, this case has the sense of 'with respect to,' 'in the case of.' Thus, in the example δεῖδειν ἀμφ' Ἀρεος φιλότῃτος, 'to sing about the love of Ares,' the genitive φιλότῃτος shows that the expression δεῖδειν ἀμφί, 'to sing about or concerning,' is to be understood of this object and no other; and in the example μάχεσθον πίδακος ἀμφ' ὀλίγης, 'they fight about, for, a small fountain,' the sense is, properly, 'they fight about . . . with respect to a small fountain;' that is, the genitive πίδακος ὀλίγης sets forth that the statement μάχεσθον ἀμφί, 'the fighting about,' is to be considered as affirmed only with respect to 'a small fountain.'

II. WITH THE DATIVE.

1. 'About.' Ἀμφὶ is used with the dative in the local sense of 'about;' e.g. Il. xviii. 343-4, δὲ εἰπὼν ἐτάροισι ἐκέκλετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς | ἀμφὶ πυρὶ στήσαι τρίποδα μέγαν, 'to place a large kettle about the fire;' properly, 'to place a large kettle about . . . for the fire,' the dative πυρὶ marking the object to which as its final aim the 'placing the kettle about' is referred. Il. ii. 388-9, ἰδρώσει μὲν τευ τελαμῶν ἀμφὶ στήθεσσιν | ἀσπίδος ἀμφιβρότης, 'the band of thy protecting shield shall sweat about thy breast;' Æsch. Agam. 317-18, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀμφὶ σώμασιν πεπτωκότες | ἀνδρῶν κασιγνήτων, 'having fallen about the bodies of brothers.'

2. 'About,' 'of,' 'concerning.' Ἀμφὶ with the dative has also the sense of 'about,' 'of,' 'concerning,' the Latin *de*: e.g. Herod. iii. 32, ἀμφὶ δὲ τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτῆς δι᾽ ὅς λέγεται λόγος, 'about, concerning, her death two stories are told;' Id. v. 19, ἀμφὶ ἀπόδω τῇ ἐμῇ πείσομαί τοι, 'about, concerning, my withdrawing I will obey you;' Id. vi. 62, οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς ἀμφὶ τῇ γυναικί, 'having no fear about his wife;' Æsch. Prom. 182, δέδια γὰρ ἀμφὶ σαῖς τύχαις, 'for I am in fear concerning your fortunes.'

3. 'About,' 'for,' 'on account of.' Ἀμφὶ occurs also with the dative in its sense of 'about,' 'for,' 'on account of:' e.g. Il. iii. 69-70, αὐτὰρ ἐμ' ἐν μέσσω καὶ Ἀργεῖλον Μενέλαον | συμβάλετ' ἀμφ' Ἑλένη καὶ κτήμασι πῶσι μάχεσθαι, 'to fight for Helen and all her substance;' Inscr. cited by Æschin. 80, 16, . . . ἐθελήσει | ἀμφὶ ξυνοῖσι πράγμασι μόχθον ἔχειν, 'to have toil for the common weal.'

In all these uses of ἀμφὶ with the dative case, while the force of the preposition is plainly discernible, there may be more or less distinctly recognised in the case its common signification of the object to be ultimately affected, that to which an action or state is referred as being its final aim, and for which it may be said to be or to be done. For its use with ἀμφί, in the above and like examples, it may depend either upon the preposition itself, which may be followed by this case in virtue of its signification of 'about,' 'near,' just as ἴσος, 'equal,' ὅμοιος, 'like,' &c. are followed by the dative, or upon the meaning of the whole phrase of which ἀμφὶ constitutes a part. It would seem to depend for its use upon the meaning of the preposition itself, in the first set of examples above given, where ἀμφὶ has the local sense of 'about;' as in ἀμφὶ πυρὶ στήσαι τρίποδα μέγαν; and so in the examples where it has the sense of 'about,' 'of,' 'concerning;' as, ἀμφὶ ἀπόδω τῇ ἐμῇ πείσομαί τοι; although, from the very fact of the preposition being employed in an accommodated and less palpable sense, it is more difficult here to see the just relation between the meaning of the preposition and the proper office of the case. On the other hand, it may be admitted as more probable that in other examples, as in the third set above, where the preposition

has the sense of 'about,' 'for,' 'on account of,' the dative depends, not wholly on the preposition, but in part also on the verb which *ἀμφί* qualifies. Thus, in the example *ἀμφὶ ξυνοῖσι πράγμασι μόχθον ἔχειν*, 'to have toil for the common weal,' the dative *ξυνοῖσι πράγμασι* depends upon the whole phrase *μόχθον ἔχειν ἀμφί*, 'to have toil for (about),' but chiefly upon the preposition itself.

III. WITH THE ABLATIVE (INSTRUMENTALIS).

In some examples *ἀμφί* occurs with the ablative of the means or instrument (*instrumentalis*), the preposition retaining its proper sense of 'about,' and having no influence upon the use of the case. E.g. Il. i. 465, *ἀμφ' ὀβελοῖσιν ἔπειραν* (sc. *κρέα*), 'and pierced the flesh with spits round about.' Here the effect of the introduction of *ἀμφί* is to show that the flesh, when pierced by the spits, was round about them. Hesiod. Op. et Di. 205, *ἣ δ' ἔλεδν γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ' ὀνύχεσσι* | *μύρετο*, 'she, pierced on both sides by the crooked talons of Irex, wailed.' The examples of this use of *ἀμφί* are by no means common; and they admit of satisfactory explanation only by considering the ablative as marking the means or instrument, and *ἀμφί* as used adverbially.

IV. WITH THE ACCUSATIVE.

1. 'About,' in a local sense. *Ἀμφί* is frequently used with the accusative in the local sense of 'about,' the case having the meaning of 'as regards,' 'as far as concerns.' E.g. Il. ii. 461-2, *Ἄσιψ ἐν λειμῶνι, Καῦστρίου ἀμφὶ ῥέεθρα*, | *ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα ποτῶνται ἀγαλλόμεναι πτερίγεσσι*, 'they fly about the streams of Caÿster,' that is, 'they fly about . . . as regards the streams of Caÿster.' Il. i. 409, *τοὺς δὲ κατὰ πύρνας τε καὶ ἀμφ' ἄλα ἔλσαι Ἀχαιοὺς*, 'and to drive the Achæi at the ships and about the sea,' that is, 'about . . . as regards the sea.' Il. ii. 305-6, *ἡμεῖς δ' ἀμφὶ περὶ κρήνην ἱεροὺς κατὰ βωμούς* | *ἔρδομεν ἀθανάτοισι τελέεσσας ἑκατόμβας*, 'we offered to the gods perfect hecatombs at the sacred altars round (περὶ) about (ἀμφί) the fountain;' that is, 'about . . . as regards the fountain.' Æsch. Prom. 415-16, . . . *οἱ γὰρ* | *ἔσχατον τόπον ἀμφὶ Μαῖω-τιν ἔχουσι λίμναν*, 'who occupy the most remote spot of earth

about lake Mæotis,' that is, 'about . . . as far as lake Mæotis is concerned.' Id. ib. 1030-1, . . . *εἰς ἀναύγητον μολεῖν* | *Ἰδην, κνεφαῖα τ' ἀμφὶ Ταρτάρου βάδην*, 'to come into rayless Hades, and about the dark deeps of Tartarus.' In this last example, it might be allowable to explain the accusative case as the object reached by the motion expressed by *μολεῖν*, and to regard *ἀμφί* as being employed adverbially; 'to come to the dark deeps of Tartarus . . . about them.' But it would seem preferable to couple *ἀμφί* with *μολεῖν*, and to consider the accusative case as having the sense of 'as regards,' just as in the former cases; 'to come about . . . as regards the dark deeps of Tartarus.' Xen. Cyrop. ii. 4, 16, *ἐγὼ πολλάκις δὴ τεθήρυκα ἀμφὶ τὰ δρια τῆς τε σῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀρμενίων*, 'I have often hunted about the borders both of your country and of the country of the Armenians;' that is, 'about . . . as regards your country.'

2. *Ἀμφί*, having properly the same sense, and preceded by the article, is frequently employed with the accusative of a personal noun to express the person and his party or attendants. E.g. Herod. viii. 25, *οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ Ξέρξεα ἐς ὁδὸν ὁρμέατο*, 'Xerxes and his attendants;' Il. iii. 146, *οἱ δ' ἀμφὶ Πρίαμον*, 'Priam and his attendants.' In this latter example, *οἱ δ' ἀμφὶ Πρίαμον*, considering the context, might be rendered by 'Priamus' alone. In Herod. ix. 69, *οἱ ἀμφὶ Μεγαρέας καὶ Φλιασίους* signifies merely 'the Megarians and Phliasians,' being expressed afterwards in the same chapter by *οἱ Μεγαρεῖς καὶ Φλιασῖοι*. Compare Thuc. i. 5, *πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος . . . περὶ τε Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ὀζόλας καὶ Αἰτωλοὺς*, where *περὶ* without the article is used in the same way. Xen. Anab. iii. 2, 2, *οἱ ἀμφὶ Ἀριαῖον*, 'Ariæus;' Id. Cyrop. vii. 5, 25, *οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Γωβρύαν*, 'Gobryas.' It is obvious that *οἱ ἀμφὶ τινα* meant properly 'those about a person,' and that it was left to the hearer to supply, as being pointed to by the article, objects appropriate to the known character or office of the person of whom *ἀμφί* shows that they are attendants. Thus, *οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρίαμον* would mean 'Priam and his suite,' *οἱ ἀμφὶ Πλάτωνα*, 'Plato and his disciples,' *οἱ ἀμφὶ Ἀριαῖον*, 'Ariæus and his troops.' The use of *οἱ ἀμφὶ τινα* to denote

the person alone, as in some of the examples above cited, would seem to be a mere license of speech; and yet, perhaps, it may be true that, in all such cases, the person is regarded as having his proper attendants, and that the license consists rather in substituting the group that is about the person, and that serves to distinguish him, for the person himself. *Οἱ ἀμφὶ Πλάτωνα*, 'those about Plato,' that is, 'the disciples or school of Plato,' might well enough stand for Plato himself, when he is contemplated in the character of a teacher of philosophy.

3. 'About,' in a figurative sense. *Ἀμφὶ* is used figuratively in the sense of 'about' with words denoting the being employed or occupied about any matter, especially with the verb *ἔχειν*: as, *ἀμφὶ τι ἔχειν*, 'to be occupied about something.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. viii. 1, 13, *τὸ δ' αὖ . . . ἀμφὶ ταῦτα αὐτὸν δεῖ ἔχειν*, ἥδει ὅτι *ἀσχολίαν παρέξοι*, 'on the other hand, he knew that to be always occupied about these matters would cause him to want leisure;' Id. ib. vii. 1, 1, *ἔτι οὖσαν ἀμφὶ τὰ ἱερὰ*, 'while they were still occupied with (about) the sacrifices.'

4. 'Concerning,' 'relating to.' *Ἀμφὶ*, in a sense very nearly related to that just noticed, is used with the accusative case to mark what concerns or relates to an object. E.g. Xen. Cyrop. viii. 2, 6, *τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο πέπονθε καὶ ἀμφὶ τὴν δίαιταν*, 'this same thing occurs also in what relates to diet;' Id. Econ. 19, 1, *τὰ ἀμφὶ τὸν σπόρον*, 'what pertains to sowing seed.'

5. 'About,' denoting, in regard to time, numbers, and the like, a mere approximation to the actual measure, and that room is left for error in the statement. Thus (a), of time: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. viii. 6, 22, *τὸν μὲν ἀμφὶ τὸν χειμῶνα χρόνον διάγειν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι*, 'to spend the period about winter-time in Babylon;' Id. Anab. i. 10, 17, *καὶ ἀφικνοῦνται ἀμφὶ δόρυπτον ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνάς*, 'and they reached their tents about dusk.' (b.) Of numbers: e.g. Xen. Anab. i. 2, 9, *πελτασταὶ δὲ ἀμφὶ τοὺς δισχιλίους*, 'about two thousand peltastæ.'

In all the above uses of *ἀμφὶ* with the accusative, the case has the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' 'as far as concerns;' unless, indeed, the class of examples above referred to, in

which a verb of motion precedes, should be regarded as forming an exception.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATION AND USE OF *ἀμφὶ* WITH THE CASES.

Significations of <i>ἀμφὶ</i> .	Gen: 'of,' 'with respect to.'	Dat: 'to,' 'for.'	Instrum: 'by,' 'with.'	Accus: 'as to,' 'as regards.'
1. 'On both sides.'				
2. 'About,' 'all about,' (around.)	'about.'	'about.'	'about,' 'round about,' '+ 'with.'	
3. 'About,' 'near.'				'about,' 'near.'
4. 'About,' 'concerning.'	'about,' 'of,' 'concerning.'	'about,' 'of,' 'concerning.'		'about,' 'what relates to.'
5. 'About,' 'for.'	'about,' 'for.'	'about,' 'for.'		

'*Adv.*

'*Adv.* has probably the same radical with the Slavonic *na*, *nad*, 'upon,' and with the Gothic *ana*, the German *an*, the English *on*, the Latin *in*, 'on'(?). See Grimm Gr. p. 252, cited by Pott ii. pp. 132, 151, and Linde Pol. Lex. s. v. *na* and *nad*.

Significations of *ἀνδ*.

1. 'Up.' The primary signification of *ἀνδ* is 'up' as opposed to *κατὰ*, 'down.' Thus, in the adverbial phrase *ἀνω καὶ κάτω*, 'up and down,' and in many compounds, as *ἀναβαίνειν*, 'to go up,' 'to ascend,' *ἀναβάλλειν*, 'to throw up,' *ἀναβλέπειν*, 'to look up.' And so when used with cases; as, Il. i. 15, *ἀνὰ σκήπτρῳ*, 'upon a sceptre;' Herod. ii. 96, *ἀνὰ ποταμόν*, 'up a river.'

2. 'Back.' In some compounds *ἀνδ* has the sense of 'back,' the idea which it conveys being that of something put into a state or having a direction contrary to its actual one, of a state or action reversed and thus restored to its former state. Thus, *γνάμπτειν* meaning 'to bend,' *ἀναγνάμπτειν* signifies 'to bend back' or in an opposite direction to the present one; *διδόναι* meaning 'to give,' *ἀναδιδόναι* has the sense of 'to give back,' the action being reversed; *διδάσκειν* meaning 'to teach,' *ἀναδιδάσκειν* signifies 'to teach differently' or contrariwise, 'to teach better' or 'to unteach;' and so *μανθάνειν*, 'to learn,' *ἀναμανθάνειν*, 'to learn in an opposite way,' 'to unlearn;' *ἀγγέλλειν*, 'to bear a message,' *ἀναγγέλλειν*, 'to carry back a message,' the messenger going and returning. The same sense is seen to belong to *κατὰ* in some compounds, as, *κατεῖναι*, 'to come back again,' 'to return

from exile.' It would seem to be due originally to the natural contrast in which the relations of 'up' and 'down' expressed by *ἀνδ* and *κατὰ* stand to each other, and for the suggestion of which either preposition may suffice without the presence of the other; just as the term white suggests black, and black white, without the opposite term being named. From this obvious suggestion of contrast the mind would pass readily enough to the more obscure one, in which the same terms *ἀνδ* and *κατὰ*, when attached to an action or state, indicate that it is made the reverse of what it actually is, or is to be taken in a contrary sense, or is brought back to its original state. The only difference is, that here the prepositions *ἀνδ* and *κατὰ*, instead of marking distinctly the notions of 'up' and 'down' as standing opposed to each other, and so retaining their proper sense together with the incidental but obvious suggestion of the contrast of *ἀνδ* with *κατὰ* and of *κατὰ* with *ἀνδ*, have lost wholly their proper meaning of the local relations of 'up' and 'down,' and retained only the incidental one of contrast or mutual opposition; and that this idea of contrast or mutual opposition, originally understood only of *ἀνδ*, 'up,' with regard to *κατὰ*, 'down,' or of *κατὰ*, 'down,' with regard to *ἀνδ*, 'up,' came to be used with reference to any state or action without regard to its direction or position in space. So that, when *ἀνδ* or *κατὰ* was attached to an action or state by way of qualification, it might not add to it, as its proper signification would require, any thing of the sense of 'up' or 'down,' nor yet any suggestion of the contrast of 'up' with 'down,' but only the idea of the relation of contrast or opposition between the action or state contained in the verb and something else. And as the contrast or opposition, to be understood, must be the one most obviously suggested, this being a necessary demand in spoken language, the thing with which the action or state is put in contrast is the same action or state itself, either in its actual mode or in some phase of it most readily admitting of the contrast. Thus, while in *ἀναβλέπειν*, 'to look up,' the contrast is naturally suggested with *καταβλέπειν*, 'to look down,' that is, the opposition of *ἀνδ*, 'up,' with *κατὰ*, 'down,' in *ἀναγγέλλειν*, 'to bring back a message,' there is,

it is true, the same notion of contrast conveyed by the same term, but with the entire absence of any idea of 'up' as opposed to 'down;' and the effect of the contrast suggested by *ἀνδ* is merely to put the action of *ἀγγέλλειν*, 'to bear a message,' or the state of 'being a messenger,' in opposition or contrast with itself in its actual mode, or to reverse it; so that the compound represents the bearing a message in a direction, or the being a messenger in a way, contrary to the same action or state as it is represented by the simple term. The reverse of 'bearing a message' from Athens to Sparta, for example, is 'to bear a message back' from Sparta to Athens. In the same way, *ἀναπίπτειν*, 'to fall back,' gives the representation of an 'act of falling' taken in a direction opposite to the actual one, and that comes back to the original position from which an object has fallen; and *ἀνακαλεῖσθαι*, 'to call back,' 'to call off,' said, for example, of the huntsman recalling his hounds in the chase, conveys the sense of a calling in a direction opposite to that in which a thing at the time is.

The explanation of the origin of this signification of *ἀνδ* here given receives strong confirmation from the fact, above referred to, that *κατὰ*, in some few compounds, is used in the same sense of 'back;' as, *κατιέναι*, 'to come back,' as from exile, *κατάγειν*, 'to bring back,' 'to restore from exile,' *καταδέχεσθαι*, 'to receive back from exile.' To show this, it might be enough, perhaps, to state generally that it would be wellnigh incredible that the only thing, besides the having the sense of 'back,' in which these prepositions agree, namely, the suggestion of contrast, should furnish a natural explanation of the meaning of 'back,' which they have in common, and yet this notion of contrast not be the true origin of such meaning. Especially would this be incredible, considering that the meaning of 'back' is just as foreign to *ἀνδ* as to *κατὰ*, and cannot be directly derived from the proper notion of either. If the sense of contrast suggested by *ἀνδ* afford a probable origin for that of 'back' expressed by this preposition, and it be found that *κατὰ*, differing in every thing else, and yet having the capacity of expressing contrast, just as *ἀνδ* has, obtains also the

meaning of 'back,' though totally foreign to its proper sense, it is doubly probable that the common signification of 'back' is owing to the common idea of contrast. But, the principle of interpretation involved being of some importance, and yet not perfectly obvious, it may be allowable to go something more fully into the explanation. If the prepositions *δὲν* and *κατά*, having wholly opposite meanings in themselves, come to obtain a common sense, and this a sense not derivable from the meaning of either, as in the case of 'back,' it is plain that this sense in which they agree is to be referred to something that is extrinsic to both, but that, from some cause, becomes equally an attendant of both. And if, again, in the history of the use of these prepositions, it be found that they not only obtain the same sense, though foreign to the proper signification of the one as to that of the other, but alike concur in the possession of some incidental capacity or force, and this one affording a probable origin of the common meaning in question, it may safely be inferred that it is to this capacity or force that the meaning in which they agree is to be referred. 'Ἀνά, 'up,' and *κατά*, 'down,' are essentially different and even opposite in sense, and yet they agree in having somehow obtained the meaning of 'back,' which is in no way directly derived from either the sense of 'up' or that of 'down.' But *δὲν* and *κατά*, standing in natural and obvious opposition the one to the other, have in common this incidental capacity of suggesting contrast; and this notion of contrast gives a probable explanation of the origin of the meaning of 'back,' rendered all the more probable from its applying to prepositions that agree in nothing else from which their common meaning of 'back' can possibly spring, save this capacity of suggesting contrast.

If any one should object, as very naturally he might, that it is too much to assume, as is here done, that the prepositions *δὲν* and *κατά* may drop their proper sense and retain a meaning in no way derived from this, but gathered up in the course of their use from the relations in which the objects with which they are connected stand to each other, let him call to mind how unmistakably this has happened

in the case of other Greek words, prepositions included, and even in other uses of *δὲν* and *κατά*. For example, how *μετά*, having the signification of 'amid,' 'among,' obtains, from the relation in which the parties in a group stand to each other, that of 'after,' and is used in this sense in a multitude of examples where the proper notion of 'amid' is apparently wholly suppressed; how these very prepositions *δὲν* and *κατά* are joined with the accusative of measure in cases where it would be absurd to insist that the extent of the measure is determined by an actual motion of 'up' or 'down,' although these are the true meanings of the prepositions.

Of the same nature essentially with the sense of *δὲν* above considered, is that which occurs in such compounds as *ἀνακαλύπτειν*, 'to uncover,' the preposition here having the effect of reversing the meaning, and of making the action as represented by *ἀνακαλύπτειν* just the contrary of that expressed by *καλύπτειν*. So in *ἀναπτύσσειν*, 'to unfold,' the opposite of *πτύσσειν*, 'to fold,' and in a number besides.

3. 'Again.' In another set of compounds *δὲν* has the sense of 'again,' not simply, however, with the notion of repetition, although this is implied; but rather with that of reversing an act, or doing it contrariwise; sometimes with that of doing a thing again for the better, of remedying an evil or repairing a loss. Thus, *ἀναβιοῦν*, 'to live again,' 'to come to life again,' the sense suggested being that of a person coming to the enjoyment of life again after having ceased to live. By means of *δὲν* the act of living is placed in opposition to the absence of life, this being what is most naturally set in contrast. So that there is expressed by *ἀναβιοῦν*, not merely a repetition of the act of living, but, more, a recovery from death, or from a state opposite to life. In *ἀναβλέπειν*, 'to see again,' 'to recover one's sight,' the state of seeing is not merely considered as existing again, but as a thing regained after having been lost; so in *ἀναμάχεσθαι*, 'to fight again,' 'to renew the fight,' 'to restore the battle,' there is represented, not simply a second fighting, but a fighting again after the battle has been relinquished or lost; so *ἀνανεάζειν*, 'to make young again,' that is, from

being old to make young again; *αναβρέχειν*, 'to wet again,' that is, from being dry to make wet again. It need hardly be added, that this meaning of *adv* is merely a modification of the preceding, being, in fact, due to its power of suggesting a contrast between the action or state which it qualifies and the opposite state naturally occurring to the mind.

4. 'Out,' 'aloud.' In some compounds *adv* has what may, perhaps, be called an intensive sense, rendered in English by 'out,' 'aloud:' e.g. *αναβοῦν*, 'to cry out,' 'to shout aloud,' *αναβροντῶν*, 'to thunder aloud,' *αναγελῶν*, 'to laugh out,' 'to laugh aloud,' *αναχλαίεν*, 'to weep aloud.' In English we use 'out' in the same sense, as in the translations just given; also 'up,' as 'to eat up,' that is, 'to eat quite or entirely;' and sometimes 'out and out,' the preposition being doubled for the sake of intensity. In Greek, also, some other prepositions are used with like intensive force; as *κατά* in *κατατέμνειν*, 'to cut to pieces,' and *ἐκ* in *ἐκνικῶν*, 'to conquer completely.' In some of the examples of such use of *adv*, it is not altogether impossible to perceive a consonance, at least, between the proper sense of the preposition and what it has been here ventured to call its intensive sense; as in *αναδεικνύειν*, 'to show forth,' 'to exhibit,' *ανακωλύειν*, 'to wail aloud.' But it may be admitted, that although this meaning is most nearly allied, as far as we can see, with the primary sense of *adv*, yet its precise relations to it are difficult to determine.

It is only in compounds that *adv* has the three last-mentioned meanings: it does not present them in its use with the cases. With these *adv* has only the sense of 'up,' and, relatively considered, that of 'upon.'

Summary of the significations of adv.

1. 'Up.'
2. From the suggestion of contrast: 'back,' 'again.'
3. Intensively: 'out,' 'aloud.'

Signification and use of adv with cases of nouns.

'*Adv* is used with the genitive, dative, and accusative cases; possibly with the ablative (locativus); with the genitive and dative only in the epic and lyric poets.

I. '*Adv* with the genitive case.

With the genitive case *adv* is employed only in a few examples; and even in these it is doubted whether the genitive should be considered as connected with *adv* in its construction. (See Passow's Lexicon, s. v.) Thus, Od. ii. 416, *ἀνὰ δ' ἄρα Τηλέμαχος νηὸς βαῖν', ἦρχε δ' Ἀθήνη*, 'Telemachus went on board the ship, and Athene had command.' According to the mode of interpretation set forth in this treatise, *adv* is to be regarded as the qualification of *βαῖνε*; 'Telemachus went up,' that is, 'on board;' and the genitive *νηός* is added in the sense of 'with respect to the ship,' to specify the object to which the going on board is to be distinctly referred; 'Telemachus went up on board . . . with respect to the ship,' and not with respect to any other object; that is, he went on board the ship.

II. '*Adv* with the dative, or with the ablative (locativus) (?).

The form of the dative and of the ablative (locativus) cases being the same in Greek, it is a question of difficulty to decide whether the examples in which *adv* occurs with this form have the dative or the ablative (locativus). E.g. Il. i. 14-15, *στέμματα' ἔχων ἐν χερσὶν ἐκβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος | χρυσέῃ ἀνὰ σκήπτρῳ*, 'having in his hands the garlands of Apollo on a golden sceptre.' If *χρυσέῃ σκήπτρῳ* be regarded, as it might be, as the ablative of position or locativus, the sense will be, 'having in his hands the garlands of Apollo up . . . on a golden sceptre,' the locativus marking the place of the garlands, 'on a sceptre,' and *adv* describing further the manner or relative direction of the holding; 'he had or held the garlands up' as opposed to 'down.' Considered as a dative case, *χρυσέῃ σκήπτρῳ* will denote the object ultimately affected, and depend immediately upon *adv* and the preceding words *στέμματα' ἔχων ἐκβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος*, 'he had in his hands the garlands of Apollo . . . upon a golden sceptre;' that is, the golden sceptre is presented as the object ultimately affected by the disposition of the garlands, just as though it were a party to whose benefit it enured, and just as the dative is admitted to attend upon *δμοιος*, 'like,' *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the

same,' &c. Although this latter interpretation seems rather difficult to admit, possibly from our being unaccustomed in our language to such use of the dative case, yet it might, perhaps, be justified by the freer use of the Greek language. If the ablative here appear to afford the simpler and more obvious construction, it may be urged, on the other hand, that as *ἐπί*, 'upon,' and *ἀμφί*, 'about,' would seem to be followed by the dative case in virtue of their own signification, in the same way that *δμοιος*, 'like,' *ἴσος*, 'equal,' *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same,' have the dative after them, so *ἀνά*, 'up,' may have this case depending upon it. Similar are the following examples cited by Passow: Od. xi. 128, *ἀθηλοεργὸν ἔχειν ἀνὰ φαιδίμφ ὤμφ*, 'on his shining shoulder;' Il. xv. 152-3, *εὔρον δ' εὐρύοπα Κρονίδην ἀνὰ Γαργάρφ ἀρφ | ἤμενον*, 'sitting on promontory Gargarus.'

III. *Ἀνά* with the accusative.

1. *Ἀνά* with the accusative is employed to express, in a variety of ways, the measure or extent of an action or motion. Thus (a), in the sense of 'up,' 'up to,' 'to the extent of:' e.g. Od. xxii. 193, *κίον ἀν' ὤψηλὴν ἔρυσαν*, 'they drew him up to the lofty pillar,' that is, 'they drew him up . . . to the extent of, as far as went, the lofty pillar.' The measure or amount of the drawing up is expressed by the accusative *κίον ὤψηλὴν*, and the proper office of *ἀνά* is to mark the direction of the drawing, that it was 'up' or 'upwards.'

b. 'Throughout,' 'all through.' *Ἀνά* with the accusative is used in the sense of 'throughout,' 'all through:' e.g. Il. i. 53, *ἐννήμαρ μὲν ἀνὰ στρατὸν ὦχετο κῆλα θεοῖο*, 'the arrows of the god sped throughout the army.' Here the accusative *στρατὸν* shows up to what limit went the infliction of the god, how far reached the sending of his arrows, *ἀνά* retaining nothing of its proper sense of 'up,' but merely serving to mark the accusative as a sign of measure, peculiar only in its resulting from giving the limit of a motion assumed to have one certain direction rather than another. Æsch. Prom. 590, *πλανᾷ τε νῆστιν ἀνὰ τὰν παραλίαν ψάμμον*, 'and drives me a famished wanderer all through (over) the

sandy shore.' Herod. i. 96, *ἔοντων δὲ αὐτονόμων πάντων ἀνὰ τὴν ἡπειρον*, 'throughout the mainland;' Id. ii. 135, *δοιδιμος ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐγένετο*, 'was celebrated in song throughout Hellas;' Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 4, *σταθμοὺς ἑπτὰ ἐπορεύθησαν, ἀνὰ πέντε παρασάγγας τῆς ἡμέρας*, 'as much as five parasangs a day.' Originally, *ἀνά* thus used denoted one of the modes of taking a measure, namely, by measuring from below upwards; just as *κατὰ* expressed the opposite mode of taking a measure, from above downwards. But, as it was really a matter of no moment, for the result, whether the measure was taken from below upwards or from above downwards, *ἀνά* was employed, not only in cases where a measure was expressed by the limit of an upward motion, and where *ἀνά* would have its proper sense, but in others also where it was not required to give any exact indication of the direction of the action or motion by limiting which the accusative came to express measure. In such case, *ἀνά* became a mere sign that the accusative was used as a note of measure, one that may fairly be assumed to have its origin from being the limit of a motion directed from below upwards, but that would seem to be used without regard to this origin. In the same way *κατὰ* is used with the accusative of measure where there is no notion of a downward motion any longer conveyed; and, accordingly, *κατὰ στρατόν* means 'throughout the army,' just as *ἀνὰ στρατόν* does.

To this use of *ἀνά* with the accusative belongs the phrase *ἀνὰ στόμα ἔχειν*, 'to have constantly in the mouth,' or 'on the tongue,' 'to be ever saying,' properly, 'to have all through the mouth,' or 'as far as ever the mouth goes.' And so *ἀνὰ θυμὸν φρονεῖν*, 'to revolve in one's mind,' properly, 'to consider to the extent of one's mind,' 'as far as one's mind goes:' e.g. Il. ii. 35-6, *τὸν δ' ἔλεπ' αὐτοῦ | τὰ φρονέοντ' ἀνὰ θυμὸν ἃ ῥ' οὐ τελέεσθαι ἐμελλε*.

c. *Ἀνά* is used also with the accusative case of nouns expressing the several denominations of time to mark the extent or measure reached. Thus, in Homer, but only in the phrase *ἀνὰ νύκτα*, 'during, all through, the night,' 'to the extent of the night:' e.g. Il. xiv. 80, *οὐ γὰρ τις νέμεσις ψυχέειν κακόν, οὐδ' ἀνὰ νύκτα*. Herod. viii. 123, *ἐπλωον οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐς τὴν*

'Ισθμὸν ἀριστήϊα δώσαντες τῷ ἀξιώτατῳ γενομένῳ 'Ελλήνων ἀνὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον, 'during, throughout, this war,' or, less accurately rendered, 'in this war.' Here belongs the expression ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ἡμέραν, 'throughout the whole day,' that is, 'to the extent of the whole day.' Here may be mentioned, also, the phrase ἀνὰ χρόνον, 'in time,' 'in course of time:' e.g. Herod. i. 173, κατὰ τοῦ Λύκου τὴν ἐπινομίην Λύκιοι ἀνὰ χρόνον ἐκλήθησαν, 'in course of time were called Lycians;' properly, 'against a period of time,' the idea being that the Lycians obtained their denomination in a space the measure of which is expressed by saying that it amounted to or reached a period of time. Cf. Herod. ii. 151.

d. 'Ανὰ is used with the accusative of numbers also, and in the same way as in the preceding cases; but, owing to our like use of 'up to' with numbers to mark the extent to which any computation goes, we can here more readily see the direction in which the measure is regarded as reached. E.g. Od. ix. 209, ἀνὰ εἴκοσι μέτρα χεῦε, 'he poured out to the amount of twenty measures,' properly, 'up to the amount of twenty measures.'

e. The same interpretation, both as to ἀνὰ and as to the accusative case, is to be given of a number of what are called adverbial phrases; as, ἀνὰ κράτος, 'with one's might,' 'to the utmost,' the literal sense being, 'up to the measure of one's strength:' e.g. Xen. Anab. i. 8, 1, προφαίνεται (Πατηγῶας) ἐλαύνων ἀνὰ κράτος ἰδρουῦντι τῷ ἱππῳ, 'riding at the top of his speed,' that is, 'up to the measure of his strength.' So ἀνὰ μέρος, 'in turn:' e.g. Eur. Phœn. 488, ὥστ' αὐτὸς ἀρχεῖν αὐθις ἀνὰ μέρος λαβῶν, 'on condition that I should get the kingdom in turn and have the dominion.' When it is said of a person that he performs an action ἀνὰ (or κατὰ) μέρος, 'in turn,' the sense really is, that he performs it 'as far as his part or share goes,' or 'according to his part or share.' (See Xen. Cyrop. iv. 2, 30.) Hardly different is the phrase ἀνὰ τοὺς πρώτους, ἔσαν, 'they were among the first;' properly, 'were up with, as far as, equal with, the first.'

f. Of the same nature essentially is the use of ἀνὰ, as well as of κατὰ, with λόγον, in the sense of 'in the proportion of,' 'according to the proportion of:' e.g. λέγεται τοὺς λίθους ἕχειν

ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὴν λειότητα, 'it is said to have its stones of the same measure of smoothness,' that is, coming up to the same reckoning or estimate in regard to smoothness, the accusative λόγον marking the measure or extent, and denoting how far the smoothness of the stones reaches, namely, to τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, 'the same reckoning or estimate,' and ἀνὰ, in its proper sense, indicating, just as our expression 'up (to)' in the translation does, the direction in which the measure is taken. Compare Herod. ii. 68, καὶ ὁ νεοσσὸς κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦ ὠοῦ γίνεται, 'and the young one is in proportion to the egg,' that is, 'is according to the size (computation) of the egg;' Id. ii. 10, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι ποταμοὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸν Νεῖλον εὐόντες μεγάρθεα, 'and there are other streams, also, that in size are not equal to the Nile,' that is, 'not according to the reckoning for, or standard of, the Nile.'

g. 'Every.' To be referred to the same class with the above examples is the use of ἀνὰ with the accusative case to express a distributive sense, answering to the English 'every' and 'each.' E.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 21, ἐποίησαντο ἑξ λόχους ἀνὰ ἑκατὸν ἀνδρας, 'they formed six companies of a hundred men each;' Id. Anab. vi. 3, 11, ὁ δὲ τρεῖς ἀφελὼν τὰς τελευταίας τάξεις ἀνὰ διακοσίους ἀνδρας, κ.τ.λ., 'detaching the three last ranks of two hundred men each;' Herod. ii. 37, ἐκ χαλκίων ποτηρέων πίνουσι, διασμέωντες ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέρην, 'rinsing them every day;' Id. vii. 106, πέμπεσκε δὲ (τὰ δῶρα) ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος, 'he sent the presents every year;' Xen. Cyr. i. 2, 8, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὁρῶσι ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν σωφρόνως διάγοντας, 'because they see the older men also living temperately every day.'

With regard to the use of ἀνὰ with the accusative in this distributive sense, it should be observed, first, that the accusative case with ἀνὰ attending it marks, properly speaking, only a measure of extent, as in the preceding instances, the accusative denoting measure, and ἀνὰ showing, originally at least, the way or direction in which the measure is reached, namely, from below upwards, but being afterwards used with the accusative of measure without any obvious reference to the direction in which the measure is reached, just as is the case with κατὰ. Secondly, that while ἀνὰ and the

accusative do merely express a certain measure, e.g. *ἀνὰ ἑκατὸν ἀνδρας*, 'to the number of a hundred men,' they are capable of being used as a standard of measure by which any number or quantity of the same class or kind shall be measured off or divided into equal parts having the same denomination with the standard of measure. Thus, in the second example above cited, the three ranks of men being mentioned as detached, the measure *ἀνὰ διακοσίους ἀνδρας*, 'to the number of two hundred men,' is introduced and applied as a standard of measure by which they are divided off into equal parts having this denomination, that is, of 'two hundred men' each. Thirdly, that the question whether a measure of extent expressed by *ἀνὰ* or *κατὰ* and the accusative, when introduced alongside of any quantity or number, is to be used simply as a measure of extent, or as a standard of measure, can be decided only by the attendant circumstances. For there is no proper and separate sign of distribution in either *ἀνὰ* or the accusative, but only the marks by which a measure of amount is distinguished; and the fact that the measure denoted by the preposition and accusative case has the capacity of being employed as a standard of measure, is suggested by the noun in the accusative marking a denomination of measure of the same kind with the parts into which the whole number or quantity may be divided. For instance, the measure *ἀνὰ διακοσίους ἀνδρας*, 'to the number of two hundred men,' or simply 'two hundred men,' is capable of becoming a standard of measure by which the body of *τρεις τάξεις*, 'three ranks of men,' may be divided off, because it is of the same denomination with the parts into which the whole number is divisible; a number of ranks of men may be divided off into companies of the same denomination with *ἀνὰ διακοσίους ἀνδρας*, that is, 'two hundred men.' But whether, in fact, the *τρεις τάξεις*, 'three ranks of men,' are divided off into equal parts by the measure of *ἀνὰ διακοσίους ἀνδρας*, 'two hundred men,' that is, whether the latter shall be considered a standard of measure for the time being, can be gathered only from the narrative. To remedy the ambiguity which must more or less attend this use of *ἀνὰ* with the accusative,

certain separate signs of distribution are sometimes super-added, as *πᾶς*, 'every,' *ἕκαστος*, 'each.' Thus, in the examples above cited, *ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν*, 'every day,' *ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος*, 'every year,' though the terms *ἀνὰ ἡμέραν*, 'up to the measure of a day,' *ἀνὰ ἔτος*, 'up to the measure of a year,' or, simply, 'the measure of a day,' 'the measure of a year,' might have been understood, from the context, to be applied as a standard of measure by which to distribute into equal parts the period of time during which the older men lived temperately, and that during which Xerxes sent presents; yet an ambiguity might remain, and it is obviated by the introduction of *πᾶς*, 'every.' In English we employ, to mark distribution, either 'every,' and 'each,' with the standard of measure alone; as, 'he gave him a present every year,' or 'each year,' 'he gave them every one a present,' or 'he gave them each a present;' or the standard of measure attended by 'a' or 'an,' the same as 'one;' as, 'he sent him a letter a month;' 'they received ten dollars a man.'

2. Besides the above cases, in which *ἀνὰ* with the accusative is employed to mark in various circumstances, and with different objects, the extent or measure of some action or state, this preposition is used with the same case to define, in a more general way, the limits within which a proposition is to be understood to be affirmed, the accusative answering to the English 'as to,' 'as regards,' 'as far as goes,' although not converted by these terms, and the preposition being rendered by 'up' or 'on.' E.g. Il. xiii. 546-7, . . . *ἀπὸ δὲ φλέβα πᾶσαν ἔχερσεν, | ἧτ' ἀνὰ ὠῶτα θέουσα διαμπερὲς, αὐχέν' ἱκάνει*, 'cut the entire vein, which runs quite up the back and reaches the neck;' properly, 'which runs quite up . . . as regards the back;' Il. x. 465-6, *καὶ ἀπὸ ἔδεν ὑψὸς αἰέρας | θῆκεν ἀνὰ μυρίην*, 'and, lifting them on high, placed them upon the tamarisk,' that is, 'placed them up . . . as regards the tamarisk.' Herod. ii. 96, *ταῦτα τὰ πλοῖα ἀνὰ μὲν τὸν ποταμὸν οὐ δύνανται πλεῖν*, 'these vessels are not capable of sailing up the stream;' properly, 'are not capable of sailing up . . . as regards the stream.' Xen. Ages. ii. 22, *καὶ ἐν πεδίῳ καὶ ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη μάχεσθαι*, 'to fight both in the plain, and on the mountains,' that is, 'up . . . as regards the moun-

tains,' *ἀνὰ* showing that the scene of the fighting is relatively 'up,' as opposed to *ἐν πεδίῳ*, and the accusative limiting the descriptive term of *ἀνὰ*, 'up,' to *τὰ ὄρη*, 'the mountains.'

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATION AND USE OF *ἀνὰ* WITH CASES.

Signification of <i>ἀνὰ</i> .	Gen.: 'of,' 'with respect to.'	Dat.: 'to,' 'for.'	Locat.: 'at.'	Acc. 1. 'to,' 'as far as;' 2. 'as to,' 'as regards.'
'Up.'	'Upon.'	'Upon.'	'Upon.'	'Up to,' 'Throughout,' 'As many as,' 'During,' 'Every,' 'each,' 'a,' 'an.'

ἄνευ.

ἄνευ, of which there is also a poetical form *ἄνευθε*, has probably the same radical with the negative prefix *d-* and *av-*, the Latin *i-* and *in-*, the English and German *un-*, the German *ohne* and *ohn-*, 'without,' the old German *ano*, and the Gothic *ihnu*. (See Pott Etym. Forsch. ii. p. 131.)

Significations of ἄνευ.

1. *ἄνευ* is used both adverbially and as a preposition, that is, both with and without a case, and has commonly the sense of 'without.' It is frequently met with in contrast with *σύν*, 'with,' 'together with:' e.g. Il. xvii. 406-7, *ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ἔλπετο ἅμπαυ | ἐκπέρσειν πολίεθρον ἄνευ ἔθεν*, οὐδὲ *σὺν αὐτῷ*, 'neither without himself, nor even with him;' Il. xxiii. 387, *ἄνευ κέντροιο θέοντες*, 'running without the lash (goad).' Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 18, *σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ καλῷ ᾤετο δεῖν τούτων τυγχάνειν*, *ἄνευ δὲ τούτων μὴ*, 'he considered that he ought to get these things with justice and honor, but not without these virtues.'

2. 'Away from,' 'apart from.' *ἄνευ* has also the meaning of 'away from,' 'apart from:' e.g. Il. xiii. 556, *οὐ μὲν γὰρ ποτ' ἄνευ θηίων ἦν*, *ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς | στρωφῶν*, 'for he was never away from foes, but turned himself against them;' Od. xvi. 238-9, . . . *εἴ κεν νῶϊ δυνησόμεθ' ἀντιφάρεσθαι*, | *μόυνω ἄνευθ' ἄλλων*, *ἣ καὶ διζήσόμεθ' ἄλλους*, 'alone, apart from others.' In the latter case, however, *ἄνευθε* might be rendered 'without.' (See Passow's Lex.) This meaning of

'away from,' 'apart from,' is only a variation of that of 'without,' and is derived from it.

3. 'Except.' *ἄνευ* has, further, the meaning of 'except,' which is but another variation of the proper sense of 'without.' E.g. Plat. Crit. 112, c, cited in Passow's Lexicon, *ἄνευ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου*, 'except gold and silver.'

Summary of the significations of ἄνευ.

1. 'Without.'
2. 'Away from,' 'apart from.'
3. 'Except.'

Use of ἄνευ with its case.

ἄνευ is used with the genitive alone, the preposition having the meanings above set forth, and the genitive having the signification of 'with respect to,' as in the above-cited examples. To these add Æsch. Pers. 609, *τογάρα χέλευθον τήνδ' ἄνευ τ' ὀχημάτων | χλιδῆς τε τῆς πάροιθεν*, *ἐκ δόμων πάλιν | ἔσσεια*, 'therefore have I come this way again from my home, without a chariot and without my former equipage;' Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 6, *ἔξδὸν μὲν εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἄνευ αἰσχύνης καὶ βλάβης*, *αἰρεῖται πολεμεῖν*, 'without shame and hurt;' Id. Hell. iii. 4, 26, *οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειε ταῦτα ἄνευ τῶν οἴκοι τελῶν*, 'he would not do this without (the consent of) the magistrates at home,' *ἄνευ* and the genitive in this, as in many other examples of the use of this preposition, having seemingly a pregnant sense. Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 14, *καὶ σὺ γελῶσας διτλήδεις μοι . . . ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἴη στρατιῇ τακτικῶν ἄνευ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων*, 'you explained to me that tactics were of no benefit to an army without provisions;' Id. Hell. i. 7, 30, *τοὺς νόμους . . . φυλάττοντες*, *ἄνευ τούτων μηδὲν πράττειν περῶσθε*, 'observing the laws, attempt to do nothing without them,' that is, 'apart from, contrary to, them.' (See Lex. Xenoph.)

For the augmented and compound forms *ἄνευθε* and *ἀπ'ἀνευθε*, see Passow's Lexicon.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *ἄνευ*.

Significations of <i>ἄνευ</i> .	Gen.: 'of,' 'with respect to.'
1. 'Without.'	'Without.'
2. 'Away from,' 'apart from.'	'Away from,' 'apart from.'
3. 'Except.'	'Except.'

Ἀντί.

Ἀντί corresponds both in form and in its characteristic sense to the Latin *ante*, 'before,' to the Gothic *and*, to the German *ant-*, as seen in *anlitz*, 'face,' and *ent-*, as in *entgegen*, 'towards,' *obvius*. It is regarded by Pott (Etym. F. i. p. 176, ii. 148) as having the same radical with the Sanskrit pronoun of the third person, *ana*, 'ille,' from which comes *antara*, 'alter,' and by Grimm is compared with the Sanskrit *ati*, 'ultra.' In both these latter cases, the sense would be shown to correspond, by referring to the derivative meaning of the demonstrative pronoun in which it signifies 'that' as opposed to 'this,' and hence 'on the other side' as opposed to 'on this side,' which is the proper notion of the comparative form *ultra*. (See also Passow's Lexicon.)

Significations of ἀντί.

1. 'Over against,' 'opposite,' 'face to face.' The proper meaning of *ἀντί* is 'over against,' 'opposite,' 'face to face,' in a local sense, as seen in the related form *ἀντην* and in the derivative *ἀντίος*, 'over against,' 'opposite,' and in many other derivative and compound forms in which *ἀντί* appears; as, *ἀντιῶν*, 'to go to meet,' 'to face,' *ἀντιαδίζειν*, 'to set opposite,' *ἀντίπριμος*, 'face to face,' *ἀντίπορος*, 'over against,' *ἀντίθρονος*, 'sitting opposite.' So also in construction with nouns: e.g. Il. viii. 233-4, *Τρώων ἀνδ' ἑκατόν τε δαῖκυσίων τε ἔκαστος | στήσασθ' ἐν πολέμῳ*, 'you will each stand against, that is, before, over against, the Trojans;' Od. iv. 115-16, *χλαῖναν πορφυρέην ἀντ' ὀφθαλμοῖν ἀνασχών | ἀμφοτέρῃσιν χερσὶ*, 'holding up a purple robe before, over against, the eyes.' This same may possibly be the sense of *ἀντί* as used with verbs of entreaty, and where it answers to the English 'by:' e.g. Soph. Œd. Col. 1326, *οἷ σ' ἀντί παιδῶν τῶνδε καὶ ψυχῆς, πάτερ, | ἱκετεύομεν, ξύμπαντες*, 'who all of us beseech you, O father, by these children and by your life;' that is, perhaps, 'over against, in the face of, before.' More probably, however, this sense of *ἀντί* is a derivative one, to be mentioned afterwards, in which it expresses the idea of an equivalent, of what is weighed against another and counterbalances it, and

so, in certain connections, comes to express what is an adequate motive. In this view, the sense here would be, 'we all beseech you, O father, placing our entreaties in the one scale, and these your children and your life in the other;' making the latter an equivalent for the former, your children and life a motive for yielding to our entreaties.

2. 'For,' as an expression of equivalent. From the sense of 'over against,' 'opposite to,' is derived that of equipoise, counterbalancing, as of one thing answering to another, and, as it were, weighed against it. Thus, in the compounds *ἀντιστοῦν*, 'to weigh against,' and *ἀντίρροπος*, 'counterpoising.' This sense is seen in a variety of uses of *ἀντί* that involve, more or less obviously, the idea of one thing corresponding to and counterbalancing another. Thus:

a. 'For,' 'of equivalent value.' *Ἀντί* has the meaning of 'for,' 'of equivalent value:' e.g. Il. ix. 116, *ἀντί νυ πολλῶν | λαῶν ἔστιν ἀνὴρ ὅντε Ζεὺς κῆρι φιλήσῃ*, 'the man whom Zeus loves in his heart is worth, equal in value to, many people;' Od. viii. 546-7, *ἀντί κασσηγήτου ξείνος δ' ἱκέτης τε τέτυκται | ἀνέρι*, 'a guest and a suppliant is for a man in the room of, counted as, a brother;' Herod. iii. 59, *παρὰ δὲ Ἑρμιονέων νῆσον ἀντί χρημάτων παρέλαβον*, 'they got the island, as an equivalent, for money.' The same sense is seen in compounds; as, *ἀντίθεος*, 'godlike,' *ἀντίκεντρος*, 'sharp as a goad.'

b. 'For,' 'in exchange for,' 'in return for,' 'in turn.' This sense of *ἀντί* is essentially the same with the preceding, and occurs in expressions of barter or interchange of values. Thus, in compounds; as, *ἀντίδους*, 'a giving in exchange,' *ἀντιβλάπτειν*, 'to injure in turn,' *ἀντιβδύλλειν*, 'to throw in turn,' *ἀντικαίειν*, 'to weep in turn,' *ἀντικαίειν*, 'to burn in return,' 'to give burning for burning.' So also in construction with the case of a noun: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. iv. 6, 8, *σὺ ἡμῖν τί ἀντί τούτων ὑπηρετήσεις*; 'what service will you render us in return for this?' Id. Hell. i. 7, 18, *ἀντί τῆς τότε φιλανθρωπίας νῦν . . . ἐπιβουλευόμενοι*, 'in return for their kindness;' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 544, *ἀντί τῶν εἰρημένων ἴσ' ἀντάκουσον*, 'hear, in return for, in answer to, what you have said.'

c. 'For,' 'instead of,' one thing taking the place of another. This sense of *ἀντί* is very nearly related to that just men-

tioned, and is of very frequent occurrence. Thus, in the compounds *ἀντιθνήσκειν*, 'to die instead of,' 'in the room of,' *ἀντιλαμβάνειν*, 'to take in the room of.' And so with nouns: e.g. Xen. Anab. i. 1, 4, *βουλεύεται ὅπως . . . βασιλεύσει ἀντ' ἐκείνου*, 'how he shall be king in his stead;' Id. Cyrop. iv. 6, 5, *πᾶν μὲν ὁ τᾶλα νεκρὸν ἀντὶ νυμφίου ἐκοιμήσθην*, 'I got a corpse instead of a bridegroom;' Id. ib. viii. 1, 20, *καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο αὐτῷ φίλος χρήσιμος ἀντὶ ἀχρήστου*, 'and thus became to him a useful instead of a useless friend;' Herod. vii. 170, *ἀντὶ δὲ εἶναι νησιώτας (λέγεται) γενέσθαι ἡπειρώτας*, 'it is said that they became dwellers on the mainland instead of islanders.'

d. 'For,' 'before,' 'in preference to.' Frequently *ἀντί*, in comparisons, obtains this sense of preference, which is nearly akin to the immediately preceding one of 'instead of,' involving, as it does, the idea of one thing counted against another, and thus returning to the primary meaning of 'over against.' E.g. Xen. Anab. i. 7, 4, *τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐλοίμην ἂν ἀντὶ ὧν ἔχω πάντων*, 'I would choose liberty before, in preference to, instead of, all that I have;' Æsch. Prom. 465, *θαλασσοπλάγχτα δ' οὕτως ἄλλος ἀντ' ἐμοῦ | λυόντερ' εὖρε ναυτίλων ὀχρήματα*, 'no one before me, instead of me;' Id. Agam. 1241, *ἄλλην τιν' ἄλλην (αἰ. ἄτην, ἄτας,) ἀντ' ἐμοῦ πλουτίζετε*, 'enrich some other rather than me, instead of me.'

e. 'For,' 'why,' 'wherefore,' 'on account of.' Derived from the sense of an equivalent, of one thing counterbalancing another, is that of 'why,' 'wherefore,' which *ἀντί* sometimes obtains, expressing the ground or motive of an action or statement. E.g. Soph. Electr. 585-6, *δίδαξον ἀνδ' ὅτου τανῶν | αἰσχιστα πάντων ἔργα δρῶσα τυγχάνεις*, 'tell me wherefore, why, you have now done the most shameful of all deeds.' Here it is plain that *ἀνδ' ὅτου* is intended to convey the idea of equivalent for the deed referred to, and this is, at the same time, to constitute its ground or motive. Xen. Cyrop. viii. 4, 2, *ἀντὶ δὲ τούτων πολλοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις ἐτιμᾶτο ὑπὸ τοῦ Κύρου*, 'for, on account of, in return for, this;' Id. ib. viii. 3, 31, *δίδωμι τοῖνυν σοι, ἔφη, τουτονὶ τὸν ἵππον. 'Ὁ δ' ἐπῆρετο ἀντὶ τοῦ*; 'he asked, wherefore? for what?' Soph.

Antig. 237, *ἀνδ' οὐ τήνδ' ἔχεις ἀδυσμίαν*; 'why are you so despondent?'

f. 'By.' Ἀντί is used with the genitive case after verbs of entreaty, in the sense of 'by,' and may be most probably explained as containing the idea of an equivalent or counterpoise, and hence of ground or motive. Thus, in the example above cited, Soph. Œd. Col. 1326-7, *ὅς σ' ἀντὶ παίδων τῶνδε καὶ ψυχῆς, πάτερ, | ἱκετεύομεν ξύμπαντες*, 'we all entreat you by these your children, and by your life,' *ἀντί* introduces objects which shall constitute a motive with the person addressed, as being an equivalent value or consideration for the thing sought. Polynices entreats his father to relinquish his anger against him, and adduces the afflicted man's children, and his own life, as an equal consideration, and therefore as motives to induce his consent. Of course, this notion of an equivalent, although properly invoked to account for the origin of this use of *ἀντί*, is not to be understood as being present in the literal and prominent way in which it is necessarily set forth in the explanation. That would be to forget that words are often used, in their derivative significations, without any very distinct reference in the mind to the original ideas which underlie them. Compare Ellendt Lex. Sophoc. i. p. 171. Referring to the interpretation of Reisig, which makes *ἀντί*, in the passage above cited, to have the sense of 'before,' 'in the presence of,' this author says, "*verius est in hac etiam formula ἀντιδόσεως significationem inesse, velut si ὥς obtestandi sensu dicitur.*" The latter part of the quotation leaves it doubtful how far the learned author has a clear conception of this use of *ἀντί*.

Ἀντί being employed with the genitive case alone, and a sufficient number of examples of the use of the preposition with this case having been already given in setting forth its primary and derivative meanings, it is hardly necessary to go over the same ground again by presenting apart the several significations in which *ἀντί* occurs with the genitive. It may be enough to remark that the genitive, as used with *ἀντί*, has its common meaning of 'with respect to,' although this is not distinctly expressed in the rendering into English.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *ἀπό* WITH ITS CASE.

Significations of <i>ἀπό</i> .	Gen: 'with respect to.'
1. 'Over against,' 'opposite,' 'face to face,' 'before.'	1. 'Over against,' 'before.'
2. 'One thing counterbalancing another:' a. 'For,' 'an equivalent for,' b. 'For,' 'in exchange for,' 'in return for,' 'in turn,' c. 'For,' 'instead of,' d. 'For,' 'before,' 'in preference to,' e. 'For,' 'why,' 'wherefore,' 'on account of,' f. 'By,' in entreaties.	2. a. 'for,' 'in the room of,' 'equal to,' b. 'for,' 'in exchange for,' 'in return for,' c. 'for,' 'instead of,' d. 'for,' 'before,' 'in preference to,' e. 'for,' 'why,' 'wherefore,' 'on account of,' f. 'by,' in entreaties.

Ἀπό.

Ἀπό, which has also an epic form *ἀπαι*, is the same as the Sanskrit *apa*, the Latin *ab*, *a*, the German *ab*, as in *abgehen*, 'to go away,' the Gothic *af*, the English *off*. The English *after* would seem to be composed of this same radical (*af*) and the comparative ending *ter*, its meaning being not inconsistent with this composition so obviously suggested by the form. The only difficulty in the way of admitting that *after* is made up of these elements, would be found in the uniformity with which the English language elsewhere aspirates this comparative ending, as in *o-ther*, *whether*, *ci-ther*. The word *better* does not furnish a parallel example, the second *t* being only an iteration of the *t* of the radical caused by the stress of the voice. Compare the Gothic *batiza*, *melior*, *batista*, *optimus*, &c. mentioned by Bopp, Gloss. Sanskr. p. 243.

Significations of ἀπό.

1. 'Off,' 'away,' 'from.' *Ἀπό* has the primary sense of 'off,' 'away,' 'from,' having properly the notion of being apart, the being separated by an interval of distance, more exactly conveyed by the English 'off,' 'away,' but nearly expressed by 'from' also; as, 'to be from home.' Thus, in the compound *ἀποπρό*, 'away from,' 'at a distance from,' and in the adjective *ἀπίος*, 'far off,' 'distant,' *ἀποθεν*, 'from afar,' *ἀποικος*, 'away from home,' 'a colonist,' *ἀποβλέπειν*, 'to look away,' *ἀποδέρκειν*, 'to take off the hide,' 'to flay,' *ἀπο-*

δρέπειν, 'to strip off,' *ἀπογίγνεσθαι*, 'to be away,' *ἀποδημεῖν*, 'to sojourn from home.'

The sense of proceeding from, and of removal, which *ἀπό* very often has when conjoined with verbs of motion and action, and which is expressed by 'away,' 'away from,' as, *ἀπιέναι*, 'to go away from,' 'to depart,' *ἀποδιδράσκειν*, 'to run away,' 'to run off,' *ἀπογαλακτίζειν*, 'to take from the milk,' 'to wean,' is merely that of 'off,' 'away,' modified by being coupled with the motion or action.

In this sense of 'away,' *ἀπό* is very commonly met with in its use with nouns also; as, *ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν εἶναι*, 'to be out of sight,' properly, 'to be off, away, . . . with respect to the eyes:' e.g. Il. ii. 292, *μένων ἀπὸ ἧς ἀλόχοιο*, 'staying away from his spouse,' that is, 'staying away . . . with respect to his spouse;' Il. xii. 19, *δασοι ἀπ' Ἰδαίων ὀρέων ἄλαδε προρέουσιν*, 'as many as flow on to the sea from the mountains of Ida;' Il. xvi. 733, *ἀφ' ἱππων ἄλτο χαμῶζε*, 'he leapt from his horses (chariot) to the ground;' Il. v. 227, . . . *ἐγὼ δ' ἱππων ἀποβήσομαι*, 'I will descend from the chariot;' Ib. 209-10, . . . *ἀπὸ πασσάλου ἀγκύλα τόξα | ἤματι τῷ ἐλόμην*, 'I took the bow from the nail;' Ib. 13, *τὼ μὲν ἀφ' ἱπποῖν, ὁ δ' ἀπὸ χθονὸς ὤρνυτο πεζός*, 'they rushed (to battle) in a chariot, he on the ground, on foot,' properly, 'from a chariot,' 'from the ground,' marking whence, from what point, the warriors directed their efforts. Although, in such examples as *ἀφ' ἱππων ἄλτο*, 'he leapt from his chariot,' *ἀπό* might be rendered by 'down from,' the notion of 'down' is not rightly attributed to *ἀπό* itself, but is suggested by the circumstances of the action.

The examples in which most obviously, perhaps, *ἀπό* has the sense of 'off,' 'away,' are those in which it is employed, as very frequently in Homer, apart from both noun and verb: e.g. Il. i. 67, *ἤμιν δ' ἀπὸ λογὸν ἀμύναι*, 'to ward off the plague from us;' Il. ii. 183, *βῆ δὲ θέειν, ἀπὸ δὲ χλαῖναν βάλε*, 'and threw his mantle away.'

2. 'From,' 'after,' 'since.' When used of time, to mark the date of an event as fixed by counting from a certain point, *ἀπό* is expressed by 'from,' 'after,' 'since:' e.g. Il. viii. 54, *ἀπὸ δ' αὐτοῦ (δείπνου) θωρήσασοντο*, 'after it (their

meal) they armed themselves; that is, the time of arming themselves is fixed by reckoning from the time of taking their meal, and is thus represented as being after it. That the date is subsequent to, 'after,' and not 'before,' the meal, is owing to the act of arming, or second term, occupying, in the order of events as they occur, a point of time nearer to the speaker as compared with the former term or the taking of the meal. In other words, the notion of 'after,' with regard to the act of arming themselves, is suggested by the obvious chronological arrangement of the facts, and not by *ἀπό* alone. The mere meaning of 'off,' 'apart from,' which is all that *ἀπό* of itself expresses, would allow it to convey the idea of 'before,' as well as that of 'after.'

3. 'Back,' ('away.') *Ἀπό* often obtains the sense of 'back,' but only in compounds, and when used apart or adverbially; as, *ἀποδιδόναι*, 'to give back,' 'to repay,' *ἀποπέμπειν*, 'to send back:' e.g. Od. xvii. 76, *ὣς τοι δῶρ ἀποπέμψω ἃ τοι Μενέλαος ἔδωκεν*, 'that I may send thee back the presents;' *ἀπολάμπειν*, 'to shine back:' e.g. Il. xxii. 319, *ὣς αἰχμῆς ἀπέλαμπ' εὐήκεος*, 'thus it shone back (was reflected) from the sharp spear;' Il. xxi. 594, *πάλιν δ' ἀπὸ χαλκὸς ὄρουσεν*, 'the brazen spear bounded back.' This sense of *ἀπό* is immediately derived from that of 'away from,' or rather, to speak more accurately, is the same meaning modified by the circumstances in which it occurs. Thus, *ἀποπέμπειν* means 'to send away,' and in this sense it is commonly used; but in the passage from the Odyssey above cited, where Piræus proposes to send away to Telemachus presents which Menelaus had given him, it is plain that, as regards Telemachus, the 'sending away' is just the same, under the circumstances, as 'sending back.' When the word *ἀποκαλεῖν*, 'to call away,' is applied to an exile, as in Herod. iii. 53, *πέμψας ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν ἀπεκάλει τὸν Λυκόφρονα ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννίδα*, 'he attempted to recall Lycophron to the throne,' it is manifest that the 'calling away' from exile is the same thing as 'calling back' to his country. So of *ἀπέχειν*, 'to hold back,' 'to restrain,' *ἀποτίειν*, 'to requite:' e.g. Hom. Il. viii. 186, *νῦν μοι τὴν κομῆν ἀποτίνετον*, 'now requite me for the care.'

4. 'Different from,' 'at variance with,' 'without,' 'beside,' the English prefix 'un-' &c. *Ἀπό* sometimes obtains, both with a noun and in composition, a kind of negative sense, answering in English to 'different from,' 'at variance with,' 'without,' and to the prefix 'un-.' Thus (*α*) in compounds, as *βύειν*, 'to fill,' 'to cram,' *ἀποβύειν*, 'to unstop,' *ἀποβώμιος*, 'away, off, apart from, an altar,' 'without an altar,' 'irreligious;' *ἀπομόναι*, 'to swear off,' 'to put away or deny by an oath.' The negative sense which *ἀπό* here bears springs immediately from that of 'away from,' 'apart from.' Thus, in *ἀποβώμιος*, as seen above, the notion of 'away from, apart from, an altar,' suggests that of 'without an altar,' 'irreligious;' in *ἀποβύειν*, 'to unstop,' the preposition prefixed marks the filling or cramming expressed by *βύειν* as being 'away,' 'off,' and the sign of separation or putting apart is, under the circumstances, equivalent to a negative; in *ἀπομόναι*, *ἀπό* prefixed to *μόναι*, 'to swear,' gives properly the notion of 'swearing off or away from' a thing, or of 'putting off or away by swearing,' the oath being the means of placing a person apart from some act or statement, and so in contrariety with it. Hence *ἀπομόναι* may mean either 'to swear that one will not do a thing,' or 'to deny on oath that one has done a thing.'

b. 'Beside,' 'different from.' In the same way is to be explained the origin of the sense of 'beside,' 'different from:' e.g. Od. xi. 344-5, *ὦ φίλοι, οὐ μὲν ἤμιν ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οὐδ' ἀπὸ δόξης | μυθεῖται βασιλεία περίφρων*, 'the very prudent queen speaks not beside the mark (indiscreetly), nor at variance with our opinion;' where *ἀπὸ σκοποῦ*, properly meaning 'away from the mark,' is equivalent to 'not hitting, missing, beside the mark,' and *ἀπὸ δόξης*, 'away from our opinion,' is the same in sense as 'not in accordance with,' and hence 'at variance with, contrary to, our opinion.' Thuc. i. 76, *οὕτως οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμάστων οὐδὲν πεποσῆκαμεν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδριωπείου τρόπου*, 'thus we have done nothing that is either strange or contrary to, out of accord with, the common course of human conduct;' that is, 'away or apart from,' and so 'different from, and contrary to, the common course of human conduct.' Il. i. 562, . . . *ἀλλ' ἀπὸ θυμοῦ |*

μᾶλλον ἐμοὶ ἔσσαι, 'you will be more distasteful to me;' that is, 'you will be more away from, removed from, out of accord with, and hence disagreeable to, me.' In the phrase σπεύδειν ἀπὸ ρυτῆρος, Soph. Œd. Col. 900, 'to hurry at full speed,' properly, 'without bridle,' 'unrestrained,' ἀπὸ has the sense of 'without,' 'free from,' which comes from that of 'away from,' 'apart from,' 'without the presence of.'

5. 'Quite,' 'entirely.' In some compounds, ἀπὸ has the meaning of 'quite,' 'entirely,' that is, obtains an intensive force. Thus, ἀποβιβράσκειν, 'to eat up,' 'to devour;' ἀποδακρύειν, 'to cry very much;' ἀποσεμνύνειν, 'to make very august.' With this intensive sense of ἀπὸ, into which that of 'away' may have passed, just as ἐξ, 'out,' does into that of 'out and out,' 'quite,' we may compare the use of our 'away' in such expressions as 'to cry away' for 'to keep crying,' 'to strive away' for 'to keep striving.'

Summary of the significations of ἀπὸ.

1. 'Off,' 'away:' (a.) of space; 'off,' 'away:' with motion, 'away from,' 'from.'
(b.) of time; 'from,' 'after,' 'since.'
2. 'Away,' 'back.'
3. 'Different from,' 'at variance with,' 'without,' 'beside,' 'un-.'
4. 'Quite,' 'entirely.'

Uses of ἀπὸ with its case.

Ἀπὸ, retaining chiefly the significations of 'from,' 'away from,' 'after,' 'since,' is employed with the genitive alone, this case having, in this connection, its common sense of defining more exactly the preceding term or statement, by marking a specific object as being that with respect to which it is affirmed to the exclusion of all others.

1. 'From,' 'away from.' In marking relative position ἀπὸ is used with the genitive in the sense of 'from,' 'away from,' both with and without motion. a. Without motion; e.g. Il. ii. 292, μένων ἀπὸ ἧς ἀλόχοιο, 'staying away from his spouse,' that is, 'staying away . . . with respect to his spouse;' Soph. Phil. 183, κείται μῦνος ἀπ' ἄλλων, 'he lies alone, away (off, apart), from others;' that is, 'away, off,

apart . . . with respect to others;' Id. ib. 1128, εἰς ἀπὸ πολλῶν ταχθεῖς, where, according to Ellendt, Lex. Soph., the meaning is, "unus prater ceteros," 'he was appointed one man in preference to many;' properly, 'one man, apart from, and so distinguished from, selected from, preferred to, many;' Herod. iv. 194, ἡ θάλασσα ἀπέχει ὡς τέσσαρα στάδια ἀπὸ τῆς λίμνης, 'the sea is four stadia distant from the lake;' that is, 'is four stadia off, away, . . . with respect to the lake;' Or. Att. 824, 24, τροφὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα καὶ ἑπτὰ μῶν λογιστέον, 'you must count off, subtract, the subsistence from the seventy-seven minæ.'

b. With motion: e.g. Il. xii. 18-19, . . . ποταμῶν μένος εἰσαγαγόντες, ὅσσοι ἀπ' Ἰδαίων ὀρέων ἄλαδε προρέουσι, 'bringing the strength of all the rivers that flow on to the sea from the mountains of Ida;' that is, 'that flow on to the sea away . . . with respect to the mountains of Ida;' Il. xxiv. 491-2, . . . ἔλπεται ἡμιτα πάντα | ὄψεσθαι φίλον υἱὸν ἀπὸ Τροίης, 'he hopes every day that he will see his son coming from Troy,' that is, 'coming away . . . with respect to Troy;' Il. x. 578-9, . . . ἀπὸ δὲ κριτῆρος Ἀθήνῃ | πλείου ἀφυσσάμενοι λείβον μελεγδέα οἶνον, 'and made libations to Athene of wine with honey, pouring it from a full goblet;' Soph. Phil. 1134, συγῆ μ' οὐκέτ' ἀπ' αὐλίων πελᾷτε, 'you will no more by your flight bring me forth from my cavern;' Herod. iii. 115, ποταμὸς ἀπ' οὗτεν τὸ ἤλεκτρον φοιτᾷν λόγος ἐστί, 'a river from which the report is that amber comes;' Xen. Anab. i. 8, 10, πρὸ δ' αὐτῶν ἄρματα διαλείποντα συγνὸν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, 'chariots standing at a considerable distance from one another.'

2. In a variety of uses of ἀπὸ there arises a somewhat peculiar sense, due to the nature and relations of the terms with which the preposition is employed, neither this nor the case having undergone any real change in their meaning. Thus:

a. 'On,' 'in.' Ἀπὸ with the genitive obtains seemingly, in some phrases, the meaning of 'on,' 'in.' Thus, in phrases such as αἱ ἐκεῖνος ἐθήρευεν ἀπὸ ἵππου, Xen. Anab. i. 2, 7, 'which he used to hunt on horse,' properly, 'from horse,' throwing his spear from the horse. The term ἐθήρευεν must be understood as implying whatever actions are involved in

the chase, so that ἀπὸ ἵππου ἐδήρυνεν may be rendered by 'he threw the spear from the horse in hunting,' and ἀπὸ and the genitive will then have their usual sense. Xen. Cyrop. iii. 3, 60, τῶν δ' Ἀσσυρίων οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐρυμάτων προμαχοῦντες, 'those of the Assyrians who fought as defenders in (from) the fortifications;' properly, who being stationed in the fortifications defended them by throwing weapons from these. Here προμαχοῦντες may be considered as having a pregnant sense, just as ἐδήρυνεν had in the preceding example.

b. 'From,' 'after,' 'since.' In marking the point from which the date of an event is reckoned, ἀπὸ with the genitive is very commonly used, and is rendered in English by 'from,' 'after,' 'since.' E.g. Il. viii. 54, ἀπὸ δ' αὐτοῦ (sc. δείπνου) θωρήσσοντο, 'after it (their meal) they armed themselves.' As has been above explained, the peculiar meaning of 'after,' which ἀπὸ seems here to bear, is properly due to the relative position in the order of events that the meal and the putting on armor occupy, considered from the speaker's point of view. Ἀπὸ δείπνου would properly mean 'from, away from, . . . with respect to the meal,' and might signify 'before' as well as 'after' it. It has the sense of 'after the meal,' only because, in the order of events as seen by the speaker, the meal comes before and the putting on armor after. So Herod. i. 126, ἐπεὶ τε δὲ ἀπὸ δείπνου ἦσαν, 'when they came from the table,' 'after the meal;' Id. ii. 44, εἶναι δὲ ἔτεα ἀφ' οὗ Τύρον οἰκέουσι τρεχκόσια καὶ διασχίλια, 'from the time they are dwellers in Tyre;' Æsch. Prom. 855, πέμπτη δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γέννα, 'the fifth generation from (after) him;' Id. Pers. 173, ἀφ' οὐπερ παῖς ἐμὸς στείλας στρατὸν . . . οἴχεται, 'since my son departed.'

3. 'From,' 'of.' Ἀπὸ is very commonly employed with the genitive of the object that marks the source or origin from which another comes; and this noun in the genitive, according to its nature, and to its obvious relation to the preceding term which it qualifies, expresses the idea of parent, race, cause or motive, means or instrument, material, &c. In all these cases ἀπὸ retains the sense of 'from,' and the genitive that of 'with respect to,' 'in the case of,' and neither in itself

considered, conveys the meaning of parentage, source, cause, means, material, nor even that of proceeding from.

a. 'From,' 'of.' Ἀπὸ with the genitive is used in connection with verbs signifying 'to be,' 'to be born,' &c., as γίνεσθαι, 'to be born,' εἶναι, 'to be,' φύναι, 'to be born,' to mark parentage or race. E.g. Od. xix. 162-3, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧς μοι εἰπὲ τεὸν γένος, ὅππόθεν ἐσσί· | οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἐσσι παλαιφάτου, οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης, 'yet even thus, tell me your race, whence you are; for thou art not descended from the ancient oak, nor from a rock.' The preceding verse shows that ἀπὸ δρυὸς, 'from the oak,' ἀπὸ πέτρης, 'from a rock,' mark the parentage disclaimed for a person, and the sense gathered from the context will be, 'thou art not, in thy birth, from the oak, nor from a rock.' But ἀπὸ δρυὸς, ἀπὸ πέτρης, taken by themselves, and apart from the notion of birth contained in γίνεσθαι, which ἀπὸ qualifies, mean no more than 'from . . . with respect to the oak,' 'from . . . with respect to a rock,' and suggest no idea of parentage. Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 1023-4, δεινὸν τὸ κοινὸν σπλάγγνον, οὐ πεφύκαμεν, | μητρὸς ταλαίνης, καὶ τοῦ δυστήνου πατρός, 'terrible is the common stock from which we are sprung, a wretched mother and an ill-fated father;' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 415, ἀρ' οἶσθ' ἀφ' ᾧν εἶ; 'dost thou know from (of) whom thou art descended?' Id. ib. 1184, ἀφ' ᾧν αὐτὸς ἔφυν τάλας, 'of whom, wretched man that I am, I am myself the offspring.' Compare οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος, 'those who derive their name from Plato,' and other like expressions given in Passow's Lexicon, s. v. ἀπὸ.

b. 'From.' In a more general way, ἀπὸ is used with the genitive of the object to which another is referred as its source, as that from which it is derived: e.g. Æsch. Pers. 603, βόους τ' ἀφ' ἀγνῆς λευκὸν εὐποτον γάλα, 'white, delicious milk from a pure cow.' Cf. Id. ib. 606.

'From,' 'on,' 'by.' Of the same nature is ἀπὸ with the genitive case used with τρέφειν and some other verbs, to mark that from which a thing is derived: e.g. Xen. Anab. i. 5, 12, ἀπὸ κοινῷ τρέφειν, 'to feed from (on) the common store;' Od. v. 40, λαχὼν ἀπὸ ληίδος αἶσαν, 'having obtained a share of (that is, that comes from) the booty;' Herod. iv. 22, ζῶουσι ἀπὸ θήρης, 'they live by hunting,' 'from the chase;'

Id. iv. 46, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ' ἀρότου ἀλλ' ἀπὸ πτηνέων, 'living, not by agriculture, but on their herds;' Id. iv. 103, ζῶσι ἀπὸ λήτης καὶ πολέμου, 'they live by plunder and war.'

c. Very nearly related to the above are many examples in which ἀπὸ with the genitive denotes, with regard to any action or state, the source to which it is to be referred, that from which it is considered to proceed: e.g. Orat. Att. 739, 21, πλούσιοι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως γιγνόμενοι, 'becoming rich by the state,' the state being the source from which they derive their riches. The phrase might be rendered 'by means of the state,' but the explanation would be the same. Id. 25, ult., ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων κρίνειν, 'to judge from the facts themselves,' the facts being the source, or furnishing the grounds of the judgment. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 395-6, ἦν οὐτ' ἀπ' αἰωνῶν σὺ προὔφάνης ἔχων, | οὐτ' ἐκ θεῶν του γνωτὸν, 'with this (divination) you did not appear, having ascertained it either from auspicy or from some one of the gods;' Id. Œd. Col. 320, φαιδρὰ γοῦν ἀπ' ὀμμάτων σαίνει με, 'accordingly, with smiling face she makes to me friendly signs of recognition with her eyes,' ἀπ' ὀμμάτων expressing that the signs of recognition proceed from the countenance. (See Ellendt, Lex. Soph. s. v. ἀπὸ.)

d. To this head, again, may be referred the use of ἀπὸ in such expressions as ἀπ' ἰσῆς, 'on an equality,' 'on equal terms,' ἀπὸ σπουδῆς, 'in earnest,' ἀπὸ τύχης, 'by chance,' which admit mostly of easy explanation, ἀπὸ and the genitive giving the character of an action by indicating its source. Thus, ἀπ' ἰσῆς, 'on equal terms,' being added as the characteristic of an action, the sense is properly that it proceeds from or has its origin in what is equal; ἀπὸ σπουδῆς, that it has its source in what is earnest; ἀπὸ τύχης, in what is accidental. E.g. Il. xii. 233, . . . εἰ δ' ἔτεόν δῃ τοῦτον ἀπὸ σπουδῆς ἀγορεύεις, 'if, in truth, you say this in earnest,' that is, 'if what you say has its origin in earnestness;' Orat. Att. 179, 21, οὐκ ἀπ' ἰσῆς ὁρῶ ἡμῖν τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν βουλὴν οὖσαν, 'I do not see that our measures and those of others stand on the same footing,' that is, 'that they have their source in equality;' Id. 141, 11, ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, 'of his own accord,' *sua sponte*; that is, his conduct originating with himself.

e. 'On the quarter of,' 'on.' Ἀπό with the genitive is used to mark the situation of an object relatively to some known point, as the points of the compass, and as considered from the speaker's position, where in English we say 'on the quarter of,' 'on.' E.g. Soph. Aj. 864, τὴν ἀφ' ἡλίου βολῶν (κέλευθον), 'the path on the east,' 'on the quarter of the rays of the sun,' 'that looks from the rays of the sun;' Id. Œd. Col. 1247, αἱ μὲν ἀφ' ἀελίου δυσμῶν, 'on the quarter of the west,' that is, 'from, looking from, the setting sun.' The preposition πρὸς with the genitive is employed in the same way, and may properly be compared with ἀπὸ: e.g. Herod. iii. 102, οἰκέουσι πρὸς βορέου ἀνέμου, 'they dwell on the north,' 'on the quarter of the north,' properly, 'towards the north wind.' The difference is, that ἀπὸ with the genitive, in giving the position of an object, marks the fixed point, by reference to which it is determined, as that from which it looks toward the speaker; thus, ἀφ' ἡλίου δυσμῶν, 'on the quarter of the setting sun,' is, properly speaking, and retaining for ἀπὸ its appropriate meaning, 'from the setting sun,' looking from the setting sun towards the speaker. In the same way the Latin language uses *a*, *ab*, with the ablative; as, *ab oriente*, 'on the east,' properly, 'from the quarter of the east.' On the contrary, πρὸς with the genitive gives the position by marking the fixed point, by reference to which it is determined, as that towards which it looks from the speaker: e.g. Herod. iii. 102, οἰκέουσι πρὸς βορέου ἀνέμου, 'they dwell on the north,' properly, looking towards the north from the speaker.

'Of,' 'concerning.' To this place may be referred such examples as Herod. iv. 53, τὰ μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν ποταμῶν, 'this is what I have to say of these rivers;' that is, 'these are the things that relate to these rivers;' properly, 'these are the things on the part of, on the quarter of, that are to be referred to, these rivers;' Id. iv. 195, τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς νήσου . . . οἰκίτα ἐστὶ ἀλγυθίη, 'what relates to the island;' Id. vii. 195, τὰ ἐβούλοντο πυθέσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς Ξέρξεω στρατιῆς, 'with reference to the expedition of Xerxes.' Comparing these with the examples of the use of ἀπὸ with the genitive just above explained, it can hardly be doubted that the

proper sense of the preposition and of the case is the same in both, and that the explanation involved in the translation given by Schweighäuser of the example from Herod. iv. 53, namely, "*quæ ab his fluviiis pervenerunt ad nostram notitiam*," is more than questionable. (See Schweigh. Lex. Herod. s. v. *ἀπό*, 7.)

f. 'On the part of,' 'so far as relates to.' In another class of examples, *ἀπό* with the genitive, although having originally the same meaning as in the preceding cases, does no more than mark the object to which any thing is referred, on the part of which it is affirmed to exist or to be done, and is rendered in English by 'on the part of,' 'so far as relates to,' 'so far as depends on.' E.g. Herod. ix. 7, *τὸ ἀπ' ἡμέων*, 'so far as we can,' 'in so far as depends on us;' properly, 'as for what (*τὸ*) lies on our part,' *ἀπ' ἡμέων* being interpreted in the same way with *ἀφ' ἡλίου δυσμῶν*, 'on the quarter of the setting sun,' above considered. Soph. Phil. 556-7, *ὥς μάθω τί μοι | νεώτερον βούλευμ' ἀπ' Ἀργείων ἔχεις*, 'that I may learn what more strange (cruel) design on the part of the Argives you have;' Id. ib. 1077, *ὦ πληρέστατον αἰλίου λώπας τὰς ἀπ' ἐμοῦ (= ἐμῆς, Ellendt, Lex. Soph.)*, 'O cave, most full of my grief;' that is, 'of grief on my part,' 'of grief to be referred to me;' Id. *Æd. Tyr.* 512-13, *τῷ ἀπ' ἐμῆς φρενὸς οὐποτ' | ὀφλήσει κακίαν*, 'wherefore, in my mind, so far as depends on my opinion, she shall never be charged with crime;' properly, if the same terms of local reference could be applied to the mind as to the points of the compass, 'on the part of, on the quarter of, my mind.' While such forms of expression are not admissible in English, it is yet true that the effect of *ἀπό* and the genitive is to denote here, as in the case of *ἀφ' ἡλίου δυσμῶν* above, the object to which a statement is to be referred as peculiarly appertaining to it, that on the part of which it is affirmed to be true.

Of the same nature are the cases in which *ἀπό* is said to be redundant. E.g. Herod. vii. 19, *ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλαίης τοὺς κλάδους*, 'the branches of the olive;' that is, 'the branches referred to the olive,' 'that are found on the part of the olive,' 'that belong to the olive;' *Æsch. Suppl.* 525, *γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶσδ' ἔνοικοι*, 'dwellers in this land,' properly, 'from, on the quarter of,

this land;' Or. Att. 580, 1, *τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς περὶαν καὶ κακόναν*, 'the bitterness and malice of (on the part of) the heart.'

g. 'From,' 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of.' *Ἀπό* with the genitive, having the same sense of 'from,' with the idea of source or origin, may sometimes be rendered by 'from,' 'after,' 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of,' 'in pursuance of,' expressing, as it does, the reason or motive of any thing. E.g. Herod. i. 209, *οὐκ ἔστι μηχανὴ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀφθας ταύτης οὐδεμὴν, τὸ μὴ κεῖνον ἐπιβουλεύειν ἐμοί*, 'from this vision, it cannot be that he is not plotting against me;' that is, 'by reason of,' 'in consequence of, this vision.' Perhaps, however, a more satisfactory meaning would be, 'looking to, having reference to, this vision,' which would rather bring this example under the preceding case, *e.* Xen. Anab. i. 5, 32, *ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σημείου*, 'from, in pursuance of, the same signal;' Id. ib. iv. 6, 3, *ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἐκείνος νυκτὸς ἀποδράς ὤχετο*, 'from this cause, in consequence of this;' Id. ib. iv. 1, 5, *ἀπὸ παρ' ἀγγέλλεως*, 'by order,' 'in pursuance of orders;' *Æsch. Agam.* 1275, *ἀλλ' ἴσθι τλήμων οὐσ' ἀπ' εὐτόλμου φρενός*, 'bold by reason of a courageous heart.'

h. 'From,' 'by,' 'with.' *Ἀπό* with the genitive is used to express the means or instrument, and also the agent of an action, being rendered in English by 'from,' 'with,' 'by.' In this case, the preposition and the genitive of the noun may be most properly explained as expressing the object from which the action proceeds, the preposition having the sense of 'from,' and the genitive its common signification of 'with respect to.' E.g. Il. xi. 675, *ἐμῆς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἄκοντι*, 'was struck with a spear from my hand,' or 'by my hand.' In this example is seen how directly the idea of the instrument or means is derived from that of the object from which any thing proceeds. Il. xxiv. 605, *τοὺς μὲν Ἀπόλλων πέφνευ ἀπ' ἀργυρέου βίβου*, 'them Apollo slew with his silver bow.' *Æsch. Eumen.* 674-5, *ἤδη κελεύω τοὺσδ' ἀπὸ γνώμης φέρειν | ψῆφον δικαίαν ὡς δὲς λελεγμένων*, 'now I bid these persons give a just decision with their mind,' the decision or vote being represented as coming from the mind. To this place might be referred the pas-

sage from Soph. Œd. Col. 320, explained above, 3, *c*, φαῖδρά γούν ἀπ' ὀμμάτων σάινει με, 'with smiling face she makes to me friendly signs of recognition with her eyes;' Xen. Anab. i. 1, 9, στρατεύμα συνέλεξεν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων, 'with this money he collected an army;' Orat. Att. 33, 24, τιμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πονῶν, 'to honor the state with his own labor;' Herod. i. 14, οὐδὲν μέγα ἔργον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐγένετο, 'no other great work was done by him;' Id. iii. 78, τὰ ἀπὸ Πριξιάσπεω γενόμενα, 'what was done by Prexaspes.' It may be remarked, however, that this use of ἀπό is comparatively rare, ὑπό being commonly employed to express the agent. The distinction made between these prepositions thus used by Ellendt, Lex. Soph. i. p. 194, who refers to Hermann ad Electr. 65, namely, that ἀπό marks the occasion, opportunity, or the reason also and cause of an action, while ὑπό refers to its author himself, is mainly true as to the fact, but does not include the ground of it, which is to be found, probably, in the proper sense of the prepositions themselves as distinguished the one from the other. See below under ὑπό.

i. 'From,' 'of.' 'Από with the genitive is used, again, in a kindred sense, to express the material of which any thing is made, just as ἐκ is more commonly used for the same purpose. E.g. Æsch. Prom. 944-5, ὅταν δὲ τεύχῃ Ζεὺς ἀπ' ὀμφακος πικρῶς | οἶνον, 'whenever Zeus makes wine from the sour (unripe) grape;' Id. Pers. 606-7, ἀσχηρᾶτον τε μητρὸς ἀγρίου ἵπυ | ποτὶν παλαιῶς ἀμπέλου γάνος τόδε, 'this is pure drink from a wild mother (the vine);' Demosth. 256, 24, στέφανος ἀπὸ ταλάντων ἐξήκοντα, 'a crown made of sixty talents.' In this use of ἀπό, the preposition has its proper meaning of 'from,' and the noun in the genitive denotes the object from which the thing made may be considered as proceeding. More exactly, the preposition ἀπό shows that the thing made stands in the relation of 'from' to some object, and, accordingly, comes from it, or has its origin in it, and the genitive specifies the object with respect to which distinctively this relation is affirmed.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS OF ἀπό WITH ITS CASE.

Significations of ἀπό.	Genitive: 'with respect to.'	
1. 'Off,' 'away.'	1. 'Away from.'	a. Of space; 'from,' 'away from.'
	'From,' 'away from.'	b. Of time; 'from,' 'after,' 'since.'
		a. Parentage, &c.; 'from,' 'of,' 'on,' 'by.'
2. 'From,' 'away from.'	2.	b. Relative position, &c.; 'from,' 'on the quarter of,' 'on.'
		c. Generally; 'on the part of,' 'so far as depends on,' 'in so far as relates to.'
	Source; 'from;'	d. Cause, motive, reason; 'from,' 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of.'
		e. Instrument, means, agent; 'with,' 'by.'
		f. Material; 'from,' 'of.'

Διδ.

Διδ, having also a poetical form, διαί, as in Æschylus, may be considered as having probably the same radical with δις, 'twice,' δύο, 'two,' and with the Latin di-, dis-, as in divido, distinguo. Compare δια-κόσιοι, 'two hundred.'

Significations of διδ.

1. 'Between.' The primary signification of διδ is 'between,' that is, having a regard to two objects, 'with an interval between.' This is seen in many compounds; as, διαιρεῖν, 'to divide,' 'to part,' 'to take apart,' 'leaving an interval between;' διαβαίνειν, 'to stand with the legs apart,' as in Il. xii. 458, Aristoph. Eq. 77, cited by Passow; διαβήτης, 'a compass,' so named from having the legs apart; δίδγγελος, 'a messenger going between two parties;' διαβδλεῖν, 'to cast over, across,' that is, over an intervening space; διαλείπειν, 'to leave an interval;' διακαθίζειν, 'to seat apart,' with a space between. Nor is this sense uncommon in the use of διδ with nouns; as, διὰ πολλοῦ, 'at a wide interval,' διὰ χρόνου, 'at an interval of time.'

2. From this notion of 'between,' 'with an interval between,' are derived a number of other meanings, viz.:

a. That of succession, and of transmission; that is, with the notion of an object following another at an interval, as in the compounds *διαδέχεσθαι*, 'to receive one from another,' 'to succeed,' as one king does another, *διαδιδόναι*, 'to give from hand to hand,' as the torch-bearers handed the torch from one to another (*λαμπάδα ἀλλήλους*). See Plat. Rep. p. 328, A, cited by Passow. The same sense is seen in such expressions as *διὰ πέντε ἡμερῶν*, 'every five days,' that is, 'at intervals of five days.'

b. That of 'in turn,' 'one by one,' or of distribution; that is, with the idea that the objects which constitute any number, whether considered individually or in groups, and so the parts of a whole, are to be taken separately, either simply or in succession. The ground-idea is that of placing at intervals. Thus, in the compounds *διανέμειν*, 'to distribute,' that is, 'to assign a lot or share to each one of any number;' *διαμεθεῖν*, 'to count up one by one,' as in Eurip. Iph. in Taur. 966, referred to by Passow, *διατάσσειν*, 'to arrange in ranks,' 'to post the divisions of an army each in its place,' *δίδοδος*, 'set with jewels,' 'having (precious) stones at intervals.'

c. That of distinction, as opposed to confounding together; that is, with the idea of placing objects apart, with an interval between: e.g. *διαγινώσκειν*, 'to distinguish,' 'to perceive objects apart from each other;' *διαφωνεῖν*, 'to sound apart,' 'to have a distinct sound;' *διαχεῖν*, 'to pour different ways,' 'to pour in distinct streams.'

To this is very nearly allied that of difference. Thus, *διαφωνεῖν* signifies 'to have different sounds,' as well as to have a distinct sound, or one that is not confounded with another.

d. This sense of distinction, and hence of difference, gives origin immediately to that of superiority; as in Hom. Il. xii. 104, *ὁ δ' ἔπρεπε καὶ διὰ πάντων*, 'he was distinguished above all,' properly, 'was comely in such measure as to be distinct from, different from, and thus superior, to all.' The meaning conveyed here by *διὰ* is its proper one of the stand-

ing apart, the being separated from an object in regard to the property described by *ἔπρεπε*; and from this comes readily that of being compared with and distinguished above it.

e. Almost parallel with this, again, is the sense of contrast, rivalry, variance, enmity, relations in which objects may be placed towards each other by being regarded as apart or divided by an interval. Compare *ἄλλα*, 'other things,' which, in the same way, obtains from the secondary meaning of 'other,' 'different from,' that of 'on the other hand.' This signification of *διὰ* is seen in a number of compounds; as, *διάφορος*, 'different,' and also 'disagreeing,' 'at variance with,' as, Eurip. Med. 579, *ἦ πολλὰ πολλοῖς εἰμι διάφορος βροτῶν*, 'surely in many things am I different from, or at variance with, many men.' So *διόδειν*, 'to contend as a rival in singing;' as, Theocr. Id. v. 22, *ἀλλὰ γέ τοι διαίσομαι ἔσπε κ' ἀπείπης*, 'I will contend with you in singing;' *διαβάλλειν*, 'to slander,' 'to traduce,' may have meant, properly, 'to set at variance,' 'to put enmity between.'

3. 'Through.' Thus far the significations of *διὰ* distinctly involve the notion of interval between objects. A second class of meanings of this word, while they contain the same idea of interval between, have regard rather to an interspace between the component parts or the substance of an object, or between the members of which a number or group is made up, and presuppose a parting or interval between them such as to allow a passing through it. An action or motion by which an object is carried through another, is described by *διὰ* to show that it occupies this interspace, or passes through an interval between its parts or members. This is expressed in English by the word 'through,' related to 'door,' and to the Greek *θύρα*. Thus, in the compounds *διάγειν*, 'to lead through,' *διακοντεῖν*, 'to pierce through,' *διήκπεύειν*, 'to ride through,' *διαπορεύεσθαι*, 'to march through,' and very many besides, there is seen to be involved the idea of an object divided by an interval between its parts, through which interval another object passes. And so in the phrase *δι' ὀργῆς ἵέναι*, 'to be angry with a person,' literally, 'to go through anger with (towards) a person,' the same sense occurs, only used figuratively.

Compare II. xiv. 288, *δι' ἡέρος αἰθέρ' ἵκανε*, 'he came to ether through the air.' Of course, if what has here been said be true, it is not proper to say that *διὰ* signifies 'through and out again,' this added phrase 'and out again' being no part of the sense of *διὰ*.

4. From this sense of 'through' come other meanings of *διὰ* of common occurrence. Or, perhaps, it would be more accurate to say, that this local sense of *διὰ* is variously modified by the circumstances in which it is used.

a. 'By means of,' 'through the agency of.' *Διὰ* very commonly obtains the sense of 'by means of,' 'through the agency of,' with the idea of a thing occupying the interval between the object effected or result and the motive cause. For example, in *δι' ἀγγέλου λέγειν*, 'to speak through the agency of a messenger,' the messenger occupies the interval or intermediate ground between the speaker and the thing spoken; that is, *διὰ* denotes that there is an interval between the speaker and what is spoken, and this is occupied by the *ἀγγελος*. Strictly speaking, *διὰ* does not of itself express the notion of means or agency, but only that of interval, being hence capable of showing that the action to which it is attached is performed, not immediately, but intermediately; the idea of agent or means, and its relation to the action, which *διὰ* has already marked as intermediately performed, are expressed by a noun that is suitable, and by the appropriate case. Thus, in *δι' ἀγγέλου λέγειν*, *διὰ* shows that the action of speaking contained in *λέγειν* is performed intermediately; *ἀγγέλου*, being the name of a messenger, introduces an object fit to perform the action of speaking intermediately, and, by having the form of the genitive case, is shown to be connected with *λέγειν διὰ* as the object to which the action is referred.

Here might seem to belong, at first view, such phrases as *διὰ σπουδῆς*, *διὰ τάχους*, *ποιεῖν*, 'to do earnestly or hastily,' 'to do quickly,' that is, 'by means of earnestness,' 'by means of haste;' but they ought rather to be considered as being of the same nature with *δι' ὀργῆς ἵέναι*, 'to be angry,' above mentioned; for they do not so much describe an intervening means or agency as the circumstances of an action.

b. 'Of,' '(made) of.' When the material of which a thing is made is introduced by *διὰ*, the force of the preposition is really the same as in the preceding case; that is, it marks the action of making as being intermediately performed; and the material is shown by the genitive case to occupy the intermediate ground between the maker and the thing made: e.g. *δι' ἐλέφαντος*, *διὰ λίθων*, *πεποικημένον*, 'made of ivory,' 'of stones.' Here the preposition *διὰ* shows that there is an interval between the action with its proper agent, and the thing made, and the genitive forms *ἐλέφαντος* and *λίθων* show that the interval is occupied by objects fitted to be the material for the object made.

c. 'For,' 'on account of.' When *διὰ* is used to express the ground or reason of an action, that 'for' or 'on account of' which it is performed, it has at bottom the same idea of interval, and hence of 'through,' that has been seen in the preceding cases to be contained in this preposition; that is to say, the object introduced as the ground or reason stands intermediately between an action or state and the personal agent to whom it is referred. E.g. *διὰ ταῦτα ἀπῆλθεν*, 'he went away on this account;' the departure is stated as occurring, not directly, but with something intermediate between it and the subject of the affirmation; and this intermediate object is expressed by *ταῦτα*. And the mind readily attributes the notion of ground or reason to whatever occupies the intermediate space between the personal agent and its action and is suitable to afford a ground or reason; just as in the former cases of the means or agent, and of the material.

5. 'Through and through,' 'quite,' 'utterly.' There is still another meaning of *διὰ*, occurring, however, only in compounds, namely, that of 'through and through,' 'quite,' 'utterly:' e.g. *διαβρέχειν*, 'to wet through and through,' 'to wet utterly;' *διαιθρος*, 'quite clear;' *διακαίειν*, 'to burn up;' *διόκενος*, 'quite empty.' This is merely an intensive sense of *διὰ*, 'through,' and may be compared with the like use of *adv.*, *περί*, *κατά*, &c. in Greek, with *per* in Latin, as *perdurus*, 'very hard,' 'thoroughly hard,' and with 'through and through,' 'out and out,' in English.

*Summary of the significations of διὰ.***Διδ. 1. Interval between; 'between;' hence:**

- a. Succession; 'from hand to hand,' 'every.'
- b. Distribution; 'each in turn,' 'one by one,' 'every.'
- c. Distinction, difference; 'apart,' 'from,' &c.
- d. Superiority in comparison; 'above,' 'before,' &c.
- e. Contrast, rivalry, enmity.

2. In the space between; 'through;' hence:

- a. Of space, and of time; 'through.'
- b. Of the intervening means or agent; 'through,' 'by means of.'
- c. Of the material; 'of,' '(made) of.'
- d. Ground or reason; 'for,' 'on account of.'
- e. Intensively; 'through and through,' 'quite,' 'utterly.'

SIGNIFICATION AND USE OF διὰ WITH CASES.

I. Διδ with the genitive.

1. Interval between, and hence distribution, at equal intervals; 'every.' Διδ is used with the genitive to express the notion of interval between, and derivatively that of distribution, the occurring at equal intervals, rendered in English by 'every.' Διδ may be thus used (a) of any object: e.g. Thuc. iii. 21, διὰ δέκα δὲ ἐπὶ δέξιν πύργοι ἦσαν μεγάλοι, 'there were large towers every tenth battlement,' properly, 'at the interval of ten battlements.' The number of towers being more than one, and the intervals being multiplied accordingly, there arises the notion of a succession of towers at the interval of ten battlements each, expressed in English by 'every ten battlements.' The same notion of interval between, and of equal successive intervals, suggested by its connection with a plural noun, is seen in the phrase δι' ἴσου: e.g. Xen. Econ. iv. 21, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐθαύμαζεν . . . δι' ἴσου τὰ πεφυτευμένα, 'when he admired the plants set at equal intervals.'

b. Of time; in regard either to general expressions, or to specific denominations of time. Thus (1), διὰ with the geni-

tive is used to mark the interval of time at which any thing occurs, rendered in English by 'at the interval of,' 'after:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. v. 5, 41, καλέσας ὁ Κυαξάρης ἰξίου τὸν Κῦρον, διὰ χρόνου ἰδόντα αὐτὸν, συνδειπνεῖν, 'as having seen him after a period of time,' that is, 'with an interval of time;' Herod. vi. 118, ἀλλὰ μὲν δι' ἐτέων εἴκοσι θηβαῖοι αὐτοὶ ἐκ θεοπροπίου ἐκομίσαντο ἐπὶ Ἀθήλων, 'the Thebans themselves, after twenty years, at an interval of twenty years, carried it (the statue) to Delium:' Id. viii. 27, ἐν τῷ διὰ μέσου χρόνῳ, 'in the intervening time,' literally, 'in the time that was between,' or, 'at the interval of the space in the midst.' The genitive case here, as also in the other examples, signifies 'with respect to;' so that διὰ μέσου is equivalent to 'between . . . said with respect to what lies in the midst.' Soph. Phil. 748, ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη διὰ χρόνου, 'for she is come after a (long) period of time.'

(2.) To be distinguished from these, although having the same meaning both of the preposition and of the case, are the examples in which διὰ is used with the genitive to mark successive intervals of time. The difference lies merely in the repetition of the intervals suggested by the context, as above explained of expressions relating to space generally, and conveyed in English by the term 'every.' E.g. Herod. iii. 97, οὗτοι συναμφοτέροι διὰ τρίτου ἔτεος ἀγίνεον . . . δύο χοίνικας ἀπύρου χρυσίου, 'both of these used to pay every third year two chœnices of gold unrefined by fire.' Here the verb in the imperfect tense, and the other circumstances of the narrative, the subject being tribute-paying, show that the interval of the third year is to be repeated for the repeated acts of bringing in tribute. Herod. ii. 4, διὰ τρίτης ἡμέρης, 'every third day:' Xen. Rep. Ath. i. 16, δι' ἑνιαυτοῦ, 'every year.' In all such examples, it is plain that διὰ expresses no more than merely interval between, the notion of a succession of intervals being indicated by the circumstances in which the preposition is used; and that the part of the noun in the genitive case is to set forth in what respect precisely the affirmation of interval is made. Thus, in the example from Thucydides above cited, the affirmation is that there were large towers; διὰ shows that they

stood at intervals; and the genitive (*δέξα ἐπάλξεω*) states that the declaration of there being large towers at intervals is made, not absolutely, but specifically 'with respect to ten battlements,' and is to be understood as referring to these exclusively.

2. 'In comparison of,' 'above.' *Διδ* is also employed with the genitive case in the sense of differing from, and hence of relative superiority, expressed in English by 'in comparison of,' 'above.' E.g. Il. xii. 104, *ὁ δ' ἐπρεπε καὶ διὰ πάντων*, 'he was comely, even above all;' that is, he stood at an interval from, differed from, and so was superior to, all in comeliness. Herod. viii. 37, *διὰ πάντων ἄξια θαυμάσαι μάλιστα*, 'especially worthy to be admired above all:' Id. viii. 69, *ἐν πρώτοις τετιμημένη διὰ πάντων τῶν συμμάχων*, 'honored among the first above all the allies.' The sense of the preposition and of the genitive case may be easily understood, in such examples, by recurring to the proper notion belonging to each. Thus, in the first example, the simple proposition that 'he was comely' (*ἐπρεπε*), is qualified by adding that herein he was 'different from,' properly, was 'at an interval' (*διδ*), considered 'with respect to all.' *Διδ* conveys the idea of 'being at an interval, different from, and hence of being superior to,' and the genitive denotes the object with respect to which specifically this relation of interval, difference, and superiority, is to be considered as affirmed.

To this construction might seem to belong the phrase *οὐδενὸς ποιῆσθαι*, Soph. Oed. Col. 584, 'to account as nothing,' 'as of no value,' *δι'* *οὐδενός* being regarded as expressing that with which comparison is made, and the sense being 'to account, to consider, as to be compared with nothing.' But the meaning then should rather be, 'to account, to consider, as differing from, and so, superior to, nothing,' which is not the sense really conveyed. It is rather to be referred to the same class of constructions with *διὰ σπουδῆς*, 'earnestly,' *διὰ τάχους*, 'speedily,' &c. to be considered under *διδ* in the sense of 'through.'

3. 'Through.' *Διδ* is used with the genitive in the sense of 'through:' e.g. Herod. ii. 33, *ρέων διὰ πάσης Εὐρώπης*,

'flowing through all Europe.' The notion of interval between, properly belonging to *διδ*, is found here also, only differently applied, as above explained, and marking, not the interval between different objects, but between the parts of the same object. A river flowing through a country does really, consistently with the meaning of *διδ*, divide it into two, and occupy the interval between its parts. The use of the genitive case here, as in other examples of the use of *διδ* with this case, is to limit the declaration of the 'flowing through' (*ρέων διὰ*) to a specific object, so that it shall be understood of this and of no other; 'the river flows through (between) . . . said with respect to Europe' exclusively.

Of this use of *διδ* with the genitive, in the sense of 'through,' there are several varieties, in which the meaning is more or less modified by the circumstances in which the preposition is used. Thus:

a. With regard to space, with verbs of action and motion, *διδ* with the genitive case has the sense of 'through:' e.g. Od. xii. 315, *διὰ νήσου ἴων*, 'going through the island;' Æsch. Eum. 75, *ἐλῶσι γὰρ σε καὶ δι' ἡπείρου μακρῶς*, 'for they will also drive thee through a distant land;' Id. Suppl. 490, *δι' ἄστεος στείχουσι*, 'they go through the city:' Herod. ii. 33, *τελευτᾷ δὲ ὁ Ἰστρος ἐς θάλασσαν ρέων . . . διὰ πάσης Εὐρώπης*, 'the Ister ends by flowing through all Europe into the sea;' Id. ii. 34, *ρέει γὰρ δι' οἰκευμένης*, 'for it flows through an inhabited country;' Xen. Anab. iv. 4, 7, *ἐντεῦθεν ἐπορεύθησαν σταθμῶνς τρεῖς διὰ τοῦ πεδίου*, 'thence they marched three days through the plain;' Eurip. Med. 144-5, *διδ μου κεφαλᾷς φλόξ οὐρανία | βαιή*, 'may the lightning of heaven go through my head;' Id. ib. 827-8, *δεῖ διὰ λαμπροτάτου | βαινόντες ἁβρῶς αἰθέρος*, 'ever walking delicately through a most brilliant atmosphere.'

b. With regard to time, *διδ* with the genitive case is used, in the same sense of 'through,' to mark the period of time through which an action or event extends: e.g. Herod. ix. 13, *ἐλπίζων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου ὁμολογήσειεν σφέας*, 'expecting through the whole time that they would come to his terms;' Id. vi. 12, *παρεῖχε τε τοῖσι Ἴωσι πόνον δι' ἡμέρης*, 'he gave the Ionians labour during (through) the day;' Xen. Cyrop. viii.

2, 1, *διὰ παντός τοῦ χρόνου φιλανθρωπίαν τῆς ψυχῆς* . . . *ἐνεφάνιζεν*, 'through the whole period of his life.'

c. With a variety of nouns in the genitive case *διὰ* is used, chiefly with the verbs of motion *ἔρχεσθαι* and *ἵκναι*, but also with a noun even, to express the peculiar manner and circumstances of the motion or other substantive idea, by marking that through or by the way of which it occurs. Thus, in the phrase *διὰ μάχης ἔρχεσθαι*, 'to fight,' literally, 'to come through, by the way of, fighting,' the action of coming (*ἔρχεσθαι*) is distinguished by *διὰ* and the noun in the genitive case as having a peculiar character, as occurring under certain circumstances, namely, as a coming that is through, by the way of, fighting. In this way, *διὰ* and the noun in the genitive, together with the verb of motion, or with a noun, when that is qualified in this manner, form a kind of periphrastic expression for the verb which would contain the same substantive idea that the noun in the genitive does. Thus, *διὰ μάχης ἔρχεσθαι* may be said to occupy the place of *μάχεσθαι*, 'to fight,' *διὰ πολέμου ἔρχεσθαι* that of *πολεμεῖν*, 'to war,' *δι' ὀργῆς ἵκναι* that of *ὀργίζεσθαι*, 'to be angry,' *διὰ φιλίας ἔρχεσθαι* that of *φιλεῖν*, 'to be friendly,' &c. (For these, and other instances, see Passow's Lex. s. v. *ἔρχεσθαι*.) E.g. Herod. vi. 9, *εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ ποιήσουσι, οἱ δὲ πάντως διὰ μάχης ἐλεύσονται*, 'if they shall not do so, but shall by all means fight,' that is, literally, 'shall come through, by the way of, fighting.' Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 20, *ἀφ' ἡμῶν καὶ καυτερίως ἐπιμέλειαι*, 'the attentions which are given strenuously;' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 773, *διὰ τύχης τοιῶσδ' ἰών*, 'having experienced such a fortune,' properly, 'having gone through such a fortune;' Id. Antig. 738, *διὰ δίκης ἰὼν πατρί*, 'in contending with your father,' that is, 'in going through a contest about right with your father;' Æsch. Prom. 121-2, *τὸν πᾶσι θεοῖς | δι' ἀπεχθείας ἐλθόντ'*, 'that has been at enmity with all the gods;' Orat. Att. p. 185, 10, *τὰ νῦν διὰ τῶν λόγων φοβερά*, 'what is now frightful in words,' properly, 'through, by the way of, words,' the property of frightfulness being distinguished by producing its effect through the medium of words. This example might, however, be more appropriately referred to a subsequent variety

of the significations of *διὰ*, in which it expresses the means or instrument.

d. To this use of *διὰ* with the genitive, to denote the manner and circumstances of an action, may be referred such phrases as *διὰ στουδῆς ποιεῖν*, 'to do earnestly,' or 'in haste,' *διὰ τάχους*, and *ταχέων ἀπιέναι*, 'to depart quickly,' and so *διὰ τέλους*, 'completely,' *δι' ἀκριβείας*, 'accurately,' &c. (See, for a number of such phrases, Passow's Lex. s. v. *διὰ*.) And of the same interpretation is the phrase *δι' οὐδενός ποιεῖσθαι*, 'to count as nothing,' 'to consider of no value;' for just as *διὰ μάχης* added to *ἔρχεσθαι* shows the peculiar manner or character of the coming, so *δι' οὐδενός* added to *ποιεῖσθαι* explains what is the peculiar condition of the valuing contained in this verb. And this it does in the same way; as *διὰ μάχης* gives the peculiar manner or character of *ἔρχεσθαι*, 'the coming,' by describing it as a coming that is 'through, by the way of, fighting,' so *δι' οὐδενός* gives the character of the valuing expressed by *ποιεῖσθαι*, by describing it as a valuing in which the worth is nothing, the term *οὐδενός*, 'nothing,' being employed in the latter phrase precisely as *μάχης* is in the former, and *διὰ* having the same sense in both. Thus explained, *δι' οὐδενός ποιεῖσθαι*, 'to count as nothing,' 'as having no value,' means, properly, to value a thing in the way or manner of valuing at nothing, or in the way or manner in which a thing is valued when considered as nothing.

e. Of the same nature, in the main, is *διὰ* with the genitive used with *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*, 'to be,' and 'to become,' in such phrases as *διὰ φόβου εἶναι*, 'to be afraid,' 'to be in a state of fear,' *δι' ἐχθρας γίγνεσθαι τινι*, 'to be at enmity, in a state of enmity, with a person,' *δι' ἐριδος*, *δι' ὀργῆς*, *δι' ἀσφαλείας*, *εἶναι*, 'to be in rivalry,' 'to be angry,' 'to be in a condition of safety.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 605.) In all these expressions *διὰ* with the genitive of a noun marks the state or condition of an object, in the same way that *διὰ μάχης* with a verb of motion denotes its manner or circumstances. Thus, in *διὰ φόβου ἦν*, 'he was in a state of fear,' *διὰ φόβου* expresses the state of fear in which a person was, or furnishes a description of the state or condition of the

subject of ἦν. Just as διὰ with the genitive of a noun coupled with a verb of motion, as *ἰέναι*, 'to go,' *ἔρχεσθαι*, 'to come,' marks the peculiar manner or circumstances of the motion, so the same form of expression used with the verbs of existence, *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*, denotes the state or condition in which the subject of the verb is; and this it does in the same way in both cases. With the verbs of motion, it is easier to see how διὰ and the genitive of a noun may serve to describe the peculiar manner or circumstances of the motion, by exhibiting 'through' what, or by the way of what, it passes, that is to say, the circumstances which attend it. The manner or circumstances of an act of coming, for example, may be set forth by adding to it the representation that it is a coming 'through,' or by the way of, 'fighting (*διὰ μάχης*).' But in the case of verbs of existence, as *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*, it is naturally more difficult to see how διὰ with the genitive, assuming it to have the same office here as with verbs of motion, is suited to express the state or condition of the subject of the verb. This difficulty, however, may be owing, not to any thing in the construction itself, but to the fact that the nouns used with διὰ in the qualification of *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι* are the names of abstract qualities, and that διὰ φόβου, for example, in setting forth the state or condition of an object, can be so used only in a figurative sense. Yet it is not impossible to perceive how διὰ with the genitive, figuratively employed as it is, and hardly admitting of being represented in English by corresponding modes of expression, at least with any accuracy, may have obtained its power of describing, when joined with a verb of existence, the condition or state of the personal subject of *εἶναι* or *γίγνεσθαι*. It may be observed, in the first place, that if, for example, διὰ μάχης, 'through, by the way of, fighting,' serves to mark the manner or circumstances of an action, it is to be admitted equally that διὰ φόβου attached to a verb of existence, as *εἶναι*, *γίγνεσθαι*, may serve to mark the state or condition of the being of a person, namely, by expressing that 'through' which, or by the way of which, being or existence obtains a peculiar state or condition. The office of

διὰ with the genitive, in the one case and in the other, would seem to be exactly the same, any apparent difference being attributable to the different character of the nouns and verbs employed in the two cases. This admitted, it is to be observed, in the next place, that in the case of διὰ and the genitive used with *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*, just as in that of its use with verbs of motion, the power of denoting the manner or circumstances of a motion, and the state or condition of being in which a person is, is due to the preposition and noun in virtue of their office of marking the relation of 'through' or 'by the way of' some object. Besides the fact that the sense of διὰ with the genitive affords a plausible solution of the phrases under consideration, even without further explanation, it may be alleged that the only other meaning of the preposition that suggests itself as possibly involved, that of 'by means of,' is utterly inappropriate. The last thing to be noticed is, that διὰ, properly speaking, obtains the sense of 'through,' as has been above explained, by referring to the interval between the parts of an object; and that it has the capacity of describing the circumstances of an action or motion by placing it in the interval between the parts of the object that is named by the noun in the genitive case, and that furnishes the means of characterizing the manner or circumstances of an action, and by thus making it proceed, as it were, with the parted object on either hand. Of course, the idea of interval between the parts of an object, of an object divided by an interval between its parts, although easily applicable in the case of sensible objects, as in δι' Εὐρώπης, 'through Europe,' that is, Europe having an interval between its parts, cannot be admitted, in this material sense, for abstract nouns such as μάχη, φόβος; but yet may be readily allowed in a figurative sense. In this accommodated acceptation, διὰ μάχης, qualifying *ἰέναι*, will mean that the going is 'through fighting,' that is, has fighting on either hand, and hence has this for its descriptive circumstance. So likewise, figuratively speaking, a person may be represented as being διὰ φόβου, 'in a state of fear,' that is, as being embraced or encompassed by fear,

just as well as, in a more obvious sense, the act of coming, *ἐρχεσθαι*, may be regarded as being *διὰ μάχης*, 'through, by the way of, fighting,' that is, encompassed by fighting, having fighting on either hand. The English phrase 'in the midst of,' although it does not convey the same meaning with *δεδ* and the genitive as here explained, may yet serve as an illustration, being employed in the same way to describe the circumstances and manner of an action, or the condition or state in which any thing is.

Thus it has been shown how *δεδ* with the genitive case, both as used with verbs of motion or action and with those of existence, may describe the circumstances or manner of the former, and the state or condition of the personal subject connected with the latter. And it may be added, that this explanation, while it justifies the interpretation given to *δεδ* and the genitive in the two classes of examples referred to, is the more probably true from its admitting, in both, the presence and influence of the primary signification of the preposition.

f. 'By means of,' 'by the agency of,' 'through,' 'by.' *Δεδ*, having still the sense of 'through,' is used with the genitive case to express the means or instrument, and the agent by whom any thing is effected, being rendered in English by such forms as 'through,' 'by,' 'with,' 'by means of,' 'by the agency of.' E.g. Soph. *Ed. Col.* 471, *δι' ὁσίων χειρῶν θηγών*, 'touching (handling) them (*χόδας*) with pure hands,' the hands being the intermediate agent, as above explained, when treating of the significations of the preposition apart. *Id. ib.* 1252, *δι' ὀφθαλμοῦ δακρυῖν*, 'pouring out tears with (through the agency of) the eye,' where the use of *δι' ὀφθαλμοῦ* to express the intermediate agency, is very analogous to that of the same preposition and case to denote the material. *Id. Ed. Tyr.* 822, *δι' ὧν περ (χειρῶν) ὤλετο*, 'by which (hands) he perished;' *Æsch. Suppl.* 531, *δι' ὧν τοι γένος εὐχόμεθ' εἶναι*, 'through whom we pretend that you have your parentage;' *Xen. Cyrop.* i. 1, 4, *τῶν δι' ἑαυτῶν (ἀρχάς) πτῆσαιμένων*, 'who acquired dominion by their own means,' literally, 'through themselves;' *Orat. Att.* 67, 14, *ἀφικνεῖται*

πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὐκέτι δι' ἀγγέλων, ἀλλ' αὐτός, 'not by (through the agency of) messengers, but in person.'

To this place may be referred a great number of examples in which *διὰ*, having really the same sense as in the examples above cited, requires to be variously rendered according to the circumstances. E.g. *Orat. Att.* 132, 22, *οἱ δι' ἐκείνου τὰς πολιτείας ποιοῦμενοι*, 'who cause the administration of the affairs of state to be in his hands,' 'who effect this through him, by his agency;' *Id.* 194, 4, *δι' αὐτῶν εἶχον τὴν πόλιν*, 'they had the state in their own hands,' properly, 'through their own agency;' *Id.* 605, 10, *δι' ἑαυτῶν εἶχον τὸ βουλευτήριον*, 'they had the senate-house in their own hands,' properly, 'through their own means;' *Æschin.* 31, 29, *πειράσσομαι διὰ κεφαλῶν ὑμῶν υπομνήσκειν*, 'I will endeavor to put you in mind summarily,' that is, 'by means of summary statements;' or, less probably, it might be interpreted, 'through, by the way of, brief statements,' showing the manner of the action rather than its means; *Soph. Antig.* 1258, *μνηστὴρ ἐπίσημον διὰ χειρὸς ἔχων*, 'having in his hand a marked token,' his hand being the means or instrument used in bearing the token, namely, *Hæmon's* dead body. In this, and other examples that seem to be properly referred to this use of *διὰ* with the genitive, there is so very distinctly involved the proper sense of the preposition, that of 'between' or 'interval between,' that it would be admissible to allege this as the true meaning. In this view, *διὰ χειρῶν ἔχειν* would mean 'to have or hold between the hands,' and the idea of the hands being used in such circumstances as the means of bearing a thing would be readily inferred.

Here, possibly, may belong, also, *Soph. Antig.* 639, *οὕτω γάρ, ὦ παῖ, χρὴ διὰ στέρνων ἔχειν*, 'for so, my son, you must needs be disposed in your mind;' that is, if *διὰ στέρνων* here express the means or instrument, 'by means of, through the influence of, the mind.' But, in fact, *διὰ στέρνων* may more probably be regarded as denoting, in conformity with what was above said of *διὰ* with the genitive, the peculiar character and condition of the disposition attributed to *Hæmon*; and, thus viewed, *διὰ στέρνων ἔχειν* will be interpreted after the same manner with *δι' ὁρτῆς γενέσθαι*; namely, it will

mean, 'to be disposed (*ἔχειν, se habere*) in the mind or mentally.' So, again, may more probably be explained the phrase *δι' ὀργῆς ἔχειν τινά*, 'to be angry with a person,' that is, 'to be angrily disposed with regard to a person;' also *δι' οἴκτου λαβεῖν*, 'to pity,' that is, 'to comprehend in one's pity.' (See Passow's Lex. s. v. *διδ.*)

'In consequence of,' 'by reason of.' *Διδ* with the genitive is also used, occasionally, to express the ground or reason of a thing, and may be rendered in English by 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of.' E.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 2, 8, *ὅτι διὰ πίστεως αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοὺς ἐνεχείρισαν*, 'who put themselves in their power in consequence of, by reason of, a pledge given them.' But the sense is, properly, 'by means of, through, a pledge given to them;' and, in such examples, *διὰ* with the genitive may be explained as setting forth the means by which a thing is effected, and needs not to be referred to a separate head.

g. 'Of,' '(made) of.' *Διδ* with the genitive is now and then employed to mark the material of which a thing is made, where more commonly *ἐξ*, and sometimes *ἀπό*, with the same case, are employed: e.g. *δι' ἐλέφαντος, διὰ λίθων, πεποιημένον*, 'made of ivory,' 'made of stone.' (See Passow's Lex.) Here *διδ*, as above explained, when speaking of the significations of the preposition separately, is to be understood as denoting, together with the noun in the genitive, the intermediate means through which an effect is reached; and the genitive, as is true of this case in all the above instances of its use, is the sign of the object with respect to which specifically the declaration is made. So uniform indeed is the meaning of the genitive case as it occurs in conjunction with *διδ*, that it has been deemed unnecessary to occupy space in pointing it out in the several examples as they presented themselves.

II. *Διδ* with the accusative case.

1. 'Through.' *Διδ* is employed with the accusative in the sense of 'through;' and this, (a) in regard to space: e.g. Eur. Hippol. 753, seqq., *ἃ διὰ πόντιον | κῦμα ἀλίχτυπον ἄλμας | ἐπόρευσας ἐμὴν ἀνυσσαν | ὀλβίῳ ἀπ' οἴκων*, 'who conveyed my

royal mistress from her rich home through the roaring waves of the sea;' that is, 'through . . . as regards the waves of the sea;' Il. xii. 308, *τείχος ἐπαίξαι, διδ τε ῥήξασθαι ἐπιδλῆεις*, 'to rush upon the wall and break through the battlements;' that is, 'to break through . . . as regards, as far as go, the battlements;' Æsch. Pers. 493, *περᾷ χρυσταλοπῆγα διὰ πόρον*, 'passes through the ice-bound strait;' Id. Suppl. 15, *φεύγειν ἀνέδην διὰ κύμ' ἄλιον*, 'to fly through the sea-waves.'

This use of *διδ* with the accusative is frequently met with in the poets, rarely, if at all, in prose, where *διδ* with the genitive is used in the sense of 'through.' Yet the meaning of this preposition with the genitive and with the accusative, although in both cases rendered in English by 'through,' is not, strictly speaking, the same. The difference is to be found in the force of the cases alone, the preposition having the same sense when used with the one case as when used with the other, namely, that of 'through,' derived, as already explained, from the notion of the intermediate space or 'interval between,' by which an object is divided when another passes through it. The genitive, when used with *διδ*, limits or qualifies an action or motion by indicating the object to which the idea of 'through,' or 'the going between the parts of,' is to be referred specifically, and as being distinct from all others; the accusative defines the extent of the action or motion by denoting the object that gives the measure up to which the idea of 'through' is to be understood as affirmed. The former distinguishes the particular one of all possible objects with respect to which the going through is declared; the latter, the measure up to which, as regards the object named by the accusative, it is to be regarded as extending. Thus, *διὰ ὤμου ἦλθεν ἔγχος*, 'the spear went through the shoulder,' means, properly, 'the spear went through . . . said with respect to the shoulder,' the genitive showing that the particular object introduced by it, and no other, is intended to be referred to; but in the phrase *ὡς ἶδον Ἥφαιστον διὰ δώματα πομπύοντα*, Il. i. 600, 'when they saw Hephæstus busily serving through the house,' the meaning is, 'when they saw Hephæstus

busily serving through . . . as regards the house,' 'so far as the house was concerned;' that is, the serving of Hephæstus is measured in its extent by the term *δώματα*. Hence *διδ* with the accusative may have the sense of 'throughout,' 'all through;' and it is with regard to this meaning that the above distinction between the genitive and accusative cases, as used with this preposition, is most obvious.

But *διδ* with the accusative case is not confined to the office of marking the extent of the action or motion in this way, namely, by making the measure of the object to which 'the going through,' for example, reaches. The action of 'going through' is measured in extent by the accusative in another way; to wit, by showing that it extends to and embraces the object introduced by the accusative as one among a number, reaching this one and no other. Thus, *φεύγειν διὰ κῦμ' ἄλιον*, 'to fly through the sea-waves,' may mean, not 'to fly through . . . up to the measure or extent of the sea-waves,' 'as far as sea-waves reach,' but 'to fly through the sea-waves,' as distinguished from flying through other objects, as the air, the land, the flying through being limited to this one among a number of objects, reaching to this and not to others. Here the sense of *διδ* with the accusative is, in effect, the same with that of *διδ* and the genitive, only it is obtained in a different way. The genitive refers the notion of 'going through' to a particular object among a number, and so limits it to this one as distinguished from all others; the accusative shows that it is measured in its extent by a particular object among a number, that it reaches to and embraces a particular object and not others, and so confines it to this alone.

b. 'Through,' 'throughout,' 'during.' In regard to time, *διδ* with the accusative case is used in the sense of 'through,' 'throughout,' 'during:' e.g. Od. xv. 7-8, *Τηλέμαχον δ' οὐχ ὕπνος ἔχε γλυκύς, ἀλλ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ | νύκτα δι' ἀμβροσίην μελεδήματα πατρὸς ἔγειμεν*, 'sweet sleep did not hold Telemachus, but, throughout ambrosial night, stirred in his mind anxious care about his father.' Here *διδ* obtains the secondary sense of 'through,' and the accusative gives the measure of the preceding action qualified by *διδ*; so that the meaning is,

'stirred anxious care . . . through . . . as far as the night went, to the extent of all the night,' or 'throughout the night.' So Od. xix. 66-7, *διὰ νύκτα | διενύων κατ' οἶκον*, 'going to and fro during the night.' (See Naegelsb. z. II. ii. 57.)

Other examples, however, of this use of *διδ* with the accusative present greater difficulty in the interpretation; e.g. Il. ii. 56-7, *θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν Ὀνειρος | ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα*, 'Oneiros came to me in my sleep in the ambrosial night.' Here *διὰ νύκτα* doubtless means 'by night,' or 'in the time of night,' marking, not the space of time during or throughout which an action occurs, and which is the measure of its duration, for that would not here be consistent with the obvious sense; but rather the period to which, in a general way, the coming of Oneiros is referred as belonging to it, and which would commonly be expressed by *νυκτός*, and be rendered in English by the phrase 'by night.' This use of *διδ* and the accusative may be explained by observing that the accusative has here the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' and not that of measure, and that *διὰ νύκτα ἦλθεν* means, not 'he came throughout or during the night,' but that his coming, considered with regard to its time, embraced only the night, and was wholly confined to it, or looked to the night alone, and extended itself to no other time. That is to say, *διδ* with the accusative, in expressions of time, as in those of space, marks the limit to which an action extends in one of two ways; either by naming an object which gives its measure absolutely, as *διὰ νύκτα διενύων*, 'going to and fro during the night,' or 'throughout the night;' or by naming an object that gives its extent relatively, by showing that it is confined to this, reaches to this and not to others; as, *διὰ νύκτα ἦλθεν Ὀνειρος*, 'Oneiros came, his coming being confined to the night, and not extending to any other time.' It is in this second way that *διὰ νύκτα* obtains the sense here attributed to it, and that may be tolerably expressed by the English phrase 'by night,' or 'in the night.' The Latin language has a similar use of the accusative case, with and without a preposition; as in the case of *quum*, 'when,' and of *ad extremum*, 'in fine,' where the accusative has the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' and

merely denotes the period of time to which an event is referred. *Διά*, in the explanation of *διά νύκτα* here given, is assumed to have the sense of 'through.' This is preferred as being more probable, and as well according with the meaning of the case with which it is associated in the phrase under consideration; and yet it is not impossible that it may have its proper notion of 'interval between,' and be thus fitted to show that the action which it defines occurs in any interspace of the night, whence might spring the sense of 'in the night.'

Naegelsbach, however, the author above referred to, and from whom the examples of *διά* in the sense under consideration have been borrowed, considers that *νύκτα*, Il. ii. 56-7, has rather a local sense, and is to be conceived as a region of space through which Oneiros comes. He cites, besides, the following examples: Od. ix. 142-3, *καί τις θεὸς ἡγεμόνευεν | νύκτα δὲ δρυφναίην*, 'and a god conducted us through the dark night;' Od. xii. 284, *αὐτως διὰ νύκτα θοὴν ἀλλήλοισι δαίνας*, 'you bid us wander about through the fleeting night;' Il. x. 297, *βάν ῥ' ἔμην . . . διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν*, 'proceeded to go through the dark night;' Il. x. 275-6, *τοὶ δ' οὐκ ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν | νύκτα δὲ δρυφναίην*, 'they saw not with their eyes through the dark night.' Doubtless, in such examples, the term *νύξ*, 'night,' may be properly enough considered figuratively as a region of space, and *διὰ νύκτα* be employed in the sense of 'through the night,' precisely as *διὰ τὸ κύμα* has the meaning of 'through the wave;' but it does not follow that the same is true of *διὰ νύκτα* in Il. ii. 56-7, and that in that passage *ἦλθεν Ὀνειρος ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα* is to be understood as representing Oneiros as 'coming through the region of the night.' On the contrary, while, in the other examples cited by Naegelsbach, the most natural and obvious interpretation may require the term *νύξ* to be understood figuratively as a region of space, in the passage cited from Il. ii. 56-7 it would be more satisfactory to regard *διὰ νύκτα* as meaning 'by night.' And it has been above attempted to show that it may have this meaning, consistently with the proper sense of both the preposition and the case.

2. 'Through,' 'by means of.' *Διά* with the accusative expresses also the means or agent by which an action is performed, and is rendered in English by the terms 'by,' 'by means of,' 'through:' Il. i. 71-2, *καὶ νήεσσ' ἡγήσατ' Ἀχαιῶν Ἴλιον εἴσω, | ἦν διὰ μαντοσύνην, τὴν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων*, 'and conducted the ships of the Achæans within Ilium by means of his prophetic art, which Apollo gave him;' Æsch. Pers. 553, seqq., *νῆες δ' ἀπώλεσαν τοτοῖ, | νῆες πανωλέθροισιν ἐμβολαῖς, | διὰ δ' Ἰωνίων χέρας*, 'but the ships destroyed them by all-ruining assaults, by (by means of) the hands of the Ionians;' Orat. Att. An. 18, 40, *οὐ δὲ ἐμὲ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τῆς πόλεως συμφορὰς εἰς πενίαν πολλὴν κατέστην*, 'not through my own fault (by means of myself), but through the misfortunes of the state, I fell into great penury;' Xen. Cyrop. iii. 2, 18, *τί οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ καὶ ἄλλα ὑμῖν ἀγαθὰ προσγένετο διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην;* 'what then, said he, if you should obtain other benefits by (by the means of) the peace?' Id. vii. 7, 7, *ἐπεὶ δὲ . . . δι' ἡμῶς σὺν θεοῖς ἔχετε τήνδε τὴν χώραν*, 'since, by the favor of the gods, you possess this country by means of us.'

It has been shown above, when treating of the preposition apart from the cases, that this sense of *διά* springs from that of 'through,' considered as referring to space; and the accusative with which *διά* in the signification of 'by means of' is sometimes used, but not so commonly as the genitive case, has the meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards,' 'as far as concerns.' The difference between the accusative when accompanying *διά* in this meaning, and the genitive, which may be considered the regular construction, is to be found in the usual difference between these cases. Thus, in Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 34, *ἀνηρώτων τὸν κωμῶρχην διὰ τοῦ περσίζοντος ἐρμηνέως*, 'they inquired through (by means of) the interpreter who spoke Persian,' the meaning of *διά* with the genitive is, properly, 'through, by means of . . . said specifically with respect to the interpreter who spoke Persian,' and the agent is thus distinguished from every other; just as where a river is described as *ῥέων δι' Εὐρώπης*, 'flowing through Europe,' the 'flowing through' is affirmed specifically 'with respect to Europe,' to the exclusion of every

other country. When it is said, *Æsch. Pers. 553, seqq., ἀπώλεσαν . . . δι' ἰαόνων χέρας*, 'they destroyed them by (by means of) the hands of the Ionians,' the meaning is, 'they destroyed them through (by means of) . . . as regards, as far as went, the hands of the Ionians,' and no further. Just as *διὰ τὴν νήσον ἵέναι*, 'to go through the island,' means 'to go through . . . as far as the island goes,' and no further. That is, the genitive distinguishes an object, considered as the means or agent, from other objects by marking it as that to which the action as qualified by *διὰ* is specifically referred; the accusative, by showing that the action thus qualified by *διὰ* is to be taken as extending to the object put in this case, and to no other. The sense resulting is materially the same; only it is reached in a different way.

3. 'On account of,' 'by reason of,' 'for.' *Διὰ* with the accusative is used to mark the ground or reason of an action, expressed in English by 'on account of,' 'by reason of,' 'for.' E.g. *Æsch. Prom. 120, seqq., . . . τὸν πᾶσι θεοῖς | δι' ἀπεχθείας ἐλθόντ' . . . | διὰ τὴν λίαν φιλόττητα βροτῶν*, 'having incurred the enmity of all the gods on account of his excessive friendship for men;' Id. *Agam. 682, δι' ἔριν αἱματόεσσαν*, 'on account of bloody strife;' Orat. Att. Lys. 125, 36, *ἀπολέσαι παρεσκευάσαντο τὴν πόλιν, εἰ μὴ δι' ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς*, 'they prepared to destroy the state, if it had not been for some brave men;' Soph. *Œd. Tyr. 768, δι' ἃ νιν εἰσιδεῖν θέλω*, 'by reason of which I desire to see him;' Xen. *Cyrop. i. 4, 5, ταχὺν δὲ παρῆει διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν τοῦ ἔργου*, 'by reason of his being fond of his employment;' Id. *Anab. i. 9, 22, δῶρα δὲ πλεῖστα . . . ἐλάμβανε διὰ πολλὰ*, 'he received the most presents for many reasons.'

In the example from *Æsch. Prom. 120, seqq., διὰ* shows that the enmity referred to was incurred not directly but intermediately; and the accusative *τὴν λίαν φιλόττητα* points out an object as that with regard to which alone or to the extent of which the fact stated occurred intermediately; and this is the same as to make the excessive friendship for men the thing intermediate between the person incurring enmity and the enmity incurred.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *διὰ* WITH CASES.

Significations of <i>διὰ</i> .	Genitive: 'with respect to.'	Accusative: 'as far as goes,' 'as to.'
1. Interval between.	1. a. Of space; 'at the interval of,' 'every.' b. Of time; 'at the interval of,' 'after,' 'every.' c. Difference, and comparison; in comparison of, 'above.'	
2. 'Through.'	2. a. Of space; 'through.' b. Of manner or circumstance; 'by the way of,' 'in,' &c. c. Of state or condition; adverbially. d. Means, agent; 'through,' 'by means of,' 'by.' e. Ground or reason; 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of.' f. Of material; 'of,' '(made) of.'	2. a. Of space; 'through.' b. Of time; 'through,' 'throughout,' 'during,' 'in,' 'by.' c. Means, agent; 'through,' 'by means of.' d. Ground or reason; 'on account of,' 'by reason of,' 'for.'

Εἰς.

Εἰς, Ionic and poetic *ἐς*, has for its radical either *ἐντ*, seen in *ἐντός*, 'within,' slightly varied in the Latin *intus*, and *endo*, found in *endopercutor* an ancient form of *imperator*, or *ἐν* the same with the preposition of this form, with the Latin and English *in*, and the German *ein*. If the former, it is formed from *ἐντ-ς*, that is, from the radical augmented by *ς*, in the same way that *τιθεῖς* is from *τιθέντ-ς*, save only that it would be too much to assert that the added *ς* is the case-sign; if the latter, it is made up of *ἐν* and *ς* (*ἐν+ς*), the *ε* being lengthened into *ε* in the same way that it is in *εἰς*, 'one,' from *ἐν-ς*. The former view assumes that the Greek *ἐν*, the Latin and English *in*, and the German *ein*, which may safely be affirmed to have the same radical with *εἰς*, have entirely lost the final *τ*. But, although this might very well happen when these words stand apart and are subject to the accidents of final syllables, it would not occur when they are prefixed to words commencing with a vowel, and where no reason for dropping the final *τ* can be alleged. Adopting the latter view, which seems preferable, for this and for other reasons, among them the fact that *ἐνς* occurs as a dialectic variety of *εἰς*, it remains doubtful what is the value

and the origin of the final *ς*; and yet this would seem to be all that distinguishes *εἰς* from *ἐν*. (See Passow's *Lexicon*, and Kühn. *Ausf. Gr.* §§ 600, 603.)

Significations of εἰς.

The proper signification of *εἰς* is 'within,' 'in,' with the idea of the being within a space having boundaries. It is opposed to *ἐκ*, *ἐξ*, 'out,' 'without,' with which it stands in contrast in such examples as Il. xiv. 86, *ἐκ νεότητος ἐς γῆρας*, 'from youth to old age;' Il. xxii. 397, *ἐς σφυρὸν ἐκ πτέρυγης*, 'from heel to toe;' Il. xxiii. 169, *ἐς πόδα ἐκ κεφαλῆς*, 'from head to foot.' (See Passow's *Lex. s. v.*) This proper meaning of *εἰς* is seen also in the derivative *εἶσω*, 'within,' opposed to *ἐξω*, 'without,' and everywhere in compounds. Thus, *εἰσεργύναι*, 'to confine within,' 'to hedge in,' *εἰσῆκειν*, 'to be arrived within,' *εἰσιδρύνειν*, 'to build or found in or within,' e.g. Herod. iv. 62, cited by Passow; *εἰσιζεσθαι*, 'to seat one's self within,' Il. xiii. 285, cited by Passow; *εἰσκεισθαι*, 'to lie within,' *εἰσοικεῖν*, 'to dwell in or within.' Comparing these and such like compounds with those in which *εἰς* is joined with words expressing action or motion, as, *εἰσερχεσθαι*, 'to come into,' *εἰσθεῖν*, 'to run into,' *εἰσαγείρειν*, 'to collect into,' *εἰσβάλλειν*, 'to cast into,' it is plain that 'into' is not the simple sense of *εἰς*, but arises from combining it with the notion of reaching some object. And it may be remarked, that the other seemingly derivative meanings of *εἰς*, as 'for,' 'against,' 'until,' 'up to,' 'as regards,' are really due to the accusative case with which *εἰς* is conjoined, or to the character of the action which it qualifies, the only proper sense of *εἰς* being 'in,' 'within.'

Signification and uses of εἰς with its case.

The preposition *εἰς* is used with the accusative case alone, and, as employed with this case, has obtained seemingly a considerable variety of meanings, as, 'into,' 'up to,' 'against,' 'until,' 'for,' 'to the amount of.' It will be seen, however, as already suggested, that these different meanings arise, not from any variation of the sense of the preposition itself, properly speaking, but from the different uses of the case as

it stands connected with the action or motion which the preposition attends.

1. 'Into,' 'to.' *Εἰς* is used with the accusative case (*a*), after verbs of action and motion, in the sense of 'into,' and of 'to,' involving the meaning of 'into:' e.g. Xen. *Anab.* i. 2, 11, *ἤκεν ἄγγελος λέγων . . . ὅτι τριήρεις ἤκουε περιπλεούσας ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας εἰς Κιλικίαν*, 'a messenger arrived and said that he heard that triremes were sailing round from Ionia to (into) Cilicia;' Id. ib. i. 2, 20, *ἐντεῦθεν ὁ Κῦρος τὴν Κιλικίαν εἰς Κιλικίαν ἀποπέμπει*, 'from thence Cyrus sent the queen of Cilicia back into Cilicia;' Id. ib. i. 2, 22, *ὄρος δ' αὐτὸ περιέχει ὄχυρόν καὶ ὑψηλὸν πάντῃ ἐκ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν*, 'stretches round from sea to sea,' literally, 'from sea into sea;' Id. i. 2, 24, *ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἐξέλιπον οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες . . . εἰς χωρίον ὄχυρόν ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη*, 'this city the inhabitants abandoned (and fled) into a strong fortress upon the mountains.' In this example the word *ἐξέλιπον* has a pregnant sense, involving, besides the idea of 'forsaking' the town, that also of 'fleeing' to the mountains; just as in Xen. *Anab.* i. 2, 1, *καὶ λαβόντες τὰ ὄπλα παρῆσαν εἰς Σάρδεις*, 'they took up their arms and came to (into) Sardis,' the word *παρῆσαν*, 'were present,' implies also the idea of coming, and may be rendered by 'came.' So Xen. *Anab.* i. 2, 18, *Κῦρος δὲ ἦσθη τὸν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους φόβον ἰδών*, and Id. ib. i. 2, 25, *ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῶν ὁρῶν τῶν εἰς τὸ πεδίον*.

In such examples as those above cited, in which *εἰς* is rendered by 'into,' or by 'to' standing in the room of 'into,' the preposition *εἰς*, retaining its proper signification of 'in,' 'within,' is attached to the verb as the qualification of its action or motion, and shows that this action or motion occupies the relative position of 'in,' or 'within.' Thus, in the first example above cited, *τριήρεις ἤκουε περιπλεούσας*, 'he heard that triremes were sailing round,' is qualified by adding *εἰς*, 'in,' 'within;' and the statement is, that 'he heard that triremes were sailing round . . . in or within,' that is, the 'sailing round' is to be regarded as having, with regard to some object, the relative position of 'in' or 'within.' The accusative is added to mark in what regard this relative position is occupied; 'as to,' 'as regards,' what

object the action or motion holds the relative position expressed by *εἰς*, 'in,' or 'within.' Thus, in the same example, to the proposition *τρίηρεις ἤκουε περιπλεύσας εἰς*, 'he heard that triremes were sailing round . . . in or within,' the accusative *Κιλικίαν* is added to show that the preceding statement is to be understood 'as to, as regards, Cilicia,' or that the sailing round stands in the position of 'in' or 'within' 'as regards Cilicia.' So that the whole sentence means, 'he heard that triremes were sailing round,' and that the sailing round was 'in or within . . . as regards Cilicia.'

An apparently simpler view would be to regard the accusative case, in such examples, where it stands after verbs of motion, as the object reached by motion, the preposition being used adverbially, as above, to describe the relative position of the motion; 'he heard of triremes sailing round to Cilicia . . . within it.' But this view, although seemingly simpler, is hardly more satisfactory, and does not embrace a very large proportion of cases in which *εἰς* occurs with the accusative after verbs of motion. Indeed, it may be questioned whether it furnishes the final solution of even the simplest cases of the use of the accusative with *εἰς* after such verbs.

In some instances, the accusative of persons, standing as the objects of verbs of motion with *εἰς*, is used in a somewhat peculiar sense: e.g. Il. vii. 311-12, *Αἴαντ' αὖθ' ἐτέρωθεν ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ | εἰς Ἀγαμέμνονα δῖον ἄγον, κεχαριστότα νίκη,* 'again, on the other hand, the well-greaved Achivi brought to noble Agamemnon Aias rejoicing in victory.' Literally taken, the sense is, 'they brought Aias in or within . . . as regards noble Agamemnon,' and, to make the meaning complete, we may supply *οἶκον* or *κλισίην*, 'the house,' or 'tent,' Agamemnon being put for the tent of Agamemnon. Such pregnant constructions as *εἰς Ἅιδου*, 'into the abode of Hades,' may be cited in illustration. Compare Od. iii. 317, *ἀλλ' ἐς μὲν Μενέλαον ἐγὼ κέλομαι καὶ ἀνωγα | ἐλθεῖν*, 'to come into the dwelling of Menelaus;' properly, 'to come in or within . . . as regards Menelaus.'

'Among.' The preposition *εἰς*, having, properly speaking, the same meaning of 'into' as in the above examples,

obtains the sense of 'among,' the Latin *inter*, namely, where the noun in the accusative case after the action or motion qualified by *εἰς* expresses a number of objects: e.g. Xen. Apol. ii. 1, 7, *εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς τάττομεν*, 'we appoint among (into the number of) the ruling class.'

'Against.' It may be noticed here that *εἰς* sometimes obtains the signification of 'against,' this sense, however, being due to the hostile relations of the parties to the action or motion, and not to any thing peculiar to *εἰς* itself. E.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 2, 7, *καὶ ἀλαλάζοντες οἱ Ἕλληνες ἔεντο εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*, 'the Hellenes, having raised the battle-cry, rushed upon (against) the men;' the meaning is, properly, 'they rushed among (into) the men,' obviously for hostile purposes, that is, 'against,' 'upon,' them. It is needless to multiply examples of this familiar and easily explained use of *εἰς*.

b. The accusative with *εἰς*, when used with verbs not containing the idea of motion, has more obviously the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' and marks within what limits the preceding statement of which it is the qualification is to be taken. E.g. Il. ix. 372-3, . . . *οὐδ' ἄν ἔμοργε | τετλαίη, κύνεός περ ἑὼν, εἰς ὧπα ἰδέσθαι*, 'nor would he dare, though impudent, to look me at least in the face.' Properly speaking, the construction is, 'nor would he, for me at least, venture to look in . . . as regards my face.' By the addition of the accusative case *ὧπα* the extent of the looking in is limited to the face. Similarly, Od. xx. 96, *ἐς μέγαρον κατέθηκεν ἐπὶ θρόνου (χλαῖναν καὶ κώσα)*, 'he deposited them in the house upon a seat;' properly, 'he deposited them within . . . as regards the house.' Otherwise, *κατέθηκεν* might be considered as used in a pregnant sense, and the construction be, 'he came into the house and deposited them;' but this would not materially affect the meaning of either the accusative or the preposition.

To this place probably belong such examples as Il. iii. 158, *αἰνῶς ἀθανάτοισι θεῆς εἰς ὧπα ἔοικεν*, 'she is wonderfully like the immortal goddesses in the face.' Here, *εἰς*, qualifying *ἔοικεν*, 'she is like,' shows that the likeness is relatively 'in' or 'within,' that it is to be found within a certain

compass; and the accusative case *ὦπα* marks the object within which as a limit this likeness is circumscribed, or with regard to which it is said to be 'within;' so that the use of *εἰς* and the accusative *ὦπα* is to show that the likeness expressed by *ἔοικεν* is 'in' or 'within . . . as regards the face.' Rightly considered, there is, in fact, no more difficulty in understanding how *ἔοικεν* is qualified by *εἰς*, and *ἔοικεν εἰς* by the accusative *ὦπα*, so that the likeness is exactly defined in its extent by having marked out the very boundary within which it is affirmed to exist, than there is in seeing how, in the English rendering 'she is like the immortal goddesses in the face,' the declaration of absolute likeness made by the proposition 'she is like the immortal goddesses' is presently qualified by the limitation 'in the face.' Od. i. 411, οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακῷ εἰς ὦπα ἔφκει, 'for he was not at all like a bad man in his looks.' Another view, however, of this construction might be taken, and that not without plausibility; namely, *εἰς ὦπα* might be regarded as used, in a way that is by no means uncommon, to mark the extent to which a thing reaches, in the sense of 'up to,' 'as far as.' And then *εἰς ὦπα ἔοικεν* would mean, 'she is like . . . to the extent of the face.' But the interpretation above given, although perhaps less obvious, is more satisfactory as accounting for the preposition as well as the case, and as being, therefore, more complete. In fact, the former interpretation is not inconsistent with the latter, but includes and goes beyond it.

Hardly different from the use of *εἰς* with the accusative just explained, is that found in such passages as Il. xv. 275-6, ἐφάνη λῆς ἱυγένειος | εἰς ὁδόν, 'a lion appeared in the path.' Here *εἰς ὁδόν* may be interpreted in the same way with *εἰς ὦπα* above; or ἐφάνη may be considered as having a pregnant sense, 'the lion came into the path, and so appeared.' (See Passow's Lex.) Compare Æsch. Prom. 846, τὰ λοιπὰ δ' ὑμῖν τῇδ' ἑ τ' ἐς κοινὸν φράσω, 'the rest I will tell to you and to her in common,' where the phrase ἐς κοινόν, 'in common,' may be interpreted in the same way with *εἰς ὦπα*. The passage in Herod. v. 38, αὐτὸς ἐς Λακεδαιμόνα τρημεῖ ἀπόστολος ἐγίνετο, is better explained by re-

garding ἀπόστολος ἐγίνετο as being equivalent to ἀπέσταλθ, 'he went,' so that it shall be rendered, 'he went to Lacedæmon as an ambassador in person in a trireme.' Yet, admitting this, the explanation of ἐς and of the accusative *Λακεδαιμόνα* will be materially the same.

The same interpretation may be satisfactorily applied to some other peculiar forms of expression: e.g. Herod. iii. 42, Πολυκράτει ἔφη ἐθέλειν ἐλθεῖν ἐς ὄψιν, 'he said that he wished to come into the presence of Polycrates,' that is, 'to come in or within . . . as regards the presence (face) of Polycrates.' Here, even more plainly than in the phrases above considered, *εἰς* shows that the action, that of coming, has a relative position of 'within' with regard to some circumscribed space or situation, and the accusative ὄψιν marks what this space or situation is, 'as regards the presence of Polycrates.' So Herod. i. 86, τὸν δὲ ἐγὼ πᾶσι τυράννοισι προετίμησα μεγάλων χρημάτων ἐς λόγους ἐλθεῖν, 'I would have valued it above great riches that he should have discoursed with all tyrants;' and Id. vii. 9, εἰ . . . ἔλθοιεν ἡμῖν ἐς μάχην, 'if they should come to blows with us,' 'should fight with us.' Add Xen. Anab. i. 2, 26, οὐδενί πω κρείττονι ἑαυτοῦ εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν ἔφη, 'he said that he had, as yet, come into conflict with no one that was his superior.'

2. 'Up to,' 'as far as,' 'to the amount of,' 'to the number of,' 'for,' 'against,' 'until.' *Εἰς* with the accusative case is used to mark the measure up to which any thing reaches, rendered in English by the various forms of expression just given.

a. Of number, and of amount generally; 'up to,' 'to the number of,' 'to the amount of:' e.g. Xen. Anab. i. 1, 10, Ὁ δὲ Κύρος δίδωσιν αὐτῷ εἰς τετρακισχίλους, 'Cyrus gave him to the number of four thousand;' Id. ib. vi. 2, 16, θυομένων δὲ πάλιν εἰς τρίς, 'and when they again sacrificed as many as (to the number of) three times;' Id. ib. vii. 1, 33, εἰς ἀφθονίαν παρέξειν ἔφη καὶ σῖτα καὶ ποτὰ, 'he said that he would supply food and drink in abundance,' 'to the measure of abundance;' Id. ib. ii. 2, 23, καὶ τούτου εἰς γε δύναμιν οὐχ ἡττησόμεθα εὖ ποιοῦντες, 'so far at least as our ability goes;' Id. ib. iv. 7, 3, εἰς καλὸν ἦκει, 'you are come opportunely,'

literally, 'against the fitting moment;' so *εἰς πάντα*, 'in every respect,' 'reaching to every thing;' *εἰς τάχος*, 'quickly,' 'amounting to quickness.'

b. Of time, both generally, and in its several denominations, expressed in English by 'up to the time of,' 'against,' 'until,' 'for.' E.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 3, *ὀλίγοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν ἑσπέραν σίτου ἐγεύσαντο*, 'few of them had tasted food until (up to the time of, against) evening,' improperly rendered by Schneider, in his index, by *sub vesperam*; Id. ib. i. 7, 1, *ἐδόκει γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἐπιούσαν ἔω ἤξειν βασιλέα*, 'for he thought that the king would arrive against the ensuing morning;' Id. Cyrop. i. 4, 16, *ἐπεθύμησε καὶ αὐτὸς θηρᾶσαι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον*, 'he desired himself also to hunt at (properly, against) this time;' Id. ib. v. 3, 6, *ἤχετε εἰς τὴν τριακοστὴν ἡμέραν*, 'come against (in) the thirtieth day;' Id. Memorab. i. 2, 8, *ἐπίστευε δὲ εἰς τὸν πάντα βίον . . . φίλους ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι*, 'he believed that they would be good friends (to himself and others) for their whole life;' Id. Anab. v. 3, 10, *θήραν ἐποιοῦντο εἰς τὴν ἑορτήν*, 'they hunted for, against the occasion of, the festival.'

In this use of *εἰς* with the accusative, it is plain that the notion of amount, or the reaching to a sum or number, is due wholly to the accusative case, and that this, being a precise measure, excludes the idea of 'about,' 'near to,' the Latin *sub*, *circiter*, by which *εἰς* with the accusative of measure is too commonly rendered in grammars, lexicons, and other books of interpretation; unless, indeed, this sense of 'about' be contained in *εἰς* itself, which, it is presumed, no one will pretend. As for *εἰς* in this use, it retains nothing of its proper meaning beyond the indication which it serves to give that the object to be measured, considered in the matter of its extent, falls within a certain denomination of values, namely, that expressed by the accusative. Thus, when it is said, Xen. Anab. iv. 7, 8, *ἀπῆλθον ὑπὸ τὰ δένδρα ἀνθρωποι εἰς τοὺς ἐβδομήκοντα*, 'there retired under (the shelter of, behind) the trees to the number of seventy men,' the preposition expresses that in number the men were 'in' or 'within' a certain value, which the accusative *ἐβδομήκοντα* presently adds, 'a number amounting to seventy.'

Properly speaking, the meaning is, 'there retired under (behind) the trees men in or within . . . as regards the number seventy.' It may assist to make this plain if it be recalled to mind that *εἰς* performs the same office in its common use after a verb of motion: e.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 7, 1, *ἐπορεύθησαν εἰς Ταόχους*, 'they marched into (the country of) the Taochi,' where the sense is, 'they marched in or within . . . as regards the Taochi,' the accusative *Ταόχους* naming the people as regards whom 'the marching in' is affirmed. The only difference between the two cases is, that in the one, the circumscribed limit within which a thing falls is that of a people or territory, in the other, that of a number, or of a denomination of value.

c. 'By —.' Besides the simple notion of amount reached, *εἰς* with the accusative, both of number generally and of time, is employed to convey the idea of distribution, for which the English language uses the expression of 'by —.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. ii. 1, 26, *ὅποτε εἰς ἓνα πορεύοιτο ἡ τάξις*, 'whenever the division marched by files,' 'by ones;' Id. ib. ii. 3, 21, *παρηγγύησεν εἰς δύο ἀγειν τὸν λόγον*, 'he gave them orders to lead the company by twos,' 'in double files;' Id. ib. vii. 1, 23, *οἱ τε ὁπλίται ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ εἰς πεντήκοντα ἐγένοντο*, 'the hoplitæ were in a little while arranged by fifties,' that is, 'fifty deep.'

Εἰς is sometimes omitted when a division into parts merely is intended: e.g. Herod. vii. 121, *τρῆς μοίρας δασάμενος πάντα τὸν περὶ τὸν στρατὸν*, 'having divided the whole infantry into three parts;' Id. iv. 148, *σφέας αὐτοὺς ἐξ μοίρας διεῖλον*, 'they distributed themselves into six divisions;' Id. ii. 147, *δωδέκα μοίρας δασάμενοι Αἴγυπτον πᾶσαν*, 'having divided the whole of Egypt into twelve parts.' But this must not be confounded with the above-mentioned distribution of a thing by equal measures. Here the word *μοίρας*, 'parts,' 'divisions,' is substituted for the standard of measure expressed by the accusative and *εἰς*, and by which a whole number is distributed into parts necessarily equal.

This sense of distribution into equal parts expressed by *εἰς* and the accusative is due to the accusative case, which furnishes, by virtue of its power of denoting the extent to

which a thing reaches, a standard of measure by which any number is divided off into successive equal parts; *εἰς*, mean, while, having the same office as in any other case of the expression of amount, to indicate, namely, that an object is 'within' a certain denomination of values marked by the accusative. Thus, for example, *εἰς δύο*, 'up to two,' 'two,' constituting a standard of measure, is applied to any body, say of soldiers, so as to divide it into equal parts by counting successively up to the number of two, that is, as expressed in English, 'two by two.' It should be observed, however, that the idea of distribution is conveyed, properly speaking, neither by the accusative, nor by the preposition, nor by the accusative and preposition conjoined. It is inferred from the juxtaposition of a standard of measure with a whole number or mass for the subdivision of which it is suited. The measure of 'one,' of 'two,' of 'three,' for example, is placed alongside of a body of soldiers, and, knowing beforehand that soldiers are wont to be marched in single files, in double files, three abreast, that is, 'by ones,' 'by twos,' 'by threes,' it is inferred that the measure is to be applied to the subdivision of the whole number into 'ones,' 'twos,' 'threes,' and that, when marching is spoken of, it is by single files, by double files, or three abreast. *Ἀνά* and *κατά* are employed with the accusative in the same way, differing from *εἰς* and the accusative only in the mode of determining the measure which is used as a standard. *Ἐπὶ* with the genitive case also is used to denote distribution, but after a different method to be hereafter explained, and more nearly corresponding to the mode in which the English 'by' is made to serve the same purpose.

8. 'Of,' 'in regard to,' 'regarding,' 'touching,' 'in the case of,' 'against.' *Εἰς* with the accusative is used also to denote the object with regard to which any thing is done, expressed in English by 'of,' 'in regard to,' 'regarding,' 'touching,' 'in the case of,' 'against.' E.g. Herod. i. 86, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐς ἑωυτὸν λέγων ἢ ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, 'saying it no more of (in regard to) himself than in regard to the whole human race;' Id. iv. 98, ἡ γνώμη ἀποδεχθεῖσα ἐς τὴν γέφυραν, 'the opinion expressed regarding, touching, the

bridge;' Id. i. 114, πρῆγμα ἐς αὐτὸν γενόμενον, 'an occurrence relating to him;' Orat. Att. 143, 1, ἐς τὸν ἑωυτῶν βίον ασφαλῶς ἔχων, 'to be secure of (in regard to) their own living;' Id. 616, penult., ἐς χρήματα ἀναδής, 'shameless in regard to, in the matter of, money;' Id. 1393, 1, ἐς χρημάτων δαπάνην, ἣ τινα ἄλλην θεωρίαν, 'touching the expenditure of money;' Id. 60, 13, κακοὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐς τὸν δῆμον γένωνται, 'of base spirit towards the demos;' Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 30, οὐτ' ἐς φιλίαν αὐτοὺς ἐμέμετο, 'nor did he blame them in the matter of friendship;' Herod. i. 118, τῷ πεπονημένῳ ἐς τὸν παῖδα τοῦτον ἔκαμνον, 'I was sorry for what was done in the case of, against, this child.'

'On.' To this sense of *εἰς* with the accusative may probably be correctly referred some examples in which *εἰς* with this case is differently rendered in English, as by 'on.' E.g. Orat. Att. 822, 3, οὐκ ἦν τῷ πατρὶ τοῦτο τὸ συμβόλαιον ἐς τὰν δράποδα ἡλιθίως συμβεβλημένον, 'my father had not unadvisedly lent his money on these slaves,' that is, 'with a reference to, having a regard to, these slaves;' Id. 822, 14, τῷ δ' ἐς τὰ ἡμέτερα δανείσαντι, 'who lent money on our property,' that is, 'in view of, having a regard to, our property;' Id. 12, 20, χορηγὸν τὸν μέλλοντα τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἑωυτοῦ ἐς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκειν, 'who is going to expend his own substance on you,' that is, 'with a regard to you.' (For the examples, see Index Or. Att. ed. Bekk.)

'Against.' In the example above cited from Herod. i. 118, τῷ πεπονημένῳ ἐς τὸν παῖδα τοῦτον ἔκαμνον, 'I was sorry for what was done in the case of, against, this child,' and in very many others in which *εἰς* is capable of being translated by 'against,' this meaning attributed to the preposition does not reside in *εἰς*, but arises from the idea of enmity and the like suggested by the nature of the attending action and by the obvious relations of the subject of the affirmation to the noun standing in the accusative case with *εἰς*. Thus, Herod. vi. 65, ἡ ἔχθρη ἢ ἐς τὸν Δημόμαχον, 'the enmity against Demaratus;' Id. i. 123, τιμωρίην ἐσομένην ἐς Ἀστυάγην, 'that punishment was likely to come upon Astyages;' Xen. Cyrop. ii. 2, 2, ὅποιοι μὲν τινες ἔσονται ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους οὕτω ἐγὼγε ἐπίσταμαι, 'what kind of men they will be against the enemy,

for my part I do not yet know,' or, 'as regards the enemy;' Id. Anab. iv. 5, 18, *ἔδραμον εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους*, 'they ran against the enemy;' Id. Hell. vii. 4, 34, οὐδὲ (χρῆ) καταλπεῖν εἰς τὸν αἰ χρόνον τοῖς πασὶν ἐγκλημα τοῦτο εἰς τοὺς θεούς, 'this crime against the gods.'

'For.' Very nearly related to the sense of 'as regards' is that which *εἰς* with the accusative has when it is used to express the object aimed at, the end had in view, conveyed in English by 'for.' E.g. Herod. i. 34, πάντα, τοῖσι χρέονται ἐς πόλεμον ἄνθρωποι, 'every thing that men use for war,' that is, 'with regard to war;' Id. ii. 98, ἡ μὲν Ἀνθυλλα . . . ἐς ὑποδήματα ἐξαιρετος δίδεται, 'Anthylla is given specially for shoes.' In Herod. i. 6, τοὺς μὲν κατεστρέψατο Ἑλλήνων ἐς φόρου ἀναγωγῆν, the sense is somewhat different, namely, 'so as to pay tribute.' The whole sentence means, 'he subjected some of the Greeks to the payment of tribute,' *εἰς* with the accusative expressing result or effect rather than object or end had in view. See Schweig. Lex. Herod. s. v. *ἐς*, who, however, translates this phrase by "*ut tributum ipsi penderent*." In fact, the one signification as well as the other is in just accordance with the meaning of *εἰς* attending upon a verb of action or motion and followed by an accusative case.

In explanation of the use of *εἰς* and the accusative case to express purpose, it is necessary to notice several particulars. Assuming that the office and proper meaning of *εἰς* are materially the same that they have been uniformly found to be in the uses of this preposition which have been hitherto examined, it is to be considered as qualifying the action, motion, or other substantive idea of the verb which it accompanies, and as showing that it has the relative position or direction of 'in,' 'within.' And attributing to the accusative case which is added to the verb and *εἰς* its common sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' that is, its power of marking the limits within which an action or statement is confined, it denotes the object with regard to which exclusively the action of the verb is to be understood as having the relative position or direction of 'in,' 'within;' and thus marks, in fact, a limited space, or, it may be, according to the nature

of the object named by the noun, a class or category, or a state or condition, to which the notion of position or direction 'in,' 'within,' is to be confined, and by which it is circumscribed. Again, when *εἰς* is added to the action or motion of the verb, or to any substantive idea that may imply these, and regard is had to the accusative case following, there arises from the conjunction of the preposition with its sense of 'in' or 'within,' of the action or motion of the verb with its now defined direction, and of the accusative case with its power of marking the limits within which the action or motion is confined, the sense of 'into;' and the effect is to represent the subject of the action or motion as brought within the circumscribed space, class or category, state or circumstances, named by the noun in the accusative. Thus, in the sentence *ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν*, 'he came into the city,' the 'coming' expressed by *ἦλθεν* is described by *εἰς* as having a relative position, or rather direction, of 'in' or 'within;' the accusative case *πόλιν* denotes the object with regard to which it has this relative position or direction; and the effect is to represent the person who is the subject of the coming as brought 'into,' or within the compass of, 'the city.' Again, in the proposition *ἔδραμον εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους*, 'they ran into (among, against) the enemy,' the action of 'running' contained in *ἔδραμον* is represented as having the relative position or direction of 'in' or 'within,' 'as regards the enemy,' and the persons who ran as being brought by the action of running 'into,' or within the compass of, 'the enemy.' Now, assuming the proposition *ἡ Ἀνθυλλα ἐς ὑποδήματα δίδεται*, 'Anthylla is given for sandals,' to have the same construction, as we have a right to do, and, indeed, are bound to do, if the doctrine of *εἰς* thus far set forth be true, and until the preposition or case, or both united, be found to have some different or additional power, *ἐς* shows that the action of 'giving' contained in *δίδεται* has the relative direction of 'in' or 'within;' the accusative case *ὑποδήματα* denotes the object with regard to which it has this direction; and the effect is to represent the town of Anthylla as brought by the action of giving 'into' or within the class of objects,

or within the peculiar condition or character, expressed by *ὑποδήματα*, 'sandals;' Anthylla, by the action of giving, is placed in the class, condition, or state of sandals, or 'in or among sandals.' Thus far considered, and without further elucidation, there is no distinct meaning conveyed by the proposition as here interpreted: certainly there is no expression of purpose or of the object had in view. But, as in the sentence *ἔδραμον εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους*, above explained, the sense of 'against' arises from the mutual relations of the parties to the action, the running of foes into or among foes being the same thing as running 'against' foes, so here the notion of purpose or of an object had in view is suggested by the circumstances of the case, namely, by the nature of the action and of the noun, and by the known relations in which the parties to the action stand to each other. And the same is true of all the instances in which *εἰς* with the accusative has the sense of purpose or expresses the object had in view. When the town of Anthylla, in the example here employed, is mentioned as being assigned (*δίδοται*) to the wives of the successive kings of Egypt *εἰς ὑποδήματα*, although the terms, properly taken, mean no more than that it is brought by gift 'into the class or condition of sandals,' yet knowing beforehand the practice of Persian monarchs, here transferred to Egypt, of assigning to their wives and other favorites towns for the supply of their table and wardrobe, one town to furnish bread, another wine, a third sandals, and so on, (cf. Xen. Anab. i. 4, 9,) it is at once seen that the placing the town given as a present in the class or condition of sandals, and that for the wives of successive kings, can mean nothing else than the putting it into the service of the queen for the time being for the supply of sandals; that is, it is manifest from the circumstances that *εἰς ὑποδήματα δίδοται*, said of Anthylla, is equivalent to 'is given for sandals.' When it is said, Herod. i. 34, that Cræsus, in his apprehension for his son's life which had been excited by a vision, removed from his son's apartments the *ἀκόντια καὶ δοράτια καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα τοῖσι χρέονται ἐς πόλεμον ἄνθρωποι*, if *χρέονται* be allowed to have a pregnant sense, that is, to imply action or motion, and this is suggested by

the presence of *εἰς* and the accusative; and if it be admitted that *εἰς*, from its common connection with verbs of action and motion, may have come to represent, in some sort, the sense of 'into' or the direction of motion to within, even when action or motion is not distinctly expressed, so that the sense shall be, 'all such weapons as men bring into and use in war,' it can hardly fail to be seen that, in the circumstances, *χρέονται ἐς πόλεμον* means, 'they use for war.' Compare Thuc. i. 1, *τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντές τε ἦσαν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφοτέρωι παρεσκευῇ τῇ πάσῃ*, 'forming my conjecture from the fact that they were both, in every way, in the highest state of preparation for it.'

In a word, *εἰς* with the accusative case is used to express purpose or the object had in view only where it attends upon some action or motion, or some term that may suggest action or motion, and where the object named by the accusative as that into which the preposition indicates that the action or motion is directed, is of such a nature as to be obviously suited to express the end or object aimed at in the preceding action or motion.

According to this view, *εἰς* does not itself contain the notion of 'for' or purpose, any more than it does that of 'among,' or of 'against;' nor does the accusative, of its own force, express this sense; nor, yet again, is it distinctly set forth by the combination of the preposition *εἰς* with the action or motion attended by the accusative; although, in so far as the notion of purpose can at all be said to reside in the terms employed, themselves considered, it is to be found, more than anywhere else, in the direction of the action or motion expressed by *εἰς* taken in its conjunction with a verb of action or motion, and in the restriction of the action thus qualified to a particular view, which is made by the noun in the accusative. In fact, it is only from the circumstances in which *εἰς* is used with the accusative after a verb of action or motion that it can be determined to have this sense of purpose.

If it be asked why *εἰς*, out of the prepositions, and in conjunction with the accusative alone, is chosen for the expression of this idea of purpose, or the object had in view, the

answer would seem to be, that *εἰς*, in conjunction with the action or motion of the verb, and with the accusative case, is peculiarly adapted to the expression of purpose from the fact that it not only denotes the direction or tendency of the action or motion, which might be done equally well by other prepositions, but serves, furthermore, to show that the direction of the action or motion, or its tendency, is into or within a state or set of circumstances, and so to restrict it more definitely within certain limits. From the use of *ut* with the subjunctive in Latin to express both purpose and result, where *ut* is certainly an accusative case, little that is positive can be inferred as to the capacity of the accusative for the expression of purpose; it being demonstrable, that, however suitable the accusative may be to the notion of purpose conveyed by *ut* and the subjunctive, the presence of the subjunctive mood is here indispensable. All that could be concluded from such use of the accusative would be that there is a certain congruity between this case and the notion of purpose or object had in view. But from the use of *ad* and the verbal in the accusative case, as *ad hæc conficienda*, 'for the accomplishment of these things,' and of the accusative of the verbal in *tus* after a verb of motion, and without a preposition, to denote purpose or the object had in view, it would seem that one mode of indicating purpose is simply to mark the object 'as regards,' or 'with a regard to,' 'with a view to' which an action is performed; that is, by restricting the action to a particular and defined view. This is materially the sense of our phrase 'with a view to,' by which we express purpose; for here also the purpose of an action is set forth by indicating that it is confined in its view to a special object, that it looks to this object and not to any other. And if the accusative alone may thus go to the expression of purpose by merely restricting the action to a definite object, much more may it be consistent with a just way of thinking to aim at conveying this idea by naming a definite object, not only as that to which the action is to be confined, but as that within the limits of which its direction is to be restricted, or into which it has its direction and tendency,

and into the class or condition of which it is brought. Some confirmation of this view may be derived from the fact that the genitive of the infinitive mood also is capable of expressing purpose: e.g. Thuc. i. 4, *τό τε ληστικόν, ὡς εἰδὼς, καθήρει ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης . . . τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον λέναι αὐτόν*, 'in order that his revenues might the better come in to him.' This it does by distinguishing in what respect exactly an action is to be taken, and so confining it to a specific view, and to a definite class or category. This sense, which the genitive is everywhere seen to possess, is more nearly expressed by *εἰς* with the accusative, as above explained, than by the accusative alone, the notion of being referred to a specific object as to a class or category, and the being brought within the limits of an object and restricted to it being nearly related, and both being distinguished from the sense in which the accusative by itself marks within what limits an action is to be considered as confined. And thus it would seem to be probably true, that the Greek mind connected the idea of the object had in view or purpose, not simply with the restricting an action or motion to a definite object, but rather with the referring it to a specific object as being that to the case or category of which it belongs; as where the genitive of the infinitive is employed; or with the confining it within a definite object, into which it has its direction or tendency, and within whose condition it is brought; as where *εἰς* with the accusative is used.

Where *εἰς* with the accusative has the sense of result or effect, as in *κατεστρέψατο ἐς φόβου ἀναγωγὴν*, 'he subjected them to the payment of tribute,' that is, 'so that they should pay tribute,' the interpretation is materially the same as in the case just considered, and may be regarded as involved in what has been said above. For if *εἰς* and the accusative may suggest the idea of purpose or object had in view by marking the limits within which the direction or tendency of an action or motion is to be restricted, they may equally suggest that of result or effect, this being quite as obviously consistent with the notion of confining an action within defined limits.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *εἰς* WITH ITS CASE.

Signification of <i>εἰς</i> .	Accusat. : a. 'up to,' 'as far as.'	b. 'as to,' 'as regards.'
'In,' 'within.'	a. 'Up to,' 'as far as.'	a. 'into,' 'to' (within).
	b. 'Until,' 'against,' (of time, &c.)	b. 'to' (pregnant construction).
	c. 'By —' (distribution).	c. 'among.'
		d. 'against' (hostility).
		e. 'as regards,' 'in the case of,' 'touching,' 'on.'
		f. 'for' (object, purpose).
		g. 'to,' 'so as to,' (result).

'Ex.

'Ex, before a vowel written *ἐξ*, is the same with the Latin *e*, *ex*. 'Eξ (*ἐξ*) differs from *ἐκ* hardly so much as *εἰς* from *ἐν*, and *e* is not further in form from *ἐκ* than *οὐ* is from *οὐκ*. The form *ἐκ* is constantly met with in the compounds, as *ἐκτός*, *ἐκφέρειν*, and may be considered to be that which is proper to this preposition. The origin of the *ς*, which is added to *ἐκ* to make the fuller form *ἐξ* (*ἐκς*), whether it be merely formative, or a significant ending, as of a case, is unknown. The same may be said of the *ς* in the formation of *εἰς*, and of *πρός* compared with *πρό*.

1. 'Out,' 'without.' 'Ex properly signifies 'out,' 'without,' with the idea of being on the outside with reference to a space limited by bounds, whether real or imaginary. It is, therefore, just the opposite of *ἐν*, 'within.' This simple and proper meaning of *ἐκ* is seen in the derivative *ἐξω*, 'without,' the opposite of *εἴσω*, 'within,' and in many compounds, as *ἐκκαθεύδειν*, 'to sleep out-of-doors,' *excubare*; *παῖς ἐκκείμενος*, 'a child lying out,' 'exposed'; *ἐκκλείσαι τῆς πόλεως*, 'to shut out from the city'; *ἐκκομίζειν*, 'to carry out'; *ἐκλείπειν*, 'to leave out'; also in such phrases as *ἐκ βέλων εἶναι*, 'to be out of the reach of darts.'

2. 'Out of,' 'from out.' But the common signification borne by *ἐκ*, as it appears apart, and as a preposition not in composition, is that of 'out of,' 'from out,' with the idea of proceeding, either literally or figuratively, from out of a circumscribed space. E.g. Il. i. 439, *ἐκ δὲ Χρυσῆς νηὸς βῆ ποντοπόροιο*, 'the daughter of Chryses went out of, from out,

the sea-going ship;' Orat. Att. 1150, 9, *ἐκέλευσα . . . καλέσαι . . . ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ*, 'I bade him call them from out the highway.' It should be remarked, that this meaning of *ἐκ*, being due partly to the action or motion of which it is the qualification, is not to be considered as simple and proper to *ἐκ*; and that, here also, the sense contained in the preposition itself is no more than that of 'out,' 'without,' above attributed to it.

The sense of 'out of,' 'from out,' which, for the sake of convenience, may be said to belong to *ἐκ*, is found occurring in quite a number of the uses of this preposition. Thus:

a. 'Ex is used in the sense of 'out of,' 'from out,' in regard to space, literally taken: e.g. Xen. Anab. i. 1, 8, *ὁ Κῦρος ἀπέπεμπε τοὺς γεγενημένους δασμοὺς βασιλεῖ ἐκ τῶν πόλεων*, 'Cyrus remitted the tribute that accrued to the king from the cities;' Id. ib. i. 1, 9, *ἐπολέμει ἐκ Χερσωνήσου ὁρμώμενος τοῖς Θρᾷξι*, 'setting out from the Chersonesus, he waged war upon the Thracians;' Id. ib. iii. 1, 14, *ἐγὼ οὖν τὸν ἐκ ποίας πόλεως στρατιγὸν προσδοκῶ ταῦτα πράξειν*, 'the officer, therefore, of (from) what state do I expect will do this?' Id. ib. i. 2, 7, and 18.

b. In regard to a number or class of objects from which one is taken out or selected: e.g. Il. xv. 680, *ἐκ πολλῶν πῖσυρας συναίρειται ἵππους*, 'he yokes together four horses out of many;' Herod. ii. 47, *ἀλλ' ἐκδιδοταί τε οἱ συβῶται καὶ ἀγέεται ἐξ ἀλλήλων*, 'the swineherds give their daughters in marriage to one another, and take wives from one another;' that is, 'marry and give in marriage out of their own number.' The meaning of *ἐκ* is the same where it stands with the genitive case after the superlative form of the adjective to mark a number of objects from which one of the same class is distinguished, and with which this one, by being taken out from them, is placed in comparison; where, in English, the reference to a class, and the comparison with it, is expressed by 'of,' 'above.' Eg. Il. iv. 96, *ἐκ πάντων δὲ μάλιστα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βασιλῆϊ*, 'and most of all to prince Alexander.'

c. 'Of,' 'from.' This meaning of 'out of,' 'from out,'

obtains in quite a variety of the uses of *ἐκ*, where, if we look to the rendering in English, which is mostly made by *of*, 'from,' the proper idea of the preposition is less readily discernible. Thus, in the expression of origin, source, cause, agent, material, of any state or condition, in fact, from which a thing may be considered as proceeding; as in *γενέσθαι ἐκ τινος*, 'to be born of a person;' e.g. Il. ix. 486, *καὶ θυμὸν φιλεῖν*, 'to love from the heart;' Il. vii. iii., *ἐξ ἐριδος μάχεσθαι*, 'to fight from jealousy,' that is, 'out of, moved by, jealousy;' Od. xix. 93, *ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἐμεῦ ἔκλυες αὐτῆς*, 'since you heard it from myself,' *ἐξ ἐμεῦ* marking the person from whom the voice proceeds; Il. ii. 668-9, . . . *φίληθεν | ἐκ Διός*, 'beloved of Jove,' Jove being the object from whom the affection of love proceeds; *πῶμα ἐκ ξύλου πεποιημένον*, 'a drinking-cup made of wood,' or 'out of wood.' Although, in some of these cases, the preposition may not, at the first view, appear to have the meaning of 'out of,' as above attributed to it, yet it will be seen, upon a closer examination, to be really present, if not literally, at least in an accommodated sense. Thus, in *πῶμα ἐκ ξύλου πεποιημένον*, the cup is regarded as having its origin in the wood of which it is made, in some sort to proceed from it; and, although this is not to be taken literally, it can easily be understood in a figurative sense; and this the more readily as the terms 'out of' and 'from' are employed in English in the same way. So again, for *ἐξ ἐριδος μάχεσθαι*, we say in English, 'to fight from jealousy,' or 'out of jealousy.'

d. 'From,' 'on,' 'in.' In the same sense nearly, but rather more obscurely involving the notion of 'out of,' the preposition *ἐκ* is found employed with the genitive case to mark the object or space to which an action, motion, or event is referred for its date or position; that is, the object or space from which, as proceeding from it, its beginning is counted or dated. Thus: -

a.) With regard to space, and generally, to denote the object from which an action is marked as having its commencement, and which makes the starting-point in taking its measure: e.g. Il. xviii. 353-4, *ἐν λεχέεσσιν δὲ θέντες, ἐανῶ λαιεὶ κάλυψαν | ἐς πόδας ἐκ κεφαλῆς*, 'they covered him with

linen vestments from head to foot;' that is, 'from out, proceeding from, commencing with, the head.'

β.) With regard to time, to mark the period from which an event is reckoned; as, *ἐκ τούτου*, 'from this time,' *ἐξ οὗ ex quo*, 'from the time that,' *ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, 'from the beginning.' Here also the preposition *ἐκ* has properly the sense of 'out of,' and, if taken literally, describes the action or event as issuing from, and so as having its commencement from, or dating from, the period of time represented by the noun in the genitive case.

γ.) To mark the point of attachment of an object, that from which it is suspended, and the like; as, *φέρειν ἐκ τῶν ζωστήρων*, 'to wear at (literally, from) the girdle.' In this case *ἐκ* would seem to have the sense of *ἀπό*, 'from,' rather than that of 'out of;' but, in the same way that the Greeks considered the period from which an action was counted as beginning to be that from which it proceeded, they would seem also to have regarded the object from which another was suspended as being that from which it came forth. But, of course, neither in the one case, nor in the other, would the preposition and genitive, thus used, be taken in a literal sense. Otherwise, but less probably, *ἐκ* may be here understood in its proper sense of 'without,' 'on the outside;' so that *φέρειν ἐκ τῶν ζωστήρων* shall mean, 'to wear without, on the outside of, the girdle.'

δ.) With regard to the space to which the position of an object is referred, where *ἐκ* is rendered in English by 'on,' 'in:' e.g. Od. xxi. 420, *αὐτόθεν ἐκ δίφροιο καθήμενος*, 'sitting there on or in the seat;' Il. xiv. 154, *στῆσ' ἐξ Οὐλύμπου ἀπὸ ρίου*, 'standing on Olympus, on its summit.' In this construction *ἐκ* would seem to define the position of a thing by representing it as looking out from the space expressed by the noun which follows it in the genitive case, the point of view being transferred from the beholder to the object or space to which the position is referred. Thus, the Greeks said *ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς*, properly, 'from out the left hand,' and the Latins, *ab oriente*, literally, 'from the east,' and still more nearly conforming to the Greek use of *ἐκ*, *una ex parte*, 'from out of one side,' where the English has 'on the left

hand,' 'on the east,' 'on one side.' Looking to such examples, and admitting the explanation suggested, *ἐκ διόφρουο* may be said to define *καθήμενος* by denoting the place to which it is referred, and by marking this as a space or position from out of which the sitting, so to speak, looks, or has its aspect, rather than as one at or in which it is seen. In the second example above cited, Homer employs *ἀπό* in the same way materially with *ἐκ*. By *ἐξ Οὐλύμποιο* the position of Iliad is described as one that is 'from out of Olympus,' or that 'looks from out of Olympus,' namely, with regard to the beholder; and by *ἀπὸ ρίου* as one that is 'from the summit,' or 'looks from the summit,' said with regard to the same beholder. The mode of defining the position of an object is the same in both cases; the only difference is, that *ἐκ* makes the object look, as it were, 'from out' the space to which its position is referred, while *ἀπό* makes it look or have its aspect 'from' the like space.

e.) 'After,' 'from,' 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of,' 'in accordance with' or 'according to,' 'in pursuance of.' From the sense of 'out of,' belonging to *ἐκ* in the way above explained, spring other meanings of this preposition, as, 'after,' 'from,' 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of,' 'in accordance with,' 'in pursuance of,' in which it points out that upon which any thing follows as a result or effect, as a natural sequence, as what is in just accord with it, &c. E.g. Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 4, *ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἐθανατώθη*, 'hereupon, consequent upon this, he was, in fact, condemned to death;' Id. ib. vi. 4, 11, *ἐξ οὗ καὶ διεβίβλεν αὐτὸν ὁ Δέξιππος*, 'for which cause, wherefore, in fact, Dexippus accused him;' Id. ib. i. 9, 19, *εἰ δέ τινα δρῆναι δεινὸν ὄντα οἰκονόμον ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου*, 'if he saw a person to be a good manager from motives of right,' 'in pursuance of right;' Id. ib. iv. 2, 23, *καὶ πάντα ἐποίησαν τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν*, 'they did every thing for those who fell, according to their ability;' Id. ib. vi. 2, 7, *ἀλλὰ ἐδόκει καὶ τὸ ἐλθεῖν ἐνταῦθα ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς εἶναι*, 'but even the having come there seemed to be of design,' *ex consilio*.

The immediate derivation of this class of meanings from that of 'out of' hardly needs illustration, especially if the natural order of these significations of *ἐκ* be regarded. What

comes forth or proceeds from another is naturally viewed as subsequent in point of time or of order, & gives the sense of 'after' as following upon that of 'and,' again, what comes after or follows upon another stand to it in the relation of a result or effect to a cause of an action to a motive that determines it; and this is expressed by such phrases as 'in consequence of,' 'in pursuance of,' 'finally,' what proceeds from another may be considered as being in accordance with it; and this sense is conveyed in English by the expressions 'in accordance with,' 'according to.'

3. 'Out and out,' 'utterly,' 'quite.' In some compounds *ἐκ* has the intensive sense of 'out and out,' 'utterly,' 'quite,' as, *ἐκλευκος*, 'quite white,' *ἐκπικρος*, 'altogether bitter,' *ἐκδιψής*, 'to be quite thirsty,' *ἐκμανθάνειν*, 'to learn thoroughly,' 'learn by heart,' in Latin, *ediscere*.

Summary of the significations of ἐκ.

- 'Ex. 1. 'Out,' 'without,' that is, 'on the outside.'
2. 'Out of,' 'from out;' = 'out' + motion from.
- a. Of space; 'out of,' 'from out.'
 - b. Of a number of objects; 'out of,' 'from (out)'; Hence, in comparison, 'of,' 'above.'
 - c. Of origin, parentage, source, cause, agent, material; 'of,' 'from.'
 - d. Of that from which an action, motion, event, &c. begins; 'from:'
 - a.) Of space, and generally; 'from.'
 - β.) Of time; 'from.'
 - γ.) Of the point of attachment; 'from.'
 - δ.) Of the space to which an object is referred in its position; 'on,' 'in.'
 - e. 'After,' 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of,' 'in pursuance of,' 'in accordance with,' viz.:
 - a.) Sequence of time and order; 'after.'
 - β.) Rational sequence; result or effect; just accordance; 'by reason of,' 'in consequence of,' 'in accordance with.'
3. Intensively; 'out and out,' 'utterly,' 'quite.'

Significations and use of ἐξ with its case.

'Ex is used with the genitive case alone. And this case, it occurs in conjunction with ἐξ, has uniformly the meaning of 'with respect to;' that is, according to its proper use, limits the sense of the preceding term by marking the object or set of objects of which specifically, and as distinguished from all other objects, it is to be understood as leged.

1. 'Out,' 'without.' 'Ex with the genitive case occurs in some instances with the primary and simple meaning of 'out,' 'without:' o.g. Od. xix. 7, ἐξ καπνοῦ κατέδρη', 'I deposited them (the weapons) out of, without, the smoke,' 'out of the reach of the smoke;' that is, 'on the outside . . . with respect to the smoke;' Id. xi. 130 . . . τῷ δ' αὐτ' ἐξ φρου γουναζέσθην, 'they two, on the other hand, without the chariot-seat implored him;' that is, 'without, on the outside, . . . with respect to the chariot-seat;' Xen. Anab. i. 3, 15, ἔνθα, οὐδ' εἰ ταχὺς εἴη πεζὸς, πεζὸν ἂν διώκων καταλάβοι τόξου ῥύματος, 'where a foot-soldier, even if he were swift, could not by pursuing overtake a foot-soldier who was out of bow-shot;' that is, 'without, on the outside, . . . with respect to a bow-shot;' Herod. iii. 83, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατῆστο, 'sat down out from their midst,' 'out, on the outside, . . . with respect to the midst of them.' The compound ἐκποδῶν, 'out of the way,' 'out of the way of the feet,' that is, 'out, without, . . . with respect to the feet,' may properly be considered to belong here, together with a number besides which ἐξ retains its proper sense, upon which the genitive depends. Thus, Herod. i. 144, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφέων αὐτέων τοὺς γὰρ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀνομήσαντας ἐξεκλήρισαν τῆς μετοχῆς, 'nay, of their own people even, they excluded from an interest (in the temple) those who disregarded the law with respect to the temple;' 'they shut out . . . with respect to, touching, the having a part (in the temple);' Id. ib. καὶ τούτους (τριπόδας ἱκέτους) χρῆν τοὺς λαμβάνοντας ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ μὴ ἐκφέρειν, 'and it as required that those who got these brazen tripods (as prizes) should not carry them out of the temple;' that is, 'out, without, . . . with respect to the temple.'

2. 'Out of,' 'from out.' 'Ex with the genitive case occurs very commonly in connection with verbs of action or motion, and with others of like force, in the sense of 'out of,' 'out from.' Thus (a), with any object, local or other, from out of which an action or motion may proceed: e.g. Il. i. 439, ἐκ δὲ Χρυσῆς νηὸς βῆ ποντοπόροιο, 'the daughter of Crysus went out of (from out) the sea-going ship;' Æsch. Prom. 59, δεινὸς γὰρ εὐρεῖν καὶ ἀμυχάνων πόρους, 'for he is of wonderful power in discovering a way of escape even from out of ills that have no remedy;' Id. Sept. c. Theb. 40, ἦκω σαφῆ τὰκεῖθεν ἐκ στρατοῦ φέρων, 'I am come as the bearer from the army of true intelligence of affairs there;' Id. Pers. 693-4, πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ θαλάσσης, πολλὰ δ' ἐκ χέρσου κακὰ | γίνεται θνητοῖς, 'for many ills befall men from (out of) the sea, and many from (out of) the land;' Xen. Anab. i. 2, 18, ἡ Κίλισσα ἔφυγεν ἐκ τῆς ἄρμαμδεῆς, 'the queen of Cilicia fled from out of her chariot;' Soph. Antig. 437-8, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐκ κακῶν πεφευγέναι | ἤδιστον, 'for the having myself escaped from out of evils is very delightful;' Æsch. Pers. 845-6, ἀλλ' εἰμι, καὶ λαβοῦσα κόσμον ἐκ δόμων | ὑπαντιάσειν παῖδ' ἐμῷ περδάσομαι, 'but I will go, and, taking vesture from out the house (palace), will endeavor to meet my son.' Xen. Cyrop. vi. 3, 15, ὁ μὲν οὖν Κῦρος, ὡς εἶδεν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ τῆς ἑδρας ὑπήντα αὐτῷ, 'Cyrus, then, when he saw him, sprang up from out of his seat, and met him;' Id. Anab. i. 2, 7, αἱ δὲ πηγαὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν ἐκ τῶν βασιλείων, 'its sources are from out of the palace;' that is, the stream flows out from fountains in the palace; Plat. Apol. p. 37, v, καλὸς ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη . . . ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ, 'I would have a reputable life if I should change my abode from one city to another;' that is, 'out of one city into another;' Orat. Att. 1150, 9, ἐκέλευσα τὸν παῖδα καλέσαι, εἰ τινὰς ἴδοι τῶν πολιτῶν παρμόντας, ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ, 'I bade the servant call them (in) from out of the highway, if he saw any of the citizens passing by;' Id. 90, 10, Βυζάντιον ἐξελέσθαι ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν Φιλίππου, 'to rescue Byzantium out of the hands of Philip;' Soph. Phil. 1271, δέχου δὲ χειρὸς ἐξ ἐμῆς βέλη τάδε, 'receive these arrows from (out of) my hands.'

In all these, and like examples, the preposition derives from the action or motion with which it is conjoined, and

of which it is the qualification, an addition to its proper sense, so that instead of the simple sense of 'out,' 'without,' it has that of 'out of,' 'from out;' or, at least, if this be too much to say, this additional idea of 'from' is suggested by the conjunction of the preposition *ἐκ* with an action or motion; and the genitive follows the action or motion, as qualified by the preposition, in the sense of 'with respect to.' Thus, in the first example cited, *ἐκ δὲ Χρυσεΐς νηὸς βῆ*, 'Cryseis went out, or from out, the ship,' the sense is, 'Cryseis went out, or from out, . . . with respect to the ship,' the genitive being added to show that the 'going out from' is to be understood specifically of the ship, and of nothing else.

b. *Ἐκ* with the genitive case is used, in the same way, with a noun that denotes a number or class of objects from which one or more are described as separated or selected: e.g. Soph. Œd. Col. 70, *ἀρ' ἄν τις αὐτῷ πομπὸς ἐξ ὑμῶν μόλοι*; 'will, then, any one of you (that is, out of your number) go and bring him?' Id. Electr. 1343, *ὅν ποτ' ἐκ πολλῶν ἐγὼ μόνον προσεῦρον πιστόν*, 'whom alone, out of many, I found faithful'; Id. Aj. 736-7, *ἐκ γὰρ συνέδρου καὶ τυραννικοῦ κύκλου | Κάλχας μεταστάς*, 'Calchas having removed him from the royal council,' of which he was one; Id. Antig. 164, *πόμποισιν ἐκ πάντων δίχα ἔσται* 'by a messenger for you to come apart from all,' that is, 'from out of all'; Id. Œd. Col. 746, *ἐκ δὲ τῶν μάλιστα ἐγώ*, 'and of them, of their number, I above all'; Orat. Att. 24, 12, *δέκα ἄνδρες ἐκ πάντων Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἡρέθησαν*, 'ten men, out of all the Athenians, were chosen ambassadors'; that is, 'ten men were chosen out . . . with respect to the Athenians.' Compare the genitive as used with the superlative degree. And so with regard to numbers: e.g. Plat. Gorg. p. 500, *Α, σύμφηφος ἡμῖν εἰ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τριῶν*; 'are you voting with us as a third one?' properly, 'of, out of, the class of those called three?' 'If you vote with us, the number of us voting together will be three: do you too vote with us, and are you thus to be referred to the number or denomination of three?' 'Do you, by voting with us, make a third party to the vote?'

Of the same nature is the use of *ἐκ* with the genitive case

to mark a number or class of objects from which one is taken or selected, and so distinguished above the rest, where in English we use 'of,' 'above.' E.g. Il. iv. 96, above cited, *ἐκ πάντων δὲ μάλιστα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βασιλῇ*, 'and especially of all, or above all, to prince Alexander'; Soph. Antig. 1137-8, *τὰν ἐκ πασῶν | τιμῆς ὑπερτάταν πόλεων*, '(Thebes) which you honor most highly above all cities;' that is, 'which one, out of all cities, you honor most highly.'

c. Besides the above instances, *ἐκ*, in the sense of 'out of,' 'from out,' is used with the genitive case in a variety of applications that involve, some more, some less obscurely, this meaning of the preposition, and that have uniformly the genitive employed in its common signification of 'with respect to.' Thus:

a.) To express the origin, source, cause, or means of any action or state. In this way *ἐκ* and the genitive are used with *εἶναι*, *γίγνεσθαι*, *φύναι*, to denote the stock or parentage from which a person is sprung: e.g. Il. xv. 187, *τρεις γὰρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφοί, οὓς τέκετο Ῥέα*, 'for we are three brothers, sprung from Kronos, whom Rhea bore'; Herod. i. 56, *οὐδ' ὢν αὐτὸς, οὐδὲ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, παύσεσθαι ποτε τῆς ἀρχῆς*, 'that, therefore, neither himself, nor those descended from him, would ever cease to reign'; Id. vii. 11, *μὴ γὰρ εἴην ἐκ Δαρείου . . . μὴ τιμωρησάμενος Ἀθηναίους*, 'for, may I not be the son of Darius, if I take not vengeance on the Athenians'; Æsch. S. c. Theb. 128, *σέθεν γὰρ ἐξ αἵματος γεγονάμεν*, 'for we are descended from your race.' And, more generally, *ἐκ* is used with a noun in the genitive case to express the source, cause, or motive to which any thing is attributed. E.g. Il. xvii. 101, *ἐπεὶ ἐκ θεόφιν πολεμίζει*, 'since he fights moved by a god'; that is, 'his fighting proceeds from, or has its source or motive in, a god'; Herod. ii. 64, *τὴν δὲ πανήγυριν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦδε νομίσαι φασὶ οἱ ἐπιχώριοι*, 'the natives say that this celebration is customary from the following cause'; Æsch. Suppl. 889, *ἐκ ποίου φρονήματος | . . . τήνδ' ἀτιμάζεις χθόνα*; 'from what purpose do you put dishonor upon this land?' Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 4, *ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἐθανατώθη ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ τελεῶν*, 'for this cause, in fact, he was condemned to death'; Id. ib. vi. 4, 11, *ἐξ οὗ καὶ*

διέβαλεν αὐτὸν ὁ Δέξιππος, 'for which reason, in fact, Dexippus accused him.'

β.) So, likewise, is *ἐκ* with the genitive case employed to express the agent from whom an action proceeds: e.g. *Æsch. Prom.* 761, *ἐκ Διὸς πάσχω κακῶς*, 'I am ill treated by Zeus;' *Herod.* iii. 14, τὸ ποιούμενον πᾶν ἐξ ἐκείνου, 'every thing that was done by him.' And, by an easy transition, the same preposition and case express also the means or instrument by which an action is performed, it being regarded as the source whence this springs. E.g. *Æsch. Agam.* 1472-3, *δολίῳ μὲν δαμείς | ἐκ χειρὸς ἀμφετόμῳ βελέμῳ*, 'destroyed by a treacherous fate with the hand by a two-edged dart.' Here, *ἐκ χειρὸς*, though it may be rendered 'with the hand,' properly qualifies *ἀμφετόμῳ βελέμῳ*, the meaning being, 'by a two-edged dart from out the hand.' Similar is the example in *Æsch. Agam.* 529, ὥς πόλλ' ἀμαυρῶς ἐκ φρενὸς μ' ἀναστένειν, 'so that I greatly lament with a troubled heart,' where *ἐκ φρενὸς* denotes the source from which the distress expressed by *ἀναστένειν* proceeds.

γ.) And, lastly, *ἐκ* with the genitive is used, in the same way, to denote the material out of which any thing is formed. E.g. *Herod.* i. 194, οὐκ ἐκ ξύλων ποιεῦνται τὰ πλοῖα, 'they do not make their boats of (out of) wood;' *Id.* ii. 71, it is said that the hide (*δέρμα*) of the hippopotamus is so thick that, when dried, they make spear-points of it, ὥστε . . . ξυστὰ ποιεῖσθαι ἀκόντια ἐξ αὐτοῦ. *Æsch. Suppl.* 931, πίνοντας ἐκ χριδῶν μέθυ, 'drinking wine made of barley (ale).'

δ. 'Ex with the genitive is employed, in a kindred sense, to mark, in a variety of relations, the object or space from which any action or event, or any measure of extent, takes its commencement, the preposition having the force of 'out of,' and the genitive its common meaning of 'with respect to.' Thus:

α.) In giving the extent to which an action reaches, the preposition *ἐκ* with the genitive case is used to mark the place from which it begins: e.g. *Il.* xxiii. 168-9, . . . ἐκάλυψε νέκυν μετὰ θυμὸς Ἀχιλλεύς | ἐς πόδας ἐκ κεφαλῆς, 'Achilles

covered the dead body from the head to the feet.' The idea conveyed by *ἐκ* with the genitive, in such an example, is seemingly nothing more than that of the point from which the action or motion proceeds, and is sufficiently expressed in English by 'from;' but the proper notion was, no doubt, that of the object or space from out of which, as from its source, the action or motion was conceived as taking its rise. In some cases this proper sense of *ἐκ* with the genitive is more readily admitted, although, perhaps, not more certainly present than in the example above cited, namely, where the object from out of which an action or motion proceeds, or from which it is considered as beginning, is such as manifestly to include the notion of space, whether local or relating to time. Thus, *Herod.* ix. 8, ἐξ ἡμέρης ἐς ἡμέρην ἀναβαλλόμενοι, 'putting it off from day to day,' literally, 'out of a day into a day,' or 'out of one day into another;' *Plat. Apol.* p. 37, D, καλὸς ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη . . . ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλειω ἀμειβομένῳ, 'if I changed from one city to another,' literally, 'if I passed from out of one city to another.'

β.) In regard to the period of time from which an event is reckoned or dated, the preposition *ἐκ* with the genitive case is used to denote the space in time from which the event described is considered as taking its commencement. E.g. *Æsch. Pers.* 748, ἐξ οὔτε τιμὴν Ζεὺς ἀναξ τήνδ' ὤπασεν, 'from the time that Zeus bestowed this honor,' *ex quo Jupiter hunc honorem contulit*; *Id. Eumenid.* 274, πολλὺς δέ μοι γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγος, 'long would be my story (if I should tell it) from the beginning;' *Id. Pers.* 774-5, πῶς ἂν ἐκ τούτων ἔτι | πράσσοιμεν ὡς ἀριστα; 'how, from this time, henceforth, shall we best prosper?' *Xen. Cyrop.* i. 5, 7, ἐκ παιδῶν ὄρων ὀμῶς, 'because I saw you from boyhood.' To this place ought, probably, to be referred the passage in *Xen. Anab.* i. 8, 14, where, after stating that the barbarian army was advancing in an even line, the writer adds, τὸ δ' Ἑλληνικὸν, ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένον, συνετάττετο ἐκ τῶν ἔτι προσόντων, 'the Greek army, remaining in the same position, drew up in order of battle while they (the enemy) were still advancing,' properly, 'from the time that they were still ad-

vancing,' or 'counting from the time that they were still advancing.' But the interpretation, with the present reading, is attended by almost insuperable difficulty. The use of *ἐκ* and the genitive in this and the immediately preceding set of examples having the same interpretation, it is needless to repeat here what has been already said with regard to it.

A construction very similar to that of *ἐκ* with the genitive just considered, and probably identical with it, is that of *ἐκ νυκτός*, 'by night,' or 'in the night,' *ἐκ τῶν νυκτῶν*, 'by night,' or 'in the night:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 4, 2, καὶ γὰρ ἐκ νυκτὸς εἴ τινας δέοιτο Ἀστυάγης, 'for, besides, if Astyages wanted any thing in the night;' Id. viii. 5, 12, ὅπως καὶ ἐκ τῶν νυκτῶν, εἰ δέοι τι, ἀκοντίζοιεν, 'in order that, in the night-time also, should there be any need, they might throw darts.' The sense expressed by *ἐκ νυκτός*, *ἐκ τῶν νυκτῶν*, is not very widely different from that conveyed by the simple genitive *νυκτός*, 'by night;' but it arises differently. It may be properly compared with the expression *ἐξ ἀριστερῆς*, or *ἐξ ἀριστερῆς χειρός*, (Herod. vii. 115,) 'on the left hand,' frequently used in marking position in space. In the case of *ἐξ ἀριστερῆς*, and so of other such examples, it is hardly to be doubted that the position of an object is defined, not simply by naming the place at or in which it stands, that is, by the ablative of place or by *ἐν* and the ablative of place, nor yet by referring it to a denomination of space to which it belongs, which would be done by the genitive alone, as is seen in the adverbs *οὗ*, 'where,' *ποῦ*, 'where?' and, for expressions of time, in *νυκτός*, 'by night;' but by marking a space as that from out of which it looks, as it were, or from out of which it has a direction or aspect towards the person or thing with regard to which its position is to be determined. It differs from the ordinary mode of denoting the relative position of an object by taking as the point of view the space to which the position is referred, instead of the person or thing with regard to which the position is to be marked. When it is said of the army of Xerxes, Herod. vii. 115, ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ κόλπον . . . ἐξ ἀριστερῆς χειρὸς ἔχων ἦεν διὰ Συλέως πεδίου καλεομένου, 'thence it went through a plain

called Syleus, having the gulf on the left hand,' the position of the gulf relatively to the Persian army is defined by stating it to be *ἐξ ἀριστερῆς χειρός*, 'from out the left hand,' that is, 'looking from out, having its direction or aspect from out, the left hand;' and this direction or aspect is towards the object with reference to which the position is to be defined, namely, the Persian army. The gulf, instead of being represented as 'on the left hand,' the Persian army being the point of view, is described as looking or having its direction 'from out the left hand,' the space or note of direction called 'the left hand' being the point of view. Compare *ἀπό* with the genitive, and the Latin *ab* with the ablative, used in nearly the same sense, both having the same point of view in marking position that *ἐκ* with the genitive has, and differing from it only in the manner of noting the direction from the point of view towards the object of reference; *ἀπό* and *ab* marking a direction 'from,' *ἐκ* a direction 'from out,' 'out of.' Now, admitting this explanation of the mode in which *ἐκ* with the genitive case defines local position, it is easy to see how the same preposition with the same case is employed to mark the time of an action by referring it to a denomination of time. As *ἐξ ἀριστερῆς*, or *ἐξ ἀριστερῆς χειρός*, Herod. vii. 115, marks the position of *κόλπος*, so *ἐκ νυκτός*, or *ἐκ τῶν νυκτῶν*, describes the period of time to which an action, as *ἀκοντίζειν*, 'to throw with the dart,' is referred: as the former represents the gulf as being 'on the left hand,' so the latter represents the throwing of darts as being 'in the night;' and the way in which the definition of position is made is plainly the same in both cases. It may be added, that *ἐκ τῶν νυκτῶν* differs from *ἐκ νυκτός*, both being rendered by 'in the night,' or 'by night,' by its implying, through the plural form, the repetition of the action of which the time is defined by the preposition *ἐκ* and the genitive, and its occurrence in or on more nights than one. Compare with the use of *ἐκ νυκτός* and *ἐκ τῶν νυκτῶν*, in the examples above cited, Herod. v. 106, ὅρα μὴ ἐξ ὕστερης σεωυτὸν ἐν αὐτῇ σῆλῃς, 'beware lest you afterwards blame yourself;' and Id. i. 108, . . . μὴδὲ

ἐμέ τε παραβῆλῃ, καὶ ἄλλους ἐλόμενος, ἐξ ὑστέρης σοὶ ἐνωτῷ περὶ πύγῃς, 'do not afterwards fall into your own snare.'

γ.) In like manner, *ἐκ* with the genitive is used to mark the point of attachment of an object, as, ἀνὰ πτεσθαὶ ἐκ τινος, 'to suspend from,' or 'to fasten to a thing;' e.g. Od. xii. 51, ἐκ δ' αὐτοῦ πείραται ἀνήφθω, 'and to it let ropes be fastened;' literally, 'let ropes be suspended from, from out of, it;' Ib. viii. 67, καὶ δ' ἐκ πασσαλόφει κρέμασεν φόρμηγγα λίγειαν, 'and down from the nail hung his loud-sounding lyre;' Herod. ix. 74, ἐκ τοῦ ζωστήρος τοῦ θώρηκος ἐφόρεε χαλκῆν ἄλυσιν δεδεμένον ἀγκυρίων σιδηρέην, 'he wore (suspended) from the belt of his breastplate an iron anchor made fast with a chain of brass.' Compare also the phrase ἐκ χειρὸς λαμβάνεσθαι, 'to take hold of by the hand.' (See Passow's Lex. s. v.) Here, as already explained, the sense of *ἐκ* is sufficiently expressed in practice by the English 'from;' but the Greeks seem to have regarded the object suspended as in some sort proceeding from, or having its direction from, the thing to which it is attached, the genitive having its ordinary sense of 'with respect to;' or, which is nearly the same thing, they may have regarded the preposition with the genitive as being used here, as in the case of ἐξ ἀριστερῶς, 'on the left hand,' to mark the object to which the thing suspended is referred for its position.

δ.) 'On,' 'in.' *Ἐκ* with the genitive is employed in other cases also to mark the object to which, as to a point of the compass, any thing is referred for its position; as where it is rendered in English by 'on,' 'in.' E.g. Od. xxi. 420, αὐτόθεν ἐκ δίφροιο καθήμενος, 'sitting there on, or in, the seat of the chariot;' Il. xiv. 154, στῆσ' ἐξ Οὐλύμπιοι ἀπὸ ῥίου, 'standing on Olympus, on its summit;' Soph. Antig. 411, καθήμεθ' ἀκρων ἐκ πάγων ὑπήμενοι, 'we sat on the top of the hill, yet sheltered from the wind;' Xen. Cyrop. viii. 5, 15, εἴ τις φάλαγγα δύναται, ἢ ἐκ δεξιῶς ἢ ἐξ ἀριστερῶς ἢ ὀπισθεν ἐπιφανέντων τῶν πολεμίων, ὀρθῶς ἐξελεῖσθαι, 'if a person should be able to deploy a phalanx properly, if the enemy appeared either on the right hand, or on the left hand, or on the rear;' Id. Anab. i. 8, 23, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ἐμάρχετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, 'and when no one fought against him,' properly,

'when no one fought with him over against, on the opposite side, face to face;' Id. ib. i. 10, 11, οἱ δ' αὖ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, ἀλλ' ἐκ πλείονος ἢ τὸ πρόσθεν ἐφευγον, 'the barbarians did not await them, but fled even at a greater distance than before.' It has been already sufficiently explained above, that *ἐκ* with the genitive, in such examples, marks the position of an object by referring to some space or object from which it has a direction or looks out, as it were, towards the person or thing with regard to which its position is defined; and that the peculiarity in this mode of describing the position of an object relatively to another is, that the space or object to which the position is referred, instead of the person or thing with regard to which the position is to be defined, is made the point of view. Reference was also made to the like use of ἀπὸ with the genitive in Greek, and of *ab* and *ex* or *e* with the ablative in Latin; and to the fact that πρὸς with the genitive is used contrariwise, namely, when the object with regard to which the position of an object is defined is made the point of view.

ε. 'After,' 'from,' 'in consequence of,' 'in accordance with.' *Ἐκ* with the genitive case is used in the sense of 'after,' 'from,' 'in consequence of,' 'in accordance with,' these significations being referred properly to the preposition itself, and being derived from that of 'out of,' as already explained when the meanings of the preposition itself were under consideration, and the genitive having its common signification of 'with respect to.' Thus:

α.) 'After.' With regard to time, *ἐκ* with the genitive is used to denote a period after which the event defined is represented as occurring, and is translated in English by 'after.' E.g. Il. xvi. 364-5, ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἀπ' Οὐλύμπου νέφος ἔρχεται οὐρανὸν εἶσω, | αἰθέρος ἐκ διγς, 'after a clear sky;' Xen. Anab. i. 3, 13, ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἀνίσταντο, 'after this they arose;' Æsch. Eum. 2, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Θέμιν, 'and after her, Themis;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 1, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου μετεπέμψατο Ἀστυάγης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρα, 'after this time Astyages sent for his daughter;' Id. ib. i. 2, 8, ἐκ τούτου δὲ εἰς τοὺς ἐφηβους ἐξέρχονται, 'after this they pass into the class of the ephebi.'

β.) 'After,' 'upon.' With regard to any occasion after

which an event is mentioned as occurring, *ἐκ* with the genitive is used, and is expressed in English by 'after,' 'upon.' E.g. Herod. i. 86, ἀναστενδῆντα ἐκ πολλῆς ἡσυχίης, ἐς τρίς ὀνομάσαι Σόλωνα, 'that after a long silence he groaned aloud and thrice pronounced the name of Solon;' Id. i. 50, ὡς δὲ ἐκ τῆς θυσίης ἐγένετο, 'and when he came from sacrificing,' 'after sacrificing;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 4, 28, ἐνταῦθα δὴ τὸν Κύρου γελάσαι ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν δακρύων, 'that hereupon, now, Cyrus laughed after his previous tears;' Id. ib. iii. 1, 40, φιλοφρονηθέντες ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἐκ συναλλαγῆς, 'showing mutual kindness, as was likely to happen, after their reconciliation;' Id. Econ. 9, 1, ἐξ ἀμυχανίας εὐπορίαν τινὰ εὐρηκυῖα, 'as she had found out some way of escape after inextricable difficulties;' Id. de. re Equ. vii. 17, ἐπειδὴν γε μὴν ἐκ τῆς στροφῆς εἰς τὸ εὐθὺ βλέπη ὁ ἵππος, 'whenever the horse, after turning, looks right forward;' Id. ib. § 18, (ἀγαθὸν) καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος αὐτῷ ὡς ἐγγυτάτω ἡρεμίζειν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐστάναι δὲ στρέψαντα δεῖ πάλιν ὀρμῆν, 'it is well, also, to bring the horse to a halt again, after being at speed, in the nearest (shortest) possible distance, and, after he stands, to turn him, and urge him forward again.'

γ.) 'From,' 'after.' Of the same character precisely is the case in which *ἐκ* with the genitive is employed to denote that from which a change has been made to something else, expressed in English by 'from,' 'after.' E.g. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 454, τυφλὸς γὰρ ἐκ δεδορκότος, 'for he is blind after having his sight,' or 'from seeing he is blind;' Id. Trach. 283, ἐξ ὀλβίων δαζήλον εὐρουῖσαι βίον, 'after prosperity having found a life of misery;' Æsch. Pers. 293, καὶ λευκὸν ἥμαρ νυκτὸς ἐκ μελαγχίμου, 'a joyous day after a night of gloom.'

δ.) 'From,' 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of,' 'in pursuance of,' 'in accordance with,' 'according to.' 'Ex with the genitive case is used in the significations just recited, to mark, namely, that upon which any thing follows as its result, as its natural or rational sequence, or as being in just accordance with it. E.g. Æsch. Agam. 101, ἐκ θυσιῶν ἀγανά φάινουσ' ἐλπίς, 'a joyous hope appearing in consequence of sacrifices;' Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 4, ἐκ τούτου, 'hereupon;' Id. ib. vi. 4, 11, ἐξ οὗ, 'wherefore;' Id. ib. i. 9, 19, ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου, 'in pursu-

ance of right,' 'from motives of right;' Id. ib. iv. 2, 23, ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν, 'according to our means;' Orat. Att. 152, 17, τυγχάνειν τῆς ἐκ τῶν νόμων τιμωρίας, 'to meet with punishment in accordance with the laws;' Xen. Anab. vi. 2, 7, ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς, 'from design,' 'designedly,' *ex consullo*; Orat. Att. 463, 4, τῶν πολιτῶν μηδένα ἐκ τρηραρχίας ὑπάρχειν ἀτελεῖ, 'that no one of the citizens should be exempt from contributions by reason of having been a trierarch;' Id. 50, 20, προδότης ἐκ φύσεως, 'a traitor by nature,' that is, 'from,' 'in accordance with his nature.'

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *ἐκ* WITH ITS CASE.

Significations of <i>ἐκ</i> .	Genitive: 'with respect to.'
1. 'Out,' 'without.'	1. 'Outside of,' 'without,' 'out of the reach of.'
2. 'Out of,' 'from out.'	2. 'Out of,' 'from out.'
	a. Of space; 'out of,' 'from out,' 'from.'
	b. Of a class; 'out of,' 'from out;'
	(in comparison;) 'of,' 'above.'
	c. Of origin, source, &c.; 'of,' 'from.'
	d. 'From' (out of):
	a. Of space; 'from.'
	β. Of time; 'from,' 'in.'
	γ. Of the point of attachment; 'from,' 'by.'
	δ. Of an object to which position is referred;
	'on,' 'in; Lat. <i>e</i> , <i>ex</i> .
	e. 'After,' 'in consequence of,' &c.
	a. Of time; 'after.'
	β. Of any occasion; 'after,' 'upon.'
	γ. Of cause, reason, &c.; 'from,' 'in consequence of,' 'by reason of,' 'in pursuance of,' 'in accordance with,' 'according to.'

'Ev.

'Ev, having a poetic form ἐνί, the epic and poetic form εἰν, and that of εἰνί, which is epic, has the same radical with εἰς. The difference of form caused by the addition of the final *ς* in εἰς (ἐν + *ς*) has not been satisfactorily accounted for, so far as the writer is aware. Assuming ἐν, which is the same with the Latin and English *in*, and with the German *ein*, to be the original as it is the simpler form, the difficulty is to give the true origin and value of the *ς* in εἰς. Εἰν is only another form of ἐν in which the *ε* has been lengthened in the same way with *ο* in εὐδαίμων. In εἰνί the final *ι* may be the same that occurs in οὐτυσί, τουτυσί, and which is under-

stood to be a demonstrative; or it may be the sign of the locativus. Although the former seems more probable, it is a matter of doubt. (See Liddell and Scott's Lexicon.)

Significations of ἐν.

1. *a. 'In,' 'within.'* The proper signification of ἐν is 'in,' 'within,' opposed to ἐξ, 'out,' 'without,' with the idea of relative position within a space having boundaries. Thus, ἐνοικεῖν, 'to dwell in or within,' ἐμβάλλειν, 'to cast in,' ἐμβαίνειν, 'to step in;' and so with many examples with nouns, as, ἐν οἴκῳ εἶναι, 'to be in a house.' In the same way, not only with regard to a circumscribed space, but of any object, state, or circumstance admitting the notion of a thing being within it or invested by it, as, ἐν ἐσθῆτι, 'in a garment,' ἐν ὅπλοις, 'in or under arms,' ἐν πολέμῳ, 'in war,' ἐν ὀργῇ, 'in anger.'

b. 'Among.' Hence, when ἐν is joined with a noun expressing a number of objects admitting the idea of another being involved in them or encompassed by them, it obtains the sense of 'among,' as, ἐν προμάχοις, 'among the foremost combatants,' ἐν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνδρώποισι, 'among both gods and men.'

c. 'With.' In a number of examples ἐν appears to have the sense of 'with,' or to mark the instrument; as, ἐν χερσὶ λαβεῖν, 'to take with the hands:' e.g. Il. xv. 229, ἀλλὰ σύγ' ἐν χεῖρεσσι λάβ' αἰγίδα θυσσανόεσσαν. But, in such examples, the idea of 'in,' 'within,' is certainly to be attached to ἐν, notwithstanding the rendering in English may properly enough be made by 'with.' (See Passow's Lex.)

d. 'On,' 'at,' 'near.' In some cases ἐν seems to be used without having the notion of 'in,' 'within,' but so as to denote position in a more general way, in the sense of 'at,' 'on,' 'near;' as, ἐν οὐρεσι, 'on the mountains,' ἐν κορυφῇσι, 'on the summits,' ἐν ἵπποις, 'on horses,' ἐν ποταμῷ, 'at the river.' E.g. Il. xviii. 520-1, οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἱκονον ὄδι σφίσιν εἶπε λοχῆσαι, | ἐν ποταμῷ; Herod. i. 76, κατὰ Σινώπην πόλιν τὴν ἐν Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ μάλιστα κη χεϊμένη, 'situated on the Euxine sea,' said of the position of Pterie; Id. ix. 81, ὅσα μὲν νυν . . . ἐν Πλαταιῇσι ἐδόθη, 'the presents made at Plataeæ;' and so

Id. ib. 100 and 101, the latter chapter having ἐν τῇ Πλαταιίδι, 'in the district of Plataeæ,' instead of ἐν Πλαταιῇσι, 'at or near Plataeæ;' Il. v. 370, ἐν γούνασι πίπτε, 'fell on her knees.' (See Passow's Lex., and Schweigh. Lex. Herod. s. v.)

In some of these and such examples it is more than possible to admit for ἐν its proper signification of 'in,' 'within,' as in ἐν οὐρεσι, 'on the mountains,' where the sense may just as well be 'in the mountains,' and so in ἐν κορυφῇσι the meaning is either 'in' or 'on the summits.' But in others this can hardly be admitted, at least without some explanation. 'Εν ἵπποις ἰέναι cannot mean 'to go in horses;' and so, in the example cited from the Iliad, ἐν ποταμῷ does not bear the sense of 'in the river' consistently with the description of which it forms a part, that, namely, of an ambush by a river. Two explanations of this difficulty seem to present themselves. First, the preposition ἐν may be considered to have entirely lost its proper force, the locative sense of the ablative case prevailing so far as to make the preposition of no appreciable value; just as κατὰ, in κατ' οἶκον, 'at home,' and other phrases, seems to have been absorbed in the meaning of the accusative case. But this, even allowing it to be true, so far as it goes, is hardly complete and satisfactory, since it in no way accounts for the presence of ἐν, as may be done for κατὰ in the case mentioned, and in all similar ones; for if it be said that ἐν is employed ordinarily to mark the more exact relation of position 'within,' but is occasionally used in a more general way to denote position without the notion of 'within' being involved, it is only repeating the statement of the apparent fact without any explanation. Secondly, it may be that ἐν has a second and distinct sense, that of 'on,' corresponding both in signification and in form to the English 'on' and the German *an*. And this would seem to be confirmed by the use of the Latin *in*, in the same way with the Greek ἐν, in the sense of 'on;' as in the compound *instare*, 'to press on,' properly, 'to stand upon,' and in such phrases as *in equo sedere*, 'to sit on a horse.' But here, again, the explanation is attended with serious difficulties. If ἐν, Latin *in*, seem to correspond to the English 'on' in such instances as have been mentioned,

it nevertheless differs essentially in its general sense; and this makes it more probable that this occasional coincidence of meaning between *ἐν* and 'on' is owing to something else than a common origin. And as to the confirmation derived from the like use of the Latin *in*, it amounts to this, and no more, that with regard to both the Greek *ἐν* and the Latin *in* alike there is required an explanation of the fact that the preposition regularly used to mark a more specific relative position, namely, that of being 'within' a defined limit, is here employed where apparently no such reference is had to a circumscribed space. Pott, (Etym. Forsch. i. p. 151,) rejecting this explanation, assumes that, in Latin, *in equo* may be used in an accommodated sense, and understood to mean 'within the space of the horse's back.' And his interpretation, although manifestly incomplete, may, in a very partial sense, be admitted to be true. For the Latin *in* and the Greek *ἐν* are not confined to marking the relative position of 'within' with regard to space and time merely, but have this office with reference also to any condition or set of circumstances that may invest a person or action. If we say in Greek *ἐν ὀργῇ εἶναι*, 'to be in a state of anger,' the proper force of the preposition is no more difficult to see than in the proposition *ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἐτελεύτησέν*, 'he died in the island.' Even the phrase *ἐν σοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν*, Soph. Œd. Tyr. 314, 'for we depend on you,' that is, for our salvation, 'we are in your hands,' although more difficult, may readily be seen to employ the preposition in the same way; only the expression is to be taken figuratively. It is not intended to be said literally that we, that is, as regards our salvation, are 'in' or 'within you,' but that, as regards our salvation, we are in certain circumstances or in a certain condition, namely, in the circumstances or condition expressed by whatever is embraced in the term *σοί*, and that is your ability and willingness to save, the person being employed for the properties belonging to him and that may be the ground of confidence for those seeking safety. So that, as a man's dying is defined in a material point, its place, by saying that it occurred *ἐν τῇ νήσῳ*, 'in, within, the island,' so the term *ἐσμεν*, 'we are,' meaning in regard to our sal-

vation, is defined in a material point, namely, the circumstances or condition in which the persons speaking stand, by the addition of *ἐν σοί*, 'in you,' that is, we are in the circumstances or condition afforded by your personal qualities, your ability and willingness to save. This is expressed in English by the phrase 'we are in your hands.' In a word, *ἐν* with a noun marks, as above said, any condition or set of circumstances that may surround an object, and the preposition indicates merely that an object is 'within' the circumstances or condition suggested by the noun. This being so, it is easily to be admitted that *ἐν τῇ Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ*, 'on (in) the Euxine sea,' Herod. i. 76, marks merely the circumstances, as to its position, in which the town of Sinope stands; that *ἐν ἵπποις ἰέναι*, 'to go on horse,' describes the condition, as to position and mode of conveyance, in which the act of going is performed; that *ἐν Πλαταιῇσι*, 'at Plataeæ,' employed by Herodotus, ix. 100, to describe the site of the battle fought at or near the town of Plataeæ, sets forth the circumstances of the battle, as regards its place, not by confining it literally 'within' Plataeæ, but by referring it to whatever may be understood, in such a connection, when the description of a battle is concerned, as comprised in this term; just as *ἐν σοί* means, as above shown, not literally 'within you,' but 'in your ability and willingness to save.' Herodotus, by employing in the same narrative, ix. 101, and with reference to the same transaction, the terms *ἐν Πλαταιῇσι*, 'at (in) Plataeæ,' and *ἐν τῇ Πλαταιίδι*, 'in the district of Plataeæ,' as equivalent, has shown clearly that the former expression is to be interpreted in the way here suggested. In the Latin phrase *in equo sedere*, 'to sit on horse,' *in equo* does not describe literally the space within which one sits, that formed by the horse's back, any more than it does the limit formed by the horse's body, but shows that the sitting is to be considered as having certain circumstances or conditions, namely, those furnished by a horse used for riding. The conclusion is that, while in a variety of examples *ἐν* is properly rendered by 'on,' 'at,' 'near,' it should not be understood as having assumed to itself the ideas of superposition and proximity which these words express, but as

retaining its own proper sense of 'in' or 'within,' and, by virtue of it, marking with its noun the circumstances or condition in which an action occurs or a person is placed.

Summary of the significations of ἐν.

'Εν. 1. a. 'In,' 'within.'

b. 'Among.'

c. 'With:' (not proper to the preposition.)

d. 'On,' 'at,' 'near.'

Signification and use of ἐν with its case.

1. 'In,' 'within.' 'Εν is used with the ablative (locativus) alone, and with it marks the space 'within' which an action occurs or an object stands. This sense is expressed in English by 'in,' 'within.' Thus:

a. 'In,' 'within.' 'Εν, in the sense of 'in,' 'within,' is used with the name of any space or object within the compass of which a thing may be placed: e.g. Il. xviii. 26-7, αὐτὸς δ' ἐν κονίῃσι μέγας μεγαλωστί τανυσθεὶς | κείτο, 'he lay outstretched in the dust;' Il. ii. 461-2, Ἀσίῃ ἐν λειμῶνι Κῶυστρίῳ ἀμφὶ βέεθρα | ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ποτῶνται, 'they fly to and fro in the Asian meadow;' Il. i. 592-3, πᾶν δ' ἡμᾶρ φερόμεν, ἄμα δ' ἡελίῳ καταδύντι | κάππεσον ἐν Δήμῳ, 'with the setting sun I fell in Lemnos;' where, it may be observed, the later language would employ εἰς with the accusative, 'I fell into Lemnos;' Il. iii. 33-34, ὥς δ' ὅτε τίς τε δρᾶκοντα ἰδὼν καλίνυρσος ἀπέστη | ὄρεος ἐν βήσσῃς, 'in the valleys of the mountain;' Xen. Anab. i. 1, 7, ἐν Μιλήτῳ δ' ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε τοὺς δ' ἐξέβαλεν, 'in Miletus Tissaphernes slew some and banished others.'

b. 'In,' 'within.' 'Εν is used also with the ablative case to mark the period of time 'in' or 'within' which an event happens: e.g. Il. ii. 469-71, ἥδ' ὅτε μυκᾶν ἀδινῶν ἔθνεα πολλὰ, | αἶτε κατὰ σταδμῶν ποικυλῆϊον ἡλάσκουσιν | ὥρῃ ἐν εἰαρινῇ, 'that fly about in the spring-time;' Orat. Att. 72, 1, κατατιθέναι χρήματα ἐν ῥητῷ χρόνῳ, 'to make a deposit of money in (within) the time appointed;' Æsch. Pers. 487, νυκτὶ δ' ἐν ταύτῃ θεὸς | χειμῶν δῶρον ὤρσε, 'in this night god raised an untimely storm;' Id. Agam. 943, θάλασσα μὲν ἐν χειμῶνι σιμαίνεσθαι

μολῶν, 'by coming you give notice of heat in winter;' Soph. Phil. 234-5, . . . φεῦ τὸ καὶ λαβεῖν | πρόσφθεγμα τοιοῦτο ἀνδρὸς ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ, 'ah me! even to have the opportunity of speaking with such a man in a long space of time;' Id. Œd. Tyr. 615, κακὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἡμέρᾳ γνῶις μὲν, 'one might perchance discover a bad man in a single day;' Id. ib. 613, ἀλλ' ἐν χρόνῳ γνῶσει τὰδ' ἀσφαλῶς, 'but in time you will know this certainly;' Xen. Anab. iv. 2, 19, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο στράτευμα παρῆι, 'while the rest of the army was passing by;' Id. ib. i. 10, 6, ἐν τούτῳ βασιλεὺς πᾶν δῆλος ἦν προσιών, 'meantime it was plain that the king was approaching;' Id. ib. iii. 1, 1, ὅσα . . . ἐγένετο . . . ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς, 'all that occurred in the period of the truce.'

c. 'In,' 'with.' 'Εν is further used with a noun in the ablative (locativus) case to mark any object, circumstance, state, or condition in which any thing is represented as placed: e.g. Il. i. 333, αὐτὰρ ὁ ἔγνω ἦσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ, φώνησέν τε, 'but he knew it in his mind, and said;' Ib. 373, στέμματ' ἔχων ἐν χερσὶν ἐκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος, 'having in his hands,' or 'holding with his hands the garlands of far-shooting Apollo;' Xen. Anab. i. 3, 21, ὅτι δὲ ἐπὶ βασιλεῦς ἄγει οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα ἤκουσεν οὐδεὶς ἐν γὰρ τῷ φανερωῖ, 'but that he was leading them against the king no one heard, even then, publicly at least;' Id. Memorab. ii. 1, 32, ἐγὼ δὲ (ἀρετῇ) ἀγαθὴ μὲν συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, βεβαιοὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ σύμμαχος ἔργων, 'I (virtue) am a good helper in the labors of (in) peace, and a steady ally in the deeds of (in) war;' Id. ib. iii. 11, 4, ὁρῶν μητέρα παρούσαν ἐν ἐσθῆτι καὶ θεραπείᾳ οὐ τῇ τυχοῦσῃ, 'seeing a mother in (with) no common dress and retinue;' Id. Cyrop. i. 2, 2, ἐκπαυδύθη ἐν Περσῶν νόμοις, 'he was educated in the customs of the Persians;' Soph. Trach. 585, εἴ τις ἐστὶ πίστις ἐν τοῖς δρωμένοις, 'if there is any reliance to be placed in what is done by you;' Id. Œd. Col. 799, ἐν δὲ τῷ λέγειν | καὶ ἂν λάβοις τὰ πλείον' ἢ σωτήρια, 'in (by) speaking you will perchance get more evil than means of safety;' Id. Œd. Col. 1360, ὅτ' ἐν πόνῳ ταῦτ' ὅτε βεβηκώς τυγχάνεις, 'when you chance to be in the same trouble.'

d. 'In the hands of,' 'depending on.' To the class of examples just mentioned might properly be referred those in

which *ἐν* with the ablative (locativus) case expresses that on which a thing depends, or in the power of which it lies, where in English we use such phrases as 'in the hands of,' 'in the power of.' E.g. CEd. Tyr. 314, *ἐν σοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν*, 'for on you we depend,' 'we are in your hands;' properly, 'we, as regards our salvation, are in you,' that is, in the condition afforded by your personal qualities, your ability and willingness to save. (See above, p. 246.) Id. CEd. Col. 247, *ἐν ὑμῖν ὡς θεῷ | κείμεθα τλάμονες*, 'wretched men, we depend on you, as on a god;' Id. ib. 423, *ἐν δ' ἐμοὶ τέλος αὐτοῖν γένοιτο τῆσδε τῆς μάχης*, 'would that for them the issue of this battle were in my hands,' 'depended on me;' Orat. Att. 113, 42, *ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς διαγῶναι*, 'it depends on you, is in your hands, lies with you, rightly to decide this matter.' Compare Hierod. vi. 109, iii. 85. In such examples, *ἐν* with its case marks the object in which any thing lies or is involved, as regards its interests, destiny, &c., that is, as above explained, describes the condition or circumstances in which it is to be considered as standing.

c. 'With,' 'by.' The preposition *ἐν* is occasionally employed with the same case to express, seemingly, the instrument, where in English it is rendered by 'with,' 'by.' In such examples, however, it is most probable that *ἐν* has its proper sense of 'in,' 'within,' and the notion of the instrument is wholly to be referred to the obvious application and use of the object in the circumstances in which *ἐν* with the ablative (locativus) describes it as placed; or else to the condition and circumstances of an action. E.g. Il. xviii. 545, *τοῖσι δ' ἔπειτ' ἐν χερσὶ δέπας μελιγδέος οἶνου | δόσκειν ἀνὴρ ἐπίων*, 'gave to them a cup of sweet wine with his hands,' 'in his hands;' or *ἐν χερσὶ* might here be referred to *τοῖσιν*, 'gave to them, in their hands, a cup of sweet wine.' Il. i. 587, *μή σε, φίλην περ εὐόσαν, ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδωμαι | δεινόμενν*, 'lest I see you with my eyes,' properly, 'in my sight;' Æsch. Pers. 162, *μήτε χρημάτων ἀνδάνδρων πλῆθος ἐν τιμῇ σέβειν*, 'to reverence with honor,' that is, 'in honor,' 'honorably,' just as *ἐν τάχει*, 'swiftly;' Id. ib. 247, *ὡς ἐν μῇ πληγῇ κατέφθαρται πολὺς δόλος*, 'how with (at) one blow much wealth is ruined,' that is, 'in one blow,' marking rather the condition under which

the ruin occurs, than the instrument by which it is effected; Soph. Phil. 102, *τί δ' ἐν δόλῳ δεῖ μάλλον ἢ πείσαντ' ἀγεῖν*, 'why should you take me away by craft rather than with my consent,' that is, 'in craft,' 'craftily,' showing the circumstances and manner in which the carrying away is made, rather than the instrument or means of its accomplishment. Id. Antig. 948, *περῶνδε κατάφρακτος ἐν δεσμῷ*, 'walled in by (in) a rocky enclosure,' where the preposition plainly retains its proper sense; Id. CEd. Tyr. 912, *τὰδ' ἐν χερσὶν | στέφῃ λαβούσῃ*, 'taking these garlands in my hands;' Id. Electr. 1128, *οὐτ' ἐν φίλῃσι χερσὶν ἢ τάλαν' ἐγὼ | λούτροις ἐκόσμησ'*, 'I neither washed him (for the burial) with my loving hands.' Here, again, *ἐν* with its case does not express, properly speaking, the instrument with which the bathing of the dead body is performed, but the manner and conditions of the service. But, while it is contended that, in such examples, the proper force of *ἐν* is almost always discernible, if not in every case, it is not inconsistent with this view to admit that, in cases where the obvious application and use of the object with which *ἐν* is joined suggests the idea of the instrument, as, for instance, in the last example cited, *ἐν* and the ablative (locativus) may have come to be wellnigh equivalent to the expression of the instrument. Although *ἐν φίλῃσι χερσὶν λούτροις ἐκόσμησα* means no more, strictly speaking, than that the washing was done with the water, or, it may be, with the body 'in the hands,' that is, that, in a general way, the washing was conducted in the hands; yet, as it is obvious that the employment of the hands in such case is instrumental, it is possible that to the Greek mind *ἐν χερσὶν* may have come to convey directly the notion of the instrument. In Soph. Electr. 1141, *ἀλλ' ἐν ξένησι χερσὶ κηδευθεὶς τάλας*, 'cared for by the hands of strangers,' the proper force of the preposition is clearly seen; and yet *ἐν ξένησι χερσὶ* might, perhaps, express at once the notion of the instrument.

f. With the ablative (locativus) of a number of nouns *ἐν* is used adverbially, as it is expressed. Thus, *ἐν τάχει*, 'swiftly,' properly, 'in swiftness,' 'in the manner or under the condition of swiftness:' e.g. Soph. CEd. Tyr. 765, *πῶς ἂν μῶλοι δῆδ' ἡμῖν ἐν τάχει πάλιν*; 'would that he might quickly come

back to us;' *ἐν βραχεί*, 'briefly:' e.g. Soph. Electr. 673, *ἐν ῥαχεί* *ἐνυθδεις λέγω*, 'I speak in brief terms,' 'briefly;' *ἐν ἑτέρῃ*, 'in turn:' e.g. Herod. i. 26, *ἐν μέρῃ ἄλλοις ἄλλας αἰτίας παύρων*, 'bringing in turn one charge against one and another against another.' Here there is no need of explanation to show that *ἐν* has its common meaning of 'in,' and that the only peculiarity of its use is to be found in the nature of the noun with which it is used.

g. 'Among.' When used with the ablative (locativus) plural of names of persons, and also of other objects, *ἐν* obtains frequently the sense of 'among,' Latin *inter*. This comes from the mere fact of the noun with which it is used expressing a number of objects, so that the preposition and its case mark a group or assemblage 'in' or 'within' which a thing is placed. E.g. Il. iii. 30-31, *τὸν δ' ὥς οὖν ἐνόησεν Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδής | ἐν προμάχοις φανέντα*, 'appearing among the foremost combatants;' Æsch. Prom. 310, *νέος γὰρ καὶ κύραννος ἐν θεοῖς*, 'for there is also a new sovereign among the gods;' Id. ib. 200, *στάσις τ' ἐν ἀλλήλοισιν ὠροῦντο*, 'for a rebellion was excited among them one with another;' Id. Eumenid. 691-2, *ἀλλ' ἐν τε τοῖς νέοις καὶ παλαιτέροις | θεοῖς ἔτιμος εἰ σὺ*, 'but you are without honor among both the new and the more ancient gods;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 2, *ἃ δὴ νόμιμα ἦν ἐν Μήδοις*, 'which now were customary among the Medes;' Id. ib. i. 5, 6, *ἔλεξεν ὁ Κῦρος ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰδε*, 'Cyrus spoke among them as follows,' that is, 'to them,' 'in their presence;' Id. ib. viii. 7, 6, *τὰ ἐν παῖσι νομιζόμενα καλὰ*, 'what is accounted creditable among boys;' Orat. Att. 20, 4, *τάττω-εν εἶναι Ὅμηρον ἐν τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις καὶ σοφωτάτοις τῶν ποιητῶν*, 'we rank Homer among the oldest and wisest of the poets.'

h. 'At,' 'near,' 'on.' *Ἐν* with the ablative (locativus) has sometimes, apparently at least, the sense of 'at,' 'on,' 'near:' e.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 22, *ἐντεῦθεν . . . ἦλθον ἐπὶ Ἰλλατταν εἰς Τραπεζοῦντα, πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα ἐν τῇ Εὐξείνῃ Πόντῳ*, 'a city on the Pontus Euxinus;' Id. Ages. ii. 23, *τῆς ἐν Λεύκτροις συμφορᾷ γεγεννημένης*, 'when the disaster at Leuctra had occurred;' Id. ib. vii. 5, *ἐν τῇ ἐν Κορίνθῳ μάχῃ*, 'in the battle at Corinth;' Il. xviii. 520-1, *οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ β' ἱκανὸν ὄδι ἴφισιν εἶπε λοχῆσαι, | ἐν ποταμῷ ὄδι τ' ἀρδμὸς ἔην πάντεσσι*

βοτοῖσιν, 'at the river.' In such examples, *ἐν* has really the meaning of 'in,' but in the accommodated sense in which it marks with its case the circumstances or conditions in which an action occurs or an object stands. Except as a mere concession to the English rendering, it is improper to say that *ἐν* has the sense of 'at,' 'in,' 'near.' As above explained, pp. 245, 247, the phrases *ἐν τῇ Εὐξείνῃ Πόντῳ*, *ἐν τοῖς Λεύκτροις*, and the like, are not to be understood literally as meaning 'in, within, the Euxine sea,' 'in, within, Leuctra,' but as descriptive generally of the circumstances of an action or object as regards its place, and so as to embrace also the adjoining region as well as the place itself.

Other similar expressions are *ἐν οὐρεσι*, 'on (in) the mountains,' *ἐν ἵπποις*, 'on horses,' 'on horseback,' *ἐν θρόνοις*, 'on seats' or 'in seats,' (See Passow's Lex.): e.g. Plat. Legg. i. p. 625, B, *ἀνάπαυλαι ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς δένδροισιν εἰσι σκιараί*, 'there are shady resting-places on (in, among) the high trees;' Il. iv. 422-3, *ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἐν αἰγαλῷ πολυχρὴ κῦμα θαλάσσης | ὄρνυτ' ἐπασσύτερον, Ζεφύρου ὑποκινήσαντος*, 'as when a wave on the resounding shore of the sea;' Il. iv. 455, *τῶν δέ τε τηλόσε δοῦπον ἐν οὐρεσιν ἔκλυε ποιμήν*, 'and the sound of them the shepherd hears on (in) the mountains afar off.' In some of these and like examples, *ἐν* may be fairly interpreted as having its common signification of 'in,' as in *ἐν οὐρεσι*, 'in the mountains,' *ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς δένδροισιν*, 'in the high trees.' In others, as in *ἐν ἵπποις*, 'on horses,' 'on horseback,' *ἐν αἰγαλῷ*, 'on the shore,' the preposition and noun must be understood as marking, not literally the space or object 'within' which a thing is placed, but rather the condition or circumstances in which it stands.

In the instances of the use of *ἐν* thus far noticed, it is hardly to be doubted that the case with which it is joined is the ablative of place, (locativus,) or of circumstance, condition, or state, derived from this. The preposition is to be considered as attached to the action or state expressed by the verb, showing that it has the relative direction or position of 'in,' 'within,' and the ablative (locativus) case is added to note the position of the action thus qualified. The locativus indicates the position of the action or state of the

verb or its subject, the preposition *ἐν* that this position is one that is relatively 'in' or 'within.' Thus, *ἐν κονίῃσι κεῖτο*, 'he lay in the dust,' means, properly, 'he lay in or within . . . namely, in the dust;' *αἷτε ἡλάσκουσιν | ὥρῃ ἐν εἰαρινῇ*, 'that fly about in or within . . . namely, in the spring season;' and, again, *ἐν ὑμῖν ὡς θεῷ κείμεθα*, 'we depend on you as on a god,' would literally mean, 'we lie, or are placed, in . . . namely, in you,' that is, 'in your power.'

i. 'In,' rendered by 'into.' In quite a number of examples *ἐν* with its case is used with verbs of action or motion, where *εἰς* with the accusative and having the sense of 'into' might have been expected. E.g. Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 49, *τότε καταβάντες ἐν μέσῳ . . . ὑμῖν παρεσόμεθα*, 'then having descended (from our horses, that is, having dismounted) into the midst.' Here, however, the sense may fairly be expressed in English by 'having dismounted in the midst,' and *ἐν μέσῳ* may be employed adverbially, as it is called, 'just as *ἐν τάχει*, 'swiftly,' *ἐν βραχεῖ*, 'briefly;' that is, *ἐν μέσῳ* may be used to describe the circumstances as to place in which the act of dismounting is performed. Xen. Hell. iv. 5, 5, *οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Ἡραίῳ καταπεφυγότες ἐξήγεσαν*, 'those who had found refuge in the Heræum went forth.' In this example also the preposition and its case may be understood to be together employed as a qualification of the action in *καταπεφυγότες*, and as serving to mark its local condition or circumstances; just as, in the example above cited, *ἐν βραχεῖ* is the qualification of the action in *λέγω*. This would make the phrase *οἱ ἐν τῷ Ἡραίῳ καταπεφυγότες* to mean, not 'those who had fled for refuge into the Heræum,' but 'those who had fled for refuge, and, as such, were in the Heræum.' A little before, in the same paragraph, the expression used with reference to the same persons and the same occurrence is, *ἐς δὲ τὸ Ἱερικὸν κατέφυγον καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες*. In this place the writer speaks of persons who fled for refuge into the Heræum, in the former of the same persons who were in the temple having fled thither for refuge. Xen. de Venat. v. 8, *ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ διαρρήπτων ἐπὶ τὸ δυνατόν, καὶ ἐν ὕδατι*, 'sometimes also it (the hare) throws itself into the sea, as far as it can, and into water.' In this

example, likewise, the preposition *ἐν* and the noun with which it is joined would seem to mark the condition or circumstances of the action in *διαρρήπτων*, in what the grammars would call an adverbial way, just as a different character of the action might have been expressed by *ἐν τάχει*, 'quickly.' Soph. Antig. 499, *τὸν αὐτῷ ἀδελφον ἐν τάφῳ τιθεῖσα*, 'placing my brother in the tomb.' Here the English phrase exactly corresponds, and *ἐν τάφῳ* added to *τιθεῖσα* does not, strictly speaking, convey the notion of 'putting into the tomb,' but describes the action of placing by this as a circumstance or condition of it, that it was 'in the tomb.' Il. i. 584-5, *δέπας ἀμφικύπελλον | μητρὶ φίλῃ ἐν χερσὶ τίθει*, 'placed the cup in his mother's hands.' In this example, again, the English mode of expression agrees with the Greek, and *ἐν χερσὶ* describes the manner or circumstances by which the act of placing the cup is characterized. If it is intelligible to say, *ἐν βραχεῖ λέγω*, 'I speak in brief,' that is, 'briefly,' so may it be to say, *ἐν χερσὶ τίδημι*, 'I place in the hands,' *ἐν* and the locativus in the former case showing the manner of the speaking, and in the latter the circumstances of the placing. Il. xviii. 474, *χαλκὸν δ' ἐν πυρὶ βάλλεν ἀτειρέα*, 'and cast the unwasting brass into the fire.' In this example, the object of *ἐν πυρὶ* is hardly to describe directly the place into which the brass was cast, although this is the sense involved; but to describe the action in *βάλλεν* after the same manner that it might have been qualified by *ἐν τάχει*, 'quickly,' the only difference being, that in the latter case the descriptive circumstance is the abstract notion of 'quickness,' in the former that of a material substance, 'fire.' Among this class of examples is placed also Eurip. Med. 424, seqq., *οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἀμετέρῃ γνώμῃ λύρας | ὤπασε θέσπιν δοιδάν | Φοῖβος ἀγήτωρ μελέων*, 'for Phœbus, leader of song, gave not in our soul the divine strain of the lyre,' *ἐν ἀμετέρῃ γνώμῃ* being the qualification of *ὤπασε*, in the same way that, above, *ἐν πυρὶ* is of *βάλλεν*, and showing the peculiar condition and circumstances of the giving the divine strain of the lyre.

In these, and like cases, the signification of *ἐν* is plainly that of 'in,' 'within,' and, as elsewhere, should be con-

sidered as immediately attached to the action or motion of the verb. The difficulty is to determine the force of the case, and how with *ἐν* it comes to occupy seemingly the place of *εἰς* with the accusative. Some (see Passow's Lex. s. v. i. 10) explain this use of *ἐν* with the locativus as a pregnant construction, both the motion to and the consequent position in the place being implied in the verb: e.g. *βάλλειν ἐν κονίῃσι*, 'to cast into the dust,' that is, 'to cast so that it shall be in the dust.' But this is not satisfactory, beyond a mere practical statement of what is expressed in the end by this employment of *ἐν* and the ablative. The explanation above given may claim the advantage of accounting for the employment of *ἐν* and the case consistently with the common use of *ἐν* and the ablative (locativus) of manner or circumstance and condition. It regards *ἐν πυρί*, *ἐν χερσὶ*, *ἐν θαλάττῃ*, as being added to verbs of action and motion to describe their local condition and circumstances, in the same way that *ἐν τάχει*, *ἐν βραχεῖ*, are added to describe their manner.

k. Sometimes *ἐν* is followed by the genitive case, but always with an obvious ellipsis of the proper case of a noun with which *ἐν* would be connected, and upon which the genitive depends. E.g. Il. xxii. 389, *εἰ δὲ θανόντων περ καταλήθοντ' εἰν Ἰδῆας*, 'if, in the (abode) of Iliades, they do forget the dead;' Od. vii. 132, *τοῦ δ' ἐν Ἀλκινόοιο θεῶν ἔσαν ἀγλαὰ δῶρα*, 'in (the palace) of Alcinoüs.' The words *δόμοις*, *αἴκῃ*, *μεγάρῃ*, are to be supplied. (See Passow's Lexicon.)

There is a single compound of *ἐν* with the genitive, namely, *ἐμποδών*, 'in the way of the feet,' 'in the way,' used to express a hinderance. E.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 13, *εἰ δὲ γενησόμεθα ἐπὶ βασιλεῖ, τί ἐμποδών μὴ οὐχὶ . . . ὑβρίζομένους ἀποθανεῖν*; 'what is to hinder us from dying (being put to death) with insults?' This word may be thus formed merely to answer to the opposite term *ἐκποδών*, 'out of the way of the feet,' 'out of the way,' and without any regard to the grammatical construction. (See Passow's Lexicon.) This is probably the true explanation, and renders it unnecessary to inquire further how *ἐν* is here employed with the genitive, where no word can be supplied upon which the geni-

tive may depend, and with which *ἐν* may be joined in the proper case.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATION AND USE OF *ἐν* WITH ITS CASE.

Signification of <i>ἐν</i> .	Ablative (Locativus):	
	1. Of position:	2. Of circumstance, condition, &c.
'In,' 'within.'	a. In space: 'in,' 'within.'	'In,' 'into.'
	b. In a group: 'among.'	'With' (= instrument.)
	c. By accommodation: 'at,' 'near,' 'on.'	
	d. In time: 'in,' 'within.'	

ὦ *Ενεχα*.

ὦ *Ενεχα* has also an Ionic and Epic form *ἐνεχεν*, and a poetic form *εἴνεχα*, and more rarely *εἴνεχεν*. All these forms are used by Homer. (See Passow's Lex.) *Εἴνεχα*, however, occurs also in Attic prose.

According to Donaldson, (New Cratylus, § 272, seqq.,) *ἐνεχα* and *ἐκατι* or *ἐχῆτι* are related forms, and *ἐνεχα* is compounded of the preposition *ἐν*, 'in,' and *ἐχα*, a mutilated locative form of *ἐκός*, 'at a distance,' the aspirate being carried back. ὦ *Ενεχεν* he considers to be a full locative form. ὦ *Ενεχα*, in his view, is related also to *ἐκών*, 'willing,' *ἐκάτερος*, 'each of two,' *ἐκαστος*, 'each of many,' &c., and has the same radical with the Sanscrit *eka*, 'one,' and, granting this, he might have added, with the English *each*. The primary sense of these words he assumes to be distance or separation, will, and unity; and that of *ἐνεχα* to be 'only,' 'especially,' this word expressing "that the action has taken place according to the will of a certain person, or with particular or exclusive reference to some person, thing, or action." For the exhibition of the grounds of this explanation of *ἐνεχα*, which is here mentioned because of its general plausibility, at the least, however some parts of it may admit of doubt, see Donaldson's New Cratylus, l. cit.

1. If the common view be followed, *ἐνεχα* with the genitive signifies 'on account of:' a, as giving the reason or motive of an action: e.g. Il. i. 94, *ἀλλ' ἔνεχ' ἀρητῆρος*, (*ἐπιμέμφεται*,) 'but (finds fault with you) on account of the priest;' or, as Mr. Donaldson would interpret it, the genitive by itself, as is seen in *εὐχολῆς* and *ἐκατόμβης* in the preceding verse, signi-

fies 'on account of;' or, rather, one should say, 'with respect to;' and *ἐνεκα* means 'especially;' so that the sense would be, 'especially on account of (rather, with respect to) the priest.' Il. xiv. 89, *ἧς ἐνεχ' οἰζύομεν κακὰ πολλά*, 'on account of which we suffer many ills,' that is, 'because of which we suffer many ills.' (See Passow's Lexicon, s. v.)

b. *Ἐνεκα* signifies 'on account of,' as indicating the cause of an action, that of which this is the effect or consequence: e.g. Il. i. 214, *ὕβριος ἐνεκα τῆσδε*, 'on account of,' that is, 'in consequence of, this insult;' and conjoined with *ἀπό*; Thuc. viii. 92, *ἀπὸ βοῆς ἐνεκα*, 'from an outcry merely,' as Passow interprets *λόγου ἐνεκα*, 'as a pretence merely.' (See also Donaldson, l. c.) Admitting the sense of *ἐνεκα* to be 'only,' 'merely,' 'especially,' the genitive, in the former example, will signify 'with respect to,' and hence 'on account of,' and *ἐνεκα* will be used adverbially with the meaning of 'especially;' and, in the latter, *ἀπὸ βοῆς* having the meaning of 'from an outcry,' *ἐνεκα* will be used in the same way, adverbially, and have the sense of 'merely,' 'only.'

c. *Ἐνεκα* with the genitive has the meaning of 'for the sake of,' that is, of 'on account of,' with the idea that the object joined with *ἐνεκα* is the thing had in view: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 1, *πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑπομείναι τοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι ἐνεκα*, 'for the sake of being praised,' or, 'merely with a view to being praised;' Id. Memorab. ii. 4, 7, *ἔνιοι μὲν δένδρα περὶ ὧνται θεραπεύειν τοῦ καρποῦ ἐνεκεν*, 'for the sake of the fruit;' or, 'only with a view to the fruit.' It was seen above, under the genitive case, that the genitive of the infinitive had the capacity of expressing 'with a view to,' which is equivalent to 'for the sake of;' so that, here also, the meaning attributed to *ἐνεκα* would seem to belong to *τοῦ* and the infinitive, and *ἐνεκα* is left to express the idea of 'only,' 'merely,' as in the foregoing paragraph.

d. *Ἐνεκα* with the genitive is used also, in the common view, in the sense of 'as far as concerns,' 'as regards,' 'with respect to:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. iii. 2, 30, *ἀλλ' ἐξέσται ἡμῖν ἐκείνου ἐνεκα πρὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον συμφέρον πάντα τίθεσθαι*, 'as far as he is concerned,' 'as regards him;' or, according to Mr. Donaldson's view, 'if we regard him alone;' Id. Vectig. iii.

1, *ἡδέως ἐνεκα χειμῶνος ἀναπαύεσθαι*, 'to rest pleasantly as far as a storm is concerned,' or, 'with respect to a storm merely, to rest pleasantly;' Herod. i. 44, *παῖδα τε σὸν . . . ἀπὸ φύλλαςσόντος ἐνεκεν προσδόκα τοι ἀπονουστήσειν*, 'so far as belongs to his guardian;' or, giving to the genitive its proper sense of 'with respect to,' and to *ἐνεκεν* that of 'only,' 'merely,' the meaning may be expressed by 'with respect to, looking to his guardian merely.'

e. *Ἐνεκα* with the genitive is occasionally used in the meaning of 'by means of,' 'by dint of;' as, *τέχνης ἐνεκα*, 'by dint of art or skill.' (See Passow's Lex. s. v.) But here, again, the meaning attributed to *ἐνεκα* may belong to the genitive itself, and the preposition have the sense of 'only,' 'merely.'

It may be observed, in conclusion, that, whether Mr. Donaldson's or the common mode of interpreting *ἐνεκα* be adopted, the genitive attending it has its ordinary signification of 'with respect to;' and that the genitive, considered in its relations to the terms which it qualifies, contains the meanings which the common interpretation assigns to *ἐνεκα*. And, further, that adding to this fact the actual occurrence of *ἐνεκα* in the sense of 'merely,' 'only,' and whatever confirmation may be derived from the etymological explanation of this word given by Mr. Donaldson, great probability is given to this author's theory of this preposition; sufficient to induce its adoption, at least in its general results, namely, that *ἐνεκα* means 'only,' 'merely,' and, perhaps, 'especially.'

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *ἐνεκα* WITH ITS CASE.

Signification of <i>ἐνεκα</i> .	Genitive: 'with respect to.'
'Only,' 'merely.' (As commonly represented; 'on account of.')	'On account of—merely;' prop. 'with respect to—merely.'
	a. As a reason or motive; 'on account of,' 'because of—merely;' prop. 'with respect to—merely.'
	b. As the cause; 'in consequence of—only;' prop. 'with respect to—only.'
	c. As the object had in view; 'for the sake of—merely,' 'with a view to—merely, only;' prop. 'with respect to—merely, only.'
	d. 'As far as concerns,' 'as regards—merely;' prop. 'with respect to—merely, only.'
	e. 'By means of,' 'by dint of;' prop. 'with respect to, looking to—merely.'

'Επί.

'Επί corresponds to the Sanscrit prefix *api*, 'super,' (see Bopp, Glossar. S. s. v.) and is probably the same with the English *up*, and the German *auf*, 'upon.'

Significations of ἐπί.

1. 'On,' 'upon.' The primary signification of ἐπί is 'on,' 'upon,' with the idea of superposition: e.g. ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέων, 'on, upon, the mountains;' and so in many compounds; as, ἐπιβαίνειν, 'to go up on,' νεὼς ἐπιβαίνειν, 'to go on board a ship,' ἐπιβάλλειν, 'to cast upon,' ἐπίγειος, 'on the earth,' 'terrestrial,' ἐπιγραφή, 'a writing upon,' 'an inscription,' ἐπιτιθέναι, 'to place upon,' *imponere*.

This proper sense of ἐπί presents itself, moreover, in significations more or less accommodated. Thus:

a. In that of 'on,' 'depending on;' as, ἐφ' ἡμῶν, 'in our hands,' 'in our power,' 'depending on us.' That this is merely an accommodated use of the local meaning of 'upon,' is altogether plain, the notion of being upon a thing easily suggesting that of resting upon or being supported by it, and this being equivalent to depending upon it, or being in its power.

b. 'At,' 'near,' 'by,' 'in,' 'in the time of.' To the sense of 'on,' 'upon,' belong also the meanings of ἐπί in the class of examples in which it expresses the relative position of 'upon' in a more general way, and so as not to convey a strictly local sense of superposition, where it is variously rendered in English by 'at,' 'near,' 'in,' and, when a period of time is concerned, by 'in the time of.' E.g. ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις, 'at the gates;' Il. viii. 539, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἐπὶ νυκτὶ φυλάξομεν ἡμέας αὐτούς, 'at night we will guard ourselves;' ἐπὶ Κύρου, 'in the time of Cyrus.'

Although, in such cases, ἐπί has not the local sense of 'upon,' the meaning which it conveys is by no means inconsistent with this, and really involves it; only the notion of 'upon' is to be taken as marking relative position in a more general and figurative way. In the same accommodated sense precisely the English language employs the terms 'on'

and 'upon' in such expressions as 'on the right,' 'on the third day,' 'situated on the sea,' 'upon his coming.' The phrase ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις does not mean 'on or upon the gates' in the sense in which we would understand the literal rendering, namely, as denoting actual superposition, but what we would express by 'at, or near, the gates;' so neither does the English sentence 'they dwelt on the sea' mean, literally, 'on the sea' in the same sense as when we say 'they sailed on the sea;' nor does the phrase 'he swore upon the altar' employ the word 'upon' in the same literal sense as when we say 'he placed it upon the altar.' The same may be said of ἐπί in the expression ἐπὶ Κύρου, 'in the time of Cyrus,' for here it means 'on,' 'upon,' only in the same way that we say 'they dwelt on the sea,' 'it falls on the fourth day;' that is, not in the literal sense of superposition, but in that of a relative position, in which the object is referred for its designation as to time or space to another object, and is figuratively represented as being upon it.

c. 'On condition of.' Derived from the sense of 'upon,' or superposition, is that of condition, expressed in English by 'on condition of,' the condition of an action or obligation being conceived as that upon which it rests, and thus bringing back the sense of condition to the proper idea of 'upon' belonging to ἐπί. E.g. Xen. Cyrop. iii. 2, 23, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἔδοσαν καὶ ἔλαβον πάντες τὰ πιστά, 'and upon these conditions or terms they all gave and received pledges;' that is, resting upon this, and as a sequence upon this.

d. 'For,' 'on account of.' Closely related to the notion of condition, and like it derived from that of superposition, and hence of superaddition or 'upon,' is the sense of occasion, ground, reason, and motive, expressed by the English 'for,' 'on account of.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 16, ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ ποτε δίκη πληγὰς ἔλαβον, 'once, now, was I beaten for one decision.' In fact, however, the same sense might, in some instances, be conveyed by 'upon;' as in the example cited, 'upon one decision, now, was I once beaten;' and it is plain that ἐπὶ μὲν δίκη marks a fact upon the occurrence of which the infliction of blows depended. Here the relation of the chief proposition and of the fact upon which

it is a superaddition is that of occasion, ground, reason, motive; in another case it might be that of condition or of mere sequence.

e. 'For,' object had in view. Among the significations of *ἐπί* may be mentioned that in which it denotes the object or end had in view, expressed in English by 'for:' e.g. Herod. i. 68, *ἐπὶ κακῷ ἀνδρώπου σίδηρος ἀνεύρηται*, 'for the hurt of men has iron been discovered;' Id. i. 59, *οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ πλέοντες*, 'as they did not sail with a view to this.' This sense of *ἐπί* is akin to that of condition, and to that of ground or reason, and would seem to arise from the notion of 'upon,' or superposition, the object had in view in an action being considered, according to this use of *ἐπί*, as something on the condition of which, as it were, it is performed, or upon the admission of which, and as a superaddition to it, the action occurs. In other terms, and recurring immediately to the proper sense of the preposition, *ἐπί* with the dative expresses the object upon which the action rests, and hence that upon which it depends for its condition, for its reason or occasion, and for its end or motive, the last meaning not only having the same foundation with the preceding ones, but in some sort implying them.

Scarcely to be distinguished from this sense of *ἐπί*, except in the fact of its relating to persons rather than to things, is the case in which *ἐπί* with the dative introduces the object for whom as its final aim an action is performed, or to whose benefit or injury it enures. E.g. Il. xxiii. 776, *ὄς ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ πέφνευ πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς*, '(oxen) which swift-footed Achilles slew for Patroclus;' Herod. i. 61, *μαθὼν τὰ ποιούμενα ἐπ' ἐωυτῷ*, 'upon learning what was doing against him.' So *γελάω ἐπὶ τινι*, 'to laugh at a person;' and the compound *ἐπιδακρύειν τινι*, 'to shed tears for a person;' in which case, however, the preposition may be admitted to have a sense very little removed from the proper one of 'upon,' as where we say 'to look upon,' 'to speak upon;' or from that of 'over' or 'upon,' as where we say, 'to mourn over,' 'to shed tears upon.' In the examples in which *ἐπί* with the dative clearly expresses the object had in view,

the preposition with its case, in marking the end or aim of the action, denotes at the same time that upon which it rests or depends for its being done, or what may, in one sense, be regarded as its condition as well as its motive.

f. 'Looking upon,' 'with a direction upon,' 'having an aspect towards.' In a great variety of relations, and where, in conjunction with cases, it is rendered into English by such terms as 'towards,' 'for,' 'against,' 'to,' 'with a view to,' &c., *ἐπί*, with and without motion preceding, conveys merely the notion of direction 'upon,' looking upon, or having an aspect towards, so as to place the action which it qualifies in a certain relation to some object. This relative direction or aspect is the same that we express in English also by 'upon,' 'on,' in such phrases as 'to march upon a point.' E.g. Herod. i. 164, *ἐπλεον ἐπὶ Χίου*, 'they sailed for Chios,' *ἐπ' οἴκου πλεῖν*, 'to sail homewards.' Here the sense is, properly, 'they sailed upon Chios,' 'to sail upon home,' the preposition marking the relative direction in which the action of sailing stands to the objects Chios and home. And although the English language would not in these instances admit the use of 'upon' in this figurative sense, yet it has just been seen that in some cases it employs it in the same way, and so as to make it perfectly easy for one using this language to understand the sense above given to *ἐπλεον ἐπὶ Χίου*.

This meaning of direction upon, of having an aspect towards, belongs to *ἐπί* in the examples where, in connection with the genitive case, it is rendered into English by 'with respect to,' 'in the case of,' that is, where the preposition and genitive case describe the circumstances or conditions in which it is to be understood that the action or statement qualified by *ἐπί* is represented as being. E.g. Orat. Att. 18, 1, *ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἂν τις ἰδεῖν δόκει μοι τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὐνοίαν φανεράν γενομένην*, 'it seems to me that a person would see that, in many respects, we have manifestly been favored by the gods;' *ἐπὶ τῶν καιρῶν πολιτεύεσθαι*, 'to administer the state with a regard to the exigency of the times;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 25, *καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων δὲ, ἧν μὲν ἐν θέρει ὦσι, τὸν ἀρχόντα δεῖ τοῦ ἡλίου πλεονεκτοῦντα φανερόν εἶναι*, 'with respect

to, 'in the case of, actions also.' In such examples, while the office of the genitive case is to denote the object with respect to which the statement qualified by *ἐπί* and the genitive is made, *πολλῶν*, for example, in the first instance cited, showing that it is 'with respect to many things' that the good-will of the gods had been experienced, that of the preposition is to point out the relation which the action or statement upon which it attends holds to the object named by the genitive. This relation is that of direction upon, of looking upon, or of having its aspect towards; and although it cannot, in such a case, be expressed in English by the term 'upon,' even figuratively employed, the sense of 'upon' is as really present as in the phrase *ἐπ' οἴκου πλεῖν*, where, notwithstanding we render the meaning by 'to sail homewards,' or 'for home,' altogether omitting the notion of 'upon' contained in *ἐπί*, we can yet see that the effect of the preposition is to describe the action of sailing as having the direction of 'upon' with reference to home, and that it is to be understood precisely as our word 'upon' is in the phrase 'to march upon the enemy.'

The sense of 'upon,' with the idea of relative direction upon, is the proper one to be attributed to *ἐπί* where it is used with the accusative case and seems to have the meanings of 'to,' 'against,' 'for,' 'with a view-to,' 'as regards.' E.g. Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 20, *ὁ δὲ Ἀναξίβιος καταδραμὼν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν*, 'Anaxibius having run down to the sea;' where the sense is, properly, 'Anaxibius having run down upon . . . as regards the sea,' *ἐπί* indicating merely the direction or aspect of the running down with reference to the sea. Herod. i. 71, *στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Πέρσας*, 'to march against the Persians,' properly, 'to march upon . . . as regards the Persians.' Here *ἐπί*, still more obviously, has the meaning of 'upon,' or direction upon; and that of 'against' arises from the hostile relations of the party marching towards the party upon whom they are marching. Herod. v. 12, *σκεύδασαντες τὴν ἀδελφεὴν ὥς εἶχον ἄριστα ἐπ' ὕδωρ ἐπεμπον*, 'they would send her for water.' In this case, again, *ἐπί* marks only the relative direction of the action, and the meaning is, 'they would send her (with a direction) upon

. . . as regards water,' or, as the English requires it to be rendered, 'would send her for water.' The use of *ἐπί* is the same in this example as in *στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Πέρσας*, only the English language allows the expression 'to march upon the Persians,' but does not admit that of 'sending a person upon water.' It will be seen afterwards, that the notion of an object had in view, expressed by 'for' in the rendering of *ἐπ' ὕδωρ ἐπεμπον*, is to be derived from the circumstances of the narrative, and is no more directly conveyed by *ἐπί* than is 'against' by the same preposition.

2. 'Over.' Immediately derived from the signification of 'on,' 'upon,' is that of 'over;' or, perhaps, this should rather be considered a mere variety of the sense of 'upon;' for that which is placed 'upon' a thing may, under some circumstances, and in a certain point of view, be said to be 'over' it. This sense of *ἐπί* is seen in such examples as *ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων*, 'those set over, having charge of, the business,' and in many compounds, as *ἐπιβώτωρ*, (Od. xiii. 222,) 'a shepherd,' 'one set over a flock as its feeder,' *ἐπικρατεῖν*, 'to be a master over,' *ἐπιχερμανύναι*, 'to hang over,' *ἐπικωλύειν*, 'to make wailings over,' (Soph. Electr. 283, cited in Passow's Lex.), *ἐπικύπτειν*, 'to stoop upon or over,' *ἐπινέφειν*, 'to snow upon or over,' (Xen. Cyneg. viii. 1, cited in Passow's Lex.)

3. 'In addition to,' 'besides;' 'after.' From the signification of 'upon,' or superposition, are derived other meanings also of *ἐπί*; thus:

a. That of addition, expressed in English by 'in addition to,' 'besides,' it being very natural to pass from the notion of one thing placed upon another to that of one thing added to another. E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 11, *ὅταν καρδάμον μόνον ἔχωσι ἐπὶ τῷ σίτῳ*, 'whenever they have cresses only in addition to their bread;' Id. Anab. iii. 2, 4, *ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὁμοῦς ἡμῖν*, 'having in addition to this, besides, himself given us his oath;' Id. Cyrop. iv. 5, 38, *καὶ νῦν ἐστὶ μὲν ἡμῖν πολλὰ χρήματα, καὶ ἄνδρες ἐπ' αὐτοῖς*, 'and now we have much means, and men besides.' The same meaning is seen in many compounds; as, *ἐπιγαμεῖν*, 'to marry a second wife,' that is, 'a wife in addition to a former wife,' *ἐπιδιδόναι*,

'to give besides,' or 'in addition,' ἐπικλησις, 'a surname,' or an additional name.' See II. xxii. 506.

b. 'After.' Very nearly akin to the notion of addition, and like it derived from that of 'upon' or superposition, is the meaning of 'after,' which it frequently has. E.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 2, 4, ἐπὶ τούτῳ Κλεάνωρ ἀνέστη, 'after him Cleanor arose.' Cleanor's rising to speak was in superaddition to the preceding speaker, and so might he said to come after him. The same sense of ἐπὶ is met with in some compounds also; as, ἐπίγονος, 'born after,' or 'born in addition,' the two meanings being almost the same; ἐπιμαχάνειν, 'to obtain by lot afterwards,' or 'in addition;' ἐπιμηθεύς, 'after-wise,' as opposed to προμηθεύς, 'fore-wise,' 'knowing beforehand;' ἐπικληρος, 'succeeding to an inheritance,' 'an heir;' ἐπιμανθάνειν, 'to learn besides or after.'

Summary of the significations of ἐπὶ.

- 'Επί. 1. Superposition; 'on,' 'upon.'
- Locally; 'on,' 'upon.'
 - Figuratively; 'upon,' 'at,' 'near.'
 - Figuratively; 'on,' 'depending on,' 'in the power of.'
 - Figuratively: condition; 'on condition of,' 'on the terms of.'
 - Figuratively: occasion, ground, reason; 'for,' 'on account of,' 'upon.'
 - Figuratively: object had in view; 'for.'
 - Figuratively: relative direction upon; 'towards,' 'for,' 'against,' 'to,' 'with a view to.'
2. 'Over.'
3. Addition; 'in addition to,' 'besides.'

USE OF ἐπὶ WITH CASES; NAMELY, WITH THE GENITIVE, DATIVE, AND ACCUSATIVE.

I. *With the genitive.*

1. 'On,' 'upon.' a. 'Επί, in its proper meaning of 'on,' 'upon,' is employed with the genitive case to mark the relative position of an object in space: e.g. Herod. vii. 111, τὸ δὲ μαντήϊον τοῦτο ἔστι μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν οὐρέων τῶν ὕψηλοτάτων,

'this oracle is upon the highest mountains;' Id. vi. 129, ἐπ' αὐτῆς (τῆς τραπέζης) ὀρχήσατο, 'he danced upon the table;' Aesch. Sept. c. Theb. 369, ἔχει ὑπέρφρον σῆμ' ἐπ' ἀσπίδος τὸδε, 'he has upon his shield this proud device;' Id. Pers. 18, ἔβαν οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ἵππων οἱ δ' ἐπὶ ναῶν, 'they went, some on horses, some on ships;' Soph. Œd. Col. 184, ξείνος ἐπὶ ξείνης, 'a stranger in (upon) a strange land;' II. x. 173, νῦν γὰρ δὴ πάντεσσιν ἐπὶ ξυροῦ ἴσταται ἀμύη, 'for now the decision is at hand for all;' literally, 'the contest stands on the edge of a knife,' that is, must be presently decided this way or that.

In such examples, while the preposition retains its proper sense of 'on,' 'upon,' the genitive has its common meaning of 'with respect to,' and shows that a preceding action or statement is to be understood only of the specific object which this case introduces. Thus, in the first example above given, the proposition is, τὸ δὲ μαντήϊον τοῦτο ἔστι ἐπὶ, 'this oracle is upon,' and the genitive τῶν οὐρέων τῶν ὕψηλοτάτων is added to denote the object to which specifically this statement is to be understood as referred; 'with respect to the mountains that are highest.'

b. 'At,' 'near,' ('upon.') 'Επί with the genitive is employed in the designation of place in cases also where it is not intended to convey the idea of literal superposition, but only to give a more general indication of relative position, expressed in English more commonly by 'at,' but also by 'near.' E.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 28, κελεύει αὐτοῦ μένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ μὴ διαβάντας, 'he bade them remain there at (on) the river, and not to cross over;' Demosth. 300, 16, τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ (μάχην), 'the battle at (on) the river;' add also, ἐπὶ τῶν βωμῶν σφάττουσιν ἀλλήλους, 'they slay each other at (on) the altars.' This last example, however, might, perhaps, be referred to a class to be subsequently mentioned, in which ἐπὶ indicates merely the relative direction or aspect of an action towards an object; the sense may be, 'they slay each other in the presence of the altars,' that is, with a position or direction that looks upon, has its aspect towards, the altars. The former interpretation would seem to be preferable.

In the examples just given, *ἐπί* has the sense of 'upon,' but in an accommodated way, just as in English 'on' and 'upon' are employed in such expressions as 'a city situated on the sea,' that is, 'at,' 'near, the sea.' The genitive, in this construction, has the same meaning as in *ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέων*, 'upon the mountains,' above explained. Thus, *κελεύει αὐτοῦ μένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ* means, 'he ordered them to remain there at (upon) . . . with respect to the river.'

c. 'In.' In a number of other examples also, *ἐπί* with the genitive case is used to express the relative position, and hence the circumstances of an action or state, where the meaning is conveyed in English by 'in.' E.g. Demosth. Phil. i. p. 42, *οὐχ οὐός τέ ἐστιν ἔχων ἀκατέστρμακται μένειν ἐπὶ τούτων*, 'he cannot, retaining what places he has subjected, abide in these;' Id. Phil. ii. p. 66, *ὥς δὲ κωλύσται· ἀν' ἐκείνων πράττειν ταῦτα ἐφ' ὧν ἐστι νῦν παντελῶς ἀργῶς ἔχετε*, 'but you are altogether listless about hindering him from what he is now occupied in,' that is, 'the things upon which he is now bent,' *quibus nunc studet*; Demosth. Meid. 516, 21, *οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτου μόνον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάντων φαίνεται προσηρημένος με ὑβρίζειν*, 'not in this matter alone, but in every thing, does he appear to have chosen to insult me;' Æschin. 64, 32, *ἵνα δ' ἐπὶ τῆς υποθέσεως μείνω*, 'to stand to, abide by (continue in), my proposition;' Id. 88, 1, *ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ἐνέγραψεν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ*, 'in, or at, the end of his letter.'

In these and like examples, it is plain that *ἐπί* and the noun in the genitive case mark the circumstances or conditions of an action or state, whether of situation or generally, as expressed by the various objects which may appropriately denote the circumstances or conditions of any action or state. And, further, that the nature of the qualification here made by *ἐπί* and the noun in the genitive case differs from that made by the same preposition and case, when a mere local relation and superposition are denoted by them, in this alone, that, in the present case, the preposition has the signification of 'upon,' or marks this relative position only figuratively; and that the noun in the genitive, instead of a material object upon which a thing actually stands, names an abstract notion even, or, at the most,

some object or class of objects, which, as here employed, may fitly denote the conditions or circumstances of an action or state generally, but not a literal resting-place. For the rest, the relative position expressed by the preposition, and the sense of the genitive case, are the same as where local superposition is represented. Thus, in the last example, *ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ἐνέγραψεν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ*, 'he wrote in his letter at, or in, the end,' *ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτῆς* marks the place in the letter to which the particular writing here mentioned is referred, just as truly as does *ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέων*, in a previously cited example, show the situation of τὸ μαντήριον, and precisely in the same way. The only difference is that *τελευτῆς*, 'the end,' is an abstract noun used to mark the place upon which, figuratively speaking, is placed the act of writing. Although the English 'on,' 'upon,' do not serve to translate *ἐπί*, as here used, they are found employed in a similar way; as in such expressions as 'upon the whole, it is better to retreat,' 'upon his trial, he made a skilful defence.'

'On,' 'upon.' To this place may be referred such examples also as Herod. ix. 11, *οἱ ἐφοροὶ εἶπαν ἐπ' ὄρκου*, 'the Ephors said upon oath,' or, as it may also be rendered in English, 'the Ephors said under oath.' Here *ἐπ' ὄρκου* describes the circumstances or condition in which the action of speaking is performed, and the office of both *ἐπί* and the noun in the genitive is the same as in the examples just considered. 'Επί shows that the action which it qualifies has, in a figurative sense, the relative position of 'upon' with reference to the object introduced by the genitive case; and, as in the preceding examples, this marking an action as occupying such a relative position is equivalent to giving its situation, and the circumstances or condition in which it is performed. According to this view, and allowing for the difference of the objects introduced by the genitive, the expression *ἐπ' ὄρκου εἶπαν*, 'they said upon oath,' is to be interpreted, so far as *ἐπί* with the genitive is concerned, in the same way with *τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ μάχην*, 'the battle at (on) the river.' Here belong such examples also as Herod. vii. 150, *μετατέειν (λέγεται) ἵνα ἐπὶ προφάσει ἡσυχίην ἄγωσι*, 'it is said that they demanded a share that

they might have a pretext for remaining inactive;’ literally, ‘that they might remain inactive on a pretext.’ Besides the fact that we can render the phrase *ἐπὶ προφάσει* by ‘on a pretext,’ using ‘on’ in the same figurative way with *ἐπὶ*, it may be proper to observe that the English language has quite a number of like uses of ‘on;’ as, ‘to be on duty,’ ‘to be on sale,’ ‘to buy on credit.’

d. ‘In the time of.’ Of the same nature with the preceding uses of *ἐπὶ* is the case in which it is employed with the genitive to express the relative position of an event with regard to time, where in English we render it by ‘in the time of.’ E.g. Herod. vi. 98, *ἐπὶ γὰρ Δαρείου . . . ἐγένετο πλεῖω κακὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι*, ‘for in the time (reign) of Darius a greater number of ills befell Hellas;’ Id. ii. 46, *ἐγένετο ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ τοῦτο τὸ τέρας*, ‘this prodigy occurred in my day;’ Xen. Anab. i. 9, 12, *ἐνὶ γε ἀνδρὶ τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῶν*, ‘for one man, at least, of those of our day;’ Orat. Att. 28, *ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ γὰρ, οὐχὶ πάλαι, τῷτ’ αὖ γέγονε*, ‘for this happened in my day, and not a long time ago.’ Here *ἐπὶ* may be said to be employed in exact accordance with its use in marking local relations; for as *ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέων* describes the position of the oracle relatively to the mountains, so *ἐπὶ Δαρείου* shows the position of an event relatively to a period of time. And although it would not be allowed in English to use such a phrase as ‘this event happened on the time of Darius,’ so that it is necessary to substitute the form ‘in the time of Darius,’ yet the English language furnishes such expressions as it ‘happened on the fourth day,’ ‘he gave it to her on her wedding-day,’ in which ‘on’ has the same figurative use that *ἐπὶ* presents in *ἐπὶ Δαρείου*, ‘in (on) the time of Darius.’ It scarcely requires to be mentioned, that the terms *Δαρείου*, *ἐμοῦ*, and others occurring in this construction of *ἐπὶ* with the genitive, stand as the representatives, not of persons merely, but of periods of time, *Δαρείου* meaning ‘the reign of Darius,’ *ἐμοῦ*, ‘my time,’ &c.

e. ‘Towards,’ ‘for,’ (‘upon.’) Another variety of the uses of *ἐπὶ* with the genitive case is that in which it occurs with verbs of motion, denoting the object towards which the action or motion defined by *ἐπὶ* is directed. E.g. Thuc.

i. 116, *πλεύσαντες ναυσὶν ἐξήκοντα ἐπὶ Σάμῳ*, ‘having sailed with sixty vessels for, towards, Samos;’ and again, in the same chapter, *ἐπὶ Καρίας*, ‘towards, for, Caria,’ *ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου*, ‘towards Chios and Lesbos;’ Herod. vii. 31, *ὁδοῦ . . . ἐπὶ Καρίας φερούσης*, ‘a road leading towards Caria;’ Thuc. i. 55, *οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀποπλέοντες ἐπ’ οἴκου Ἀνακτόρου . . . εἶλον ἀπάτην*, ‘the Corinthians in sailing away homewards took Anactorium by an act of fraud.’ Here *ἐπὶ*, consistently with its proper notion of ‘upon,’ marks the direction of the motion as being ‘upon’ an object, just as in English we say ‘to march upon a point.’ The notion of direction ‘upon,’ which is no doubt, properly speaking, always involved when *ἐπὶ* is thus used, and which distinguishes *ἐπὶ* with the genitive from every other mode of expressing relative direction, is not accurately conveyed by the terms ‘for’ and ‘towards,’ which alone we can ordinarily use in rendering this construction into English. The genitive, it may be added, is here employed to point out the specific object with respect to which the motion has the relative direction of ‘upon.’ Thus, *ἐπὶ Σάμῳ πλεῖν* means, properly, ‘to sail upon . . . with respect to Samos,’ that is, ‘to sail towards Samos,’ or ‘for Samos.’

f. This meaning of direction upon, so readily discerned in the preposition *ἐπὶ* as used with the genitive case, when attending upon verbs of motion, is not confined to this class of examples, but is seen, more or less obviously, to belong to *ἐπὶ* in quite a variety of its other uses with the genitive; in all those, namely, in which it denotes that the action or state qualified by it has a direction upon, or looks, has its aspect, towards some object; that object, to wit, which is introduced by the genitive case. In the case of this signification of *ἐπὶ* already considered, the preposition and noun in the genitive introduce some denomination of space as the object towards (upon) which the verb’s motion is directed. Of the other instances of the use of *ἐπὶ* in this signification, some have the preposition and a noun in the genitive case qualifying a term that does not express motion, the noun, however, being a designation of space; others, again, and much the larger proportion, qualify the

action or state of the verb by *ἐπί* and the genitive of various nouns the names of objects other than those of space. So that *ἐπί*, with the idea of direction upon and of looking towards, is used in conjunction with the genitive case in three different ways, according to the nature of the verbal idea which it qualifies, and to the character of the object introduced by the genitive case. First, it adds a local qualification of a verb of motion: secondly, a like qualification of an action or state; and, thirdly, a qualification that embraces the circumstances and conditions, generally, that may attend an action or state. It may be remarked that *ἐπί*, in the sense under consideration, and as employed with the genitive case, will be variously rendered in English according to the nature of the action or state qualified, and to that of the object to which it stands in the relation indicated by *ἐπί*, that is, of the noun in the genitive. Thus, it may be rendered by the following terms: 'at,' 'near,' ('towards'); 'at,' 'before,' 'in the presence of,' in Latin, *ad*, *apud*; 'by,' 'of,' 'concerning,' 'about,' 'at,' 'with,' 'for,' 'to meet,' 'according to,' 'with respect to,' 'in,' 'in the case or matter of,' 'upon,' 'about,' 'with a view to.' It may be useful to notice more particularly these various uses of *ἐπί* with the genitive.

α.) 'At,' 'near,' ('towards.') Most nearly related to the use of *ἐπί* with the genitive to qualify verbs of motion, above considered, is the case in which it is employed with the genitive of some local designation to mark the object towards, in the direction of, and, by inference, near which, any thing lies or is placed; where it is rendered in English by 'at,' 'near.' E.g. Herod. vii. 115, *κόλπον τὸν ἐπὶ Ποσειδῶντος ἐξ ἀριστερῆς ἔχων*, 'having, on the left hand, the gulf at, or near, the temple of Poseidon;' Id. vii. 6, *αἱ ἐπὶ Λήμνου ἐπικείμεναι νῆσοι*, 'the islands lying near (properly, towards) Lemnos.' Here it can hardly be questioned that the proper office of *ἐπί* is to show that the objects which it qualifies have the direction of 'upon,' or look towards the designations of place introduced by the genitives *Ποσειδῶντος* and *Λήμνου*; so that *ἐπί*, as here used, shall correspond to the Latin phrase *versus in*. A gulf described as having its

aspect upon or towards the temple of Poseidon may be readily understood to be 'at' or 'near' this object. But the idea of 'at,' 'near,' is inferential, the 'proper relation being that of a direction or looking upon or towards.

β.) 'At,' 'before,' 'in the presence of,' in Latin, *apud*, *coram*. Among the cases in which *ἐπί* with the genitive case marks relative direction, and hence position, is that in which it denotes the circumstances in which an action is performed or an object stands, and where it is nearly equivalent to the English 'at,' 'before,' 'in the presence of,' and to the Latin *apud* and *coram*. E.g. Dem. 1367, 17, *ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαστηρίου ἄνεν ἐρχεμείδιου χρῆσθαι ὅτι ἂν βουλευθῇ, ὡς μοιχῶ ὄντι*, 'before the court,' 'in the presence of the court;' Isocr. 130, α, *ἐπὶ τῶν βωμῶν σφάττουσιν ἀλλήλους*, 'they slay each other at, before, the altars;' but here the sense may, perhaps, more obviously be, 'on the altars;' Demosth. 273, 8, *ἐπωμόσαντο ἐπὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν*, 'they took the oath in the presence of the generals;' so *ἐπὶ μαρτύρων*, *ἐπὶ δικαστῶν λέγειν*, 'to speak before witnesses,' 'before judges.' (See Kühn. Ausf. Gr. ii. p. 295.) E.g. Xen. Hell. vi. 5, 41, *οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγων μοι δοκοῦσι μαρτύρων νῦν ἂν εἰ παθεῖν ὑφ' ὁμῶν*, 'for it seems to me that they will now receive a favor at your hands before many witnesses.'

In such examples, *ἐπί* has the same meaning, properly speaking, with that more obviously seen in former instances, where there was a mere local relation to describe. As in the example from Herodotus vii. 115, *κόλπον τὸν ἐπὶ Ποσειδῶντος ἐξ ἀριστερῆς χερὸς ἔχων*, 'the gulf at or near the temple of Poseidon,' that is, 'having its direction upon, looking towards, the temple of Poseidon;' and Id. vii. 6, *αἱ ἐπὶ Λήμνου ἐπικείμεναι νῆσοι*, 'the islands lying near Lemnos,' that is, 'having their direction upon, or their aspect towards, Lemnos;' with which compare the phrase *ἐπ' οἴκου πλεῖν*, 'to sail homewards,' that is, 'to sail upon home,' 'to sail with a direction upon home.' In the expression *ἐπωμόσαντο ἐπὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν*, 'they took the oath in the presence of the generals,' *ἐπί* shows that the act of taking the oath is to be understood as having its direction upon, as looking or having its aspect towards, the objects represented by *τῶν*

στρατηγῶν; and this, if the action and the parties to it be considered, is equivalent to saying that it was done with a reference to, or 'before,' 'in the presence of,' the generals. With this use of ἐπί with the genitive may be compared that of *apud* with the accusative in Latin, in such expressions as *apud senatum dixit*, 'he spoke before, in the presence of, the senate,' properly, 'at . . . as regards the senate.' The office of the preposition in the case of *apud*, as in the case of ἐπί, is to place the action in a certain relation to the object before, and with reference to which, it is performed; and nothing more is required to suggest the sense which we express in English by 'before,' 'in the presence of.' That the whole business of the preposition is to place the action of the verb and the object which it concerns in some such relative position as that they shall be understood to be connected the one with the other; that the character of the connection is to be inferred chiefly from the nature of the action, of its subject, and of the object with which it stands connected; and that it is only further required of the preposition that its sense shall be appropriate to the relations between the action and the parties to it, would appear from the fact that prepositions so widely different in their proper signification as ἐπί, 'upon,' *apud*, 'at,' and the English 'before,' are equally employed to mark the same relation between the like action of a verb and a noun.

The other examples admit of the same explanation. And not essentially different is the example found in Soph. *Ed. Col.* 746-7, ὁρῶν σε τὸν δούστηνον . . . | . . . κατὰ προσπόλου μῆς | βιοστερῇ χωροῦντα, 'seeing you, in your wretchedness, wandering in penury with a single attendant.' Here ἐπί with the genitive προσπόλου μῆς is added to βιοστερῇ χωροῦντα to show that the state which it represents, the wandering of *Œdipus* in penury, is to be regarded as having an immediate reference to a certain object, namely, προσπόλου μῆς, 'a single attendant.' To this object ἐπί points by virtue of its sense of direction upon or aspect towards, indicating the particular regard or aspect in which the miserable condition of *Œdipus* is intended to be presented; and the genitive προσπόλου μῆς denotes the specific object thus had in view.

The effect is, that προσπόλου μῆς shows the condition or circumstances by which the expression βιοστερῇ χωροῦντα is to be qualified. The nature of the action or state described, and the character of the parties to it, do not allow ἐπί to be here expressed in English by 'at,' nor by 'towards,' nor by 'before,' 'in the presence of,' as in other examples it is, but require that it shall be rendered by 'with.' But it is yet true, that as ἐπὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν, in the instance above examined, describes in what relative circumstances or condition the oath was taken (ἐπωμόσαντο), so ἐπὶ προσπόλου μῆς shows in what relative circumstances or condition the wandering of *Œdipus* in penury (βιοστερῇ χωροῦντα) occurred. The use of the term 'before' or 'in the presence of,' in the one case, and of 'with' in the other, in rendering ἐπί into English, does not prove the construction to be different. With this example from *Sophocles* may be compared *Demosth.* 1000, 21, ἐγὼ μὲν ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου πάντα τὸν χρόνον, 'I was all the time with this name,' or 'having this name;' and *Id.* 230, 19, οὐτ' ἐπ' ἀληθείας μηδεμῶς εἰρημένα, 'spoken with no truth,' 'with no regard to truth.' For a different interpretation of ἐπὶ προσπόλου μῆς, see *Ellendt, Lex. Soph. s. v. ἐπί*, iv. 2, who translates it by "fultus comite," 'resting upon, supported by, a (single) attendant.'

γ.) 'By.' Of the same nature essentially is ἐπί with the genitive when used in such examples as that found in *Herod.* ii. 2, ἐν στέγῃ δὲ ἐρήμῃ ἐπ' ἑωυτῶν κέεσθαι αὐτὰ (ἐνετείλατο), 'he gave orders for them to lie by themselves;' to which add *Id.* v. 98, οἰκούντας τῆς Φρυγίης χωρὶν τε καὶ κώμην ἐπ' ἑωυτῶν, 'inhabiting both a place and village in Phrygia by themselves,' that is, apart from all others; *Id.* ix. 17, ἐκελεύσε σφέας ἐπ' ἑωυτῶν ἵζεσθαι, 'he bade them sit by themselves;' *Æschin.* 33, 4, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἱ συμπρέσβεις ἐγένεμεθα, 'and when, now, we that were associated in the embassy were by ourselves,' that is, apart from all others; *Demosth.* 656, 7, εἰ γὰρ . . . μηδ' ἐφ' ὁμῶν αὐτῶν οἱ τε ἦτε ταῦτα συνείναι, 'for, even if you were not able to understand this of yourselves;' *Id.* 688, 26, οἷον τὴν πατριὸν μετεκίνησε πολιτείαν ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ, 'because he changed of himself the government of his country,' that is, of his own suggestion, at his

own prompting, apart from others; Xen. Anab. ii. 4, 10, οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες αὐτοὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐχώρουν, 'the Greeks went apart by themselves;' Id. Hell. v. 1, 34, ἐπεὶ δὲ . . . αὐτῇ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἡ πόλις ἐγένετο, 'when the state became independent,' that is, when it was separate from the Argives, and stood by itself in its government.

In the first example here cited, ἐπὶ added to *κέεσθαι* shows that the infant children were to lie or be placed so as to have a position that looked towards, or had its direction or aspect upon, some object; and the genitive *ἑωυτῶν* denotes the object to which this position or aspect is to be referred. They were to be placed or lie in a position that had its direction or aspect of 'upon' or 'towards' with respect, not to others, but to themselves. The sentence means, accordingly, that the infants were to be placed in a position that had no relation to any other beings, but only to themselves; and this is equivalent to saying that they were to lie 'by themselves.' The difficulty of interpreting the expression ἐπ' ἑωυτῶν lies quite as much in the genitive *ἑωυτῶν* as in the preposition ἐπὶ. This difficulty, arising from the peculiar nature of the term *ἑωυτῶν*, may be overcome by comparing other like uses of ἐπὶ with the genitive already considered. Thus, it has been seen that, in the phrase αἱ ἐπὶ Λήμνου ἐπικείμεναι νῆσοι, Herod. vii. 6, ἐπὶ Λήμνου added to ἐπικείμεναι shows that the islands had the relative direction of 'upon' or 'towards' with respect to Lemnos, so that the islands are described as 'lying towards Lemnos.' And, in the same way, ἐπ' ἑωυτῶν, as the qualification of *κέεσθαι*, sets forth the situation of the infants as having its direction 'upon' or its aspect 'towards' themselves and no others; and this reference of the direction or aspect of their position to themselves, to the exclusion of every other object, gives the idea conveyed by the English phrase 'by themselves;' for to be placed in a position that looks or has its direction towards one's self, and towards no one else, is the same as being placed by one's self.

δ.) 'Of,' 'concerning,' 'about.' 'Επί with the genitive, having the sense of 'of,' 'concerning,' 'about,' is used in such expressions as ἐπὶ τινος λέγειν, 'to speak of, or about, a person:' e.g. Plat. Charm. p. 155, D, δς εἶπεν ἐπὶ χαλοῦ λέγων

παυδός, 'who said, speaking of a handsome lad;' Demosth. 1392, 23, κοινούς ἐπὶ πάντων ἐπαινούς ποιήσομαι, 'I will speak praises concerning all in common;' Isocr. 124, A, ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως οὐδὲν ἔχω τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, 'of, or concerning, our state, then, I have nothing of the sort to say.' Here ἐπὶ properly signifies 'upon,' with the idea of a direction upon, what is said of an object being conceived as having a relative direction with regard to it, or as being directed upon it. In English also we say, with probably the same idea involved, 'to speak on or upon a subject.' In this construction, therefore, ἐπὶ is employed, as above suggested, in the same way as in such expressions as ἐπ' οἴκου πλεῖν, 'to sail homewards.' As ἐπ' οἴκου, regarded as the qualification of πλεῖν, means, properly, that the sailing has a relative direction of 'upon' with respect to home, and hence signifies 'towards home,' 'homewards,' so ἐπὶ παυδός, as the qualification of λέγειν, shows that the speaking has a relative direction of 'upon' with respect to a lad, and so conveys the idea of its having a reference to, and of being directed upon him, and the phrase may properly be rendered by 'to speak of, or about, him.'

'Against,' 'at.' 'Επί, having the same sense, is sometimes employed with the genitive, where, from the peculiar nature of the action which it qualifies, it is rendered by 'at' or 'against.' E.g. Demosth. 574, 2, ἐπὶ πάντων ὁμοίως ὀργιζόμενοι φαίνεσθε, 'you seem to be angry at, or with, all alike.' It requires no explanation to see that ἐπὶ with the genitive has here the same meaning in fact that was attributed to it just above.

ε.) 'For,' 'to meet,' 'according to.' Even more obviously, perhaps, does ἐπὶ with the genitive involve the notion of direction upon, looking towards, where it is employed in the sense of 'for,' 'to meet,' 'according to.' E.g. Demosth. 484, 20, οὐ γὰρ ᾤετο δεῖν ὁ Σόλων . . . τοὺς νόμους . . . ἐπὶ καιροῦ τεθέντας . . . κυρίους εἶναι, 'for Solon did not consider that the laws should be of force when made for the occasion,' or 'to meet the occasion,' 'according to the exigency.' The meaning is plainly 'looking to,' 'having a view to,' 'with the action directed towards or upon.'

ζ.) 'With respect to,' 'in,' 'in the case of,' 'upon,' 'about,' 'with a view to.' Nearly related to the preceding cases is another use of *ἐπί* with the genitive, that, namely, in which it occurs with such verbs as *ζητεῖν*, *κρίνειν*, *σκοπεῖν*, *λέγειν*, *ἐπιδεικνύειν*, to show in what case, under what circumstances, an action is performed, and where it is rendered in English by 'in the case of,' 'in the matter of,' 'in,' 'with respect to,' 'upon,' 'about,' 'with a view to.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 25, *καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων δὲ, ἣν μὲν ἐν θέρει ὦσι, τὸν ἀρχοντα δεῖ τοῦ ἡλίου πλεονεκτοῦντα φανερόν εἶναι*, 'in the matter of, with respect to, deeds also, it behooves an officer to take advantage of the sun, if it be summer;' Demosth. 18, 1, *ἐπὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἰδεῖν . . . δοκεῖ μοι τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὐνοίαν φανεράν γενομένην τῇ πόλει*, 'it seems to me that a person would see that in, with respect to, many things we have been manifestly favored by the gods.' Here, it may be observed that *ἐπὶ πολλῶν*, 'with respect to many things,' 'in many things,' has corresponding to it, at the end of the same sentence, the expression *οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐν ταῖς παρούσαις πράγμασι*, 'and, above all, in the present affairs.' Æschin. 85, 20, *καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ χρόνου λέγειν σημειῖόν ἐστι ἐπὶ τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀνδρὸς πολιτευομένου*, 'and the speaking after an interval of time is the sign of a man that orders his conduct in public affairs according to, with a view to, the exigency of the times and to what is convenient;' Id. 55, 41, *οἱ δὲ ἀπείσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων*, 'others are absent upon, about, with a view to, their private affairs.'

In such cases, *ἐπί* signifies 'having a direction upon or towards,' 'looking to,' as in preceding instances, and the genitive marks the object with respect to which specifically the action has this direction or aspect. But the translation of *ἐπί* is varied, as above explained, to suit the nature of the action and the character of the parties to it. Thus, in the last example, *ἀπείσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων*, while the sense is, properly, that 'their absence looks to, has its direction upon or towards, their private affairs,' the rendering in English may be either, 'they are absent upon their private affairs,' where the term 'upon' exactly answers to the Greek *ἐπί*, or, 'they are absent about their private affairs.' But, in the

first example, *ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων . . . δεῖ . . . τοῦ ἡλίου πλεονεκτοῦντα φανερόν εἶναι, ἐπί*, having the same sense, namely, pointing to *τῶν πράξεων*, and showing 'upon,' in view of what, the sentiment is expressed that it becomes an officer to take advantage of the sun in summer, must be rendered by 'in the case of,' 'in,' or 'with respect to.'

η.) 'On the ground,' 'for the reason,' 'in view of.' In such examples as Herod. iv. 45, *οὐδ' ἔχω συμβαλέσθαι ἐπ' ὅτε μὴ εὐόση γῇ οὐνόματα τριφάσια κέεται*, 'nor can I even conjecture why (wherefore) three different names are given to one land,' *ἐπί* with the genitive has the sense of 'on the ground,' 'for the reason,' and the meaning of the preposition is the same as in the preceding cases. For its proper office here is to show in what view, looking to what, an action is performed; that is, to indicate, according to the power which so many examples have proved it to have, direction upon, and the having an aspect towards. When, in the example cited, Herodotus says, 'nor can I even conjecture on what grounds three different names are given to one land,' the giving three different names is shown, by the addition of *ἐπί*, to be done 'in view of,' that is, properly, with a direction upon, or an aspect towards, some object; and this object is designated by the genitive case, according to the common meaning of this case. So that the sense is, 'nor can I even conjecture in view of what, or on what grounds, three different names are given to one land.'

2. 'Over.' 'Επί with the genitive case is occasionally employed in the sense of 'over,' a meaning plainly derived from that of 'on,' 'upon.' E.g. Herod. v. 109, *ἡμεῖς μὲν νυν ἐπ' οὗ ἐτάχθημεν, ταύτῃ πειρησόμεθα εἶναι χρηστοί*, 'we will endeavor to be useful in the business over which we were appointed;' Demosth. 309, 10, *τῷ διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων*, 'by corrupting those over, that is, having the charge of, affairs;' Xen. Anab. iii. 2, 36, *εἰ οὖν ἀποδεχθεῖν τινὰς χρή ἐπὶ | τῶν πλευρῶν ἐκατέρων εἶναι*, 'if, therefore, an appointment were made of persons whose duty it should be to be over, that is, to command, have charge of, either flank.' The genitive, in this construction, has its common sense of 'with respect to.' Thus, in the last example, *τινὰς χρή εἶναι*

is qualified by *ἐπί*, showing that the persons spoken of would be in the relation of 'over,' and the genitive *τῶν πλευρῶν ἐκατέρων* is added to mark the object to which specifically this relative position is referred. The whole phrase means, 'whose duty it should be to be over . . . with respect to either flank.'

3. Superaddition. *Ἐπί* is further used with the genitive case in the sense of superaddition; and this meaning, as has been already seen, is derived immediately from the proper notion of 'on,' 'upon,' belonging to *ἐπί*, the addition expressed by this preposition being made by placing one thing upon another. Thus:

a. 'At a time,' &c. *Ἐπί* is used with the genitive of numerals, in such expressions as *ἐφ' ἑνός*, 'one at a time,' 'by ones,' in Latin, *singulatim*, *ἐπὶ τριῶν*, 'by threes,' 'three deep,' *ἐπὶ τεττάρων*, 'four at a time,' 'by fours,' 'four deep.' In all these and such examples, *ἐπί* with the genitive is used to express the arrangement or distribution of a number of objects into equal parts or groups, by making successive additions of the same number, 'one upon one,' 'two upon two,' and so forth, until the whole number is exhausted. Thus, Xen. *Cyrop.* ii. 3, 21, *ἰδὼν ταξίαρχον ἄγοντα τὴν τάξιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν ἐφ' ἑνός*, 'upon seeing a taxiarch leading his battalion to the left in single file,' that is, 'by ones,' 'one upon one;' Id. *Anab.* i. 2, 15, *ἐτάχθησαν ἐπὶ τεττάρων*, 'they were drawn up four deep,' that is, 'by fours,' 'four upon four;' Id. *Hell.* iii. 4, 12, *ἐπὶ τεττάρων παρατεταγμένοι*, 'drawn up alongside four deep;' Id. *ib.*, *τὸ βάθος ἐπὶ πολλῶν*, 'many deep,' 'each rank many deep,' 'by many at a time;' Id. *Cyrop.* ii. 4, 2, *ἐν ὀλίγῳ δὲ χρόνῳ ἐγένετο τὸ μὲν μέτωπον ἐπὶ τριακοσίων*, . . . *τὸ δὲ βάθος ἐφ' ἑκατόν*, 'in a little time the front (of the column) was of three hundred men, but the depth reached a hundred;' that is, counting the men composing the column by the front, the ranks were of three hundred each, or they were drawn up 'by three hundreds,' while the depth reached a hundred, that is, counting from front to rear, the column was arranged by hundreds; Id. *Anab.* v. 2, 6, *ἦν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑνός ἡ κατάβασις ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου*, 'the descent from the stronghold was made in single file,' or

'one by one.' Here *ἐπί*, having the sense of superaddition, derived from the notion of putting one thing upon another, *ἐφ' ἑνός*, 'one at a time,' 'by ones,' 'in single file,' means, properly, 'one upon one,' and *ἐπὶ τριῶν*, 'by threes,' 'three at a time,' 'three deep,' is equivalent to 'three upon three,' and so on. More precisely, and to account for the use of both the preposition and the case, *ἐπί* is the sign of the addition, or of the placing number upon number, and the noun in the genitive case denotes the specific class or denomination of numbers to which the superposition is to be referred, that is, in which the addition is made. Thus, in *ἐπὶ τριῶν ταχθῆναι*, 'to be drawn up by threes,' *ἐπί* shows that the arrangement is made by superadditions, a number upon a number, as one upon one, two upon two, or any other number upon the same number; and the genitive *τριῶν* shows that the number taken for superaddition belongs to the threes, or that the specific number by which addition is made is denoted by three. In English, also, a like mode of distributing a number into equal divisions is employed, the term 'by' being used as a sign of addition, as in the expression 'one by one;' only the English counts off the divisions, or makes the successive additions, by placing them alongside the one of the other, 'by,' the German *bei*, meaning 'by the side of,' 'at.'

b. 'After,' 'for,' 'from.' A second set of examples in which *ἐπί* has the sense of addition is that in which it is used with such words as *καλεῖσθαι*, 'to be called,' 'to be named,' and corresponds to the English 'after,' 'for,' 'from:' e.g. Herod. vii. 40, *Νισαῖοι δὲ καλέονται ἵπποι ἐπὶ τοῦδε*, 'they are called Nisæan horses from this circumstance;' Id. vii. 74, *ἐπὶ δὲ Λυδοῦ τοῦ Ἄλκυος ἔσχον (οἱ Λυδοὶ) τὴν ἐπωνυμίην*, 'the Lydians had their appellation from Lydus.' In the former of these examples, the fact that the horses are called Nisæan (*Νισαῖοι καλέονται ἵπποι*) is qualified by the addition of *ἐπὶ τοῦδε*, 'from this circumstance;' and, in this qualification, *ἐπί* shows that the calling the horses Nisæan is a matter of superaddition, the meaning being, properly, 'they are called Nisæan horses by way of addition;' and the genitive *τοῦδε* marks the object with respect to which this superaddition is

affirmed, that to which it is made, and, by being made to it, does in fact repeat it. When it is said of horses that they are called Nisæan from this circumstance, (*Νισαῖοι καλέονται ἵπποι ἐπὶ τοῦδε*, scil. *Νισαίου πεδίου*.) the meaning is, properly, according to the Greek construction, that the name of Nisæan borne by the horses is a superaddition to the Nisæan plain; or that by giving to the horses the name of Nisæan belonging to a plain so called, there is made a superaddition of the name of Nisæan (horses) to the name (Nisæan) of the plain. In the same way, when it is said that the Lydians were named after Lydus, the sense is, according to the Greek way of representing it by means of *ἐπὶ* and the genitive, that the name of Lydians (*Λυδοί*) which they bore was a superaddition to the name of Lydus, the repetition of the name of Lydus (*Λυδός*) made by giving it to another being a superaddition to the name of Lydus. In this latter example, as well as in the former, the genitive introduces the object with respect to which the superaddition and repetition is affirmed, or to which it is restricted; that is, the genitive *Λυδοῦ* shows that the name *Λυδοί* is an addition upon (*ἐπὶ*) and repetition of the name of Lydus exclusively.

II. *Ἐπὶ* with the dative case.

1. *a.* 'On,' 'upon.' *Ἐπὶ* is used with the dative also in its proper sense of superposition, being rendered in English by 'on,' 'upon.' E.g. Herod. v. 77, *κληρούχους ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ λέπουσι*, 'they left cleruchi in, properly on, the district;' Id. vii. 217, *ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῷ ἀκρωτηρίῳ τοῦ οὐρεως*, 'they were on the spur of the mountain;' Æsch. fragm. 302, *ἔσσι κλέμωι κλεῖς ἐπὶ γλώσση φύλαξ*, 'I too have a guardian key upon my tongue;' Herod. vii. 41, *ἐπὶ τοῖσι δόρασι ροαῖς εἶχον χρυσέας*, 'on their spears they had golden pomegranates.' The use of the dative case, in such examples, depends, probably, upon the notion of superposition, 'on,' 'upon,' contained in the preposition itself, which would seem to be appropriately followed by the dative of the final object, that is, of the object beneficially or injuriously affected, just as *ὁμοιως*, 'like,' *ἴσος*, 'equal,' and the like, are followed by that case.

It may be remarked that *ἐπὶ* is thus used after verbs of motion also: e.g. Soph. Antig. 246, *καπὶ χρωτὶ διψίαν κόνιν παλύνεις*, 'and upon his body having sprinkled dry dust;' Id. Aj. 338, *καπ' ἐμοὶ βλέψας*, 'having looked upon me.' In such examples, the use of the dative is to be explained in the way that has just been mentioned, namely, as depending on the notion of superposition contained in *ἐπὶ*.

b. 'On,' 'at,' 'near.' *Ἐπὶ* with the dative case is sometimes equivalent, not only to the English 'on,' 'upon,' but also to 'at,' 'near.' E.g. Herod. iii. 16, *ἀποθανόντα ἐθαψαν ἐπὶ τῇσι θύρῃσι*, 'they buried him at, near, the gate;' Id. vii. 75, *οἰκούντες ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι*, 'dwelling on the Strymon;' Id. vii. 89, *οὗτοι οἱ Φοίνικες τὸ παλαιὸν οἶκον ἐπὶ τῇ Ἐρυθρῇ θαλάσῃ*, 'these Phœnicians anciently dwelt on the Red sea;' Xen. Anab. vi. 2, 4, *ξύλα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ναυπηγήσιμα ἐπ' αὐτῇ τῇ θαλάττῃ*, 'much fine ship-timber on, at, the very sea;' Id. ib. i. 2, 8, *βασίλεια . . . ἐπὶ ταῖς πηγαῖς τοῦ Μαρσίου ποταμοῦ*, 'a palace at, or on, the sources of the river Marsyas;' Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 405, *Καπανεύς ἐπ' Ἠλέκτρασιν εἰληχεν πύλιν*, 'Capaneus hath obtained his post at the gate of Electra.'

In such examples, *ἐπὶ* is employed, as has been already explained, in an accommodated sense, just as 'on' is used in English in such expressions as 'the town is situated on the river;' that is, it marks the relative situation of 'on,' 'upon,' yet without the idea of literal superposition. When Herodotus says of the Phœnicians that they dwelt on the Red sea, *ἐπὶ τῇ Ἐρυθρῇ θαλάσῃ*, he does not mean that they dwelt upon the very waters of the sea, but only what we sufficiently indicate by saying that they dwelt 'on,' 'at,' 'near,' the sea. And yet neither 'at' nor 'near' can be said to represent exactly the sense of *ἐπὶ*. They can be substituted for the proper sense of 'on,' only because of the more general and figurative way in which *ἐπὶ* here expresses the relation of 'upon.' In this construction *ἐπὶ* should be immediately conjoined in sense with the verb, as, *οἶκον ἐπὶ*, 'they dwelt upon,' *ἐθαψαν ἐπὶ*, 'they buried upon;' and the dative case, which depends in some sort upon the substantive idea of the verb as qualified by *ἐπὶ*, but more immediately upon the idea of superposition contained in the

preposition itself, should be understood as marking the object ultimately affected, that is, as being used in the same sense precisely as after *ἴσος*, 'equal,' *ὅμοιος*, 'like,' *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same,' &c. The idea of the dative so employed is, in fact, hardly more difficult to apprehend, allowing for the difference between a personal and any other object standing as the final aim of an action or state, than in such expressions as *ἐπιτίθεσθαι τινι*, 'to set upon, to attack, a person.' And, if this be admitted, the dative, as was above said, is more immediately dependent for its use upon the sense of 'upon' contained in the preposition.

c. 'On,' 'at,' 'in.' In the same way, *ἐπί* with the dative case is employed to mark the time or occasion to which an action is referred, where it is rendered in English by 'on,' 'at,' 'in;' the only difference between this and the preceding case being found in the nature of the object to which the relative position expressed by *ἐπί* is referred. E.g. Il. viii. 529, *ἀλλ' ἵτοι ἐπὶ νυκτὶ φυλάτσομεν ἡμέας αὐτούς*, 'but, indeed, at night we will guard ourselves;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 12, *τοιούτους μὲν αὐτοῖς εὐθυμίας παρεῖχεν ἐπὶ τῷ δείπνῳ*, 'such entertainment did he afford them at supper;' Id. ib. i. 4, 24, *ὅτι ἑώρα τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ πάππου ἡγριωμένον ἐπὶ τῇ θεᾷ τῇ αὐτοῦ*, 'because he saw his grandfather's countenance angry at the sight of him;' Id. Memorab. i. 5, 2, *εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου γενόμενοι*, 'and if, when we are at the end of life;' Id. ib. ii. 2, 8, *ἃ οὐκ ἂν τις ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ παντὶ βούλοιο ἀκοῦσαι*, 'which a person would not wish to hear in his whole life;' Id. Anab. vii. 3, 34, *ὥς δ' ἦν ἥλιος ἐπὶ δυσμαῖς*, 'when the sun was at his setting,' 'at sunset.' In such examples, *ἐπί* means 'on' in the same sense that this word is used in English in designations of time; as, 'on the fourth day;' and this notwithstanding that 'in' and 'at' may sometimes be substituted for 'on' as the rendering of *ἐπί*. The dative, in this construction, is to be explained as depending immediately on the sense of 'upon' contained in *ἐπί*, just as in the designations of place above considered.

The examples cited by Passow (Lex. s. v. *ἐπί*) as having *ἐπί* with the dative in the sense of distribution, to wit, Od. ii. 284, *ὅς δ' ἂν σφί σχεδὸν ἔστιν ἐπ' ἡμῖν πάντας ὀλέσθαι*, 'who

(death) is daily near them to destroy them all,' and Od. xiv. 105, *τῶν αἰεὶ σφιν ἕκαστος ἐπ' ἡμῖν μῆλον ἀγινεῖ*, 'each of whom ever brings for them a sheep daily,' are properly to be referred to this place. In the former example, the proper interpretation is probably different from that given in Passow's Lexicon, the sense being rather, 'who is near them, so as for them all to perish in a day.' See Loewe, ad loc., who translates by "*ut omnes uno die pereant.*" In the latter example, the sense of distribution can hardly with fairness be attributed to *ἐπί*, but is to be inferred from the other terms employed, as *αἰεὶ*, *ἕκαστος*, and the imperfect tense *ἀγινεῖ*, and from the circumstances of the narrative. In both examples, *ἐπ' ἡμῖν* means no more than 'on, or in, a day.' In the former, death is said to be near the suitors, to destroy them all in (on) a day; in the latter each one brings a sheep (on, in) a day. Compare Il. x. 48-9, cited by Loewe, *οὐ γὰρ πω ἰδόμεν, οὐδ' ἔκλυον ἀνδρῶν, | ἀνδρ' ἕνα τοσσάδε μέρμερ' ἐπ' ἡμῖν μητίσασθαι*, 'I have not yet seen, nor from one that told of him have I heard of, a man that devised so many mischiefs in (on) a day.'

d. 'Depending on,' 'in the power of.' 'Επί with the dative is used also in the sense of 'depending on,' 'in the power or hands of.' E.g. Herod. viii. 29, *ἐπ' ἡμῖν ἔστι . . . ἡνδραποδίσθαι ὑμέας*, 'it is in our hands, or power, to enslave you;' Soph. Phil. 991, *μὴ πὶ τῷδ' ἔστω τάδε*, 'let not this be permitted to this man;' that is, 'let it not lie in this man's power to do so.' Philoctetes has threatened to cast himself down from the rock, and so destroy himself; and Odysseus bids his attendants seize him, and not allow him the opportunity to do it; Id. Ed. Col. 66, *ἀρχεῖ τις αὐτῶν, ἢ πὶ τῷ πλήθει λόγος*; 'does some one rule over them, or is the authority in the hands of the multitude?' Isocr. 376, e, *ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις γενόμενοι*, 'having come to be in the power of the enemy.'

Here, from the signification of 'upon' *ἐπί* obtains that of 'resting upon,' and so of 'depending on,' and of being 'in the power of,' 'in the hands of.' The dative, as marking the object upon which a thing lies or rests, upon which there is superposition, naturally follows *ἐπί* for the same

reason that this case is used after *ικανός*, 'suitable,' *ἴσος*, 'equal,' *ὅμοιος*, 'like,' *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same,' and the like.

e. 'On condition.' *Ἐπί* is frequently used with the dative case in the sense of 'on condition:' e.g. Herod. iii. 83, *ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ ὑπεξίσταμαι τῆς ἀρχῆς*, *ἐπ' ᾧ τε ὑπ' οὐδενός ὑμέων ἀρξομαι*, 'I surrender my claims to the government on this condition, that I shall not be ruled over by any one of you;' Id. vii. 158, *ἐπὶ λόγῳ τοιῷδε τάδε ὑπίσχομαι*, *ἐπ' ᾧ ἡγεμὼν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔσομαι*, 'I promise this on a condition of this sort, that I shall be commander-in-chief of the Greeks;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 11, *ἴσους γὰρ ἔφ' οἷς αὐτοὺς Κυαξάρης ἀγεται συμμάχους*, 'for they know on what terms Cyaxares leads them as allies.'

It was shown, in treating of the significations of *ἐπί*, that the notion of condition which this preposition here obtains is to be referred to the sense of 'resting upon' or 'depending upon,' itself derived immediately from the primary signification of 'upon' or superposition. Thus, in the first example cited, when Otanes says, *ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὑπεξίσταμαι τῆς ἀρχῆς*, 'I surrender my claims to the government on this condition,' he makes the act of surrendering his claims to rest or depend upon the fact or state of things represented by *τούτῳ*, namely, his not being ruled over by any one of his fellow-conspirators, *ἐπ' ᾧ ὑπ' οὐδενός ὑμέων ἀρξομαι*; or, what is the same thing in reality, he makes this fact the condition of withdrawing his claims to the government. If this explanation of the proper meaning of *ἐπί* be admitted, the dative case, as here used, must be regarded as depending on the sense of resting or depending upon contained in *ἐπί*, in the way that was above explained.

f. Occasion, ground; 'for,' 'on account of,' 'upon.' *Ἐπί* is sometimes used with the dative case to mark the ground or reason of an action or state, that 'for' or 'on account of' which it is or is done, being rendered in English by 'for,' 'on account of,' 'upon,' and occasionally by 'at.' Besides other instances, *ἐπί* is very frequently met with in this sense in connection with verbs which express states of the mind; as, *θαυμάζειν*, *θαυμάζεσθαι ἐπὶ τινι*, 'to admire,' 'to be ad-

mired for a thing,' *φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τινι*, 'to pride one' self upon a thing,' *ἀνῆσθαι ἐπὶ τινι*, 'to be vexed on account of a thing;' and so with verbs expressing sentiments of approbation, of blame, and the like; as *ἐπαινεῖν ἐπὶ τινι*, 'to commend for a thing,' *γελάειν ἐπὶ τινι*, 'to laugh at a thing.' E.g. Plat. Menon, init., *πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοῖ . . . ἐθαυμάζοντο ἐφ' ἱππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ*, *νῦν δὲ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ*, 'formerly the Thessalians were admired for their horsemanship and wealth, but now, as it seems to me, for wisdom (philosophy) also;' Herod. iv. 4, *ἐκπλαγέντας ἐπὶ τῷ γενομένῳ*, 'alarmed at what had occurred;' Id. iii. 40, *ἐπ' ᾧ σὺ ἀπολομένῳ μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλήσεις*, 'for the loss of which you will be most pained;' Plat. Symp. 217, A, *ἐφρόνουν γὰρ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῇ ὥρῃ θαυμάσιον ὤσων*, 'I was marvellously proud of my beauty;' Xen. Hell. iv. 4, 15, *φοβούμενοι μὴ τοὺς φάσκοντας ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ φεύγειν κατὰγειν*, 'fearing they would restore those who said they were in exile for favoring the Lacedæmonians;' Herod. i. 137, *ἐπὶ μῇ αἰτίῃ (μυθῆνα) ἀνέχεστον πάθος ἔρδειν*, 'that no one should inflict a capital injury for a single cause of blame;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 16, *ἐπὶ μᾶ δὲ ποτε δίκῃ πληγὰς ἔλαβον*, 'once upon a time, now, I was beaten for one decision.'

As already explained, *ἐπί*, in such examples, has properly the notion of resting or depending upon, itself derived from that of 'upon' or superposition. Thus, in the last example, the fact of receiving blows contained in *πληγὰς ἔλαβον* rests or depends upon the having made a single decision, as is shown by the added phrase *ἐπὶ μᾶ δίκῃ*; and, by making the receiving blows to rest or depend upon the giving a single decision, it is at once suggested that the latter is the occasion, ground, or reason of the former. Just as, in the preceding set of examples, the idea of condition is suggested by the same relation of resting or depending upon. As in former examples, so here, the dative is appropriately used to mark the object upon which another is placed, and upon which by consequence it depends for its ground or reason.

g. Object or end had in view, motive; 'for,' 'with a view to.' Nearly related to the above use of *ἐπί* is that in which it is used with the dative to denote the object

or end had in view in an action, that for which it is performed, the motive that prompts it, commonly expressed in English by 'for,' 'with a view to.' E.g. Herod. i. 68, *ἐπὶ κακῷ ἀνθρώπου σίδηρος ἀνεύρηται*, 'iron has been discovered for the hurt of men;' Id. iii. 59, *οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ πλέοντες*, 'as they did not sail with a view to this;' Plat. Apol. 20, *ε*, *ἀλλ' ὅς τις φησι ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει*, 'and says it with the view of calumniating me;' Aristoph. Ach. 13-14, *ῥνίχ' ἐπὶ μόσχῳ ποτὲ | Δεξιθεὸς εἰσῆλθ' ῥσόμενος Βουώτιον*, 'to sing for a calf;' Herod. iii. 38, *ἐπὶ κόσμῳ ἂν χρήματι βουλοίαιτο τοὺς πατέρας ἀποδινέσκοντας κατασιτέεσθαι*, 'for what sum of money;' Xen. Symp. i. 5, *σὺ μὲν Πρωταγόρῳ τε πολὺν ἀργύριον δέδωκας ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ*, 'you have given Protagoras a large sum of money for (teaching you) philosophy.'

Here *ἐπὶ* obtains its sense of 'for,' 'with a view to,' or of the object aimed at, in the same way substantially that it gets the notion of condition, and of ground, reason, motive; namely, it marks the object upon which an action rests or depends; and as this may be the condition, ground, or reason, so may it be also the end, the object had in view, or the motive of it. When it is said, in the second example cited, 'as they did not sail with this view,' it is plain that the phrase *ἐπὶ τούτῳ*, which is added to the chief statement *οὐ πλέοντες*, shows, if *ἐπὶ* have its most obvious signification, that the act of sailing is to be understood as in some way resting or depending upon the fact represented by *τούτῳ*; and that as the circumstances of the case may elsewhere suggest that the thing upon which an action rests or depends is its condition or ground, so they may here suggest that it is its motive or end had in view. With regard to the employment of the dative case with *ἐπὶ* in the sense of the motive or end had in view, it should be referred, just as in the preceding cases, to the notion of superposition, and hence of resting or depending on, properly belonging to the preposition, and which is here also involved.

h. Personal object had in view; 'for,' 'against.' To this place may properly be referred the use of *ἐπὶ* with the dative case to indicate the personal object 'for' whom, that is, with a view to whose benefit or injury, a thing is done,

or its final aim. E.g. Il. xxiii. 776, *οὗς ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ πέμνεν πόδας ὠκύς Ἀχιλλεύς*, 'the oxen which Achilles slew for Patroclus;' Il. i. 382, *ἦκε δ' ἐπ' Ἀργείοισι κακὸν βέλος*, 'sent a deadly arrow against the Argives;' Herod. vi. 88, *πᾶν μηχανήσασθαι ἐπ' Ἀἰγινήτῃσι*, 'to devise every thing against the Æginetæ;' Herod. i. 61, *μαθὼν τὰ ποιούμενα ἐπ' ἐωυτῷ*, 'upon learning what was doing against him;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 39, *τάς μηχανάς δς ἐπὶ τοῖς πάνυ μικροῖς θηρίοις ἐμχανῶ*, 'which you contrived against (for) animals that were very small.'

Here both *ἐπὶ* and the dative obviously have the same explanation with that given in the preceding cases. Whether *ἐπὶ* shall be rendered by 'for,' or by 'against,' will depend, of course, upon the nature of the action which it qualifies, and upon the obvious relations of the parties to it. While, in the first example, it is plain that the offering of victims by Achilles was made to do honor to his friend Patroclus, it is equally so, in the last example, that the nets contrived by the fowler were intended to harm the birds. In the former case, accordingly, *ἐπὶ* is translated by 'for,' in the latter by 'against.'

To this case of the use of *ἐπὶ* may be referred also the examples in which it is employed with the dative of the person, in such phrases as *γελῶν ἐπὶ τινι*, 'to laugh at a person;' thus admitting a natural distinction between *ἐπὶ* with the dative of the person, and *ἐπὶ* with the dative of the thing, after *γελῶν* and such verbs. The latter was above considered to express the occasion or ground of the verb's action, and the former may properly be regarded as denoting the object for which it is performed. E.g. Xen. Symp. ii. 17, *γελᾶτε, ἔφη, ἐπ' ἐμοί; πότερον ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ βούλομαι γυμναζόμενος μᾶλλον ὑγιαίνειν*, 'do you laugh at me, said he? is it for this, if I choose by exercising myself to have better health?' Here the use of the dative *ἐμοί* after *γελῶν ἐπὶ* is the same precisely in its character with the dative of the person attending many verbs compounded with *ἐπὶ*; e.g. Xen. de Venat. xii. 16, *πολλὰ ἐπιτιμῶσι τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις*, 'they find much fault with those that are educated;' Id. Apol. i. 2, 31, *ἐμίσει τὸν Σωκράτην . . . ἐπηρεάζων ἔκρινεν, καὶ*

τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτεμώμενον ἐπιφέρειν αὐτῷ. It may possibly be worth remarking, also, that the English 'at,' in the phrase 'to laugh at,' answering to γελῶν ἐπὶ, has undergone the same change in sense as compared with 'at' in such expressions as 'to strike at,' 'to throw at,' that 'on,' in the phrase 'to look on,' has undergone as compared with the meaning which it has in the forms 'to stand on,' 'to cast on.'

i. Result or effect; 'for,' 'so as to cause,' &c. In some examples, ἐπὶ with the dative case would seem to mark the end reached or result attained, and to be, therefore, equivalent in English to the phrase 'so as to result in,' or 'having for its effect,' although sometimes capable of being rendered by 'for.' E.g. Soph. Antig. 787-8, cited, together with the following examples, by Ellendt, Lex. Soph., σὺ καὶ δικαίων ἀδίκους | φρένας παρασπᾶς ἐπὶ λῶβῳ, 'you pervert minds so as to injure others,' ὥστε λωβῆσθαι ἄλλους; Id. Aj. 143-4, μεγάλοι θύρῳροι κατέχουσ' ἡμῶς | ἐπὶ δυσκλείᾳ, 'to our discredit,' that is, 'so as to discredit us;' Id. Antig. 758-9, . . . ἀλλ' οὐ, τόνδ' Ὀλυμπόν, ἴσθ' ὅτι | χαίρων ἐπὶ φόβοις δεινὰς ἐμέ, 'nay, by Olympus here, thou shalt not with impunity revile me with reproaches,' that is, 'and so bestow reproaches on me;' Id. Electr. 108-11, . . . οὐ λήξω . . . | μὴ οὐ τεκνολέτειρ' ὥς τις ἀγδών, | ἐπὶ κωκυτῷ, τῶνδε πατρῶν | πρὸ θυρῶν, ἡχῶ πῦσι προφωνεῖν, 'like some nightingale robbed of her young, I will not cease from uttering a cry with wailings before this my paternal threshold in the hearing of all.' 'Ἐπὶ κωκυτῷ added to ἡχῶ προφωνεῖν shows that the cry will be very lamentable, so as to be a wailing, or shriek of woe: this, assuming ἐπὶ to have, here also, the sense of the end reached, attributed to it in preceding examples. And not only does this seem to be the most probable meaning of ἐπὶ in this and the other passages cited, but it is one perfectly consistent with those meanings which it has been seen to have in the immediately foregoing examples, and is not therefore improbable in itself. For, more nearly considered, that which is here expressed by ἐπὶ and the dative, that is, the end reached or the result attained, has its origin in the same meaning of ἐπὶ that enables it to convey the ideas of

condition, of ground or reason, and of motive or end had in view. In all these the fundamental idea contained in ἐπὶ is that of being or resting upon; and when ἐπὶ with this meaning is conjoined to a noun in the dative case, the notion given is that of an object upon which an action rests or depends, either as its condition, or as its ground or reason, or as its motive or end had in view. The proper idea conveyed by ἐπὶ in these meanings is that of being or resting upon, or depending upon; and this is common to all; the other significations are all alike derivative. In the present case likewise, ἐπὶ and the dative mark the object upon which an action is figuratively represented as being or having its position; and from this notion of an object upon which an action is conceived as standing or having its position is derived, again, that of the circumstances and character of an action. When it is said, ἔθαψαν ἐπὶ τῇσι θύρῃσι, 'they buried him at (figuratively 'on') the gates,' ἐπὶ τῇσι θύρῃσι describes, not merely the place, but also the circumstances and peculiar character of the burial; and so, when it is said, φρένας παρασπᾶς ἐπὶ λῶβῳ, 'you pervert minds to the injury of others,' ἐπὶ λῶβῳ, marking primarily the relative position of the action, comes secondarily to describe the circumstances and character of the act of perverting minds, φρένας παρασπᾶν, as being one attended by injury to others; and when it is said, Herod. i. 68, ἐπὶ κακῷ ἀνθρώπου σίδηρος ἀνεύρηται, 'iron has been discovered to the hurt of man,' the effect of adding to the proposition σίδηρος ἀνεύρηται the qualification of ἐπὶ κακῷ ἀνθρώπου is to mark some characteristic circumstance or condition belonging to or attending upon the discovery of iron; and, again, when ἐφ' ἱππικῇ is added to ἐθαυμάζοντο, in the sentence Θετταλοὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο ἐφ' ἱππικῇ, Plat. Menon, init., it shows the state or condition of things in which the Thessalians were admired, in the matter of horsemanship. This, then, is common to all these notions of condition, ground or reason, motive or end had in view, and result or answering effect, as expressed by ἐπὶ and the dative, that they mark the condition or circumstances of an action, and that this is derived, either primarily from the notion of having a position upon,

or secondarily from that of resting or depending upon. The expression of condition, and of ground or reason, as well as that of motive or end had in view, are more nearly allied to the secondary notion of resting or depending upon, and that of result or end attained to the primary sense of position on, of which that of circumstances and condition is a mere variety; but they are not essentially different. The diversity of meanings that may be represented by this common idea of the circumstances or condition of an action, namely, condition, ground or reason, motive or end had in view, and result or answering effect, depends, not upon *ἐπί*, not upon the dative, but on the character of the action and of the noun which with *ἐπί* marks its circumstances or condition. From these alone can be divined the peculiar object to be answered by the descriptive circumstances introduced by *ἐπί* and the dative, whether they are to denote a mere local relation of superposition, or the circumstances more generally, or a condition, or a ground or reason, or a motive or end had in view, or an effect or end attained. If this view be correct, and if *ἐπί φόγοις* and *ἐπί κακωτῶ*, while they describe attending circumstances of the actions which they qualify, do also represent the effects answering to these actions, they may be properly expressed in English by 'with reproaches,' 'with wailings,' or by 'so as to give reproaches,' 'so as to make a wailing.'

It is proper to mention that a different interpretation has been given of the above-mentioned use of *ἐπί* with the dative. Thus, with regard to *ἐπί φόγοις*, Soph. Antig. 758-9, Ellendt, Lex. Soph. i. p. 648, considers it as expressing object or end, translating it by "*mei reprehendendi causa*;" and so of *ἐπί κακωτῶ*, Soph. Electr. 108, which he renders by "*alios ad lugenulum provocantem*." Schneidewin, on the contrary, in his note on Soph. Antig. l. cit., renders *ἐπί φόγοις* by "*mit Vorwürfen*," 'with reproaches,' referring to *ἐπί κακωτῶ*, Soph. Electr. 108, and to *κλέπτειν ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇ, καταστένειν τινα ἐπὶ δάκρυσι καὶ ῥόοις*, as like examples, and may be considered as sustaining the interpretation here given, although he furnishes no explanation.

2. 'Over.' '*Επί* is used with the dative in the sense of 'over,' 'having charge of,' 'having authority over,' in such examples as Xen. Anab. iv. 1, 13, *καὶ πολλοὶ δὴ αὐτῶν, οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὄντες, ἀπόμαχοι ἦσαν*, 'now many of them, who had charge of these, or were over these, were withdrawn from the ranks;' Id. ib. iv. 4, 19, *καταλείποντες . . . στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς μένουσι Σοφαίνετον Στυμφάλειον*, 'having left Sophænetus of Stymphalus as commander over those who remained behind;' Dem. 928, 11, *αὐτὸς γὰρ ἔφη . . . τὸν αὐταδελφὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ . . . πλευσεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς χρήμασι*, 'for he himself said that his own brother would sail as supercargo,' 'in charge of the goods;' Xen. Cyrop. vi. 3, 28, *ὅς ἀρχεὶς τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς μηχαναῖς*, 'who are chief of the engineers,' 'who have command of those who are in charge of, or are over, the engines.'

In this use of *ἐπί* it has properly, as before mentioned, the sense of 'on,' 'upon,' the idea of 'over,' whether considered as expressing a merely local relation, or taken figuratively, as here, to denote authority or supervision, being immediately derived from this. And in this class of examples, even more obviously than in some of those that have been previously considered, the dative case depends for its use upon the sense of the preposition itself.

Here belong, as having *ἐπί* employed in a like figurative sense, though one more nearly approaching the idea of local superposition, such examples as Plut. Sympos. 214, A, *οὕτως οὔτε τι λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῇ κύλασι οὔτ' ἐπ' ἄδομεν*, 'do we thus neither narrate nor sing any thing over our cups?'

3. a. 'In addition to,' 'besides,' 'with.' In many examples *ἐπί* is used with the dative in the sense of 'in addition to,' 'besides,' 'with.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 11, *ὅταν καρδαμον ἔχῃσι ἐπὶ τῷ σίτῳ*, 'whenever they have crosses in addition to their bread,' or 'with their bread;' Id. Anab. iii. 2, 4, *ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀμώσας ἡμῖν*, 'having, in addition to this, given us his oath;' Soph. Trach. 1242, *καπὶ τοῖσδε τὴν χάριν ταχεῖαν πρόσθε*, 'and, besides this, bestow your service promptly;' Id. Œd. Col. 550, *δευτέρῳ ἐπαισας ἐπὶ νόσῳ νόσον*, 'you inflicted a second calamity in addition to the one I

bad;' Id. Antig. 590, *πήματα ἐπὶ πήμασι πίπτοντα*, 'disasters happening upon disasters.'

The notion of addition which *ἐπὶ* expresses in such examples as these is obviously derived immediately from that of superposition, one of the ways in which addition is made being the placing one thing upon another. The dative has the same sense as in the preceding examples, and depends upon the meaning of the preposition itself.

b. 'After.' Very nearly akin to the above use of *ἐπὶ* is that in which it has the sense of 'after,' or marks the following of one thing upon another: e.g. Od. vii. 120, *ὄρχνη ἐπ' ὄρχνη γηγάσκει, μῆλον δ' ἐπὶ μῆλῳ*, 'pear ripens after pear, and apple after apple,' that is, 'pear upon pear, and apple upon apple;' Il. vii. 163, *τῷ δ' ἐπὶ Τυδείδης ὤρτο κρατερὸς Διομήδης*, 'after him rushed mighty Diomedes, Tydeus' son;' Xen. Cyrop. ii. 3, 7, *ἀνέστη ἐπ' αὐτῷ Φεραύλας*, 'after him rose up Pheraulas;' Id. ib. v. 1, 27, *ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἔλεξεν ὁ Τιγράνης ὧδε*, 'after him Tigranes spoke as follows;' Id. ib. vi. 3, 24, *ἀκοντιστάς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς θωρακοφόροις τάξω, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκοντισταῖς τοξότας*, 'I will station darters after the men with breast-plates, and bowmen after the darters;' Æsch. Pers. 519, *ὕμᾱς δὲ χρὴ 'πὶ τοῖσδε τοῖς πεπραγμένοις* | . . . *ἔνυμφεριν βουλευματα*, 'it is necessary for you, after what has occurred, to consult together.' In the same way, *ἐπὶ* in the sense of 'after' is used with the dative with regard to time also: e.g. Xen. Anab. v. 9, 12, *ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὁρῶν ὁ Μυσὸς ἐκπεπληγμένους αὐτούς*, 'after this, when he saw that they were terrified;' Id. Hell. iv. 4, 9, *τὴν μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῇ νυκτὶ ἣ εἰσῆλθον ἡμέραν ἄμαχοι δαήμενον*, 'during the day, therefore, that followed the night on which they entered, they continued without fighting.'

With regard to the meaning of *ἐπὶ* in this class of examples, it is plain that as the notion of superposition gives the secondary sense of addition, so also it gives that of sequence, expressed by 'after.' This, indeed, in certain connections, is but a variety of the meaning of addition. The dative case, in this construction, has the same meaning as in the preceding set of examples, and depends for its use upon the sense contained in the preposition itself.

III. 'Επί with the accusative case.

1. 'On,' 'upon.' 'Επί in the sense of 'on,' 'upon,' is used with the accusative case, both with and without motion preceding. a. With motion preceding: e.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 25, *ἐπεὶ δὲ πορευόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου ἀνέβησαν ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον γήλοφον*, 'when from the plain they went up upon the first hill;' Id. ib. § 27, *σχολῇ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον ἀφικνοῦνται*, 'they arrived upon the summit at an easy pace;' Soph. Phil. 622, *ἐγὼ μὲν εἰμι' ἐπὶ ναῦν*, 'I will go upon the ship;' Æsch. Suppl. 816, *βωμοὺς ἐπ' ἄλλους δαιμόνων ἐγχωρίων* | *θές*, 'place them (xlaδoυς) upon other altars of the divinities of the place;' Herod. i. 171, *ἐπὶ τὰ κράνεα λόφους ἐπαδέεσθαι Κῦρες εἰσι οἱ καταδέξαντες*, 'it is the Carians that showed how to fasten crests upon their helmets.'

In such examples, *ἐπὶ* has obviously its proper sense of 'on,' 'upon,' denoting the relative position or direction of the motion of the verb. Thus, in the first example, *ἀνέβησαν ἐπὶ* means 'they went up . . . upon;' and the accusative case is used after the action or motion of the verb, thus qualified by *ἐπὶ*, to mark the limits within which the statement made by the verb and preposition is to be admitted, or the object as to which it is affirmed; 'they went up . . . upon (ἀνέβησαν ἐπὶ) . . . as regards the first hill,' 'as far as the first hill was concerned,' (τὸν πρῶτον γήλοφον.)

b. Without motion preceding: e.g. Xen. Anab. vi. 3, 25, *παρηγγέλλετο δὲ τὰ μὲν δόρατα ἐπὶ τὸν δεξιὸν ὦμον ἔχειν*, 'orders were given them to keep their spears upon the right shoulder;' Soph. Œd. Col. 100, *κατὰ σεμνὸν ἐξόμην βάθρον τόδε*, 'and sat upon this revered seat;' Isocr. 13, b, *ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν μέλιτταν ὁρῶμεν ἐφ' ἅπαντα μὲν τὰ βλαστήματα καθιζάνουσιν*, 'as we see the bee lighting on every plant.' Here, again, it is plain that the sense of *ἐπὶ* is that of 'on,' 'upon,' and that the accusative is added to show in what regard, as to what, the preceding statement is to be considered as made. Thus, in the first example, *παρηγγέλλετο τὰ δόρατα ἔχειν ἐπὶ . . . τὸν δεξιὸν ὦμον*, 'orders were given them to keep their spears upon . . . as regards the right shoulder,' 'as far as the right shoulder was concerned.'

In the same way, in such examples as Hom. Od. i. 183, *πλέων ἐπὶ οὔρου πόντον*, 'sailing upon the dark sea,' the proper sense is, 'sailing upon . . . as regards the dark sea,' *ἐπὶ* qualifying the action of sailing as being relatively 'upon,' and the accusative marking the object as to which this action thus qualified is affirmed. So Od. iv. 417-18, *πάντα δὲ γιγνόμενος περὶσσεύεται, ὅσα' ἐπὶ γαῖαν | ἔρπετ' ἄ γίγνεται, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ θεσπιῶδες πῦρ*, 'all the creeping things that are upon the earth,' that is, 'that are upon . . . as far as the earth goes.'

c. 'At,' 'on,' 'to.' The phrase *ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν*, 'at, on, or to, the bank or money changer's and lender's table,' may here deserve notice, although hardly requiring much explanation. E.g. Demosth. 896, 7, *ἀποδοθέντων ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν*, 'having been paid back to (at) the bank;' Id. 900, 14, *ἀποστερεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν χρέος*, 'to be deprived of the money due at the bank,' that is, 'on the money-changer's table;' Id. 945, 23, *προσώφειλε τὰ ἑνδεκα τάλαντα ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν*, 'he owed, besides, the eleven talents to (at) the bank,' that is, 'on the money-lender's table;' Id. 895, 15, *ἀπολυθήσομεν τῆς ἐγγύης τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν*, 'we will release him from the engagement made at (to) the bank,' that is, 'on the money-lender's table or board.' In these examples *ἐπὶ* has the sense of 'on,' 'upon,' that is, of simple superposition; but is translated by various terms, 'on,' 'at,' 'to,' 'in,' according to the nature of the action which it qualifies, and to the derivative sense in which the word *τράπεζα* is used. Thus, in the last example, *ἐπὶ* qualifies *ἐγγύη*, 'a pledge,' showing that the pledge or obligation was made 'on the money-lender's table,' just as in English we use 'on' in the phrase 'on 'Change;' but it would commonly be expressed by 'at' or 'in,' and the pledge represented as one 'at bank' or 'in bank.' The accusative is here used in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards;' thus, *ἐγγύη ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν* means properly 'a pledge made on . . . as regards the money-lender's table.'

2. a. 'To.' *Ἐπὶ*, having originally the same sense of superposition, is used with the accusative case to qualify various actions, motions, and states, by marking them as

having, with regard to some object, the relative direction or position of 'on,' 'upon,' to be understood, not literally, but figuratively; just as in English 'on' and 'upon' are employed in such phrases as 'to march on a point,' 'to go on an expedition,' 'it lies on the south,' and as *ἐπὶ* was seen above to be used with the genitive and dative. In this signification, and when employed with the accusative case, *ἐπὶ* is very commonly equivalent, seemingly, to the English 'to,' and sometimes to 'at.' In fact, however, neither 'to' nor 'at' represents the sense of *ἐπὶ*, but rather that of the accusative as denoting the limit of an action or motion; and the relative direction or position indicated is not expressed. E.g. Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 20, *ὁ δὲ Ἀναξίβιος καταδραμὼν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν*, 'Anaxibius having run down to the sea.' Here the preposition *ἐπὶ* qualifies the action contained in *καταδραμὼν* by showing that its direction was 'upon' relatively to the sea, or that it looked upon, or had its aspect towards, the sea; and the accusative *θάλατταν* points out the object with regard to which the action of *καταδραμὼν* has its relative direction or position, 'as regards the sea.' Thus, the whole sentence would mean, 'Anaxibius having run down upon . . . as regards the sea;' that is, his running down had its direction upon or towards as regards, not all objects, but definitely the sea. It might be sufficient to say that *θάλατταν* is the accusative of the object reached by the motion represented by *καταδραμὼν*, and that *ἐπὶ* qualifies the motion by marking its relative position; so that the construction would be, 'Anaxibius ran down to the sea . . . upon it.' But this is hardly satisfactory as regards the use of the case, which more probably gives the limit of the verb's action or motion by designating the object as to which it is affirmed. Add, as examples of this use of *ἐπὶ*, Xen. Anab. v. 1, 1, *ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ μέχρις ἐπὶ θάλατταν*, 'in the march quite to the sea;' Id. ib. *καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ Τραπεζοῦντα . . . ἀφίχοντο*, 'and how they arrived at Trapezus;' Id. ib. i. 2, 5, *ἐξελεύσιναι . . . ἐπὶ τὸν Μαιάνδρον ποταμὸν*, 'he proceeded to the river Meander;' Id. ib. ii. 4, 23, *ἐπὶ μέντοι τὴν γέφυραν δμως φυλαχὴν ἐπεμψάν*, 'however, they sent a guard to the bridge,' literally, 'upon the bridge.'

b. 'To the extent of,' 'for.' Sometimes *ἐπί* is used with the accusative case, whether denoting space generally or time, to mark more distinctly the measure or extent of the preceding action, where in English the form of expression is 'for,' 'to the extent of.' E.g. Od. xi. 576-7, καὶ Τιτυὸν εἶδον Γαίης ἐρικυδέος υἱόν, | κείμενον ἐν δαπέδῳ· ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κῆτο πέλεθρα, 'he lay (extended) for, to the extent of, nine plethra;' Xen. Cyrop. vii. 5, 8, ποταμὸς πλάτος ἔχων πλείον ἢ ἐπὶ δύο στάδια, 'having a width that reaches to more than two stadia;' Id. Anab. i. 7, 15, παρετέτατο δὲ ἡ τάφρος . . . ἐπὶ δώδεκα παρασάγγας, 'the canal had been made for twelve parasangs;' Herod. i. 193, ἐπὶ δερχόσια . . . ἀπυδούσ, 'the land yields a return to the extent of two hundred fold.' Add such phrases as ἐπὶ πολὺ, 'to a great extent,' ἐπὶ πλεόν, 'to a greater extent,' ἐπὶ μέγα, 'to a great amount.'

In such examples, the idea of extent, or of the point up to which a measure reaches, is wholly due to the accusative case, this being one of its common meanings. Consequently, the terms 'for,' 'to the extent of,' used to render *ἐπί* and the accusative in such instances as those above cited, belong to the accusative, and in no sense to the preposition, which, in fact, is not expressed in the English translation. Yet *ἐπί*, here also, has its proper meaning of 'upon,' to be understood, not of local superposition, but, as in the case of *καταδραμὼν ἐπὶ θάλατταν*, of *πλεῦν ἐπὶ Χίου*, and of other examples above considered, of the direction or aspect of an action or motion, and as being in some sort equivalent to 'towards,' 'looking upon.' Used as the qualification of an action or motion, and coupled with an accusative of measure, it merely serves to show that the action or motion has a certain relation to the object that measures its extent, a relation that may be expressed by saying that it has its direction upon it, looks upon, or has its aspect towards, it. Thus, in the first example above given, ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κῆτο πέλεθρα, 'he lay (extended) for nine plethra,' the lying of Tityos outstretched is measured in its extent by the accusative ἐννέα πέλεθρα, 'for nine plethra;' and *ἐπί* shows merely the relative direction which it has with regard to the object that furnishes its measure, that it has this aspect, or looks

this way, and, hence, is to be considered with reference to it. In other cases of measure, *ἀνά* or *κατά* is used with the accusative, showing that the direction of the action or motion measured by the accusative is to be conceived as being 'up' or 'down.' In the case under consideration, *ἐπί* differs in its use in this alone, that it expresses in a more general way that the action or motion has a direction upon, or aspect towards, an object by which its extent is measured.

'On,' 'upon,' 'by.' To this place may be referred the phrases ἐπ' ἴσα, 'equally,' and ἐπὶ σάδμην, 'by rule,' or 'by, upon, the line,' *ad amissim.* E.g. Il. xii. 436, ὡς μὲν τῶν ἐπ' ἴσα μάχῃ τέτατο πόλεμός τε, 'thus the fight and battle between them was waged on equal terms,' that is, 'up to the measure of equality,' 'to the extent of what was equal,' 'equally,' neither gaining the advantage. Od. v. 243-5, αὐτὰρ ὁ τάμνετο δοῦρα· θοῶς δέ οἱ ἦνυτο ἔργον· | εἴκοσι δ' ἐκβαλε πάντα, πελέκκησεν δ' ἄρα χαλκῷ, | ξέσσε δ' ἐπισταμένως, καὶ ἐπὶ σάδμην ἴθυνεν, 'and straightened them by the line,' or, as might also be said in English, 'to the line.' In both examples equally the accusative case has the sense of measure or extent, 'as far as to;' ἴσα, in the former case, marking how far the battle was pushed, namely, to the point where there was equality, and σάδμην, in the latter, showing up to what measure the straightening the beams was carried, namely, 'up to the line,' until it accorded with the line. And the preposition, as in the examples already considered under this head, is present to indicate the direction or aspect of the action, which way it looks, so to speak, to find its measure or extent.

When *ἐπί* is employed with the accusative case to express the amount of time, where 'for' is commonly used in English, both the preposition and the case are to be explained in the same way as when they are used to denote the measure of space. E.g. Xen. Vectig. i. 4, οὐ μόνον δὲ κρατεῖ τοῖς ἐπ' ἐνιαυτὸν θάλλουσι, 'not only excels in those which flourish for a year;' Herod. iii. 59, εὐδαιμόνησαν ἐπ' ἔτη πέντε, 'they were prosperous for five years;' Id. i. 32, οὐ γὰρ τοι μέγα πλοῦσιος μῦλλον τοῦ ἐπ' ἡμέρην ἔχοντος ὀλιγώ-

τερὸς ἐστι, 'for, indeed, he that is very rich is not happier than he that has subsistence for a day.'

c. 'Among.' The same meaning belongs to ἐπί in those phrases in which it is used with the accusative in the sense of 'among.' E.g. Il. x. 212-13, μέγα χέν οἱ ὑπουργάνιον κλέος αἶψ' | πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, 'he will have great fame among all men;' Il. xxiv. 201-2, ὦ μοι, πῇ δὴ τοι φρένες οἴχονθ' ἧς τὸ πάρος περ | ἔκλε' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ξείνους, 'for which thou wast formerly famed among strangers;' Plat. Tim. 23, v, ἔτι δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον γένος ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, ἐν τῇ χῶρῳ τῇ παρ' ὑμῶν οὐκ ἴστε γεγονός, 'the noblest and best race among men.'

In such examples, ἐπί with the accusative, although properly enough rendered by 'among,' really means the reaching to, and embracing or including, the objects named by the noun in the accusative case. Thus, in the first example cited, κλέος πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, 'fame among all men,' is, properly speaking, according to the Greek mode of representing it, 'fame that reaches to and embraces all men.' The term 'among' does not express this sense of extent, but vaguely suggests it by the obvious reference it has to a plurality of objects, such as 'men' (ἀνθρώπους), and by its thus connecting the word fame with a number that may be very great. The office of the accusative here, as in the preceding cases of ἐπί with this case, is to mark the extent to which the κλέος, 'fame,' referred to reaches, namely, πάντας ἀνθρώπους, 'to all men,' 'so as to embrace all men,' properly, 'as far as to the measure of all men;' and that of the preposition ἐπί is to show, precisely as before, that the fame spoken of has a certain relative position or direction with regard to some object, or has its aspect towards or looks upon it. The whole phrase thus means, 'he will have a fame that, taken in the direction of and considered relatively to all men, reaches to and embraces them.' It may be proper to add, that although the sense here and elsewhere attributed to ἐπί could not be conveyed by 'on,' 'upon,' in this class of expressions, yet such a meaning of 'on,' 'upon,' is by no means foreign to the English language, but is familiar in such instances as 'he sees danger on every side.'

d. 'As far as concerns,' 'as regards.' Of the same nature is ἐπί with the accusative case in a great variety of phrases which admit of ready explanation from what has been already said. Thus, in the expression τὸ ἐπ' ἐμέ, 'for me,' 'for what concerns me,' 'so far as I am concerned,' properly, 'as to what has regard to me,' 'as to what has the relative direction or aspect of upon as regards me;' Plat. Euthyd. 279, ε, ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, 'to speak generally;' that is, to speak so that the discourse shall have its direction upon, or aspect towards, every thing, and, hence, shall have reference to every thing, and embrace every thing. And here, again, it is to be observed that the English language has 'upon' used in the same way with ἐπί as here employed; as in the phrase 'to speak upon a subject.' The phrase ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰπεῖν is not, it is true, capable of being rendered by 'to speak upon every thing;' but not because 'upon' fails to convey the meaning of ἐπί. In the same way, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, 'for the most part,' ἐπί here showing that the action or state referred to by the speaker has a direction upon, is to be regarded as looking upon or having its aspect towards, some object; and this object being set forth by the accusative τὸ πολὺ, meaning 'as regards, as far as goes, the most part.' The construction may, perhaps, be made more obvious by considering the like form of expression in Xen. Laced. iv. 2, ἐνόμζεν . . . οὕτως ἂν καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ πλείστον ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀνδραγαθίας, 'he accounted that so these would arrive at the highest pitch of bravery,' where the motion contained in ἀφικνεῖσθαι is qualified by ἐπί, just as in the case of ἀνέβησαν, Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 25, above cited, giving the sense of 'to arrive . . . upon;' and τὸ πλείστον ἀνδραγαθίας is added in the signification of 'as regards the largest measure of bravery.' The only difference between the construction of ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον, in this example, and ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, is, that, in the latter, the connection with the action qualified is less obvious.

e. 'On,' 'upon.' Again, in the phrases ἐπ' ἀριστερά, 'on the left hand,' and ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ, 'on the right hand,' both ἐπί and the accusative have the same explanation. E.g. Herod. vi. 33, ὁ ναυτικὸς στρατὸς τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ ἐσπλέοντι τοῦ 'Ελλη-

σπόντου αἴρεε πάντα, τὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι ὑποχείμα ἦν γερονότα κατ' ἡπειρον, 'the fleet took all the parts of the Hellespont that are on the left hand as you sail into it; for the parts on the right hand had become subject to the Persians themselves on the mainland;' Id. ii. 93, οἱ δ' ἂν αὐτέων (τῶν κέγχρων) ἄλῳσι ἐκπλώνοντες ἐς θάλασσαν, φαίνονται τετριμμένοι τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τῶν κεφαλῶν· οἱ δ' ἂν ὀπίσω ἀναπλώνοντες, τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ τετρίφεται, 'any of them that may be caught while swimming down to the sea appear to be rubbed on the left side of the head; but any of them that may be caught while swimming back up the stream are rubbed on the right side of the head.' Here the preposition *ἐπὶ* shows that the object of which the situation is to be marked looks upon, has its direction upon, or its aspect towards, some point; and the accusative denotes this point, or indicates the particular thing with regard to which this direction or aspect is affirmed. Thus, in the former of the examples cited from Herodotus, it is said that the parts of the Hellespont which were taken by the fleet have, to a person sailing into it, the direction or aspect of upon (*ἐπὶ*) as regards the left hand (τὰ ἀριστερὰ); that is, they have a position defined as looking upon or towards the left hand; and this is expressed in English by the very similar phrase 'on the left hand,' in which 'on' is used in the same figurative sense that the Greek *ἐπὶ* has. The preposition, as here explained, may be compared with the use of *ἐπὶ* with the genitive in the expression ἐπ' οἴκου πλεῖν. It might seem simpler and more satisfactory to give to *ἐπὶ* the sense of relative position, instead of relative direction; so that the meaning of ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ would be 'upon . . . as regards the left hand;' but, although the difference is slight, apparently, the explanation above given is preferred as upon the whole better according with the signification of the preposition as used with the genitive, and with the meaning of the accusative case. On the other hand, the sense of relative position seems better to agree with the signification of the dative, as in ἐπὶ τῇ Ἐρυθρῇ θαλάσῃ, 'on the Red sea.'

When, in such descriptions of relative position, an action

or motion is introduced and qualified by *ἐπὶ* with the accusative, as Herod. ii. 36, Ἑλλῆνες μὲν (γράφουσι) ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ φέροντες τὴν χεῖρα, Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ, 'the Greeks write carrying the hand from the left to the right, the Egyptians carrying it from the right to the left,' the same sense of the preposition *ἐπὶ* is involved, and the same explanation is required. That *ἐπὶ* stands after φέροντες to show the direction in which the carrying of the hand is made, or its position with regard to the right or left, may be more easily admitted, but is not more certainly true, than the same thing is of ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ as the qualification of τὰ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου in the former case. And that this interpretation of *ἐπὶ* and of the accusative case is the true one, might be still further confirmed by a reference to the use of *ἐπὶ* and the accusative in such examples as Xen. Memorab. iii. 5, 13, θαυμάζω γε ἢ πόλιν ὅπως πυτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκκλινει, 'I wonder how the state did ever incline to the worse,' that is, 'in a direction that looked upon, or had its aspect towards, . . . the worse.' Compare also Id. Anab. iv. 3, 29, τοῖς δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶ παρήγγειλεν . . . ἐπὶ δόρυ ἡγεῖσθαι τοὺς οὐραγούς, 'to lead the rear files to the right.'

f. 'Against.' 'Επί with the accusative has also the sense of 'against.' E.g. Herod. i. 71, παρασκευαζομένου δὲ Κροίσου στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Πέρσας, 'and when Cræsus was making ready to march against the Persians;' Id. i. 157, πυθόμενος ἀγχοῦ εἶναι στρατὸν ἐπ' ἐωυτὸν ἰόντα, 'when he learned that an army coming against him was near at hand;' Xen. Anab. i. 4, 14, νῦν δεῖται Κῦρος ἔπεσθαι τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ, 'to follow him against the king;' Demosth. 22, 8, ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννικὴν οἰκίαν ἐβοήθησε, 'he gave help against the tyrants' family;' Id. 537, 5, ἔχει ὀργὴν ἐπὶ Μειδίαν, 'he is incensed against Meidias.'

Here, again, *ἐπὶ* has the secondary and figurative sense of 'upon,' marking the direction or aspect of the action which it qualifies relatively to an object standing in the accusative case, which itself has the signification of 'as to,' 'as regards.' Thus, στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Πέρσας means, properly, 'to march upon . . . as regards the Persians.' The sense of 'against,'

which *ἐπί* so frequently bears, arises from the obvious relations existing between the parties to the action qualified by *ἐπί*. In the first example cited, *στρατεύεσθαι ἐπί* properly means, as has just been seen, 'to march upon,' and the accusative *Πέρσας* shows that the action thus qualified is to be understood as having regard to the Persians; 'to march upon . . . as regards the Persians.' But in the relations of hostility in which the parties to the action stand to each other, namely, Cræsus and the Persians, the marching of Cræsus 'upon' the Persians is the same thing as marching 'against' the Persians. *ἰέναι ἐφ' ὕδαρ* means 'to go for water;' but *ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους*, 'to go against the enemy;' and the difference lies, not in the preposition, which has the same sense of 'upon' in both cases, nor yet in the accusative, which has the same meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards,' in both examples, but in the different relation which the party going, in the one case and in the other, holds to the object expressed by the accusative case.

g. 'For,' 'with a view to,' 'after.' *Ἐπὶ* with the accusative case is used to mark the object had in view in an action or motion, that for which as its end it is performed, expressed in English by 'for,' 'with a view to,' 'after.' E.g. Od. iii. 421, *ἀλλ' ἄρ' ὁ μὲν πεδίωνδ' ἐπὶ βοῦν ἵτω, ὄφρα τάχιστα | ἔλθῃσιν*, 'let one go to the plain for an ox;' Herod. v. 12, *σκευάσαντες τὴν ἀδελφεῆν ὡς εἶχον ἀριστα ἐπ' ὕδαρ ἐπεμπον*, 'they would send her for, after, water;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 6, *λέγουσιν ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔρχονται*, 'they say that the boys come for this,' 'with this view;' Id. ib. i. 6, 12, *ὅτε ἐγὼ μὲν πρὸς σε ἦλθον ἐπ' ἀργύριον*, 'when I came to you for money;' Id. ib. iv. 5, 31, *πέμπων ἐπὶ στρατεύμα εἰς Πέρσας*, 'on sending to (among) the Persians for an army;' Id. ib. i. 2, 9, *ὅταν δὲ ἐξίῃ βασιλεὺς ἐπὶ θήραν*, 'whenever the king goes forth to hunt;' Id. ib. iii. 1, 6, *ἐξεστί γάρ σοι ἐπὶ δίκην καταβαίνειν*, 'you have leave to come down for a trial;' Demosth. 677, 17, *Χαβρίαν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον κατεστήσατε* 'you appointed Chabrias for (the conduct of) this war.'

In such examples, as in so many preceding ones, *ἐπί* is added to the verb to mark the direction or aspect of its action as being relatively 'upon,' in the same sense in which

'upon' is used in the English phrase 'to march upon,' 'to rush upon;' and the accusative is used to introduce the object as regards which the action has the direction of 'upon.' Thus, in *ὁ μὲν ἵτω ἐπὶ βοῦν*, the action of going contained in *ἵτω* is represented by *ἐπί* as having the relative direction or aspect of 'upon,' and the accusative *βοῦν* shows that it has this 'as regards an ox;' and, thus far, the meaning of *ἐπί* and the accusative is essentially the same that in other connections is expressed by 'to,' as in *καταδραμὼν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν*, 'having run down to (upon) the sea.' But it is plain, from other examples, that this relation of 'upon' expressed by *ἐπί*, that is, the having a direction upon or an aspect towards an object, is capable of being regarded in a variety of ways according to the nature of the action and to the relations of the objects that are parties to it. Thus, in *στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Πέρσας*, 'to march against the Persians,' *ἐπὶ*, as seen above, obtains the sense of 'against,' due to the hostile relations of the parties to the action; while in *καταδραμὼν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν* it conveys merely the notion of 'upon,' for which, under the circumstances, 'to' may be substituted. And, in the examples above given, the meaning seemingly borne by *ἐπί* is that expressed by the English 'for,' 'with a view to,' 'after,' this peculiar sense being referable to the circumstances in which the preposition is used rather than to any thing contained in itself. If the context of the phrase *ὁ μὲν πεδίωνδ' ἐπὶ βοῦν ἵτω* be examined, it will be seen that Nestor is giving orders for a sacrifice to Athene, and that among them is one that a man go to the plain to bring an ox, which the herdsman (*ἐπιβουκόλος ἀνήρ*) is to drive up quickly, and for the due preparation of which as a victim to be slain provision is made. So that, under the circumstances of the case as described, it cannot be doubted that 'the going to the plain to an ox,' or, more exactly, 'the going to the plain with the action of going directed upon an ox,' is the same thing as going 'for' an ox. So, likewise, in Herod. v. 12, although *ἐπ' ὕδαρ ἐπεμπον* means, literally, no more than that 'they would send her to water,' it is easily gathered from the context that the sense

intended to be conveyed is that 'they would send her for or after water.'

It would appear, from what has been said, that the idea of the object had in view, as conveyed by *ἐπί* with the accusative, is mainly due to this case itself, being suggested by its marking out an object 'as to' or 'with regard to' which alone an action or motion is performed; and that the office of the preposition *ἐπί* is merely to show that the action or motion has a certain direction relatively to the object that constitutes its aim. This view being adopted, it is easy to see how other prepositions also, as *εἰς*, *κατά*, and *μετά*, may be used with the accusative to denote the object had in view.

h. 'For,' 'as regards.' Very nearly related to the use of *ἐπί* with the accusative just considered is that in which also it is translated by 'for,' but has the notion, not of the object or end had in view, but of the end to which a preceding condition of things is adapted, and may sometimes be represented by 'as regards.' E.g. Il. vi. 79, οὐνεκ ἄριστοι | πᾶσαν ἐπ' ἰδὺν ἔστε μάχεσθαι τε φρονέειν τε, 'the best for every purpose, the literal sense being, 'best . . . as regards every purpose;' Œd. Tyr. 690, seqq., ἴσθι δὲ | παραφρόνιμον, ἄπορον | ἐπὶ φρόνημα πεφάνθαι μ' | ἄν, εἴ σε νοσφίζομαι, 'know that I shall seem foolish and incapable of discretion if I deceive you.'

In such cases, *ἐπί* with the accusative may be considered as describing the extent in which the proposition which it qualifies is to be taken; ἄριστοι ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἰδὺν properly means, 'best . . . as regards, as far as goes, every undertaking.' To speak more exactly, however, the accusative itself expresses the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' or marks in what regard precisely the persons addressed are ἄριστοι; and of *ἐπί* very little account seems to be taken. It serves, however, as in numerous preceding instances, to mark the relative direction or aspect had by the term which it qualifies; so that it shall be regarded as having a direction 'upon,' as looking towards or having a regard to πᾶσαν ἰδὺν, 'every undertaking,' that is to say, as requiring to be admitted with a special aspect.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *ἐπί* WITH CASES.

Significations of <i>ἐπί</i> .	(Gen.: 'of,' 'with respect to.'	Dative: 'for.'	Accusat.: 'as to,' 'as regards.'
1. 'On,' 'upon.'	1. a. 'On,' 'upon.'	1. a. 'On,' 'upon.'	1. a. 'On,' 'upon.'
a. Locally: 'on,' 'upon.'	b. 'Upon,' 'on,' 'at,' 'near,' 'in,' 'in the time of.'	b. 'On,' 'at,' 'near,' 'in,' 'depending upon,' 'in the power of,' 'on condition of,' 'for,' 'upon,' (ground, reason;)	'at,' 'on,' 'to,' (<i>ἐπὶ τὴν ῥάβδον</i> .)
b. Figuratively: 'upon,' 'at,' 'near.'	c. 'Towards,' 'for,' 'at,' 'before,' <i>ἄπud</i> ; 'by,' (<i>ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν</i> ;) 'of,' 'concerning,' 'about,' 'against,' 'at,' 'for,' 'to meet,' 'according to,' 'with respect to,' 'in the case of,' 'with a view to,' 'on the ground of,' 'for the reason,' 'in view of.'	'for,' 'so as to cause,' (result.)	c. 'To,' 'to the extent of,' 'for,' 'on,' 'upon,' 'by,' (<i>ἐπὶ ἐνάδμῳ</i> ;) 'among,' 'as regards,' 'as far as concerns,' 'on,' 'upon,' (<i>ἐπ' ἀπορῆς</i> ;) 'against,' 'for,' 'with a view to,' 'after,' 'for,' 'as regards.'
c. Direction 'upon,' aspect towards.	2. 'Over.'	2. 'Over.'	
2. 'Over.'	3. 'In addition to.'	3. 'In addition to,' 'with,' 'after.'	
3. 'In addition to.'	3. 'By,' (distributively;) 'after,' 'from,' 'for,' (<i>ἐνομάζεσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ</i> .)		

Κατά.

Significations of *κατά*.

1. 'Down.' *Κατά* has for its primary signification the idea of 'down' from above, being directly opposed to *ἀνά*, 'up.' Thus, Hom. Il. i. 45, βῆ δὲ κατ' Οὐλύμπου κορυφῶν, 'he came down from the tops of Olympus;' κατὰ τὸν ποταμὸν πλεῖν, 'to sail down the river.' So likewise in a multitude of compounds; as, καταβαίνειν, 'to come down,' 'to descend,' καταβόστρυχος, 'having locks of hair that hang down.' So obviously prevalent is this sense of *κατά*, and so universally admitted as the primary notion of this preposition, that it does not require to be established by multiplied examples. The mutual opposition of sense between *ἀνά* and *κατά* is strikingly exhibited in the related adverbial forms *ἄνω* and *κάτω*, 'above' and 'below,' 'up' and 'down,' so frequently conjoined in the phrase *ἄνω καὶ κάτω*, 'upside down.'

2. This proper and merely local sense of *κατά* is variously modified in the course of its use, both in compounds and in its employment with the cases. Thus:

a. 'Down.' It retains the sense of 'down,' to be taken rather in a figurative way; as in *καταγράφειν*, 'to write down,' 'to enroll,' *καταθορυβεῖν*, 'to put down (a speaker) by noise,' *καταπατεῖν*, 'to trample on,' 'to treat with contempt,' *καταπαύειν*, 'to cause to cease,' 'to assuage,' *καταπλεῖν*, 'to sail down from the high seas into harbor,' *καταπολεμεῖν*, 'to put down by war,' 'to subdue,' *καταπονεῖν*, 'to weary out by toil,' *κατασβεννύναι*, 'to quench,' *καταφρονεῖν*, 'to despise.'

b. 'Under.' Immediately derived from the sense of 'down' is that of 'under;' as in the compound *κατάγειος*, 'underground,' and in such expressions as *κατὰ γῆν ἵέναι*, 'to go under or beneath the earth,' properly, 'to go down . . . as regards the earth.' Compare *κατακρύπτειν*, 'to conceal under,' 'to hide,' *καταδύειν*, 'to sink,' 'to go down or under.' It is plain from such examples that 'under,' as expressed by *κατά*, is merely a relative acceptance of 'down.'

c. 'Back,' 'again.' In some compounds *κατά* has the sense of 'back,' 'again;' as *κατάγειν*, 'to bring back from exile,' *κατιέναι*, 'to come back from exile,' *καταδέχεσθαι*, 'to receive back,' as from banishment; *κατέρχεσθαι*, 'to come back,' 'to come home,' as from exile, *κατακομίζειν*, 'to bring into a place of refuge,' properly, 'to bring back,' *καταρτίζειν*, 'to restore to order,' (Herod. v. 106, cited by Passow.)

In such examples, the notion expressed by *κατά* is that of reversing an action, and so of restoring a thing to its original state. Thus, in *κατάγειν* the meaning is, 'to bring a person back to his former place of abode,' 'to restore him to his home' from which exile had removed him; and in *καταρτίζειν* the reference is properly to a dislocated joint, and the meaning is, 'to bring back a limb to its original state,' and hence, figuratively, 'to restore to order.' And this sense of reversing an action, or of restoring a thing to its original or ordinary state, would seem to be most naturally derived from the notion of contrast which the mind so readily supplies between *ἀνὰ* and *κατά*, the one suggesting its opposite, even where it is not named, and the notion of

contrast or opposition coming to occupy the place of the term which suggested it. Certainly there remains in *κατάγειν* nothing of the sense of 'down,' but only, so far as *κατά* is concerned, the idea of reversing an action, or placing it in opposition or contrast with its actual state. That is to say, *κατά*, 'down,' having once suggested the idea of contrast by its almost necessary reference to its opposite, *ἀνὰ*, 'up,' ceases to convey the meaning of 'down,' and retains only that of contrast, and hence of opposition or contrariety. See what has been already said in treating of the preposition *ἀνὰ* in the same signification.

d. 'Quite,' 'utterly.' In a great number of compounds *κατά* has the meaning of 'quite,' 'utterly,' as has the Greek *ἐκ*, the Latin *per*, and the English 'up;' as, *καταθέλειν*, 'to soothe completely,' *κατακαίειν*, 'to burn up,' 'to consume by burning,' *κατάλιθος*, 'full of stones,' 'all stony,' *κατανίφειν*, 'to cover up with snow,' *καταξάίνειν*, 'to card to pieces,' 'to destroy,' *καταπετροῦν*, 'to stone to death,' (Xen. Anab. i. 2, 3, cited by Passow,) *καταπρίειν*, 'to saw up,' (Herod. vii. 36, cited by Passow,) *κατέθειν*, 'to eat up,' 'to devour quite,' *καταβρέχειν*, 'to wet thoroughly,' *καταγνύναι*, 'to break in pieces.' Probably here belong *κατανέμειν*, 'to distribute,' namely, 'to assign (*νέμειν*) all the parts of a whole,' and *καταλείπειν*, 'to leave behind,' the sense being, 'to leave utterly,' or a merely intensive meaning of *λείπειν*.

This signification of *κατά* is no more than an intensive use of the idea of 'down,' just as we use 'out,' multiplying its force by repeating it, 'out and out;' or, again, as we employ the same particle in the derivative form 'utterly.' The preposition *κατά*, having obtained this intensive sense, was employed to express it in many cases where there could be no reference to the primary notion of 'down.' Besides the examples above given, this may be seen in *κατάλογος*, 'a list,' or 'enumeration,' where it would be futile to attempt to trace in *κατά* any thing of its proper notion of 'down,' its whole force being to mark the completeness of the counting.

e. 'Against,' 'at.' In a number of compounds *κατά* has seemingly the sense of 'against,' expressed, however, by

other terms also in English, as 'at.' Thus, *καταγεῶν*, 'to laugh at,' *καταδικάζειν*, 'to condemn,' 'to pronounce judgment against,' *καταγινώσκειν*, 'to decide against,' 'to have an adverse opinion,' 'to lay to one's charge,' *κατατιᾶσθαι*, 'to accuse,' 'to blame,' 'to bring a charge against,' *κατακρίνειν*, 'to decide against,' 'to give judgment against.' So likewise, in a variety of phrases, with a case, as *κατὰ τινος εἰπεῖν*, 'to speak against a person.'

Although the sense of 'against' which *κατὰ* here conveys cannot be said to be immediately derived from its proper sense of 'down,' it being, in fact, partly at least, due to the known relations of the parties to be qualified by *κατὰ*; such, for example, as would exist between a judge and the accused person, the accuser and the accused; yet it may be safely affirmed that there is in the notion of 'down' contained in *κατὰ* a fitness at least to qualify the action when it relates to adverse parties. The English language employs the word 'down' itself in a somewhat similar way, when it says figuratively 'to look down upon,' in the sense of 'to treat with contempt;' and the Greek language uses *καταπτύειν*, 'to spit upon,' 'to spit at,' properly, 'to spit down upon,' to express disgust. And it may be that the sense of 'against,' so far as it belongs to *κατὰ* apart from the relations of the parties concerned in the action which it qualifies, springs from the figurative application of the sense of 'down.' If it be not admitted that, to this extent, *κατὰ* is fitted to convey the idea of 'against,' it will be difficult to see why this one of all the prepositions is chosen to express this sense. In other cases in which the proper sense of the preposition seems to be shut out of view through the predominance of the case, or from other causes, there is still left the means of seeing the appropriateness of the use of the preposition, if for nothing else, yet to indicate the original direction or relative position of the action with regard to its object. And so of *κατὰ* in the sense of 'against,' if we admit that the relative direction of 'down upon' is, in certain circumstances, and with regard to parties having certain relations, appropriate to the expression, not only of contempt, but also of 'against' or what is adverse. Otherwise *κατὰ* must

be regarded as having here both lost its proper sense of 'down,' and as being employed without having any appropriate office to perform, so far as we can see.

f. 'For,' 'after.' In another class of examples, where *κατὰ* with the accusative is rendered in English by 'for,' 'after,' and denotes the object had in view in an action, it is clear that the proper meaning of the preposition is almost entirely lost sight of, and its only traceable force is to mark the action as having a certain direction relatively to its object. Thus, in Od. iii. 106, *πλαζόμενοι κατὰ λήϊδα*, 'roving for, or after, booty,' it would hardly be possible to assign to *κατὰ* the distinct idea of 'down upon.' It is enough for the sense that it shows the action to have an appropriate relative direction with regard to its object. That the relative direction denoted by *κατὰ* is an appropriate one, according to Greek ways of thinking, is only to be proved by the actual usage of the language; for nothing in the English language would suggest it. Of course it cannot be asserted that the notion of 'for,' 'after,' or of the object had in view, is expressed by *κατὰ*, any further than as it denotes the relative direction here spoken of, and thus in some sort connects the action with its object. As will be seen below, the sense of 'for,' 'after,' or of the object had in view, is more properly referred to the accusative case. This view is confirmed by the fact that the same sense of 'for,' 'after,' is expressed by other prepositions and the accusative case, as by *ἐπί*, and *μετά*: e.g. *ἐφ' ὕδαρ ἰέναι*, and *μεθ' ὕδαρ ἰέναι*, 'to go for, or after, water.' By this fact it is shown, also, that not one relative direction alone of the action is appropriate to the expression of the object or end had in view, but that, as the relative direction of *κατὰ*, 'down,' is suitable to it, so is that of *ἐπί*, 'upon,' as well as the relative position of *μετά*, 'in the midst.'

The same may be said of *κατὰ* in other constructions; as where it is said to mark distribution, as *καθ' ἑνα*, 'one at a time,' *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν*, 'every year,' 'year by year,' *κατὰ φύλα*, 'by tribes;' where it is said, with the same incorrectness, to mean 'at,' 'in,' 'throughout,' as, *κατ' οἶκον*, 'at home,' *καθ' ὄμιλον*, 'in a crowd,' *κατὰ στρατόν*, 'throughout an army;'

where it is represented, with like error, as signifying 'according to,' 'as to,' 'as regards,' as, *κατὰ θυμόν*, 'according to one's mind,' *κατὰ δύναμιν*, 'according to one's power or ability,' *κατὰ τοῦτο*, 'as regards this,' *κατὰ πάντα*, 'in every regard,' 'as to every thing;' and, again, where it is translated by 'by,' as, *κατὰ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν*, 'by land and by sea.' In all these, and in some other instances as well, the only office of *κατὰ* is to mark the relative direction of some action or motion with regard to the object named by the accusative; and the various notions, improperly referred to the preposition, such as distribution, 'as regards,' 'according to,' belong to the accusative, either alone, or aided by the circumstances in which it stands.

Summary of the significations of κατὰ.

Κατὰ. 'Down.'

- a. Locally; 'down,' either from or upon.
- b. Figuratively; 'down,' 'at,' 'against.'
- c. Relatively; 'under,' 'down under,' 'beneath.'
- d. Relatively, and by contrast and opposition; 'back,' 'again.'
- e. Intensively; 'quite,' 'utterly.'
- f. Relative direction, 'down;' the sense of 'down' being hardly discernible, and not rendered in English, the case predominating.

SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *κατὰ* WITH CASES.

I. *With the genitive.*

1. 'Down from,' 'down upon,' 'down in,' 'down under.' *Κατὰ* with the genitive case is very commonly used in its proper and local sense of 'down:' e.g. *Hom. Il. i. 44, βῆ δὲ κατ' Ὀλύμπου κορυφῶν χαόμενος κῆρ*, 'he came down from the heights of Olympus;' *Hierod. viii. 53, ἐρρίπτειν ἑαυτοὺς κατὰ τοῦ τεχνέος κἀτω*, 'they threw themselves down from the wall;' *Id. vi. 18, οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι . . . τὴν Μίλητον πολιορκέοντες . . . αἰρέουσι κατ' Ἀκρης*, 'the Persians captured Miletus utterly,' properly, 'down from the top' (to the bottom); *Xen. Anab. iv. 2, 17, ἀλλόμενοι κατὰ τῆς πέτρας*, 'leaping down from the rock;' *Id.*

Anab. iv. 5, 18, οἱ δὲ πολέμοι δέισαντες, ἤκαν ἑαυτοὺς κατὰ τῆς χιόνος εἰς τὴν ὑάπην, 'cast themselves down upon (or through) the snow into the valley;' *Id. Anab. vi. 4, 31, οἱ πολέμοι ἱππεῖς φεύγουσι κατὰ τοῦ πρανοῦς*, 'the enemy's cavalry fled down the declivity;' *Id. Anab. vii. i. 30, εὐχομαι μυρίας ἐμέ γε κατὰ τῆς γῆς ὀργυιάς γενέσθαι*, 'I wish, for my part, that I had been ten thousand fathoms beneath (down under) the earth;' *Il. xxiii. 100, ψυχὴ κατὰ χθονὸς ᾤχετο*, 'the spirit departed down under the earth;' *Il. iii. 217, κατὰ χθονὸς ὀμματι πῆξας*, 'fixing his eyes down upon the ground;' *Il. xx. 321, κατ' ὀφθαλμῶν χέεν ἀχλὺν*, 'shed darkness down upon his eyes;' *Aristoph. Vesp. 1216, κατὰ χειρὸς ὕδωρ*, 'pour water down upon the hands;' *Il. v. 659, τὸν δὲ κατ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρεβεννὴ νύξ ἐκάλυψεν*, 'him dark night overspread, down upon his eyes.'

The sense of 'from' which we add to 'down' in translating *κατὰ* with the genitive, in many instances, is not contained in *κατὰ* itself, but is wholly relative, or arises from the obvious relative position of the subject of the action with regard to the object to which the genitive shows that it is to be referred. *Κατὰ* merely defines the action or motion which it qualifies as having the direction of 'down,' and the genitive case shows that it has this direction 'with respect to' a specific object; whether it is 'down from' above, or down to something below, that is, 'down upon,' is to be gathered from the known position in which the subject of the action and its object stand relatively to each other. The same is to be said of the accessory ideas of 'upon,' 'in,' 'under,' which are necessarily connected with 'down' in rendering other examples of the use of *κατὰ* with the genitive. And that this is so, is at once shown by the very fact of *κατὰ* with the genitive at one time signifying 'down from,' and at another 'down upon,' 'down under;' it being manifest, on the one hand, that the same preposition cannot of itself convey ideas so opposite, and easy to see, on the other, that, attributing to *κατὰ* the simple expression of direction 'down,' the additional sense of 'from,' 'upon,' 'in,' 'under,' will be suggested by the relative position in which the subject of the action and the object to which it is referred

stand to each other. Thus, in Xen. Anab. iv. 2, 17, ἀλλόμενοι κατὰ τῆς πέτρας, *κατὰ* shows that the leaping expressed by ἀλλόμενοι was 'down' in its direction, and the genitive τῆς πέτρας that it was a leaping down 'with respect to the rock;' but neither *κατὰ* nor the genitive, in itself considered, gives any answer to the question whether it was 'down from' or 'down upon' the rock. But, upon consulting the narrative, it is found that the persons described as leaping down belonged to a party of soldiers that had been cut off from a hill which they had been sent to occupy, and that it was in attempting to escape from the eminence to the body of the army below that they performed the act of leaping; and the circumstances at once show that the leaping was 'down from the rock,' and not 'down upon the rock.' And so of the other cases.

2. In a multitude of examples in which *κατὰ* is employed with the genitive, it does not retain with any distinctness, according to the English way of thinking, at least, the primary sense of 'down,' however this may have been originally involved, but only marks the relative direction or position of the action, motion, or state expressed by the verb with respect to the object introduced by the genitive. All that we can see of the force of *κατὰ* thus introduced is often no more than this, that the direction of 'down,' which it properly denotes, is appropriate to the relation in which the action or motion qualified by it and its object stand to each other. See what has been said of *κατὰ* above, 2. f.

a. 'At.' *Κατὰ* with the genitive is sometimes translated by 'at,' as in such examples as τοξεύειν κατὰ σκοποῦ, 'to shoot at a mark.' Here it can hardly be said that *κατὰ* retains distinctly the sense of 'down,' although it may have originally had it; for the direction of the arrow is not always nor necessarily 'down' with reference to the object aimed at. But the preposition, in its proper sense, having come to be used in such connection, namely, to indicate the direction of the action relatively to the object to which it is referred, it may have been afterwards retained in cases where, strictly speaking, the direction of the action was not 'down.' It should be observed, further, that the office of *κατὰ* being, in

such case, according to the assumption, merely to mark that the action has a certain direction relatively to its object, and not strictly to denote a downward motion, it cannot be rendered in the English translation. The term 'at,' employed in translating *κατὰ* with the genitive, does not answer to any thing contained in *κατὰ*, but to the notion of 'with respect to' expressed by the genitive. This is clear, not only from the consideration of the office of the genitive itself, τοξεύειν κατὰ σκοποῦ meaning, properly, 'to shoot with a bow, or to be an archer . . . with respect to a mark,' that is, 'to shoot . . . at a mark,' but also from the fact that the genitive alone is used with τοξεύειν in the sense of 'at:' e.g. Il. xxiii. 853, seqq. . . . ἐκ δὲ τρήρωνα πέλειαν | λεπτῇ μηρίνθῳ δῆσεν ποδός, ἧς ἀρ' ἀνώγει | τοξεύειν, 'at which he bade them shoot.'

b. 'Of,' 'concerning.' *Κατὰ* with the genitive is also rendered by 'of,' 'concerning:' e.g. Demosth. 68, 2, ὁ καὶ μέγιστόν ἐστι καὶ ὁμῶν ἐγκώμιον, 'which, in fact, is the greatest commendation of you;' Id. 1412, 5, καὶ ἐνός μόνου πράγματος οὐ τὰ κράτιστα ἐγνώκειν, 'concerning one thing alone has he decided not the most wisely;' Id. 615, 27, κατὰ παντός τοῦ χρόνου σκέψασθε, 'consider of the whole of time,' 'of all time.' Xen. Cyr. i. 3, 1.

In such examples, the genitive, having the sense of 'with respect to,' expresses the relation which we render by 'of,' 'concerning,' and the meaning of *κατὰ* is not retained in the translation, the English language having nothing that answers to it when so employed. The preposition retains here only so much of its proper sense as serves to indicate that the action which it qualifies has a certain relative direction with respect to the noun introduced by the genitive.

Here belong such phrases as κατὰ ὅλου, 'on the whole,' properly, 'with respect to, concerning, the whole,' and κατὰ παντός, 'altogether,' that is, 'with respect to every thing,' or 'in respect of every thing.'

c. 'Upon,' 'by.' The same interpretation may be given of such phrases as εὐχεσθαι κατὰ τινος, 'to vow by, upon, a thing,' ὀμῶσαι κατὰ τινος, 'to swear by, upon, a thing;' the

sense being 'to make a vow . . . with respect to a thing,' 'having reference to a thing,' 'to swear or take an oath . . . with respect to, having reference to, a thing,' the idea of 'with respect to,' 'having a reference to,' being expressed by the genitive, and the preposition merely indicating the relative direction of the action towards the object marked by the genitive case. Otherwise, *κατά* must be considered as retaining more of its proper sense, and as indicating that the person that makes a vow or swears stands over the object by which he swears. (See Passow's Lexicon, s. v.) Either way, the sense of 'by,' 'upon,' belongs to the genitive case and not to *κατά*.

d. 'Against.' Again, in the many examples in which *κατά* with the genitive has seemingly the sense of 'against,' the same interpretation applies. Thus, in the phrase *κατά τινος εἰπεῖν*, 'to speak against a person:' e.g. Plat. Apol. 37, B, πολλοῦ δέω κατ' ἐμυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός, 'I am far from intending to speak against myself.' The genitive marking the object with reference to or with respect to which the act of speaking is affirmed, *κατά* shows that the action has a certain direction relatively to this object. The notion of 'against' is not contained in *κατά*, but is suggested by the relation in which the subject of the verb and the object of its action stand to each other. That this is so, is shown by the fact that *κατά τινος* is employed equally with words that signify praise and with those that express blame. E.g. Demosth. 646, 4, τὴν ὁμοίαν ἐποσάσατο πιστὴν αἰτίαν κατ' αὐτοῦ, 'he accounted the like charge against him to be true,' compared with Id. 68, 2, above cited, ὃ καὶ μέγιστόν ἐστι κατ' ὑμῶν ἐγκώμιον, 'which, in fact, is the highest commendation of you.' (See Reiske Ind. Græc. Demosth. s. v. *κατά*.)

II. With the accusative.

1. 'Down.' In some examples of its employment with the accusative case *κατά* retains its proper signification of 'down:' e.g. Herod. ii. 96, ταῦτα τὰ πλοῦα ἀνὰ μὲν τὸν ποταμὸν οὐ δύνανται πλέειν, . . . κατὰ ῥόον δὲ κομίζεται ὧδε, 'these vessels cannot sail up the river, but go down stream as follows.' Here the proper signification of *κατά* is 'down,' and the

accusative ῥόον means 'as regards the stream;' 'they go down . . . as regards the stream.' It is true that *κατὰ ῥόον* might be interpreted 'with the current,' that is, 'according to the current,' (see Schweig. Lex. Herod. s. v. *κατά*;) but nothing forbids the attributing to *κατά* its original sense, the more as it stands in immediate opposition to ἀνὰ τὸν ποταμὸν, 'up the stream.' Il. xvii. 86, ἔρρει δ' αἷμα κατ' οὐταμένην ὤτειλῃν, 'the blood flowed down from the inflicted wound.' In this example, *κατά* added to αἷμα ἔρρει shows that the flowing is 'down,' and the accusative οὐταμένην ὤτειλῃν indicates in what regard this is affirmed, 'as regards the inflicted wound.' So that, strictly taken, the meaning would be, 'the blood flowed down . . . as regards the inflicted wound;' and the sense of 'from,' which is properly added in the translation 'the blood flowed down from the inflicted wound,' is not contained in *κατά*, but is suggested by the circumstances of the case.

2. a. 'Throughout,' 'all through.' *Κατά* with the accusative is employed to measure the extent of an action, where in English are used the terms 'throughout,' 'all through:' e.g. Il. iv. 199, βῆ δ' ἰέναι κατὰ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν, 'he went to go throughout the host of the Achæi;' Il. i. 229, ἦ πολὺ λῶδόν ἐστι κατὰ στρατὸν εὐρὺν Ἀχαιῶν | δῶρ' ἀποαρεΐσθαι, 'surely it is far better to take away from us, throughout the wide host of the Achæi, what has been bestowed upon us;' Herod. i. 30, τὸν Σόλωνα θεράποντες περᾶλλον κατὰ τοὺς θησαυρούς, 'attendants conducted Solon all through the treasures.'

In such examples *κατά* does not retain distinctly its proper sense of 'down,' although it may be safely assumed as true that, even here, this meaning did originally belong to it, but was afterwards lost from the view, chiefly through the predominant force of the accusative case. In the first example cited, the accusative is employed to measure the extent of the action βῆ δ' ἰέναι, and shows that the going was 'to the extent of, reached as far as, the Greek host;' and *κατά* was originally added, in the case of such measure, to mark the relative direction of the action, so as to indicate that the measure of its extent was to be taken from above downwards. But as this was a wholly subordinate matter, the

leading idea being, not so much the mode of determining the measure, whether by taking it from above or from below, as the measure of extent itself, the proper meaning of *κατά* almost vanished, and little more was expressed, when *κατά* was added, than the mere measure of extent furnished by the accusative itself.

That *κατά* was thus used with the accusative of measure merely to show the direction in which the extent of an action is measured, namely, from above downwards, will be seen afterwards in explaining other constructions, such as *καθ' ἓνα*, 'one at a time,' *καθ' ἡμέραν*, 'by the day,' 'a day at a time.' And that *κατά* is so employed in such examples as *κατά λαόν*, 'throughout the people,' may be proved by the fact that *ἀνά*, 'up,' is used with the accusative in precisely the same sense. Thus, Il. iv. 209, *βάν δ' ἰέναι καθ' ὄμιλον ἀνά στρατὸν εὐρὺν Ἀχαιῶν*, 'they proceeded to go in, among, the crowd, all through the wide army of the Achæi.' Here, if *ἀνά* be allowed to have been originally employed in its peculiar sense, it shows that the measure of extent expressed by *στρατὸν* is to be regarded as taken from below upwards, just as, in the case of *κατά*, it is to be regarded as taken from above downwards; and it can hardly be explained how the two expressions *κατά στρατὸν* and *ἀνά στρατὸν* came to be identical in sense, 'throughout the army,' but by observing that the prepositions merely indicated the direction which the action was conceived as having, that is, the manner of taking its measure, from above downwards, and from below upwards; and that while the actual measure of extent, the accusative, remained the same in both cases, it was a matter of no moment whether it was reached in this way or that.

It may be observed, although not deemed necessary, nor even important, for the confirmation of the above explanation, that, occasionally, *κατά* with the accusative in the sense of 'throughout,' or of the entire measure of an action, does possibly retain the idea of 'down' with more distinctness than can be affirmed of it in the preceding examples. Thus, Il. xvii. 84, *πάπηνεν δ' ἄρ' ἔπειτα κατὰ στίχας*, 'he looked throughout the ranks,' where we could also say, 'he looked

down the ranks,' and where it may be more readily admitted that *κατά* retains its proper sense.

b. 'At,' 'on,' 'by,' 'in.' *Κατά* occurs with the accusative case of a variety of words in such phrases as *κατ' οἶκον*, 'at home,' *καθ' ὄμιλον*, 'in a crowd,' *κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν*, 'on or by the road,' *κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν*, 'by land and by sea,' and in such conjunction admits of being rendered in English by 'at,' 'on,' 'by,' 'in,' 'among' even, and perhaps by other terms, according to the nature of the noun and of the action defined by *κατά* and the accusative. E.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 11, *ἄνδρες δ' οὐδαμῇ φυλάττοντες ἡμῶς φανεροί εἰσι, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδόν*, 'except on this road;' Il. iv. 209, *βάν δ' ἰέναι καθ' ὄμιλον ἀνά στρατὸν εὐρὺν Ἀχαιῶν*, 'they proceeded to go in, among, the crowd;' Xen. Hell. iv. 5, 1, *ἀπεχώρουν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Κεγχρέας ὁδόν*, 'they retreated by, along, over, the road to Kenchreæ;' Id. Hell. v. 4, 47, *τὸ ὑπὲρ τῆς κατὰ τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα ὁδοῦ ἄκρον*, 'the summit above the road at, near, Kithæron.'

In such examples, the proper sense of 'down,' however truly it may be involved, is not distinctly retained by *κατά*; and yet the presence of this preposition may be accounted for and its force determined. In fact, this use of *κατά* is very nearly the same as in the preceding case, the only difference being that there the accusative measures the extent of the action qualified by *κατά*, while here it marks, in a less palpable sense of measure, the object to which the preceding statement is to be confined, that 'as to,' 'with regard to' which it is affirmed. It was seen above, that in the phrase *ἰέναι κατὰ στρατὸν*, 'to go throughout the army,' the accusative gives the measure of the action, being equivalent to 'as far as the army reaches,' 'to the extent of the army,' while the proper office of *κατά* was to mark the direction of the action, and so to note the way in which the extent or measure of the action is determined, namely, from above downwards, or from below upwards; and, accordingly, that the peculiar signification of *κατά*, although unquestionably originally present, came to be almost entirely overlooked.

But if this be so of *κατά* in connection with actual

measures of the extent of actions, it must equally be true of the cases in which *κατά* with the accusative is used, so very nearly in the same way, to mark the limit of extent in which a proposition is to be taken. In this latter case, likewise, *κατά*, originally used to mark the direction and relative position of an action, motion, or object, came to be of hardly any other force than merely to show that the action or state qualified by it was to be considered, with reference to some object that determines the extent of its meaning, an object 'as to,' 'as regards' which it is affirmed. Just as much here as in the former case is it true, that of the qualification added to the action or state of the verb by means of *κατά* and the accusative the most important part is that expressed by the accusative, and that the direction in which the reference is made to this by *κατά* is wholly subordinate, it being a matter of indifference which way the pointing to the object is made, whether from above downwards, or from below upwards. Only some mode of reference must be used, and that a sign of direction; and that one was chosen which was already familiar as an index of direction in determining the measure of the extent of an action.

According to this view, as in the phrase *ἵέναι κατὰ στρατόν*, 'to go throughout the army,' the accusative *στρατόν* means 'as far as the army reaches,' 'to the extent of the army,' and so measures the extent of *ἵέναι*, 'the going,' or marks it as being 'throughout the army,' *κατά*, which originally served only to indicate the direction in which the action is to be measured, having ceased to have any appreciable influence on the meaning; so in the phrase *κατ' οἶκον μένειν*, 'to stay at home,' the accusative *οἶκον* added to *μένειν* shows that the act of 'staying' is to be taken, not absolutely and in every regard, but up to the limit marked by the accusative; that is, it denotes the object as to which, or with regard to which, the staying is affirmed, and thus makes known that the staying is to be understood only 'as regards home,' 'as far as home is concerned.' And *κατά* qualifies *μένειν*, properly speaking, by showing its direction or relative position; so that, when an accusative is added and measures the extent in which the idea of 'staying' is to be understood

as being affirmed, the sense conveyed by *κατά* will be that the direction in which the measure of limitation is to be made is that of *κατά* or 'down.' And as the accusative of measure or extent is no more than a mark to show how far an action or motion goes, or a statement is to be admitted, it must always be conceived as lying in the line of the action or motion, or in the direction in which a statement looks for its limitation. Hence, again, when *κατά* marks the direction of an action, or the aspect which a statement is to be regarded as having, it does virtually point to the object introduced by the accusative of measure; and it may, therefore, be said that *κατά* is the sign that gives the reference of the action or statement to the object that measures or limits it. In the case under consideration, the notion of 'down' proper to *κατά* is not perceptibly present, this word having retained no more than the power of pointing the statement contained in *μένειν* to the object by which its meaning is limited. And, obviously, this is all that is required of *κατά*, it being of no moment to mark the precise direction of the pointing or reference, whether it is made upwards or downwards. Accordingly, *κατά* and such accusatives as have been mentioned together with *οἶκον* will be rendered in English, which has no term by which to represent *κατά* as here employed, in the sense of the accusative alone, that is, of 'as to,' 'as regards,' and by a variety of expressions answering to the nature of the action qualified and of the noun in the accusative case. Thus, *μένειν κατ' οἶκον* is rendered by 'to stay at home,' the meaning being 'to stay . . . as regards, as far as concerns, home,' that is, the staying being described as having reference to home, and to be understood as extending to that alone; *καθ' ὁδόν πορεύεσθαι* is translated by 'to march on a road,' or 'by a road,' the sense being, 'to march . . . as regards a road,' that is, the marching is to be taken as affirmed, not absolutely, but with a limitation, 'as regards a road,' 'as far as a road is concerned;' *ἵέναι καθ' ὄμιλον* is rendered by 'to go in, among, or through, a crowd,' the sense being, 'to go . . . as regards a crowd,' that is, the going is to be understood as affirmed in a limited extent, and as having reference to a

crowd, not to any objects indifferently. When in English we would speak of a staying that has to do with home alone, and extends to no other place of staying, we describe it as a staying 'at home;' when of a journeying that has to do with a road alone, or extends to no other way of journeying, we describe it as a journeying 'by, on, or over a road;' and so, when of a going that has to do with a crowd alone, and embraces no other circumstance attending a going, we describe it as a going 'in, among, through, a crowd.' In other words, we employ in English, where the Greek employs *κατά* with the accusative, in such expressions, the terms 'at,' 'in,' 'on,' 'among,' 'by,' one in one connection, and another in another, as may suit the action of the verb and the nature of the noun by which its sense is limited. In Hom. Il. iii. 151-2, . . . τεττίγεσσι ἐοικότες, ὅτε καθ' ὕλην | δενδρέφ' ἐφεζόμενοι ὅπα λειριόεσσιν ἰεῖσιν, 'like grasshoppers, that, sitting on a tree in the forest, send forth a shrill cry,' καθ' ὕλην, rendered 'in a forest,' properly understood, shows the precise extent in which the terms δενδρέφ' ἐφεζόμενοι are to be taken; so that the sitting on a tree shall have reference exclusively to the forest, and the meaning be almost the same as 'sitting on a forest tree.' Compare Il. iii. 36, ἃς αὖτε καθ' ὄμιλον ἔδυ Τρώων ἀγερῶχων, 'he went in, among, the crowd;' and Xen. Anab. v. 2, 16, ὁ δὲ Ξενοφῶν στάς κατὰ τὰς πύλας, ὑπόσους ἐδύνατο κατεκάλυε, 'standing at the gates.'

c. 'On,' 'in.' The same explanation is to be given of *κατά* with the accusative in such phrases as βάλλειν κατ' ἀσπίδα, 'to strike on the shield,' βάλλειν κατὰ στῆθος, 'to strike on the breast,' εἰδέναι κατὰ φρένα, 'to know in the heart,' where it is rendered in English by 'on,' 'in.' E.g. Il. iii. 347, καὶ βάλεν Ἀτρεΐδου κατ' ἀσπίδα πάντοσ' ἐίστην, 'and struck on the shield of Atreides;' Il. iv. 163, εὖ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸδε οἶδα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, 'for well know I this in my mind and heart.' Here, as in the case just considered, the accusative of itself marks the particular object to which the action or state qualified by *κατά* is intended to be limited. Thus, in the example βάλεν Ἀτρεΐδου κατ' ἀσπίδα, 'struck (his spear) on the shield,' the accusative denotes the object to which definitely the act of striking is to be understood

as restricted; 'he struck (his spear),' not absolutely, but only 'so far as the shield goes,' 'to the extent of the shield,' and no more; and *κατά* is added to the verb to mark, in the way above explained, the reference of its action or state to the object that limits its extent. With regard to the sense of the accusative there can hardly be any question; and with respect to *κατά*, it is plain that it has lost its proper sense of 'down;' for it would not be consistent with the fact to say, in the above example, that 'he struck his spear down on the shield.' Rather, *κατά* having become familiar in use to denote the direction in which the measure of an action or motion was to be taken, from above downwards, it came to be employed as the mere index of the direction which an action to be measured had relatively to the object that gave its measure or extent; that is, it showed that the action or motion was in the direction of the object that measured its extent; and this even where the direction of 'downwards' was not apparent nor even applicable. In fact, as has been above seen, the notion of the measure of the action furnished by the accusative is so entirely predominant, that the precise direction in which it is measured is very unimportant, and is lost sight of. In this view, βάλεν κατ' ἀσπίδα would not signify 'he struck downwards . . . as regards the shield,' 'as far as the shield goes,' but that 'he struck,' and that the striking was determined in its extent by a limit or measure, showing that it reached as far as a certain object, and embraced no other, namely, by ἀσπίδα meaning 'as regards the shield,' 'as far as the shield goes;' and as a limit or measure of an action was determined very commonly by taking it in a direction from above downwards, the preposition *κατά*, which marks this direction, was employed as a general conventional sign, as it were, of the direction of an action in measure-taking, without any special regard to its proper sense, and, therefore, without any reference to the actual direction of the action, whether it was upwards, downwards, or any other possible direction. And, here again, it is to be remarked, that the accusative case supplying the actual measure or limit of

the action, and *κατά* denoting merely the presence of such measure, or the reference of the action to it, the phrases in which *κατά* stands thus connected with the accusative are to be rendered in the sense of the accusative alone, *κατά*, in such constructions, being incapable of translation in the English language; and that the variety of the rendering in English is due, not to any difference in the meaning either of the accusative or of *κατά*, but to the different nature of the action and of the noun that gives its measure or limit. Hence, *βόλεν κατ' ἀσπίδα*, 'he struck . . . as regards the shield,' is rendered by 'he struck on the shield,' but *τόδ' οἶδα κατὰ φρένα*, 'I know this . . . as regards my heart,' is translated by 'I know this in my heart.'

If this explanation be true, it is readily applicable to a great variety of expressions which it is needless to enumerate. One or two may be here mentioned, merely by way of illustration. Thus, the common phrase *κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν*, 'by land and by sea;' e.g. Thucyd. i. 13, *τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸ πάλαι κατὰ γῆν τὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐπιμσγόντων*, 'the Greeks having intercourse with each other in the olden time more by land than by sea, (and, accordingly, passing) through their territory.' Here, the proposition '*Ἑλλήνων παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐπιμσγόντων*, 'the Greeks had intercourse with each other,' is qualified by the terms *κατὰ γῆν τὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν*, showing in what extent it is to be taken, 'as regards the land more than as regards the sea;' that is, their intercourse, considered with reference to the land, was greater than their intercourse considered with reference to the sea; or, as it is expressed in English, 'their intercourse by land was greater than their intercourse by sea.'

The phrase *ἕκαστος γοῦν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐρᾷ*, Xen. Cyrop. v. 1, 11, 'each loves what suits himself,' furnishes another example of *κατά* employed with the accusative case to mark the extent in which a preceding proposition is to be taken. The meaning is, that each one loves the things that have regard to, that stand related to, himself; that is, that have this reference, are to be taken in this regard, and in no other; and this is, in effect, the giving, by means of *καθ'*

αὐτόν, the measure or extent in which *τῶν ἐρᾷ* is to be taken. The sense of limiting the preceding statement by marking with regard to what object it is true, is obviously due to the accusative case, and not to *κατά*. The presence and meaning of the preposition are to be explained in the same way as in the preceding examples.

d. 'By,' 'at a time.' Among the more remarkable uses of *κατά* with the accusative is that in which it is employed with numerals and other terms to mark the standard or unit of measure or division by which any whole number or aggregate is divided off into equal parts. Thus, *καθ' ἓνα*, 'by ones,' 'one at a time,' *καθ' ἕκαστον*, 'individually,' that is, 'each and every one of a number taken by himself,' a number counted by, or divided into, individuals; *ἕκαστος* conveying the notion of each individual of some number by means of its radical *ἕκα*, 'one,' the same as the English *each*, and the Sanskrit *eka*, 'one,' and the ending (σ)-τος, the same as τος in *ἕκ-τος*, as *th* in the English *six-th*, as τὸ the common demonstrative or article in Greek, and as *th* in the English *th-e* and *th-a-t*, serving, by pointing to and thus distinguishing it, to separate the term *ἕκα*, 'one,' from the other objects of an indefinite number, and so conveying the notion of individuality. Of course the idea of some number, of which *ἕκαστος* shows that the component objects are taken individually, is implied in the same way that *ἕκτος*, naming as it does only one object, but separated or distinguished as the 'sixth,' implies a number of 'six' from which the one is distinguished. So *κατὰ φύλα*, 'by tribes,' that is, a nation parted off into tribes, or taken 'by tribes;' *καθ' ἡμέραν*, 'daily,' 'by the day,' 'a day at a time,' that is, some larger period of time, as life or the like, divided off into equal parts by the measure of a day. E.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 7, 8, *ἀπῆλθον ὑπὸ τὰ δένδρα ἀνδρωποὶ ἐβδομήκοντα, οὐκ ἀδρόοι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἓνα*, 'there retired under shelter of the trees seventy men, not in a body, but one by one,' 'one at a time.' In this example, we have a number of soldiers divided off into equal subdivisions, namely, of one each; and they retire, not in a body (*ἀδρόοι*), but 'by ones,' 'one at a time,' *singulatim*. The division into parts is made

by applying successively a standard or unit of measure, namely, *καθ' ἓνα*, 'one,' 'a measure that reaches to, or amounts to, one;' just as a husbandman divides a heap of corn into parts of a bushel each by the use of a bushel-measure.

The notion of a measure to be thus employed to mark off a whole number into equal subdivisions, as *καθ' ἓνα*, 'one,' 'the measure of one,' belongs to the accusative itself, meaning, in the instance just mentioned, 'as far as one goes,' 'as much as one,' 'to the amount of one;' and *κατά* has no other office than that of showing how this measure is determined, namely, taken in its proper sense, by noting that a limit of measure or extent is reached by a direction from above downwards. But it has been shown above that *κατά*, from being frequently used in its proper sense to determine the way in which an action was measured, and, especially, from the prevalence of the notion of measure itself, whereby was shut out a regard to the direction in which it was determined, came to denote any direction in which an action was measured, and, of course, without regard to its being downward, it being indifferent which way any thing is measured, whether from below upwards, or from above downwards. That, in fact, *κατά* became a mere sign of the direction of an action with reference to the determination of its measure or extent. Accordingly, *καθ' ἓνα* would mean, as it has been seen that it really does, 'as much as one,' 'up to the measure of one,' 'one.' And if *καθ' ἓνα* obtained this sense of measure, 'one,' 'to the amount of one,' it might be used as a standard, or unit of measure, to be applied to appropriate objects. A number of persons may be counted off by this measure, and divided into parts of 'one' each, or, which is the same thing, distributed into such parts. Thus, in the example above given, the seventy soldiers are described as having retired under the shelter of the trees, not in a body (*ἀθρόοι*) or as an aggregate number, but by 'ones,' 'one at a time' (*καθ' ἓνα*), that is, in subdivisions of 'one each,' made by dividing or distributing the whole number by applying successively the measure of 'one.'

It has been shown that *κατά* with the accusative expresses a measure, and that such measure is capable of being used with appropriate objects as a unit or standard of measure by which to divide or distribute a whole number or aggregate of objects into equal parts or divisions having the denomination of the unit of measure. But it may be asked whence the idea of actual distribution comes, it being one thing to have a unit of measure, and another thing to express the fact of its actual application with resulting distribution. Clearly, the notion of distribution, that is, of a number or aggregate of objects divided off into equal parts by the application of a unit of measure, does not reside in *κατά*. This appears from all that has been hitherto said of its proper and derivative significations, no one of them containing any such notion. Nor is it to be found in the accusative case, which does no more than express the measure. Nor yet, again, is it conveyed by *κατά* and the accusative conjoined; for, as has been seen already, the sense which they convey is only that of measure, belonging to the accusative, with an index at most, given by *κατά*, of the direction in which this is obtained. The notion of distribution is, in fact, suggested by the juxtaposition of the unit of measure and the number or aggregate to be subdivided or distributed, and is only rendered more obvious by the attending circumstances. Of course, it is always required, in order to its being understood that *κατά* and the accusative, when placed alongside of a whole number, are the unit of measure or divisor by which it is to be distributed into equal parts, that the unit of measure formed by *κατά* and the accusative shall be of a nature suited to the division or distribution of the whole number, that is, that it shall be the name of one of the parts of which the whole number is made up, and into which it is capable of being divided. When seventy soldiers are said to retire (*ἀπὸ τῶν δένδρων ἀνδρῶντες ἐβδόμηχοντα*), and *καθ' ἓνα* is added with the sense merely of a unit of measure, 'up to one,' 'one,' but naming one of the parts or numbers of which the whole number seventy is composed, and being therefore fitted to become its divisor, the mind supplies, without

difficulty, under the circumstances, the application of this unit of measure to the whole number alongside of which it stands as its divisor; so that ἀπὸ πλῆθους ἀνδρῶν ἐβδομήκοντα, οὐκ ἀθροῖοι ἀλλὰ καθ' ἓνα, may readily be understood to mean, that the seventy soldiers were distributed by the application of the unit of measure καθ' ἓνα into equal parts of 'one each,' and so retired 'by ones,' or 'one at a time.' In Hom. Il. iii. 326, οἱ μὲν ἔπειθ' ἴζοντο κατὰ στίχας, 'they sat in rows or ranks,' the host of men is described as sitting 'in rows,' distributed 'by rows;' and it is obvious that κατὰ στίχας, 'rows or ranks,' is a unit of measure by which the host is distributed, it being a suitable one by which to arrange a host, especially when they were to be spectators of a single combat. Thuc. i. 5, προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν ἀτεχνήτοις καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκουμέναις ἡρπάζον, 'falling upon cities that were unwall'd and inhabited villagewise, they plundered them.' Here the object to be distributed or divided is πόλις, 'a city,' and the unit of measure by which it is divided is κατὰ κώμην, 'a village,' 'the measure of a village;' and this, as we know from other passages showing that the Greek cities (πόλεις) were sometimes composed of a number of villages, as distinguished from a compact arrangement, was suitable to be employed as the divisor of the object or aggregate πόλις, if not ordinarily, yet certainly in the present circumstances, where its peculiar arrangement and its being unwall'd are assigned as the occasion of its being plundered. Although the proper unit is κατὰ κώμην, the plural κατὰ κώμας is employed to show the plurality of parts or villages into which the πόλις was distributed. Thuc. i. 2, τῆς τε καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς πανταχοῦ ἀν' ἡγούμενοι ἐπακρατεῖν, 'counting that they would everywhere obtain their necessary daily subsistence.' In this example, men are spoken of as requiring food for subsistence, and, although life is not mentioned as the period during which food is required, it is necessarily implied. Καθ' ἡμέραν, 'for a day, the measure of a day,' 'a day,' being one of the subdivisions of which this period is obviously capable, and being, moreover, peculiarly suited to make the subdivision when necessary subsistence is

spoken of, upon its addition as a unit of measure divides off this period of man's demand for food into equal parts of a day each. The sense which arises is, that they counted upon commanding everywhere their necessary subsistence 'for a day at a time,' or their 'daily' subsistence. Thucydides, i. 3, describes the Greeks as being called to a greater extent Hellenes καθ' ἑκάστους, 'considered individually,' that is, distributed into individuals, the number to be divided being the ancient inhabitants of Hellas, and the term καθ' ἑκάστους, 'each,' 'individual,' being the unit of measure by which it is divided off into equal parts. In the same chapter he says that the Hellenes, prior to the Trojan war, accomplished nothing κατὰ πόλεις, 'as states,' considered as divided into πόλεις or 'states,' the whole nation being regarded as divided off into πόλεις. The aggregate to be distributed into parts is the Greek people, and the unit of measure by which it is divided off into equal parts is the term κατὰ πόλεις, or, using the singular, κατὰ πόλιν, 'a state,' 'the measure of a state;' and this is suitably employed as a divisor as being the name of a familiar division of the Greek people.

In some of the examples, the plural number is employed, as, κατὰ πόλεις, καθ' ἑκάστους, κατὰ κώμας, while in others the singular is used, as καθ' ἓνα, καθ' ἡμέραν. By the employment of the plural the idea is conveyed that of the parts into which a whole number is distributed there are several comprised in the speaker's view. Thus, κατὰ πόλεις, in the example above considered, shows not only that the Greeks were divided by the unit of measure κατὰ πόλιν, but that there were in the writer's view a number of the parts resulting from the division; whereas, when the singular is employed, the attention is confined to the distribution according to the unit of measure named, and no regard is had to the multiplication of this. In other examples, however, the plural number with κατά is used because the unit of measure itself is made up of a plurality of objects; as, κατὰ τρεῖς, 'by threes,' where, the unit of measure being 'three,' the several equal parts resulting from the division or distribution consist of 'three.'

To the use of *κατά* with the accusative which has just been considered belong, besides others, the expressions *κατά μέρος*, 'in turn,' 'by turns,' *κατ' ὀλίγους*, 'a few at a time,' *κατ' ὀλίγον*, 'by little and little,' 'a little at a time,' *κατά μικρόν*, 'gradually,' 'a little at a time,' *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν*, 'year by year,' 'every year,' *κατά μῆνα*, 'monthly,' 'by the month,' 'every month.'

e. 'Up to,' 'as far as reaches.' The same explanation, both as to the preposition and as to the case, which has been given in the constructions hitherto examined under this head, applies also to *κατά* and the accusative in such expressions as *κατά κράτος*, 'with one's might,' *κατά τάχος*, 'as fast as one can,' 'with one's utmost speed,' 'at the top of one's speed,' *κατά δύναμιν*, 'for, according to, one's powers or ability.' E.g. Herod. i. 124, *ποιεε ταῦτα καὶ ποιεε κατά τάχος*, 'do this, and do it as quickly as possible.' Here the accusative has the sense of 'as far as goes,' 'to the measure or extent of,' that is, it marks the limit to which the action qualified reaches; so that *ποιεε κατά τάχος* properly means, 'do it up to the measure of your quickness,' which is expressed in English by 'do it as quickly as you can.' And *κατά*, as in former cases, retaining only the power of indicating in a general way the mode of determining the measure of extent, that is, not requiring that the direction of the action shall be conceived as being 'downwards,' but merely as having a regard to, or pointing to, the object that marks the measure of extent, serves to connect the action of *ποιεε* with the accusative *τάχος*, which follows to denote the point up to which it reaches.

Of the same nature, essentially, is the phrase *τὸ κατ' ἐμέ*, 'so far as I am concerned:' e.g. Xen. Hell. i. 6, 5, *οὐ κωλύω τὰ κατ' ἐμέ*, 'I do not stand in his way, so far as I am concerned.' So also such expressions as *κατά τοῦτο*, 'according to this,' 'in this view,' that is, 'so far as this goes,' *κατά ταῦτα*, 'in the same way,' 'according to the same things,' 'so far as the same things are concerned,' *καθ' ὅτι*, 'as far as,' 'as far as what . . .,' 'according to what . . .'. In these expressions, it is plain that *κατά* with the accusative is introduced to denote the extent to which the proposition of

which it is the qualification is to be admitted; and that, accordingly, both the preposition and the accusative are to be explained in the same way precisely as in the case of *κατά τάχος*.

f. 'According to,' 'after,' 'conformably to,' 'like.' To the class of cases in which *κατά* with the accusative gives the measure or extent of the preceding proposition, may be referred a considerable variety of examples in which this preposition, with the same case, is used in the sense of 'according to,' 'after,' 'conformably to,' 'like.' E.g. Il. ix. 108, *οὔτι καθ' ἡμέτερόν γε νόον*, 'not at all according to, after, my mind at least.' Nestor, referring to the conduct of Agamemnon in taking away Briseïs from Achilles, says that it was not at all according to, in conformity with, his own judgment; that is, the conduct of Agamemnon did not answer to the measure or standard of his judgment, or, as it might be expressed in English, did not square with it. Herod. vii. 143, *συλλαμβάνοντι κατά τὸ ὀρθόν*, 'if one apprehend it rightly,' 'according to what is right,' that is, 'in conformity with the measure or standard of right;' Herod. ii. 10, *ποταμοὶ οὐ κατά τὸν Νεῖλον ἐόντες μεγάλα*, 'rivers that are not like the Nile in size,' that is, not conforming to the measure or standard of the Nile, hence, not 'like the Nile;' Herod. ii. 68, *ὁ νεοσσὸς κατά λόγον τοῦ ὠοῦ γίνεται*, 'the young (of the crocodile) is in proportion to the size (ratio) of the egg;' that is, 'conforms to the standard of measure which in reckoning (*λόγον*) is furnished by the egg.' Id. ib. (*ὁ χροκόδειλος*) *ἔχει . . . ὀδόντας μεγάλους . . . κατά λόγον τοῦ σώματος*, 'the crocodile has large teeth, in accordance with the size (ratio) of his body.' Aristoph. Av. 1001-2, *αὐτίκα γὰρ ἀήρ ἐστὶ τὴν ἰδέαν ὅλος | κατὰ πυγέα μάλιστα*, 'the whole atmosphere is in its appearance most like an oven,' that is, answers to the measure or standard of an oven.

In such examples, *κατά* with the accusative does not seemingly furnish a direct measure of the preceding proposition, but rather gives a measure of extent to which as a standard the proposition is referred. In fact, however, it amounts to the same thing; and this use of *κατά* with the accusative is to be compared with *καθ' ἑνα*, *καθ' ἡμέραν*, and

the like, where, as above explained, it makes a unit of measure. The only difference is, that in *καθ' ἓνα*, and the like expressions, the measure given is applied to some whole number or aggregate of objects a number of times successively, and so as to divide it into several parts of the same denomination with itself, while here it is applied but one time, and merely to determine the accordance of an object with the standard.

Here belong such expressions as *κατὰ φύσιν*, 'naturally,' 'in accordance with nature,' 'conforming to the standard of nature;' *κατὰ μοῖραν*, 'fitly,' 'as is right,' that is, conformably to an apportionment or assigned share, and therefore to what is right or one's due, not too much nor too little; *κατ' αἶσαν*, 'rightly,' 'as is fit,' that is, conformably to what is destined, and, hence, to what is due; *κατ' οὐδέν*, 'as well as nothing,' 'amounting to nothing,' 'answering to the standard of nothing:' e.g. Herod. ii. 101, *τῶν δὲ ἄλλων βασιλέων, οὐ γὰρ ἔλεγον οὐδεμίην ἔργων ἀπόδεξιν, κατ' οὐδέν εἶναι λαμπρότητος*, 'the rest of the kings, for they mentioned no deed of theirs, were of no distinction,' 'as much as nothing in point of splendor;' *κατ' ἀνθρώπων*, 'according to the measure of a man,' 'according to human nature.'

To this place should be referred also the case in which the comparative is followed by *ἢ* and *κατὰ* with the accusative of a noun added to mark the standard with which the comparison is made. E.g. Xen. Hell. iii. 3, 1, *καὶ ἔτυχε σεμνοτέρας ἢ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων ταφῆς*, 'and obtained funeral obsequies more splendid than befits a man,' that is, 'than are according to the measure or standard of a man;' Id. Memorab. Socr. i. 7, 4, *προσάττεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς, ἔφη, μείζω ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν*, 'for there was assigned them, he said, what was too great for their powers,' that is, what was too great when measured against their powers.

g. 'About,' 'near.' In the same way must be explained the examples in which *κατὰ* is used with the accusative of numerals to introduce, not the exact measure of any action, but a standard of measure to which it is referred for comparison, and where it may be rendered in English by 'about,' 'near.' E.g. Herod. ii. 145, *Διονύσιον μὲν νυν . . . κατὰ ἑξα-*

κόσια ἔτεα καὶ χίλια μάλιστα ἔστι ἐς ἐμέ, 'for Dionysus, now, there are, at the most, about sixteen hundred years to my time;' properly, the time assigned to Dionysus is represented as conforming to, answering to, like, a measure or standard of sixteen hundred years; and this sense, when speaking of numbers, is sufficiently expressed by 'about,' 'near,' although these terms do not exactly express the idea conveyed by the Greek.

h. 'At,' 'near.' Another instance of the use of *κατὰ* with the accusative, differing, however, from those which have been thus far examined, as do also the remaining examples to be considered, in the sense which the accusative bears, is that in which it occurs with the accusative case of names of places and of some other nouns, being employed to describe the position of objects and actions relatively to these, where the English uses the terms 'at,' 'near.' E.g. Herod. vii. 137, *ἤλωσαν κατὰ Βισάνθην τὴν ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ*, 'they were captured at, or near, Bisanthe;' Xen. Anab. vii. 5, 13, *καὶ οἱ Θρᾷκες οἱ κατὰ ταῦτα οἰκοῦντες ληΐζονται*, 'the Thracians who dwell in this region are robbers.'

In such examples, the accusative is introduced to mark, not simply the extent or measure of the action which is to be defined, but the object in space to which exclusively it is referred for its relative position, that one to which alone, in this respect of relative position, it may be said to have regard; and has, therefore, the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' 'having regard to,' or indicates, not merely how far the action goes, but what object it embraces. Thus, in the first example cited, the capture (*ἤλωσαν*) is represented as having for Bisanthe a certain relative position or aspect, namely, a position or aspect defined by saying that the capture is confined in its local relation to Bisanthe, or that it is to be understood as having a position 'as to,' 'as regards,' Bisanthe. That is, its scene is determined, not by noting the very place at which it occurred, which would require the ablative of position (*locativus*), or other equivalent form of expression, but by naming an object with regard to which alone it is asserted to have a relative local position. The accusative, in this construction, may be regarded as

having the same sense as in such phrases as *κατ' οἶκον μένειν*, above considered. The preposition *κατά*, as in *κατ' οἶκον μένειν*, serves to point the action which is to be defined to the object named by the accusative, or to indicate its relative direction, the primary notion of 'down' being lost sight of. Here, again, *κατά* is merely a general sign of reference; and the preposition and accusative being, not so much the note of the exact scene of an action, as the description of an object to which, in determining the local relations of the action, it is to be understood as having an exclusive regard, may be translated in English by 'at,' 'near,' although these terms cannot be said to be a complete transcript of the Greek expression. They agree with it, however, in not giving an exact designation of position.

i. 'In,' 'of the time of.' Not materially different is the use of *κατά* with the accusative of a variety of terms to denote the period of time to which any action or object is referred, where the English employs the expressions 'in,' 'in or of the time of.' E.g. Herod. vii. 137, (*ἡ Ταλθυβίου μῆρις*) *χρόνῳ μετέπειτα πολλῷ ἐπεγέρθη, κατὰ τὸν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων πόλεμον*, 'the wrath of Talthybius was aroused a long time after, namely, in the time of the war of the Peloponnesians and Athenians.' Properly, the accusative, in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' introduces a term expressing the period of time to which the action or state is referred, and with regard to which alone it has a relative direction. That the idea of the time or period to which an action is referred may be indicated by the accusative case of a suitable noun, in virtue of its meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards,' that is, by its power of marking the object to which an action is restricted in its aspect, is seen also by the use of *tum* and *quum* in Latin, and 'then' and 'when' in English. *Κατά*, in this construction, as in previous instances, does no more than point the action to the object in the accusative or show its relative direction, its proper sense of 'down' being entirely disregarded. Thus, in the example cited above, to the statement *ἡ Ταλθυβίου μῆρις χρόνῳ μετέπειτα πολλῷ ἐπεγέρθη*, 'the wrath of Talthybius was aroused a long time after,' the phrase *κατὰ τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων*

πόλεμον is added to show that it is to be referred to the period of the war between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, and to be considered as having regard to it exclusively; and this is equivalent in English to 'in the time of the war between the Peloponnesians and Athenians.' Of course the notion of time is suggested by the noun in the accusative, which, either properly or figuratively, expresses a period of time. Compare Xen. Cyrop. i. 3, 14, *ἄφες πάντας τοὺς κατ' ἐμὲ διώκειν*, 'permit all those of my age to engage in the chase;' Id. Rep. Laced. x. 8, *ὁ γὰρ Λυκούργος κατὰ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας λέγεται γενέσθαι*, 'for Lycurgus is said to have been of the time of the Heracleidae;' Id. Ages. x. 4, *ἔτυχε τούτου μάλιστα τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν*, 'he had this good fortune more than any of his time;' Id. Memor. Socr. iii. 5, 10, *ἐν οἷς πᾶσιν ἐκείνοι δῆλοι γερόντασι τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀνθρώπων ἀριστεύσαντες*, 'in all these instances it is plain that they were the first of the men of their day;' Herod. ii. 134, *πρὸς δὲ ὅτι κατὰ Ἀμασιν βασιλεύοντα ἦν ἀκμάζουσα Ῥοδῶπις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον*, 'besides that Rhodopis flourished in the time when Amasis was king, and not in his time.' Add Id. ii. 67, and see Passow's Lexicon, s. v. *κατά*.

k. 'Against,' 'over against,' 'opposite to.' *Κατά* with the accusative is used to mark the relative position of any thing by introducing an object to which its aspect is confined, or with regard to which alone it has its relative position, not only in the sense of 'at,' 'near,' and, where a period of time is concerned, in that of 'in,' 'in the time of,' but also in that of 'against,' 'over against,' 'opposite to.' E.g. Xen. Anab. i. 10, 7, *ὁ γὰρ Τισσαφέρνης . . . οὐκ ἔφυγεν ἀλλὰ δέσχετο παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν κατὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας πελταστὰς*, 'over against, opposite to, the Greek peltastæ;' Id. Anab. vi. 3, 28, *τῶν δὲ πολεμίων τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον εὐθὺς διεσπάρη, καθ' ὃ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἵππεῖς ἦσαν*, 'opposite to which the Greek cavalry were posted;' Id. Anab. vii. 5, 13, *καὶ οἱ Θρᾷκες οἱ κατὰ ταῦτα οἰκοῦντες, στήλας ὀρισάμενοι, τὰ καθ' αὐτοὺς ἕκαστος ἐκπύοντα λήζονται*, 'plunder each the vessels that are stranded opposite to, or at, his own station.'

It can hardly be doubted that the accusative has here the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' nor that it defines the position

of an object or action by introducing something with regard to which alone it is to be considered as having its relative position or direction, and by thus restricting the view to this, just as in μένειν κατ' οἶκον, 'to stay at home,' as above explained; nor, again, that κατὰ, as in many of the preceding cases, merely points the action to the object in the accusative by which it is defined, or shows that it has a relative position or aspect with regard to it, its proper sense of 'down' being left out of view; nor, lastly, that the idea of 'against,' 'over against,' 'opposite to,' is not proper to either κατὰ or the accusative, but is derived from the circumstances of local opposition in which the object or action defined and that by which it is defined stand to each other; just as it was seen to be true of ἐπὶ in the sense of 'against' with the idea of hostility, and as it will be seen to be equally true of παρὰ and πρὸς in the same sense, that this meaning of 'against' is suggested by the mutual relations of the parties to the action. Thus, in the first example above given, 'Tissaphernes forced his way along the river over against, or opposite to, the Greek peltastæ,' the sense properly is, he forced his way (διήλασε) in a direction (κατὰ) that had regard to the Greek peltastæ (τοὺς Ἑλλήνας πελταστὰς); or, his march is described as having a direction that pointed exclusively to the Greek peltastæ. But it being known that Tissaphernes and the Greeks, the parties concerned in the action of διήλασε, were engaged in battle on opposite sides, and that the actual march of Tissaphernes along the river could hardly be otherwise directed than in a way opposite to and against the Greeks, who had their post on the river, the sense attached to κατὰ and the accusative must needs be that of 'against,' 'opposite to.' And, in the last example, the Thracians having been described as occupying each a separate post on the marshy shore of the Euxine, when it is added that they plundered the vessels that were stranded κατ' αὐτούς, that is, in a position or direction that had regard to and pointed to these posts respectively, so as to have, in the matter of situation, exclusive relation to these, it is easily understood, from the condition of things presented, that the vessels stranded and plundered were

'over against' or 'opposite to' the robbers' stations. Compare the Latin *adversus*, 'against,' properly, 'turned towards,' or 'having a direction or aspect towards,' which has an accusative of the object 'as to' or 'with regard to' which there is this relation existing.

l. 'For,' 'on,' 'upon,' 'after.' *Kard* with the accusative is used also to express the object had in view in an action, or that engages the efforts of a person, where in English we employ the terms 'for,' 'on,' 'upon,' 'after.' E.g. Od. iii. 72, ἦ τι κατὰ πρῆξιν, ἢ μαψιδίως ἀλλήλοισθε; 'do you rove on some enterprise?' Od. iii. 106, πλαζόμενοι κατὰ ληΐδ', 'roving for, in pursuit of, plunder;' Herod. ii. 152, κατὰ λήγην ἐκπλώσαντες, 'who had sailed from home in quest of booty;' Id. i. 94, ἀποπλέειν κατὰ βίου τε καὶ γῆς ζήτησιν, 'sailed away in search of subsistence and a country (home).'

Here, again, κατὰ added to the action does no more than indicate its direction relatively to the object introduced by the accusative and to which it is referred, no regard being had to its proper sense of 'down.' And the accusative, having the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' is brought in to mark the object with regard to which alone the action is performed. In other words, it restricts the action to a definite case, showing, for example, that the sailing was performed, not in any possible regard, but with regard to a particular thing, and so may be said, in one sense, to set a limit to its extent. Thus viewed, πλαζόμενοι κατὰ λήϊδα would mean, 'roving with a direction or aim . . . as regards booty;' and ἀποπλέειν κατὰ βίου ζήτησιν, 'to sail away with a direction or aim . . . as regards a search for subsistence.' Of course, if this representation be true, the sense of object had in view is more properly to be referred to the accusative than to the preposition; but is partly to be inferred from the nature of the action and the corresponding character of the noun.

m. 'For,' 'on account of.' Admitting of the same interpretation is the case in which κατὰ with the accusative is used to express the ground or motive of an action, rendered in English by 'for,' 'on account of,' and very nearly related to that just mentioned.' E.g. Herod. i. 143, ἀπε-

σχίσθησαν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων Ἴωνων οὗτοι κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, 'these were separated from the rest of the Ionians for no other cause, on account of nothing else;' properly, 'as regards nothing else;' Id. iii. 137, κατὰ δὴ τοῦτο μοι δοκεῖ σπεῦσαι τὸν γάμον τοῦτον τελέσας χρήματα μεγάλα Δημοκλήδης, 'Democedes seems to me to have hastened this marriage for this reason,' 'on account of this,' or 'with this view or motive;' Id. v. 3, εἰσὶ δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο δαδενέες, 'they are, then, on this account weak.' Κατὰ τοῦτο, in this last example, shows in what regard the proposition εἰσὶ δαδενέες is affirmed. Whether the limitation is to express a ground or motive, the object had in view, or simply the sense of 'with regard to,' can only be decided from the circumstances of the case.

η. 'Relating to,' 'belonging to.' Very similar, and requiring the same explanation both of the case and of the preposition, is the use of κατὰ with the accusative in the sense of 'what relates to,' 'what belongs to,' 'as far as concerns.' E.g. Herod. i. 124, κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τούτου προθυμίην τέδινηκας, τὸ δὲ κατὰ θεοῦς τε καὶ ἐμὲ περίεις, 'so far as concerns, so far as regards, this man's purposes, you are dead; but in so far as relates to the gods and to me, you survive;' Xen. Anab. i. 6, 9, ὥς σχολὴ ἢ ἡμῖν, τὸ κατὰ τοῦτον εἶναι, τοὺς ἐθελοντάς φίλους τούτους εὖ ποιεῖν, 'that we may have leisure, so far as relates to this man, to confer benefits upon these that are willing friends.' It may be observed that the accusative here, even more plainly than in the preceding instances, has the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' or is employed to show in what extent, and in what regard, the proposition which it qualifies is to be taken. So plain, indeed, is the meaning of the accusative case in this class of examples, that they might be alleged in proof of the interpretation given to this case in former instances, in which, although the accusative must be admitted to be of the same construction, its sense is less obvious. That κατὰ, in these examples, serves merely to show the reference of the action or state which is defined to the object by which it is defined, will scarcely be doubted if it be considered in the light afforded by the instances of its use already explained.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS OF κατὰ WITH THE CASES.

Significations of κατὰ.	Genitive: 'with respect to.'	Accusative: α. 'As far as,' (extent.) β. 'As to,' 'as regards.'
1. 'Down.'	1. 'Down from.' 'Down upon.' '(Down) under.'	1. 'Throughout,' 'all through.'
2. Relative direction.	2. 'At.' '(Of, 'concerning.' 'Upon,' 'by.' 'Against.'	2. 'At,' 'on,' 'in,' 'by.' 'By,' 'at a time,' (distributively.) 'Up to,' 'as far as goes.' 'According to,' 'after,' 'conformably to,' 'like.' 'About,' 'near,' (of numbers, &c.)
		2. 'At,' 'near.' 'Over against,' 'against.' 'For,' 'on,' 'upon,' 'after,' (object had in view.) 'For,' 'on account of.' 'Relating to,' 'belonging to.'

Μετὰ.

Μετὰ has the same radical with μέσ-ος, 'middle,' 'in the midst,' with the Latin *med-ius*, the German *mit*, and the English *mid*, as in *mid-way*, *midd-le*, *mid-st*.

Significations of μετὰ.

Examined as it stands apart, in compounds, and in its connection with nouns, μετὰ presents a considerable variety of meanings, all of which involve the idea of 'in the midst.'

1. α. 'In the midst,' 'amid,' 'among.' First to be mentioned, as belonging to μετὰ, is the sense of 'in the midst,' 'amid,' 'among,' containing more or less distinctly the idea of one object having its position among several, so as to be one of a number, and to be encompassed by, or, rather, grouped with, them. Thus, in such compounds as μεταδόημος, 'among the people,' μεταξύμος, 'in the midst of the waves,' μετὰμέλωμαι, 'I sing in the midst,' 'among others,' μετὰριθμος, 'counted among;' and so in construction with nouns; as Od. xvi. 140-1, μετὰ δμῶων τ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ | πῖνε καὶ ἔσθ', 'drink and eat among the servants;' Il. i. 252, μετὰ δὲ τριτάτοισιν ἀνασσειν, 'ruled among the third generation;' Il. xxiii. 476, οὔτε νεώτατός ἐσσι μετ' Ἀργείοισι τοσούτον, 'the youngest among the Argives.'

β. 'With.' Immediately connected with the sense of 'in the midst,' 'among,' is that of 'with,' having the notion of community, of partaking or sharing with others, and

being thus distinguished from *σύν*, 'with,' which has only the notion of conjunction. Thus, in many compounds; as, *μεταδαινύμαι*, 'I share in a feast,' 'I partake with others of a feast:' e.g. Od. xiii. 48, *αλεῖ δ' αὖθ' ἡμῖν μεταδασσεται*, 'will share the feast with us;' *μεταμίγνυμι*, 'I mingle with or among:' e.g. Od. xviii. 310, *καὶ δαΐδας μετέμωγον*, 'and mingled torches with it;' *μετατεῖν*, 'to demand a share,' *μεταλαγχάνειν*, 'to obtain a share by lot.' And so in construction with nouns, in such examples as Od. ii. 148, *τῷ δ' ἰὼς μὲν ῥ' ἐπέτοντο μετὰ πνοιῆς ἀνέμοιο*, 'flew with, together with, accompanying, the blasts of the wind;' Xen. Cyrop. ii. 1, 12, *νομίζοντες μετὰ πλείονων ἀγωνεῖσθαι*, 'thinking that they would share the contest with a greater number;' Xen. Hell. iv. 1, 32, *αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵππου μαχόμενος μεθ' ὁμῶν ἐς τὴν θάλατταν κατεδίωκον τοὺς πολεμίους*, 'fighting on horse with you,' that is, 'sharing with you in the fight;' Id. ib. iv. 1, 35, *νῦν δὲ ἔξεστί σοι μεθ' ἡμῶν γενομένῳ*, 'if you be with us;' Id. ib. vi. 5, 32, *συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων*, 'joined the expedition with those who were with (allied with) the Thebans.'

c. 'Between.' To the sense of 'among,' 'in the midst,' belongs also the case in which *μετά* corresponds to 'between' in English, where an object is represented as being, so to speak, in the midst with reference to two groups of things, and even to two objects alone, rather than with reference to a number of individuals. This sense is more exactly expressed by the English 'between,' which by its radical 'two' makes distinct reference to two objects or sets of objects; and by the Latin *inter*, in which the ending *ter* shows that two objects are had in view, while *in* conveys the notion of 'in,' 'within,' the compound meaning 'within . . . with regard to two objects or sets of objects.' E.g. Il. xix. 110, *ὅς κεν ἐπ' ἡματι τῷδε πέσῃ μετὰ ποσσὶ γυναικός*, 'whoever shall this day fall between the feet of a woman;' Il. v. 461, *Τρωὰς δὲ στήχας οὗλος Ἀργὸς ὤτρυνε μετελθών*, 'going between (among) the ranks;' Il. iii. 85, . . . *Ἑκτωρ δὲ μετ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἔειπε*, 'Hector spoke in the midst of (between) both armies.' The same sense is seen in the derivative *μεταξύ*, 'in the space between,' and in com-

pounds; as, *μεταστήδιος*, 'between the breasts,' *μεταίχμος*, 'between two armies.'

2. a. 'After.' *Μετά* has also the sense of 'after,' with the idea of sequence, both in compounds and in its use with the cases of nouns. Thus, in compounds; as, *μεταβιῶν*, 'to live after,' 'to survive,' *μεταγενής*, 'born after or subsequently,' *μεταστένειν*, 'to lament afterwards:' e.g. *Æsch. Eumen. 59, μὴ μεταστένειν πόνων*, 'the not groaning after trouble,' that is, 'the not having trouble and uttering groans afterwards;' *μεταύριον*, 'the day after to-morrow.' And so when used with the cases of nouns, in such examples as Il. xiii. 492, *λαοὶ ἔπονθ' ὥσεί τε μετὰ κτῖλον ἔσπετο μῆλα*, 'as sheep follow the bell-wether;' Xen. Hell. vi. 5, 49, *μετὰ ταῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι*, 'after this the Athenians deliberated.' In fact, however, as will be shown more fully below, *μετά*, in this case also, has properly the sense of 'with,' 'in company with,' 'amid,' the meaning of 'after' not really belonging to *μετά*, but being suggested by the attending circumstances. Thus, in the example above cited, *μετὰ κτῖλον ἔσπετο μῆλα*, the sheep are represented as following after the bell-wether; but belonging, as they do, to the same flock with him, they properly follow with him, in company with him. And the very office of the *κτῖλος* being to lead the way, and the practice of the sheep to follow after, the *κτῖλος* and the *μῆλα* still forming one flock or company, and the *μῆλα* being 'with' (*μετά*) the *κτῖλος*, this familiar relation of the parties, namely, the one habitually going before and the other following after, suggests, if it does not make necessary, the sense of 'after' as suited in English to convey the meaning which the circumstances give to *μετά*. The same is to be said of *μετὰ ταῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο*, 'after this they deliberated.' A series of events, which *ταῦτα* recalls, is set before the hearer, and with them, as forming one of the series, is conjoined another by means of *μετά*, the sense of *μετὰ ταῦτα* being properly 'among, with, these.' The order of events, however, clearly enough indicates that the act of deliberating (*ἐβουλεύοντο*), though one of the group or series, is really subsequent to the other events recited; and, hence, we prefer in English

to use the term 'after,' and thus to mark distinctly this relation of coming after, altogether omitting the notion of 'with,' 'among.'

Yet, when this meaning of 'after' had once come to be familiarly coupled with *μετά*, it became not uncommon to attach it to the preposition, in many compound words at least, where there was little if any thing present to suggest the circumstances from which it originally sprang. Thus, in the above-mentioned and in many like compounds, as, *μεταυτίχα*, 'immediately after,' *μεταπίνειν*, 'to drink after or subsequently,' *μεταχλαίειν*, 'to weep after,' that is, 'subsequently,' and also 'to share one's grief,' it may be that *μετά* had this signification assigned to it from its having been already commonly used in this sense in cases where the circumstances sufficiently indicated that the object referred to a group by *μετά* did in reality come after the other objects composing the group. But, even in these more obscure cases, it is not impossible, once it is seen how in any case *μετά* came to bear the meaning of 'after,' to discern the condition of things that rendered the employment of the preposition in the sense of 'after' altogether appropriate. Thus, *μεταγενής*, 'born subsequently,' properly means a person 'born among, that is, so as to be one of a number of, children.' But the statement itself of being thus born will imply, under circumstances easily imagined, what the preposition does not express, that the subject of it is born subsequently to the other members of the group to which *μετά* shows that it belongs. In *μεταστένειν πόνων*, *Æsch. Eum.* 59, 'to utter groans after experiencing trouble,' although the proper sense, as indicated by the preposition, is that the lamentation belongs to the group of evils expressed by *πόνων* so far as to be counted with or among them, yet the circumstances sufficiently suggest that it comes after them in point of order.

b. 'After,' expressing aim, object had in view. *Μετά* further obtains, apparently, the sense of 'after,' with the idea of a thing to be obtained, of aim, or of the object had in view, rendered in English by 'after,' and also by 'for.' Thus, in many compounds, as *μεταδιώκειν*, 'to pursue after,'

μεταθεῖν, 'to run after,' 'to chase,' *μεταπέμπεσθαι*, 'to send after,' 'to send for,' *μεταστέλλεσθαι*, 'to send after,' 'to summon.' And so, likewise, when used with nouns, as *Od. i.* 183-4, *πλέων . . . | ἐς Τεμέσσην μετά χαλκόν*, 'sailing to Temessa for, after, in quest of, copper;' *Od. ii.* 308, *μετά πατρός ἀκουήν*, (*ἵνα θύσσων ἔκηαι*), 'that you may quickly arrive (at Pylos) in search of news of your father;' literally, 'for, after, news of your father.'

Here, again, the proper sense of *μετά* is 'amid,' 'in the midst of,' and the notion of 'after,' 'for,' 'in pursuit of,' is suggested by the known business or object of the party to whom the action qualified by *μετά* is attributed. In the example from the *Odyssey*, *i.* 184, the person sailing to the 'midst' of copper (*μετά χαλκόν*) is a merchant carrying with him iron to give in exchange, and his known business, together with the circumstances of the narrative, at once suggest that the voyage is made with the object of obtaining a return cargo of copper. This we express directly in English, or imagine that we express directly, by using the terms 'after' and 'for,' which from their familiar use in this sense, and not from any thing in the primary meaning that is more suitable to convey it, seem to express more definitely the idea of aim or object had in view. In truth, if called upon to say how the English 'after,' a comparative form of 'off,' Latin *ab*, Greek *ἀπό*, and commonly marking the being relatively subsequent, and how 'for,' another form of 'fro,' as in 'fro-ward,' the same with the Latin *pro*, and the Greek *πρό* and *πρός*, and properly expressing the idea of being 'in front of,' 'before,' and 'forwards,' came to express aim or object had in view, a person might find it quite as difficult to render a satisfactory answer as it is to show how *μετά* obtains the same meaning. And if, upon examination, he found, as is really the case, that both 'after' and 'for,' when expressing object or aim, retained their proper sense, and that the peculiar meaning they seemed to have obtained arose from the circumstances in which they were used, it would lend strong confirmation to the above explanation of the way in which *μετά* obtained this signification.

When *μετά* is used in compounds with this notion of the

aim or object had in view, it no doubt had originally the sense of 'amid,' and the signification of 'after' was suggested, as just explained in regard to its use with nouns, by the attending circumstances. But, in many instances, these circumstances are so imperfectly marked as to be incapable of satisfactory exhibition; and, hence, it may be admitted as probably true that, from familiar use of *μετά* in this signification, the idea of aim or object had in view was sometimes immediately attached to it without any regard to its proper sense. Yet in many other compounds, as *μεταστέλλεσθαι*, *μεταπέμπεσθαι*, the proper notion of *μετά* may be discerned, and it may be seen that the meaning of 'after,' that is, of aim or object had in view, was suggested by the nature of the action and by the obvious relation of the party performing the action to its object. Thus, *μεταπέμπεσθαι* means, properly, 'to send (on one's own account) into the midst, among, or so as to be with, in the company of.' But the sending into the midst of, among, or so as to be with, in the company of, any object or number of objects admitting this relation, allows and leads to the inference of aim, or of an object which the sender has in view. If, at the same time, the object into the midst of which, or into the company of which, the sending is made, is of such a nature as to be obviously a thing sought for by the person that sends, the condition of things is such as to make it highly probable that *μετά* has the sense of 'after,' 'for.' Thus, in Herod. i. 77, *Κροῦσος . . . μεταπεμφόμενος Βαβυλωνίους*, the circumstances under which Cræsus sends, namely, when he is anxiously seeking recruits for his army, and, in the immediate context, is said to have summoned his Egyptian allies, show plainly enough that the Babylonians, into the midst of whom he sends, are an object sought for, and lead at once to the inference that the sending 'into the midst' is, in fact, a sending 'for' or 'after.' See also Herod. i. 41, and 108, cited by Schweigh. Lex. Herod.

c. 'Change,' 'alteration.' In many compounds, although not in its use with the cases of nouns, *μετά* is apparently the sign of change, of transfer, of the passing over from one place or thing to another, of alteration, and the

like. Thus, *μεταβαίνειν*, 'to pass over from one place to another;' as, Herod. i. 57, *μεταβαίνοντες ἐς ταῦτα τὰ χωρία*, 'in migrating into these places,' that is, 'in passing from another into these places;' *μεταβάλλειν*, 'to change,' 'to alter,' that is, 'from one thing to another;' as, Herod. i. 57, *ὅσα ἄλλα Πελασγικά ἐόντα πόλειςματα τὸ οὐνομα μετέβαλε*, 'as many other Pelasgic states as changed their name;' *μεταβουλεύεσθαι*, 'to change one's plan,' *μεταγίγιναι*, 'to transfer from one vessel into another,' *μεταγινώσκειν*, 'to alter one's opinion or judgment,' *μεταμανθάνειν*, 'to unlearn,' 'to alter or exchange by learning;' as, Herod. i. 57, *τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἔθνος διὰ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῇ ἐς Ἑλλήνας καὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν μετέμαθε*, 'the Attic nation, at the same time that it was changed into Hellenes, exchanged (unlearned) also its tongue.'

This sense attributed to *μετά*, by which it expresses change, is immediately connected with that of 'after' in the meaning of sequence, and, of course, has the same origin. Thus, *μεταβάλλειν*, 'to alter,' 'to change by throwing,' means, properly, 'to throw afterwards,' that is, to throw after having already thrown, and, hence, 'to alter one's throwing;' *μεταβουλεύεσθαι*, 'to alter one's plan,' means properly, 'to have an after-plan,' just as in English we say, 'to have an after-thought;' *μεταγίγιναι*, 'to transfer from one vessel to another,' means, properly, 'to pour into a vessel after having already poured into a vessel,' the mind readily supplying what is necessary to make an 'after-pouring into a vessel' into 'a pouring from one vessel into a different vessel.'

Summary of the significations of μετά.

Μετδ. 1. a. 'In the midst of,' 'amid,' 'among.'

b. 'With,' 'having community with,' 'sharing with others.'

c. Between.

2. a. 'After;' sequence.

b. 'After,' 'for;' object had in view, aim.

c. Change, alteration.

SIGNIFICATION AND USE OF *μετά* WITH CASES OF NOUNS.I. *Μετά* with the genitive case.

1. 'Among,' 'in the midst of.' *Μετά* with the genitive case is employed in its proper sense of 'among,' 'in the midst of:' e.g. Od. xvi. 140, . . . *μετά θυμάτων τ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ | πῖνε καὶ ἔσθ'*, 'drink and eat in the house with or among the servants;' Od. x. 320, *μετ' ἄλλων λέξο ἑταίρων*, 'among your other comrades.' Here it is plain that *μετά* has the sense of 'among,' 'in the midst,' and that the genitive has the meaning of 'with respect to.' Thus, in the first example, the meaning is, 'drink and eat in the midst . . . with respect to the servants,' the drinking and eating in the midst being shown by the genitive case to have reference specifically to the servants.

2. 'With;' having community with, sharing with others. Very nearly akin to the above signification of *μετά*, and immediately flowing from it, is that of 'with,' which it frequently has, and in which is contained the idea of being in the midst of a number, and hence of sharing with them. This, as before observed, distinguishes *μετά* from *σύν*, the latter expressing mere conjunction. E.g. Il. xxiv. 400, *τῶν μέτα παλλόμενος κλήρῳ λάχων ἐνθάδ' ἔπεισθαι*, 'casting lots with them (in the midst of and in common with them), I obtained by lot to come hither with the expedition;' Il. xiii. 700, *μετά Βοιωτῶν ἐμάχοντο*, 'they fought with the Boeotians,' that is, 'in their midst,' and 'in common with them.' Add Il. iii. 460, iv. 2, 16, 61, 341; and Od. xvii. 256-7, *αὐτίκα δ' εἶσω ἔεν, μετὰ δὲ μνηστῆρσι χάδιζεν, | ἀντίον Εὐρυμάχου*, 'with, in the midst of, the suitors.'

Hence, further, *μετά*, 'with,' is used also even where one person only is named with whom another acts in common, it being easy, when once the idea of community was attached to *μετά*, to employ it with reference to a single object instead of many. Thus, in Xen. Cyrop. ii. 1, 12, the plural is employed, *νομίζοντες μετὰ πλείονων ἀγωνεῖσθαι*, 'thinking that they would contend with (in company with) a greater number;' but in Cyrop. ii. 1, 20, *ἐπειρᾶτο ὁ Κῦρος ἀσκεῖν τὰ σώματα τῶν μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς ἰσχύν*, the singular is

used, *μετά* having the same force, 'Cyrus endeavored to exercise the bodies of those who were with him so as to make them strong,' that is, 'of those who were in his company,' or 'were associated with him in his army.' Xen. Anab. i. 7, 10, *τῶν δὲ μετὰ Κύρου βαρβάρων (ἀριθμὸς ἐγένετο) δέκα μυριάδες*, 'the number of the barbarians who were with Cyrus;' Xen. Hell. iii. 3, 11, *μαστιγούμενος . . . αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ*, 'both himself and those with him,' 'that were associated with him;' Id. Anab. i. 10, 1, *οἱ μετὰ Ἀριαίου*, 'those with Ariæus,' 'belonging to his division of the army.'

3. In the sense of 'with' or community, *μετά* is employed with the genitive variously according to the nature of the action qualified by the preposition, and to the relation in which the noun following *μετά* stands to the subject of the proposition. Thus:

a. 'Of the party of,' 'on the side of.' *Μετά* with the genitive sometimes expresses the being 'of the party of,' 'on the side of.' E.g. Xen. Hell. iv. 1, 15, *ἔξεστί σοι μεθ' ἡμῶν γενομένῳ*, 'if you become of our party,' 'take sides with us,' *si nobiscum te conjunxeris*; Id. Cyrop. ii. 4, 6, *ὅτι φαίη μετὰ τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἔσεσθαι*, 'that he would be on the side of, take part with, the injured party.'

b. 'With,' marking accompanying circumstances. Sometimes *μετά* with the genitive introduces the accompanying circumstances of an action, answering to the English 'with.' E.g. Xen. de Venat. xiii. 15, *καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἡ ἀγρὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης, τοῖς δὲ μετὰ αἰσχροῦ θρόδους*, 'some pursue the chase with moderation, some with reprehensible daring;' Id. Agesil. xi. 9, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνδρίαν γε τὸ πλεόν μετ' εὐβουλίας ἢ μετὰ κινδύνων ἐπεδείκνυτο*, 'but, indeed, he exhibited manly spirit more by (with) prudent counsel than by (with) encountering peril;' Æschin. 84, 15, *ἀνὴρ ὄντως μετ' ἀρετῆς βεβιωκώς*, 'a man that really lived virtuously.'

c. 'With,' expressing the accompanying means or agent. *Μετά* with the genitive denotes also the accompanying means or agent, rendered in English by 'with,' 'by means of,' 'with the help of.' E.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 5, 8, *τοῦ μετ' ἀρετῆς πρωτεύειν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, 'to be at pains to be distin-

guished by means of virtue,' that is, 'with virtue for a companion and helper;' Id. *Cyrop.* iv. 6, 7, *εἰ ἐλπίδα τινὰ λάβοιμε τῷ φίλῳ παιδί τιμωρίας ἂν τινος μετὰ σοῦ τυχεῖν*, 'that I would obtain, with your help, some revenge for my son;' having you for a companion and helper.

d. 'With,' in conformity with, consistently with. *Μετά* with the genitive, in the sense of 'with,' has, further, the meaning of in conformity with, consistently with: e.g. *Antiph.* 136, 25, *μετὰ τῶν νόμων ὑμετέρων ἀπολέσαι*, 'to ruin in conformity with your laws;' *Plat. Apol.* 32, c, *μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ δικαίου ᾗμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὧν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων*, 'I suppose that I ought rather to incur every risk in conformity with law and right, than to take part with you.' (See Passow's *Lex.*)

e. 'Against.' Lastly, *μετά* with the genitive, just as the English 'with' and the Latin *cum*, is occasionally used in the sense of 'against,' the notion of 'against' being suggested by the known relations of the parties to the action qualified by *μετά*. E.g. *Xen. de Rep. Laced.* xi. 7, *μετὰ τοῦ παρατυχόντος ὁμοίως μάχεσθαι*, 'to fight with (against) any one indifferently.'

In all the above instances, the genitive with *μετά* has the meaning of 'with respect to;' that is, shows the specific object to which the action or statement qualified by *μετά* is to be referred, so that it shall be understood of this, and not of any other object.

II. *Μετά* with the dative case.

Μετά with the dative case is met with only in the poets, chiefly epic; and in Homer occurs only with the plural and with collective nouns. (See Passow's *Lex.*)

1. 'Among,' 'with.' a. *Μετά* in the sense of 'among,' and hence of 'with,' is used with the dative of persons: e.g. *Il.* i. 252, it is said of Nestor, *μετὰ τριτάτοισιν ἀνασσειν*, 'he ruled among or with the third generation.' Here, while *μετά* retains its proper sense of 'among,' or may have assigned to it that of 'with,' the dative case is used in its common signification of the object ultimately affected, or that for which as an end any thing is or is done. The

sense here is, 'Nestor ruled in the midst . . . for the third generation.' *Od.* ix. 335, *αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ πέμπτος μετὰ τοῖσιν ἐλέγμην*, 'I chose myself as the fifth with (among) them.' Here, however, four having been chosen before, *μετά*, though really signifying 'among,' 'with,' and thus showing that the fifth person chosen was to be considered of the same company with the four, might, under the circumstances, be regarded as equivalent to 'after;' 'I chose myself as the fifth among, but after them.' *Od.* x. 203-4, . . . *ἐταίρους | ἡρίθμουν, ἀρχὸν δὲ μετ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ὅπασσα*, 'and gave them with each a leader,' properly, 'and with (in company with) them both sent a leader each;' *Il.* i. 368, *καὶ τὰ μὲν εὖ δάσσαντο μετὰ σφίσιν υἱες Ἀχαιῶν*, 'and these things the sons of the Achæi rightly divided among themselves;' *Il.* i. 503, *Ζεῦ πάτερ, εἵποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν ὄνησα*, 'if I have ever rendered thee help among the immortal gods.'

b. The preposition *μετά*, having the same sense, is used also with the dative of the names of things: e.g. *Il.* xix. 110, *ὅς κεν ἐπ' ἡματι τῷδε πέσῃ μετὰ ποσσὶ γυναικός*, 'whoever shall this day fall between the feet of a woman,' that is, 'shall fall in the midst . . . for the feet of a woman,' the dative here, as in the case of persons, marking the object for, or in the interest of which, any thing occurs or is done. *Il.* xxiii. 367, *χαῖται δ' ἐρρώοντο μετὰ πνοῆς ἀνέμοιο*, 'and their hair flew with the blasts of the wind;' *Il.* xv. 118, *κεῖσθαι ὁμοῦ νεκύεσσι μεθ' αἵματι καὶ κονίῃσιν*, 'to lie with dead bodies amid blood and dust.'

2. 'After.' *Μετά*, as used with the dative case, obtains also, apparently at least, the sense of 'after.' E.g. *Od.* ix. 369-70, *Ὅστιν ἐγὼ πύματον ἔδομαι μετὰ οἷς ἐτάροις, | τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πρόσθεν*, 'I will eat Outis last, after his comrades, and the rest of them previously.' Here the meaning of *μετά* seems to be that of 'after,' the term *πρόσθεν*, which refers to τοὺς ἄλλους, making it plain that, of the two parties into which Polyphemus divides Outis and his comrades, one was to be devoured previously, and Outis, of course, as being the other party, afterwards; and this seems to be expressed by *μετά*. Admitting this, and it cannot be denied, it may notwithstanding be affirmed that *μετά* has really the signifi-

cation of 'with' or 'among.' For what Polyphemus says is, that he will eat Outis with, in common with, his comrades; that is, him as well as them, so that they shall share a common fate; but adds, that he will devour the rest before, and him afterwards. The idea conveyed is that of two parties to a transaction, the one of which is marked as being a sharer with the other, and as standing in such relations to it as to admit the antecedence in point of time of the party with which it is associated, and, of course, its own coming after. Outis is associated with his companions in Polyphemus's declaration that he will eat them all, and this is expressed by *μετὰ*, 'with,' 'among;' but, according to the arrangement of the Cyclops, they are to be eaten before, and he is to be eaten afterwards. The notion of afterwards is not, properly speaking, expressed by *μετὰ*, but is suggested by the relative position in regard to the order of time which the parties to a common transaction are made to hold to each other. It is true, then, according to this view, that while *μετὰ* of itself means no more than 'among,' and 'with,' 'in common with,' it may be used to express community of action or condition under such circumstances that of the parties associated one shall be understood to come after the rest; and that, as the object which is marked as being associated with others is constantly that one which, under the circumstances, is to be understood as coming after those with which it is associated, *μετὰ*, the sign of its being thus associated, is naturally made to assume the sense of 'after.' The only condition necessary in order that *μετὰ*, 'among,' 'with,' 'in common with,' may bear for the time the sense of 'after,' is that the object introduced into a number or group of objects by *μετὰ* as sharing in common with them, shall at the time be regarded as standing after them in point of time or order.

Here, also, the dative used with *μετὰ* may be considered as denoting the final object, that, namely, to which an action or state is referred as that for which, in some sort, it is or is done.

III. *Μετὰ* with the accusative case.

1. 'Among.' *Μετὰ*, in the sense of 'among,' is used with the accusative case both with and without motion preceding.

a. With motion preceding: e.g. Il. xvii. 457-8, τῷ δ' ἀπὸ χαλκῶν κονίην οὐδὰσδε βαλόντε | ῥίμφ' ἔφερον θοὸν ἄρμα μετὰ Τρῶας καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς, 'they bore the swift chariot among the Trojans and the Achæans.' The accusative has here the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' the meaning being, 'the horses bore the swift chariot among, in the midst, . . . as regards the Trojans and the Achæans.' Il. xvii. 460, ἵπποις δίσσων, ὥστ' αἰγυπτὸς μετὰ χήνας, 'rushing with his horses, as a vulture (darts) among geese;' Il. iv. 70, αἶψα μὲν ἐς στρατὸν ἔλδ' μετὰ Τρῶας καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς, 'go quickly to the host among the Trojans and Achæans;' Il. i. 423, Ζεὺς γὰρ ἐς Ὠκεανὸν μετ' ἀμύμονας Λιδιοπῆας | χθιζὸς ἔβη, 'for Zeus went yesterday to Oceanus among the noble Æthiopians.' Here *μετὰ*, as well as ἐς, attaches itself to ἔβη, and means 'among,' 'in the midst,' while the accusative signifies 'as regards,' showing that Zeus went 'in the midst,' 'among,' only 'as regarded the Æthiopians.' Compare Il. xvii. 581, and ii. 376, δς με μετ' ἀπρήκτους ξριδας καὶ νεῖκεα βάλλει.

b. Without motion: e.g. Il. ii. 142-3, . . . τοῖσι δὲ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρνευεν, | πᾶσι μετὰ πληθύν, 'he excited desire in the breasts of all among the multitude;' that is, 'excited desire among or in the midst . . . as regards the multitude,' 'as far as the multitude went;' Herod. vii. 16, ταύτην τὴν στρατηλασίην καὶ τὸ κάρτα εἶχομεν μετὰ χεῖρας, 'we were very much occupied with this expedition,' literally, 'had it very much in the midst of, between, our hands,' or 'had it very much on our hands.' Xen. Ages. ii. 14, παρῆν δὴ θεάσασθαι . . . ἐγχειρίδια τὰ μὲν χαμαὶ, τὰ δ' ἐν σώμασι, τὰ δ' ἐτι μετὰ χεῖρας, 'one might see daggers, some on the ground, some in the bodies (of the slain), some still in the hands,' that is, 'in the midst of, between, the hands.'

c. As an instance of this use of *μετὰ* in the sense of 'among,' may be mentioned its employment with the accusative after a superlative to mark the number of objects among which some one stands preëminent: e.g. Il.

ix. 53, *Τυδείδῃ, πέρι μὲν πολέμῳ ἐν καρτερός ἐσσι, | καὶ βουλῇ μετὰ πάντας ὁμήλικας ἐπλεῖ ἀριστος*, 'the best among all your fellows.'

d. The sense of 'in the midst of' would seem to belong to *μετὰ* in the phrase *μεθ' ἡμέραν*, 'in the daytime,' *interdiu*, opposed to *νύκτωρ*, 'in the night,' 'by night,' occurring commonly in Herodotus, and frequently met with in Attic Greek. Thus, Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 12, *νύκτωρ ἀμαχεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρὸ ποδῶν ὁρῶν τις, ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν μαχόμενος*, 'one would see better what was in his way by night when not fighting, than in the daytime, if engaged in fighting;' that is, 'in the midst of the day,' 'in the daytime,' to which almost exactly corresponds the Latin *interdiu*. Admitting *μετὰ* to have here the sense of 'in the midst of,' the accusative has the meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards;' and the construction will be, 'in the midst . . . as regards the day.' Plat. Phædr. 251, ε, init., *καὶ ἐμμανὲς οὔσα οὔτε νυκτὸς δύναιται καθεύδειν οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν οὐδ' ἂν ἢ μένειν*, 'can neither sleep by night, nor in the day remain wherever it may be,' (anywhere at all.) Æschin. 64, 36, *διαλέγεσθαι φησὶν ἑαυτῷ νύκτωρ τοὺς θεοὺς οὓς μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιорκεῖ*, 'he says that he meditates by night on the gods by whom in the daytime he swears falsely;' Id. 72, 31, *μεθ' ἡμέραν μίαν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνῆρπασται*, ('Thebes) has in one day been torn from Greece;' that is, 'in the midst of one day.' The same interpretation is to be given when *μετὰ* is used with *ἡμέραν* and a numeral; as, *μετὰ τρίτην ἡμέραν*, 'in the third day,' properly, 'amid the third day.' If this use of *μετὰ* with the accusative of a word expressing time (*ἡμέραν*) be compared with that in which it is used with other nouns in the accusative, as *Τρῶας, χεῖρας*, it will seem quite as easy to admit that the preposition has the meaning of 'in the midst of,' 'amid,' in the former case as in the latter. If it is intelligible to say, *θεάσασθαι ἐγχειρίδια μετὰ χεῖρας*, 'to see daggers in the midst of (between) the hands,' it ought to be equally so to say, *τὰ πρὸ ποδῶν ὁρᾶν μεθ' ἡμέραν*, 'to see obstructions in the midst of (in) the day.' Any difficulty in the explanation of *μεθ' ἡμέραν*, accordingly, may seem to belong more to the want in our language of modes of expression in regard to time that cor-

respond to *μεθ' ἡμέραν* than to any thing in the Greek construction *μεθ' ἡμέραν* itself.

e. 'According to,' 'in conformity with,' 'after.' *Metd* with the accusative case is sometimes used in the sense of 'according to,' 'in conformity with,' which may be also expressed in English by 'after.' E.g. Il. xv. 52, *αἰψά μεταστρέψει νόον, μετὰ σὸν καὶ ἐμὸν κῆρ*, 'he would quickly change his mind in conformity with your and my wishes;' properly, 'with,' 'in common with,' 'sharing with,' and hence 'according to,' 'in conformity with,' 'after.' So Od. viii. 582-3, . . . *οὔτε μάλιστα | κήδιστοι τελέδουσι, μεθ' αἰμά τε καὶ γένος αὐτῶν*, 'according to their race (blood) and family;' that is, 'having community with, standing with, or being in the midst of, them . . . as regards their race and family.'

f. 'To,' 'against.' In a variety of examples *μετὰ* is used with the accusative case, especially after verbs of motion, to mark the object with which another, the subject of the affirmation, is brought into company, whether in friendly relations or otherwise, where the rendering in English is simply by 'to' or 'against.' E.g. Il. x. 73, *αὐτὰρ ὁ βῆ ῥ' ἰέναι μετὰ Νέστορα ποιμένα λαῶν*, 'he proceeded to go to (visit) Nestor.' Here the proper office of *μετὰ* is to express the idea of being 'with,' the having companionship; that is, it marks the same relation in regard to one person or thing that in the signification of 'among,' 'in the midst,' it conveys in regard to many. Just as *μετὰ Τρῶας ἰέναι*, 'to go among, in the midst of, the Trojans,' gives the idea of going into the midst of, and so forming one of the number or host of Trojans, *ἰέναι μετὰ Νέστορα*, 'to go to Nestor,' conveys the notion of going to Nestor so as to be in his company. In the latter case, however, the use of the English language does not represent distinctly this meaning of *μετὰ*, but is content with naming the object merely to which the motion is directed, or with regard to which it is affirmed. We translate *βῆ ἰέναι μετὰ Νέστορα* by 'he proceeded to go to Nestor,' whereas, if the full sense were represented, we should say, 'he proceeded to go so as to be with, in the company of, Nestor.' In Il. xviii. 188, *πῶς τ' ἄρ' ἔω μετὰ υἴῳ*; 'how, then, shall I go into the battle?' the sense of

rd is more manifest, and the sentence might be rendered 'how shall I go into the midst of the battle?'

'Against.' In such examples as Il. v. 152, βῆ δὲ μετὰ ἄνδρον τε Θόωνά τε Φαίνοπος υἱέ, 'he (Tydeides) went against anthus and Thoon, sons of Phænops,' the sense of μετὰ is the same as in the preceding case; namely, it expresses the being in the company of, mingling with, and having a share in the same action or condition with others. When the parties between whom μετὰ shows this relation to exist are equal, and the action or state in which they share in common is such as belongs to enemies, the sense of 'against' is attributed to μετὰ; but it is obvious, from what has been said, that this sense is due to the known mutual relations of the parties brought into company or community of action with each other, and not to μετὰ, which merely indicates the being 'with,' 'in company or community of action with,' whether the persons forming the group be friends or foes. Whether μετὰ is to be rendered by 'to' or 'against' must be determined in every case by the context, that is, by a reference to the mutual relations of the parties having the connection expressed by μετὰ, and to the nature of the action or state which they may be considered as sharing. In the example above cited, Tydeides is represented as raging in battle on the side of the Greeks like a lion, and, after slaying one and another of the Trojan leaders, as going into the company of, and sharing a common action with, Xanthus and Thoon, and other Trojan foes. They being foes, and having a common action to share which he comes being the fighting in battle, it is manifest that Tydeides is brought into their company, not for friendly purposes, but to fight with or against them. It may be observed, here, that the Latin *cum* and the English 'with,' equally with μετὰ, have a twofold employment in regard to friendly and unfriendly relations and actions; so that *pugnare cum aliquo*, and 'to fight with a person,' may mean, according to the relations of the parties, 'to fight on the side of a person,' or 'to fight against a person.'

2. 'After.' Μετὰ with the accusative is used also in the sense of 'after;' and this in two ways chiefly, to express the

object aimed at, and to mark the being subsequent in point of time or order.

a. Μετὰ with the accusative case denotes the object which is the aim of an action or motion, expressed in English by 'after,' 'for:' e.g. Il. xvii. 605-6, Ἑκτορα δ' Ἰδομενεύς, μετὰ Λήϊτον ὀρμηθέντα, | βεβλήκει, 'Idomeneus struck Hector, who had rushed after Leitus.' Here the sense of μετὰ is materially the same as in the immediately preceding case, βῆ δὲ μετὰ Ἐάνδρον, and may be interpreted in the same way. Od. i. 183-4, πλέων ἐπὶ οἶνοπα πόντον ἐπ' ἀλλοθρόους ἀνδράπους, | ἐς Τεμέσιν μετὰ χαλκόν, ἄγω δ' αἰθωνα σίδηρον, 'sailing after copper,' or 'for copper.' Eurip. Alc. 66-7, Εὐρυσθέως πέμψαντος ἱππείον μετὰ ὄχημα, 'Eurystheus having sent him after the chariot with horses.' In the last two examples, the proper force of μετὰ is not at once so obvious, the meaning of the preposition having so entirely vanished out of view, at least in the English rendering. Looking, however, to the previous instances in which the proper sense of the preposition, although hardly discernible at the first view, is yet made manifest by a more careful examination, it may be not unfairly surmised that, here also, however hidden from sight, it may be really involved. When βῆ δ' ἵέναι μετὰ Νέστορα, Il. x. 73, is translated by 'he proceeded to go to (see) Nestor,' the force of μετὰ is, nevertheless, that of 'with,' 'into the company of,' and the preposition is there seen to have its proper sense, or, at least, one immediately derived from it. Now, in this very example, it appears from the after-interview of Agamemnon and Nestor that Agamemnon really went to bring Nestor forth from his tent, or went after him. In line 97, Agamemnon says to Nestor, δεῦρ' ἐς τοὺς φύλακας καταβείομεν, ὅφρα ἴδωμεν, &c., 'let us descend among the watches, that we may see,' &c.; and, line 108, Nestor answers, σοὶ δὲ μάλ' ἔψομι' ἐγώ, 'I will, by all means, follow you;' and again, line 126, Agamemnon urges him to come forth, ἀλλ' ἴομεν, 'well, let us go.' Thus, seen in its connection, βῆ δ' ἵέναι μετὰ Νέστορα might be rendered, 'he proceeded to go after Nestor.' And then it would be plain, that while the proper sense is, 'he went so as to be with, in company with, Nestor,' the attendant circumstances show

that this going into the company of Nestor was with an aim or object which we express in English by 'going after,' 'going for.' If so, the sense of 'after,' that is, of aim or object had in view, attributed to *μετά*, is due, not to the preposition itself, retaining, as it does, its proper signification of 'with,' 'in company with,' but to the circumstances in which it stands; just as in *βῆ δὲ μετὰ Σάνθου*, *μετά* obtains the meaning of 'against' from the known relations of the parties and from the nature of the action.

If this be admitted as the proper explanation of the origin of the meaning 'after,' 'for,' when attributed to *μετά* and the accusative of a person, it may also be admitted for that of the same sense of *μετά* when used with the accusative of a thing. The only difference is that a personal object easily admits the idea of 'with,' in the sense of companionship, while the inanimate object can allow this notion of 'with' to be connected with it only in a modified or accommodated way, or else takes the meaning of 'in the midst of,' where the personal object has that of 'with' or community and companionship. *Πλεῖν μετὰ χαλκόν* cannot well mean 'to sail so as to be with, in the company of, copper,' as *λέναι μετὰ Νέστορα* means 'to go so as to be with, in the company of, Nestor;' but it may readily have the sense of 'to sail so as to be in the midst of copper,' that is, 'in the midst . . . as far as copper is concerned.' So far, then, *μετά* may be said to have the same meaning essentially in *λέναι μετὰ Νέστορα* and in *πλεῖν μετὰ χαλκόν*, being in the former equivalent to 'with,' 'in the company of,' and in the latter to 'in the midst.' For the rest, it is as easy in the one case as in the other to conceive that the sense of 'after,' 'for,' is suggested by the circumstances in which the preposition *μετά* is employed, that is, by the relation of the party performing the action, and of the action itself, to the object of the action. If the going so as to be 'with, in the company of,' Nestor, is understood, from the circumstances in which it is performed, to mean, in fact, the going 'after' or 'for' Nestor, so may the sailing so as to be 'in the midst of' copper be understood, from the circumstances of the case, namely,

when a merchant is sailing into the midst of copper, laden with a cargo of iron which he seeks to exchange for copper, to mean really the sailing 'after' or 'for' copper.

b. 'After,' subsequent to. *Μετὰ* with the accusative is used also in the sense of 'after,' denoting the being subsequent to in point of time or order. Thus, *μετά* is so employed with verbs signifying to follow, and the like, where it may be rendered in English by 'after,' 'next after,' 'behind.' (See Passow's Lex. s. v. iii.) E.g. Il. xiii. 491-3, . . . αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα | λαοὶ ἔπονδ' ὥσπερ τε μετὰ κτῖλον ἔσπετο μῆλα | ποίμεν' ἐκ βοτάνης, 'then the people followed, as sheep after (behind) the bell-wether follow the shepherd from the pasture.' In such examples, the proper meaning of *μετά* is 'with,' 'in the company of,' a meaning derived immediately from that of 'in the midst,' 'among.' But, while this is the only idea here expressed by *μετά*, the relation of 'with,' 'in company with,' 'of the same number,' which it denotes, does not exclude the notion of a part of the company or group being before and another part behind or after in point of time or order. This was seen in considering *μετά* as used with the dative in the meaning of 'after.' The obvious relations in which one part of a company stands to the other parts may suggest the idea of its being either subsequent to them in point of time, or coming after in respect of order, that is, of 'after' or 'behind,' and this idea may be expressed in English even to the suppression of the proper sense of 'with,' 'in company with.' Thus, in the example above cited, the sheep follow 'with,' 'in company with,' the bell-wether, they with him belonging to, or rather forming, a flock; and this is all that *μετά* expresses. But the most familiar idea of the relation of the sheep of a flock (*μῆλα*) to the bell-wether (*κτῖλος*) is that of the latter as leader and of the former as following after or behind. Hence, when it is said of the sheep that they follow the shepherd from the pasture *μετὰ κτῖλον*, 'with,' 'in company with,' the bell-wether, we properly enough, according to the English use, and in conformity with the known relative position or order of the parties, say that the sheep follow the shepherd 'after' or 'behind' the bell-wether, and this though

proper meaning of *μετά* be thus wholly left out of view; compare II. xviii. 320-2, . . . ὁ δὲ τ' ἀγνύται ὕστερος ἐλθών· ἀλλὰ δὲ τ' ἀγχε' ἐπῆλθε μετ' ἀνέρος ἔχνη' ἐρευνῶν, | εἴ ποθεν σοι, 'he (the lion), coming subsequently (too late), is urged, and visits many a vale, searching after the tracks of man,' that is, following after and searching or trailing. The proper sense of *μετά* is 'among,' 'amid.' The lion is represented as hunting, searching, or trailing 'among the tracks of the man.' But the whole context, consistently with the habits of the lion, gives the idea of the lion hunting and seeking for a man by following after and tracing his tracks, as the dog trails his game. And, allowing this notion to become the prominent and prevailing one, we properly render μετ' ἔχνη' ἐρευνῶν, not by 'hunting among, in the midst of, the tracks,' but by 'hunting or searching after (behind) the tracks.' *Μετά*, it is true, might here be understood in the sense of 'after,' 'for,' that is, as indicating the object had in view; and then the interpretation of the preposition would be according to what has been said in the preceding paragraph. An unequivocal example of *μετά* in the sense of 'after,' 'subsequently to,' is seen in II. ii. 133, πρόσθε μὲν ἱππῆες, μετὰ δὲ νέφος εἵπετο πεζῶν, 'before the horsemen, and after followed a cloud of infantry.' The antecedent term πρόσθε shows that *μετά* has the sense 'after;' and yet this meaning springs only from the circumstances furnished by the context, the proper signification of *μετά*, here also, being 'with,' or 'in the same company or host.' The body of the Myrmidons, ordered by Achilles, rush forward in chariots, on horses, and on foot: the poet adds, that of this host the horsemen went before, and the infantry followed with them, in the same company or host; but, if the horsemen went before, plainly the infantry, though of the same host, came after.

'After,' subsequent to. And so, generally, in describing a number of events forming a connected series or group, so that some one or more of the number shall be subsequent to the rest in point of time or order, associated with the rest, and of the same number, but following them, *μετά* in the accusative case is employed to mark this after-

coming event as belonging to the group or series. The fact of its being after, and not before or simply of the number, is gathered from the context. *Μετά* does no more than show that it belongs to the series, or is to be counted among the number composing it. Thus, Xen. Anab. vii. 3, 13, after reciting the meeting with Seuthes, and the circumstances of the interview, the demands of the Greeks, and the promises of the king, the historian adds, μετὰ ταῦτα ἐδίδουτο λέγειν τῷ βουλομένῳ, 'after this leave was granted to any that pleased to speak.' The leave to speak, whoever pleased, is associated in the narrative with the series of facts already recounted, so as to form one of the number, and to be counted 'among' them or 'with' them. This is expressed by *μετά* prefixed to ταῦτα, the latter term being the sign or representative of the facts just recited. Literally, the sense would be, 'among . . . as regards these facts.' But the fact thus introduced by *μετά* is, by the very order of the events in the narrative, shown to be subsequent in regard to time, and hence is in English connected by the term 'after.' The Greek method of connecting an event actually subsequent in order of time with a preceding series, as here seen, is to mark it so as to be counted among the series; this is done by *μετά*, 'among,' 'with;' the English method, as here seen, is to mark the subsequent event as being reached by proceeding from the antecedent series; this is done by 'after,' signifying relatively 'off' or away from, said with respect to the preceding series of events.

d. 'After,' 'with.' But *μετά* with the accusative is not only thus employed when there are several events with which a subsequent one is to be associated, but also when a single fact is mentioned with which another of after-occurrence is to be connected as belonging to the same narrative. Thus, Xen. Anab. vii. 3, 7, μετὰ τοῦτο Ξενοφῶν μὲν ἡγήετο, οἱ δ' εἵποντο, 'after this Xenophon led the way, and they followed.' The preceding narrative contained a speech of Xenophon to the assembled army, and the fact that Xenophon led the way and the rest followed is marked by *μετά* as forming a part of the recital. Properly, μετὰ τοῦτο signifies 'with this,' 'in association with this,' that is,

'with . . . as regards this.' That the preposition is rendered by 'after,' and not by 'with,' is owing to the fact that the time of Xenophon's leading the way and the rest following is subsequent to the speech with which it is grouped in the narrative. In this, as in the preceding examples, the accusative used with *μετά* has the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' marking to what extent, and in what regard, the action or statement qualified by *μετά* is to be considered as affirmed; as, in *μετά τοῦτο ὁ μὲν ἤγειτο*, his leading the way is to be understood as belonging to the same group of events . . . as far as regards the preceding speech.

e. 'After,' 'next after,' commonly with a superlative. Of the same nature, and requiring the same explanation, is *μετά* with the accusative usually following a superlative, and marking an object as being 'after,' 'next after,' another in any property, as number, rank, and the like.' E.g. Il. ii. 673-4, *Νηρέως, ὃς κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθεν | τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν μετ' ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα*, 'the handsomest of all the Danaï after next to, the son of Peleus.' Here the proper sense of *μετά* is 'with,' 'of the same company with,' so that, the accusative *Πηλεΐωνα* being added in the sense of 'as regards the son of Peleus,' Nireus is said to be the handsomest of all the Danaï, with, in company with, that is, in comparison with, the son of Peleus. And so far as the preposition itself is concerned, nay, more, so far as the mere terms with which it is connected are all together concerned, this is the only sense conveyed. The idea of Nireus being the handsomest of all the Danaï only 'after' or 'next after' the son of Peleus is merely inferred from the circumstances of the case, especially from the unqualified pre-eminence accorded by the poet to the son of Peleus in regard to personal qualities. This was a thing so fully admitted in the poet's mind, that when Nireus is said to be the handsomest of all the Danaï, and it is then added, 'with,' 'in company with' (*μετά*), the son of Peleus, this, so far from placing them on an absolute equality and excluding precedency, actually suggests the superiority of the son of Peleus and the inferiority of Nireus. So, in Herod.

v. 3, *Θρηάκων δὲ ἔθνος μέγιστόν ἐστι, μετὰ γε Ἰνδοῦς πάντων ἀνθρώπων*, 'the nation of the Thracians is the largest of all men, after the Indians at least.' The Indi are assumed to be the most numerous nation in the world; and when it is stated that the Thrakes are the most numerous of all men in company with the Indi, it is readily inferred that the companionship is one, not of superiority, but of inferiority on their part. Besides, the intended superiority of the Indi and inferiority of the Thrakes, while they are put into the same group, is suggested by the very fact of *μετά* being employed to introduce the latter into the same group with the former, it being almost necessarily implied, as has been shown above, that the object brought in by *μετά* comes after and allows the precedence to that into whose company or group it is brought. Herod. iv. 53, *τέταρτος δὲ Βορυσθένης ποταμὸς, ὃς ἐστὶ μέγιστος μετὰ Ἰστρον τουτέων*, 'the fourth river is the Borysthenes, which after the Ister is the largest of these rivers.' As the historian considers the Ister to be the largest river of all that he knew, see iv. 48 and 50, the Borysthenes must be understood to be the largest of the rivers referred to in common with the Ister (*μετὰ Ἰστρον*), yet so as to yield to it the precedency or come 'after' it.

That *μετά* when used after the superlative has really the sense of 'with,' 'in company with,' and that the idea of 'after' is to be inferred from the relative position of the parties, might be further shown from the examples in which *μετά* so employed actually retains the meaning of 'among.' E.g. Il. ix. 54, (*Τυδείδῃ*) . . . *βουλῇ μετὰ πάντας δῆμῳ*, 'the best in counsel among all your fellows,' that is, 'the best of all,' 'the best compared with all.' Here, there being nothing in the condition of the parties with whom Tydeus is associated to mark precedency on their part, except the suggestion above referred to as contained in the mere fact of *μετά* introducing an after-coming object among a prior group, while, on the other hand, the superlative attached to Tydeides presupposes his preëminence, *μετά* retains its sense of 'among,' and with the accusative denotes the company over which he has superiority.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *μετά* WITH CASES.

Significations of <i>μετά</i> .	Genitive: 'with respect to.'	Dative: 'for.'	Accusative: 'as to,' 'as regards.'
1. a. 'In the midst,' 'among.' b. 'With,' 'of the same company,' 'sharing.'	1. a. 'In the midst of,' 'among.' b. 'With,' 'in common with.' c. 'Of the party of,' 'on the side of.' d. 'With,' 'attending circumstances.' e. 'With,' 'accompanying means or agent.' f. 'With,' 'in conformity with.' g. 'Against.'	1. a. 'Among.' b. 'With.'	1. a. 'Among.' b. 'In' (amid); e.g. <i>μετ' ἡμέραν</i> . c. 'According to,' 'in conformity with,' 'after.' d. 'To,' 'against.' 2. a. 'After,' of time or order. b. 'After,' 'for,' aim, object had in view. c. 'After,' 'next after,' with a superlative.
2. 'After' (among, with.) a. Subsequent to. b. Aim.		2. 'After,' of time or order.	

* *Οπισθε*, and before vowels *ὀπισθεν*.

* *Οπισθε*, before vowels *ὀπισθεν*, and having an epic form *ὀπιθε* and *ὀπιθεν*, has probably the same radical with *ὀπις*, 'retribution,' and occurs in the compounds *ἀνόπιν*, 'backwards,' *κατόπιν*, 'behind,' 'after,' *μετόπιν*, 'behind.' Some consider it to be connected with *ἐπομαι*, *sequor*, 'I follow,' others with *ὄπ'* in *ὄφρομαι*, *ὄψ*, 'the seeing.' See Passow's Lex. s. v. The etymology of *ὀπισθε* is, however, uncertain, there being nothing satisfactory in what is here stated.

1. 'Behind,' 'at the back.' * *Οπισθε* has the sense of 'behind,' 'at the back,' and is used with the genitive case: e.g. Il. xvii. 468, *στῇ δ' ὀπιθεν δίφροιο*, 'he stood behind the chariot,' or, 'at the back of the chariot;' Il. xiii. 536, *ὀπισθε μάχης ἰθὺς πτολέμοιο | ἔστυσαν*, 'they stood behind (in the rear of) the battle.' Sometimes it stands after the noun: e.g. Il. xxiv. 15, *Ἔκτορα δ' ἔλκεσθαι δησάσχετο δίφρου ὀπισθεν*, 'he wished to drag Hector behind his chariot.' (See Passow's Lex. s. v.)

2. 'After,' 'in future,' 'hereafter.' * *Οπισθε* has also the meaning of 'after,' 'in future,' 'hereafter,' opposed to *αὐτίκα*, 'immediately.' E.g. Od. ii. 270, *οὐδ' ὀπιθεν κατὸς ἔσσεαι*, 'thou wilt not be a coward hereafter, in the future;' Il. ix.

519; *νῦν δ' ἄμα τ' αὐτίκα πολλὰ διδοῖ, τὰ δ' ὀπισθεν ἐπέσται*, 'both now presently gives much, and made promises for the future.' In this second case *ὀπισθε* would claim to be regarded as simply adverbial; but, so far as the nature and meaning of the word itself are concerned, the distinction which is made between *ὀπισθε* as used with a case, and the same word as employed without a case, can scarcely be considered of any importance. (See Passow's Lex.)

The genitive case used with *ὀπισθε* has the meaning of 'with respect to,' showing to what specific object the previous statement is to be referred. Thus, in the first example, *στῇ δ' ὀπιθεν δίφροιο*, the meaning is, 'he stood behind . . . with respect to the chariot.'

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *ὀπισθε* WITH ITS CASE.

Significations of <i>ὀπισθε</i> .	Genitive: 'with respect to.'
1. 'Behind,' 'at the back.' 2. 'After,' 'in the future,' 'hereafter,' used adverbially.	'Behind,' 'at the back of.'

Παρά.

In epic poetry *πάρ* and *παρά* occur as variations of *παρά*. Of the etymology of *παρά* nothing satisfactory, so far as the writer knows, has yet been determined.

Significations of παρά.

1. a. 'Alongside,' 'beside,' 'by the side of.' The primary signification of *παρά* is 'alongside,' 'beside,' 'by the side of,' as seen both in compounds and in the use of *παρά* with the cases of nouns. Thus, in *παραβάλλειν*, 'to cast alongside,' 'to throw by the side of, or beside:' e.g. Il. viii. 503-4, . . . *ἀτὰρ καλλίτριχας ἵππους | λύσασθ' ὑπ' ἐξ ὀχέων, παρά δέ σφισι βάλλειτ' ἐδωδὴν*, 'loose the horses from the chariots, and throw food for them alongside;' Thuc. ii. 77, *φοροῦντες δὲ ὕλης φακέλους παρέβαλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ χῶματος*, 'carrying fagots of wood, they would cast them alongside;' *παραzeugνύναι*, 'to yoke beside;' *παραθαλάσσιος*, 'by the sea-side,' 'dwelling along the sea;' *παρακαθίζειν*, 'to seat beside.' So likewise

with cases of nouns: e.g. Herod. ix. 15, *κατέτεινε δὲ (τὸ στρατόπεδον) ἐς τὴν Πλαταιίδα γῆν παρὰ τὸν Ἰσωπὸν ποταμὸν τεταγμένον*, 'drawn up along the river Asopus;'. Xen. Anab. i. 2, 13, *ἐνταῦθα ἦν παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν κρήνη ἣ Μίδου καλουμένη*, 'there was a fountain by the roadside;'. Id. i. 3, 24, *ἔμειναν δὲ καὶ οἱ παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκούντες ἐν Σόλοις καὶ ἐν Ἰσούς*, 'those who dwell along the sea,' 'by the sea-side.'

b. 'During.' A mere variety of this signification of 'alongside' is that of 'during,' arising from the idea of one thing keeping alongside of another, and so maintaining an equal measure with it; as, *παρὰ τὴν ἡμέραν*, 'during the day,' that is, 'running alongside of, and having the same measure with, the day:'. e.g. Demosth. 395, 11, *παρὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀποδημίαν*, 'during this sojourn abroad.'

c. 'With,' 'at,' 'near.' Nearly connected with the meaning of 'beside,' 'alongside,' is that of 'with,' 'at,' 'near,' which *παρὰ* sometimes has, the transition being very ready from the idea of 'beside' an object to the being 'with,' 'at,' 'near' it. E.g. Il. i. 26, *μή σε, γέρον, κοίλῃσιν ἐγὼ παρὰ νηυσὶ κηΐω*, 'lest I find thee at the hollow ships;'. Herod. viii. 140, *πυνθάνεσθε δὲ καὶ τὴν νῦν παρ' ἐμὲ ἐοῦσαν δύναμιν*, 'the force that is now with me;'. Id. iv. 87, *οὗτος δὲ λίθος κατελείφθη παρὰ τοῦ Διονύσου τὴν νηόν*, 'at the temple of Dionysus.'

d. 'Among.' A mere variety of the sense just mentioned is that of 'among' or 'with,' which *παρὰ* obtains when used in such circumstances that the being 'alongside,' 'with,' 'near,' relates to a number of objects: e.g. Od. i. 154, *ὅς ῥ' ἔειδε παρὰ μνηστῆρσιν ἀνδραγῆ*, 'he sang among the suitors by compulsion.' Here the meaning of *παρὰ* is properly 'by the side of,' 'near,' 'with;'. and the notion of 'among' by which it may be rendered in English is due to the plurality of objects represented by *μνηστῆρσιν*, and does not strictly belong to *παρὰ*.

e. 'To' (alongside of.) *Παρά* is very commonly used with an accusative case after verbs of motion seemingly in the sense of 'to,' by which it is rendered in English. In such cases, however, the proper meaning of *παρὰ* is 'alongside,' 'near,' that of 'to' being due to the accusative case as connected with a verb of motion, and as marking the object

reached by it, or the extent to which it goes. The proper signification of *παρὰ* with an accusative case attending a verb of motion would be 'to go,' for example, 'alongside . . . as regards.' The English use compels us, in rendering *παρὰ* thus employed, to omit its proper notion of 'alongside.' E.g. Il. i. 347, *τὼ δ' αὖτις ἔτην παρὰ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν*, 'they went again to the ships of the Achæi,' that is, 'they went alongside or near . . . as regards the ships of the Achæi;'. Od. i. 285, *κεῖθεν δὲ Σπάρτηνδε (ἐλθέ) παρὰ Ξανθὸν Μενέλαον*, 'thence go to Sparta, to Menelaus,' properly, 'go alongside, near, . . . as regards Menelaus;'. Herod. i. 36, *ἀπικόμηναι παρὰ τὸν Κροῖσον*, 'having reached Cræsus,' properly, 'having arrived alongside, near, at, . . . as regards Cræsus;'. Id. i. 86, *ἤγαγον παρὰ Κῦρον*, 'they brought him to Cyrus,' properly, 'they brought him alongside, near, at, . . . as regards Cyrus,' or, 'brought him beside Cyrus.' So in compounds; as, *παρακαλεῖν*, 'to call to one's side,' 'to summon;'. *παραλαμβάνειν*, 'to take to one's side,' 'to receive.'

f. 'From (alongside).' In very many examples, *παρά*, occurring with the genitive case as the qualification of verbs of motion, has apparently the signification of 'from,' and is so rendered. E.g. Il. xxi. 443-4, . . . *δὲ ἀγήνορι Λαομέδοντι | παρ Διὸς ἐλθόντες θεγεύσαμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν*, 'having come from Jupiter;'. Herod. viii. 140, *ἀγγελίη ἔχει παρὰ βασιλῆος*, 'a message has arrived from the king.' And so in a number of compounds; as, *παραρεῖν*, 'to take from,' that is, 'from beside;'. *παρατεῖσθαι*, 'to beg from.' In such instances, however, *παρὰ* has, in fact, its proper meaning of 'alongside,' 'beside,' that of 'from' being suggested by the circumstances in which the preposition is employed, chiefly by the known relation in which the parties to the action stand to each other. Thus, in the example cited from Homer, when Poseidon says that he and Apollo came (to Ilium) and served Laomedon, and the coming is further qualified by the addition of *παρὰ*, 'alongside,' so as to mean a coming that is alongside; and when this, again, is more precisely defined by the genitive *Διός*, 'with respect to Jupiter,' thus giving the idea of 'a coming that is alongside in respect of Zeus;'. it is naturally understood from the circumstances of

the action, and from the mutual relation of the parties to it, that the coming is 'from beside Zeus,' and not 'to beside Zeus.' For, while the motion contained in *ελλδόντες* will allow either 'to' or 'from' to be supplied with *παρά*, 'alongside,' it is not only fitting to the relation existing between the parties to the action or motion that Poseidon and Apollo, as inferior to him, should come on their errand to Ilium from Zeus, but the other words of the sentence show that the object reached by the coming was Ilium, and thus render it certain that, in the connection in which it stands, the motion qualified by *παρά* and the genitive is one 'from' and not 'to' Zeus. The inferred sense of 'from' is alone expressed in the English rendering; the idea of 'beside,' 'alongside,' contained in *παρά*, being wholly omitted. If it be not true that *παρά* has obtained its apparent sense of 'from' in the way here stated, then this meaning, it being utterly inconsistent with the other significations of *παρά*, and therefore not to be referred to the preposition, at least with any degree of plausibility, must be attributed to the genitive case. But this case, rightly understood, has no such signification, any more than the preposition has, and, of course, cannot communicate it to *παρά*. The only meaning that the genitive can convey, consistently with its use elsewhere, is that of 'with respect to;' that is, it can only show that the action as qualified by *παρά* is to be understood as having special reference to the noun marked by the genitive; that, for example, 'the coming alongside or beside,' in the instance cited above, is to be taken as having specific reference to Zeus. Then, the action being referred to a specific person, if it be of such a nature as fitly to come from him, and if his relative position and rank be such that the action may suitably proceed from him, it may be assumed that it intended to be so understood. The coming of Poseidon and Apollo to Ilium as servants of Laomedon being referred to Zeus, and it being he alone that could send them upon such a degrading service, it is at once inferred that the coming was 'from' him; and it is then true that this idea of 'from' is derived from the relative position of the parties to the action, regard being had to

the character of the action, and not from the genitive by itself considered, nor yet from the preposition *παρά*.

That the origin here given of the signification of 'from,' as attributed to *παρά* with the genitive case, is the true one, might be further shown to be probable from the fact already noticed, that *κατά*, 'down,' is used with the genitive case both in the sense of 'down from' and 'down upon.' In that case, it is plain that the idea of 'from' and that of 'upon' are to be inferred from the circumstances in which *κατά* stands, and that if the signification of 'from' be attributed to the genitive case, that of 'upon' must equally, and for the same reason, be given to this case. But this latter is by no one pretended to be among the meanings of the genitive. A like confirmation might be derived from the use of *πρός* with the genitive in the sense of 'from;' but it can hardly be required.

An additional example or two may be given, in which *παρά*, having apparently the signification of 'from,' is joined with the genitive case of the object from which, more obviously than in the examples already cited, the action proceeds. Thus, *Æschin.* 23, 31, *κραυγή πολλή παρά τῶν δικαστῶν ἀπαντήσεται*, 'a great outcry from the dicastæ will meet him;' *Id.* 62, 3, *παρ' ἐκόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπολαβεῖν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν*, 'to receive the hegemony from the Greeks voluntarily bestowing it.'

2. 'Like,' 'equivalent to,' 'as much as,' 'by,' 'lacking,' various forms of comparison of values, &c. From the proper sense of 'alongside,' 'beside,' *παρά* obtains the notion of comparison, which is readily suggested by placing objects alongside of each other. (See Passow's *Lexicon*, s. v.) This meaning of *παρά* will vary with the varying results obtained by comparing objects according to this method, and is expressed in English by such terms as 'like,' 'equivalent to,' 'as much as,' 'by,' 'lacking.' Thus, in a number of compounds, as, *παραγλύφειν*, 'to carve alike,' 'to counterfeit,' *παραδεικνύειν*, 'to show alongside,' 'to show as a pattern,' *παράδειγμα*, 'an example,' 'a pattern,' 'something exhibited alongside for comparison.' And so in a variety of uses with the accusative case: e.g. *Xen. Memor.* i. 4, 14, *παρά τὰ ἄλλα*

ζῶα ὡς περ θεοὶ οἱ ἀνδρῶποι βιοτεύουσι, 'compared with the rest of animals;' Orat. Att. 1416, 21, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐὰν μὴ παρὰ μικρὸν ἤγησῃ, 'if you do not consider philosophy a thing of little moment,' that is, 'a thing that is placed alongside of, and so is counted equal to, what is small.'

3. a. 'On one side of.' Παρὰ not only expresses the idea of 'alongside,' 'beside,' or of an object placed by the side of another, but conveys also the meaning of 'on one side of,' that is, of not coinciding with; and this will be rendered in English by other terms also, as 'by,' 'past,' &c. Thus, in some compounds, as, παραβαίνειν, 'to go on one side of,' 'to pass by,' also, 'to transgress;' παράβασις, 'a deviation,' that is, 'a going on one side,' not in a line with, 'a transgression;' παραβλέπειν, 'to overlook,' 'to omit,' 'to see amiss,' properly, 'to look on one side' and not in a line with, and so 'to miss seeing aright;' παράγειν, 'to lead past,' 'to lead by,' that is, 'to lead on one side of;' παραδρομή, 'a running past;' παραδύεσθαι, 'to steal in,' that is, 'to enter at one side of, by, past, a person,' and so, without being observed; παραπλεῖν, 'to sail by,' 'to sail past,' that is, 'on one side:' e.g. Xen. Anab. v. 1, 11, ὁρῶ πλοῖα πολλὰς παραπλέοντα, 'I see vessels frequently sailing by;' Id. Hell. i. 5, 12, παρ' αὐτὰς τὰς πρῶρας τῶν Λυσάνδρου νεῶν παρεπλεῖ, 'he would sail past the very prows of Lysander's ships.' So likewise where παρὰ is used with the accusative case of a noun: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. v. 2, 29, παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν Βαβυλῶνα δεῖ παρεῖναι, 'one must pass-by Babylon itself,' that is, 'on one side of Babylon.'

b. 'Beyond.' The sense of 'beyond,' which παρὰ often has, is a variety of that just noticed, and has its origin in the idea of going 'by' or 'past' an object, that is, 'on one side of it.' Thus, in compounds, as, παραφέρεσθαι, 'to be borne beyond,' that is, 'to be borne past' or 'on one side of;' παρατρέχειν, 'to run past,' 'to run beyond,' 'to outrun.' And so when παρὰ is used apart with the accusative case: e.g. Xen. Ages. v. 3, ἐκὼν ἐπόνει παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, 'he voluntarily toiled more than all others,' that is, 'beyond, past, all others.'

'Very.' In some compounds this sense of 'beyond'

becomes equivalent to 'very,' 'in excess,' the idea conveyed by παρὰ being that an action or state goes beyond or past what is usual or reasonable. Thus, παραγηρᾶν, 'to be too old,' and, hence, 'to be childish;' παραθερμαίνειν, 'to heat to excess.'

c. 'Besides.' Another variety merely of this same sense of 'beyond' is that of 'besides,' the Latin *præter*: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 9, ἔχειν δὲ δεῖ τοὺς ἐξιόντας τόξα, καὶ παρὰ τὴν φαρέτρην ἐν κολεῷ κοπίδα, 'besides the quiver;' Id. Econ. viii. 12, γέμει δὲ παρὰ πάντα φορτίων, 'it is full, besides every thing (already mentioned), of lading.'

d. 'Against,' 'contrary to.' In many instances παρὰ has the meaning of 'against,' 'contrary to.' Thus, in compounds, as, παράνομος, 'contrary to law,' 'in violation of law;' παραβαίνειν τοὺς νόμους, 'to transgress the laws;' παράλογος, 'unreasonable,' 'contrary to reason,' 'unexpected,' 'contrary to what is counted upon.' So also with the accusative case: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 6, παρὰ γὰρ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν θεσμούς πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι, 'contrary to the divine laws;' Id. Anab. v. 8, 17, ἐξεστὶν αὐτοῖς . . . εἴ τι ὅπ' ἐμοῦ ἔπαθον παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, δίκην λαβεῖν, 'if they suffered any thing at my hands contrary to right;' Plat. Phæd. 95, A, θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν, 'contrary to my expectation,' *præter opinionem*; Id. ib. 93, A, οὐδὲ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκέῖνα ἢ ποτὶ ἢ πάσχη, 'contrary to whatever they do or suffer.'

This sense of 'against,' 'contrary to,' is plainly of the same nature with that of 'on one side of,' and, hence, not coinciding with; thus, παραβαίνειν τοὺς νόμους, 'to violate the laws,' properly means 'to go (act) otherwise than in accordance with the laws,' to act so as to be 'at one side of,' that is, not coinciding with, the laws, not in the same line with them; παρὰ δόξαν εἰπεῖν signifies 'to speak not in conformity with, so as not to coincide with, one's expectations.' This origin of the sense of 'against,' 'contrary to,' as had by παρὰ, is more manifest in such compounds as παραφρονεῖν, 'to be out of one's senses,' or, as it is accurately expressed in English, 'to be beside one's self;' that is, 'to think in a wrong way,' to direct one's thoughts, not in the right way, but on one side of the proper line; and so in παραπαίειν,

'to commit a blunder,' literally, 'to strike amiss,' 'to strike on one side of a string,' as in playing with a plectrum, 'to go out of the furrow,' (see Passow's Lexicon,) 'to be out of one's mind;' compare the Latin *delirare*, 'to be mad,' properly, 'to go out of the furrow,' (*lira*;) *παράλῃρος*, 'talking amiss,' 'talking foolishly.'

e. 'Lacking,' 'wanting.' To the instances in which *παρά* means 'on one side of,' 'not coinciding with,' belongs its use with the accusative to express how much a thing lacks of a certain measure, where it is rendered in English by 'lacking,' 'wanting.' E.g. Orat. Att. 743, 21, *παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους ἰτιμώσατε*, 'you condemned him to *ἀτιμία*, lacking a few votes;' that is, 'your judgment fell on one side of, was not coincident with, a condemnation to *ἀτιμία*, failed of accomplishing this result, by (to the extent of) a few votes;' Orat. Att. 41, 36, *παρὰ τέτταρας ψήφους*, 'lacking, wanting, four votes.' (See Index Orat. Att.) According to the view here presented, it is easily understood how *παρά* may have meanings so entirely different as 'like,' 'as much as,' 'equivalent to,' and 'lacking,' 'wanting.' In the former case, an object stands 'alongside of' another, and conforms to it; in the latter, it falls 'on one side of' it, and does not coincide with or conform to it, and hence comes short of it, or is lacking.

Summary of the significations of παρά.

Παρά. 1. 'Beside,' 'alongside.'

- a. 'Beside,' 'alongside;' 'during.'
 - b. 'By,' 'at,' 'near,' 'with,' 'among.'
 - c. 'To,' (beside, near.)
 - d. 'From,' (beside;) 'by,' (agent.)
 - e. 'Compared with,' 'like,' 'as much as.'
2. 'At, or on, one side;' 'not coinciding with.'
- a. 'At, or on, one side,' 'past,' 'by.'
 - b. 'Past,' 'beyond;' 'very.'
 - c. 'Besides.'
 - d. 'Against,' 'contrary to.'
 - e. 'Lacking,' 'wanting.'

SIGNIFICATION AND USE OF *παρά* WITH CASES OF NOUNS.

I. *Παρά with the genitive case.*

1. 'By,' 'at,' 'near.' *Παρά* with the genitive in the sense of 'by,' 'at,' 'near,' is used seldom, and only in lyric poetry, the dative being commonly used with *παρά* in this signification. E.g. Soph. Antig. 966, *παρὰ δὲ Κυανέων πελαγέων | διδύμας ἄλδς*, | *ἀπταὶ Βοσπόρται*, 'by the dark sea,' or, 'by the sea of the Cyanean rocks;' Id. ib. 1122, seqq., *ὦ Βαχχεῦ, Βαχχῶν μητρόπολιν θήβαν | ναίων παρ' ὑγρῶν Ἰσμηνοῦ | ρεεῖδρων*, 'by the watery stream of Ismenus.' (See Passow's Lexicon.)

Παρά is here used in a sense immediately derived from that of 'beside;' and the genitive has the meaning of 'with respect to.' Thus, in the latter example, *παρ' ὑγρῶν Ἰσμηνοῦ ρεεῖδρων* means 'by,' 'near,' properly, 'beside,' . . . with respect to the stream of Ismenus. The example cited from the Iliad, iv. 468-9, *πλευρά, τὰ οἱ κύψαντι παρ' ἀσπίδος ἐξεφάδωνθι*, | *οὔτησε ξυστῇ χαλκήρεϊ*, 'he wounded his side, which, as he stooped, was exposed at one side of his shield,' and which Passow makes to mean 'was exposed by going from his shield,' may rather be regarded as an instance of the use of *παρά* with the genitive in the sense of 'at, or on, one side of.' Otherwise, it is better to attribute to *παρά* in this place its usual meaning of 'beside.' It would surely seem better to say that the side was exposed, or was displayed, without the shield at one side or alongside of it, than to admit so far-fetched an interpretation as 'was exposed by going from the shield.'

2. a. 'From.' The common sense of *παρά* with the genitive is that apparently of 'from,' occurring chiefly with verbs of motion: e.g. Il. i. 190, *ἣ δ' ἔγε φάσγανον δέξ' ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ*, 'having drawn his sharp sword from (beside) his thigh;' Herod. viii. 140, *ἐμοὶ ἀγγελίη ἦκει παρὰ βασιλῆος*, 'a message to (for) me has arrived from the king;' Xen. Anab. i. 7, 13, *οἱ αὐτομολήσαντες . . . παρὰ μεγάλου βασιλέως*, 'those who deserted from the great king;' Id. ib. i. 3, 7, *παρὰ δὲ Ξενίου καὶ Πασίωνος πλείους ἢ διαχίλιοι*, 'more than two thousand (went away) from Xenias and Pasion.' And even where motion is not expressed, but an action is described

hat involves the notion of something proceeding from, or to be obtained from, a person, *παρὰ* is employed in the same sense. E.g. Xen. Anab. v. 1, 11, *εἰ οὖν αἰτησόμενοι παρὰ Τραπεζούντιων μακρὰ πλοῖα κατέχοιμεν*, 'if we should ask and obtain long ships (of war) from the people of Trapezus.'

In such examples, the sense of 'from,' seemingly represented by *παρὰ*, does not properly belong to this preposition, but is suggested by the obvious relation in which the parties to the action or motion stand to each other. Thus, in the example above cited from Herodotus, *ἐμοὶ ἀγγελίη ἦκει παρὰ βασιλῆος*, 'a message to (for) me has arrived from the king,' the coming of a message implies a messenger and a person by whom he has been sent, and the action of coming can be hardly otherwise conceived by us than as being from the person by whom the message or messenger is sent. So that the moment a person is pointed out as being the sender of the message, he is at the same time understood to be the person from whom the action or motion proceeds. The idea of 'from' is most readily suggested by bringing together, with their proper connection marked, the action or motion, its subject, and the person from whom it naturally proceeds. Now, not only is *βασιλεὺς*, 'the king,' naturally so related to *ἀγγελίη*, 'a message,' and to *ἄγγελος*, 'a messenger,' which is implied in *ἀγγελίη*, that it is at once seen that the latter may properly proceed from the former; but the genitive case *βασιλῆος* is employed to show that the *ἀγγελίη* is to be taken as appertaining to the *βασιλεὺς*, that it is a message, not of any other, but specifically of the king. Furthermore, the words of the example are spoken by Marlonius, the king's officer; and nothing can be more natural than to assume that the message which he says has arrived for him, and is referred to the king, is from the king. These things, then, concurring, a message represented as having come, and a person from whom naturally it would proceed, and who is marked by the genitive case as the object to whom the message is to be referred, the mind at once connects them in their proper relation, and regards the message as proceeding 'from' the king. If this be so, the idea of 'from' is derived from neither the preposition nor the geni-

tive case, but from the relation seen to exist between the action and the parties to it, and between these parties themselves. In fact, the genitive case, as seen above, does no more than point out the object to which the action is to be referred as appertaining to it; and, so far as the case alone is considered, the action might be regarded either as coming from it or going to it; just as of *λαίου χρησμοί*, Herod. v. 43, for any thing contained in the genitive case itself, might as well mean the oracles given by Laius, or proceeding from Laius, as the oracles received by Laius. And, as regards *παρὰ*, it merely marks the action or motion as having the relative position of 'beside,' 'alongside,' 'near,' with reference to the object to which the action qualified by the preposition belongs; so that, when the coming of a message from a person is further defined by *παρὰ*, it means 'the coming of a message from beside or near a person.' But if, as it thus appears, the idea of 'from' is due, not to the preposition *παρὰ*, nor yet to the genitive case, but to the obvious relations of the action or motion, and of the parties to it, the one to the other, it might seem difficult to say why the meaning of 'from,' as connected with *παρὰ*, arises only when the preposition is used with the genitive case and with the verbs of motion or action implying motion. The answer is, that the only other case that is used with *παρὰ* and verbs of motion is the accusative, and that here the idea of 'from' can hardly arise, because this case, coupled with such verbs, marks either the object actually reached by the motion, or its measure or extent; and, in either case, the idea suggested by the relation in which the accusative stands to the action or motion is that of 'to,' and not of 'from.' Indeed, the fact that *παρὰ* is used with the accusative case apparently in the sense of 'to' after the very verbs with which, when the genitive is employed, it seems to mean 'from,' goes to confirm the view here taken, that *παρὰ* really signifies neither 'to' nor 'from,' but only 'beside,' 'near.'

In the same way is to be explained the use of *παρὰ* with the genitive to mark the object from which any thing is derived or is regarded as proceeding, occurring with such verbs as *μανθάνειν*, 'to learn,' *πυνθάνεσθαι*, 'to be informed,'

'to learn,' *ακούειν*, 'to hear,' *διδόναι*, 'to give.' (See Passow's Lex.) Thus, in *μανθάνειν παρὰ τινος*, 'to learn from a person,' the only use of *παρὰ* is to show that the act of learning, or the person who learns, is 'beside,' 'near,' the party from whom instruction comes. The genitive *τινός* points out the object to which the act of learning, or the being a learner, is referred as specifically appertaining to it, so as to convey the notion of the relation of pupil and teacher; and to be a person's learner or disciple means the same thing as to learn from a person. And thus the natural relations of the parties connected with the act of learning suggest the notion of 'from,' and *παρὰ* merely marks the relative position of the learner and of the person from whom the teaching comes.

b. 'By,' marking the agent. Of the same nature essentially, and requiring the same explanation, is the use of *παρὰ* with the genitive case, not rarely met with, to express, as do also *ὑπό*, *ἀπό*, *πρός*, *ἐκ*, with the genitive, the agent, or the object from whom an action proceeds. E.g. Soph. Trach. 596, *μόνον παρ' ὑμῶν εἶδ' στεγνοίμεθ'*, 'only might we be well concealed by you,' that is, 'have a covering from you;' Plat. Symp. 175, ε, cited by Passow, *σοφίας παρὰ τινος πληροῦσθαι*, 'to be filled with wisdom by a person.'

II. *Παρά* with the dative case.

'Beside,' 'by,' 'near,' 'at,' 'with.' *Παρά* with the dative case retains its proper sense of 'beside,' 'by,' or has the nearly related meaning of 'near,' 'at,' 'with.' E.g. Il. v. 572, *ὥς εἶδεν δύο φῶτε παρ' ἀλλήλοισι μένοντε*, 'remaining alongside of each other,' or 'beside, near, with, each other.' Od. i. 154, *Φημίμιν, ὅς ῥ' ἤειδε παρὰ μνηστῆρσιν ἀνδραγῆ*, 'who sang among the suitors by compulsion;' properly, 'beside, near, with, or among, before, the suitors.' And so in a variety of uses, and admitting of a diversity of rendering in English according to the circumstances. E.g. Herod. iii. 160, *Ζωπύρου δὲ οὐδεὶς . . . ὑπερεβόλετο παρὰ Δαρείῳ χρητῇ*, 'no one surpassed Zopyrus in the judgment of Darius;' that is, 'with, near, beside, Darius (if he were) judge;' Id. i. 32, *οὗτος παρ' ἐμοὶ τὸ οὐνομα δικάως ἐστι φέρεσθαι*, 'he, in my opinion, has a right to bear the title,' properly, 'with me

he has a right;' Id. i. 86, *καὶ μάλιστα (λέγων) τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι αὐτοῖσι δοκούντας ὀλβίους εἶναι*, 'and saying it of those especially who think they are happy,' that is, 'who with themselves seem to be happy;' Id. i. 105, *καὶ ὁρᾷν παρ' ἐωυτοῖς τοὺς ἀπικνεομένους ἐς τὴν Σκυθικὴν χώραν, ὥς διακέεται*, 'and that those who arrive in the Scythian country see among the Scythians themselves, or in their own land, how they are affected;' properly, 'see with, that is, among, themselves.' Add Xen. Anab. ii. 5, 8; and Herod. vi. 86, fin.

In all these and like instances of the use of *παρὰ* with this case, the dative introduces the object to which any action or state qualified by *παρὰ* is referred as being that ultimately affected by it, or as that which it concerns; and the dative case depends for its use more immediately on the sense of 'beside,' 'near,' contained in the preposition itself; for it is as easy to attach the dative in the sense of the final object to the notion of 'beside,' 'near,' conveyed by the preposition *παρὰ*, as to the idea of 'sameness' in *ὁ αὐτός*, or to that of 'equality' in *ἴσος*.

III. *Παρά* with the accusative case.

1. α. 'Alongside of,' 'beside.' *Παρά* is very commonly employed with the accusative case in the sense of 'alongside of,' 'beside.' α. Without accompanying motion, and simply to mark position by the side of: e.g. Od. xii. 32, *οἱ μὲν κοιμήσαντο παρὰ πρυμνήσια νηός*, 'they slept by the side of the moorings of the ship;' Il. i. 463, *νέοι δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν ἔχον πεμπύβολα χερσίν*, 'by his side, beside him, the young men held spits in their hands;' Xen. Anab. i. 9, 13, *πολλὰκις δ' ἦν ἰδεῖν παρὰ τὰς στιβομένας ὁδοὺς καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν στερουμένους ἀνθρώπους*, 'along, by the side of, frequented roads;' Id. ib. i. 2, 13, *ἐνταῦθα ἦν παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν κρήνη*, 'there was a fountain by the roadside.' See Id. ib. i. 2, 24; iii. 5, 1.

β. With a verb of motion, which *παρὰ* qualifies: e.g. Xen. Anab. v. 10, 1, *ἐπλεον ἡμέρας δύο παρὰ τὴν γῆν*, 'they sailed two days along the land;' Id. ib. iv. 3, 26, *παρ' ἀσπίδας παραγαγόντας τὴν ἐνωμοτίαν ἐπὶ φάλαγγος*, 'leading the

enomoty to the left in the form of a phalanx,' that is, 'by the side of, alongside of, the shield or left hand.'

In both sets of examples, the accusative has the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards.' Thus, in *ἦν παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν χρήνη*, the construction is, 'there was a fountain alongside . . . as regards the road;' and in *ἐπλεον παρὰ τὴν γῆν*, 'they sailed alongside . . . as regards the land,' 'as far as the land was concerned.'

b. 'Beside,' 'near,' 'by,' 'at.' In a sense very nearly related to that above noticed, *παρὰ* with the accusative case is used to mean 'beside,' 'near,' 'by,' 'at,' the relative position indicated by these terms very naturally following that of 'alongside.' E.g. Herod. iv. 87, *οὗτος δὲ (λίθος) κατελείφθη παρὰ τοῦ Διονύσου τὸν νηὸν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ*, 'this stone was left at, near, the temple of Dionysus in Byzantium,' properly, 'alongside of, beside, the temple.' The example, Od. xii. 32, *οἱ μὲν κοιμήσαντο παρὰ πρυμνήσια νηός*, might be rendered, quite as well, 'they slept by, near, the moorings of the ship.' Here, also, the accusative has the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards;' thus, *οὗτος δὲ κατελείφθη παρὰ τὸν νηὸν* means, properly, 'this stone was left near, at, . . . as regards the temple.'

c. 'With.' *Παρὰ* with the accusative case has also the signification of 'with,' retaining, however, enough of its primary meaning of 'alongside' to distinguish it from *σύν* and *μετά*. E.g. Herod. vi. 86, *ἐδοξε μοι τὰ ἡμίσεα πάσης τῆς οὐσίης ἐξαργυρῶσαντα θέσθαι παρὰ σέ*, 'I determined to deposit the half of my substance with you;' Id. i. 86, *καὶ δις ἐπτά Λυδῶν παρ' αὐτὸν παῖδας (ἐπὶ τὴν πυρὴν ἀνεβίβασε)*, 'and placed on the funeral pile fourteen sons of Lydians with him;' Id. viii. 140, *πυνθάνεσθε δὲ καὶ τὴν νῦν παρ' ἐμὲ ἐοῦσαν δύναμιν*, 'you are aware of the force that is now with me;' Xen. Hell. i. 6, 29, *παρὰ δὲ Διομέδοντα οἱ Σάμιοι . . . τεταγμένοι*, 'and with Diomedon were posted the Samians,' or, 'alongside of, beside, Diomedon,' the sense being really the same. The accusative case, in this, as in the preceding uses of *παρὰ* with this case, has the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' or marks the extent in which the action or state as qualified by *παρὰ* is to be taken. Thus, in the

example *δις ἐπτά Λυδῶν παρ' αὐτὸν παῖδας ἐπὶ τὴν πυρὴν ἀνεβίβασε*, the meaning properly is, 'he caused fourteen sons of Lydians to ascend the funeral pile beside, near, with, . . . as regards him.' Compare, in Herod. vi. 86, the example above given with the use of *παρὰ* with the dative, in the same sense of 'with,' at the end of the chapter; *εὐ ἐξεπισταμένῳ ὥς μοι κείμενα ἔσται παρὰ σοὶ σόα (τὰ χρήματα)*.

d. 'During (the time of).' *Παρὰ* with the accusative case is frequently employed to denote the period of time with which an action runs parallel, or to which it corresponds, the idea being that of lying or running alongside of a thing, keeping pace with it, and so answering to it exactly in measure or extent. In English this is expressed by 'during,' 'in the time of,' 'in.' E.g. Xen. Anab. ii. 3, 15, *καὶ ἦν καὶ παρὰ πότον ἡδὺ μὲν κεφαλalγὲς δέ*, 'and it (the date wine, *οἶνος φοινίκων*) was sweet in, during, at the time of, drinking it, but caused headache.' Here *παρὰ πότον* marks the sweet taste of the wine as corresponding in extent of time with the drinking it, that is, as lying, in point of time, alongside of it, or as keeping pace with it, the one exactly answering to the other; and this is in accordance with the proper sense of *παρὰ*. Orat. Att. 395, 11, *παρὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀποδημίαν*, 'during this journey,' or 'throughout this journey,' that is, coinciding in extent of time with this journey, and running parallel with it; Id. 470, 12, *παρὰ τοὺς μέγιστους καιροὺς*, 'in, during the time of, the greatest exigency;' Id. 514, 8, *παρὰ πᾶσαν τὴν χορηγίαν*, 'during, throughout, the whole time that he was choregus;' Demosth. 229, 19, *ταῖς ἐκ τῶν νόμων τιμωρίας παρ' αὐτὰ τὰ δακρύματα, χρῆσθαι*, 'to use the legal punishment at the very time of the wrong-doing;' that is, making the punishment keep pace with the wrong-doing, answering to it throughout.

In such examples, it is sufficiently plain that *παρὰ* scarcely departs at all from its original sense of 'alongside,' and that the accusative case has the meaning of 'as regards,' 'as far as goes,' giving the measure of the parallelism expressed by *παρὰ*. Thus, in the first example, the accusative *πότον* shows the extent to which the sweet taste of the wine

(ἡδύ) was 'alongside' (*παρά*), or was coincident, namely, 'as far as the drinking went,' 'as regarded the drinking it.'

e. 'On account of,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' properly, 'conformably to,' 'with a just regard to,' 'in view of,' 'in consideration of.' *Παρά* with the accusative case is occasionally capable of being rendered in English by 'on account of,' 'because of,' 'by reason of.' E.g. Demosth. 48, 14, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗτος παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν τοσοῦτον ἐπηύξηται, δσον παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν, 'for neither has this man (Philip) aggrandized himself so much by reason of his own strength, as on account of our neglect;' Id. 110, 15, οὐ παρ' ἐν οὐδὲ δύο εἰς τοῦτο τὰ πράγματα ἀφίεται, 'our affairs have come to this pass, not by reason of one thing, nor of two.'

In such examples, the proper sense of *παρά* with the accusative is 'conformably to,' 'consistently with,' 'according to the measure of,' that is, it marks the object with which an action or proposition corresponds in its measure or extent. This sense is nearly akin to the idea of comparison, which *παρά* with the accusative has been seen to express, and, like it, is derived from the meaning of 'alongside,' 'beside,' both these notions springing from the conceiving an object as placed alongside of another. Thus, in the first example, the meaning is, 'this man has aggrandized himself, not so much in conformity with, according to the measure of, his own strength, as in conformity with, according to the measure of, our neglect.' And so, in the second example, the meaning is, 'our affairs have come to this pass, not conformably to, as properly accords with or answers to, one thing, nor even two things;' that is, 'not one thing, nor yet two things, furnish a just measure with which our present condition of affairs shall be found conforming.' The rendering of *παρά* with the accusative in English by, 'on account of,' 'by reason of,' though not strictly accurate, is yet not very remote from the true meaning, provided the terms be understood somewhat in the sense of 'in view of,' 'in consideration of.' When it is said, 'this man has aggrandized himself, not so much in conformity with his own strength as in conformity with our neglect,' it is not far from saying, 'in view of, in con-

sideration of, not so much his own strength as our neglect;' nor is this very different from saying, 'by reason of, on account of, not so much his own strength as our neglect.'

Here, again, the accusative case used after *παρά* has the sense of 'as regards,' 'as far as concerns.' Thus, in the example οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗτος παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν τοσοῦτον ἐπηύξηται, the construction is, 'nor has this man aggrandized himself so much in exact accordance with, with a corresponding measure . . . as regards his own strength.' That is, the accusative marks the extent to which the conformity expressed by *παρά* is to be understood as asserted.

f. 'To (beside).' *Παρά* with the accusative case, chiefly of persons, is frequently used after verbs of motion, to mark, in the most obvious view, the object which the motion reaches, and is rendered in English by 'to.' E.g. Od. i. 284-5, πρῶτα μὲν ἐς Πύλον ἔλθε, καὶ εἶρεο Νέστορα δῖον | κῆρυν δὲ Σπάρτηνδε παρὰ ξανθὸν Μενέλαον, 'and thence go to golden-haired Menelaus;' Herod. i. 36, τέλος δὲ, ἀπικόμενοι παρὰ τὸν Κροῖσον τῶν Μυσῶν ἀγγελοι, ἔλεγον τάδε, 'at length messengers of the Mysians reached Cræsus, and spoke as follows;' Xen. Anab. i. 2, 12, ἐνταῦθα ἀφικνεῖται Ἐπύαξα . . . παρὰ Κῦρον, 'here Epyaxa reached Cyrus;' Id. ib. i. 2, 17, πέμψας Πίγρητα τὸν ἐρισηέα παρὰ τοὺς στρατηγούς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, 'sending Pigres to the Greek officers.'

In such examples, *παρά* really means 'by the side of,' 'beside,' 'near,' and the sense of 'to,' by which seemingly *παρά* is rendered in English, is due to the accusative as connected with a verb of motion and expressing the object reached. Thus, in the last example, the sending to the officers is expressed by πέμψας and τοὺς στρατηγούς, but is further qualified by *παρά*, so as to signify that the interpreter Pigres came to them and was 'alongside of' them or 'near' them; that is, Pigres was sent to the officers so as to be alongside of or near them. Compare what was said above of the use of *παρά* with the genitive case in the sense of 'from alongside of.'

The accusative, however, in this construction, may either be considered, in the more obvious view, as directly marking

the object reached by the verb's motion, or, as is probably more correct, may be regarded as attending upon the action of the verb as qualified by *παρά*, in the sense of 'as regards,' that is, to define with regard to what object, or within what limits, this combined meaning is to be taken. Thus, using the same example, in *πέμψας Πίγρητα παρά τοὺς στρατηγούς*, the action of sending is qualified by *παρά*, so as to mean, 'having sent Pigres alongside or near,' and the accusative *τοὺς στρατηγούς* marks in what regard, within what limits, this is affirmed, 'as regards the officers.' So that, according to this latter view, which seems more satisfactory, the sentence will mean, 'having sent Pigres alongside . . . as regards the officers,' the officers alone being regarded as directly concerned in the message.

g. Comparison: 'as much as,' 'as good as,' 'equivalent to,' &c. *Παρά* with the accusative case expresses, in a variety of ways, the idea of comparison, rendered in English by a diversity of phrases, according to the circumstances of the comparison, as will be seen presently in detail. This notion of comparison readily springs from the sense of 'alongside,' 'beside,' proper to the preposition, objects being placed alongside of each other for the purpose of comparison, and comparison being readily suggested by the fact of such juxtaposition. And it may be remarked generally, as necessary to the right interpretation of such forms of comparison as are expressed by *παρά* with the accusative in its sense of 'alongside of,' that, when an object is placed beside another for comparison, either of two cases may occur; first, it may equal the standard of comparison; as, *παρ' οὐδέν*, 'as much as nothing;' or, secondly, it may exceed the standard; as, *παρά τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπόνει*, 'he toiled more than the rest.' Meanwhile, *παρά* expressing no more than the being alongside, and so suggesting comparison merely, these relations of equality and superiority must be gathered from the conditions of the comparison, which ordinarily leave no great room for ambiguity. There is, it may be mentioned, still a third case of comparison expressed by *παρά*, that of inferiority, or coming short of the standard of comparison; but that belongs to *παρά* in the sense of 'at or on one side

of,' 'not coinciding with,' and does not come under consideration in this place.

α.) 'As much as,' 'as good as,' 'as.' *Παρά* with the accusative case is used to mark an object to which, as to a standard of comparison, another is referred and counted as equal. This is expressed in English by 'as much as,' 'as good as,' 'as.' E.g. Soph. Antig. 465-6, *οὕτως ἐμοίγε τοῦδε τοῦ μόρου τυχεῖν | παρ' οὐδέν ἄλγος*, 'so, for me, forsooth, to meet with this doom is a sorrow of no moment,' 'as good as nothing;' Id. ib. 34-5, . . . *καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἄγειν | οὐχ ὡς παρ' οὐδέν*, 'and to account the matter not as a thing of naught,' properly, 'as equal to nothing;' Id. Electr. 1327, *πότερα παρ' οὐδέν τοῦ βίου κ'δεσθ' ἔτε;* 'do you still have no care for life?' Id. CEd. Tyr. 982-3, . . . *ἀλλὰ τῷδ' ὅτι | παρ' οὐδέν ἐστι, ῥᾶστα τὸν βίον φέρει*, 'to whom this is as nothing,' 'who values it as nothing worth;' Eurip. Or. 569, *παρ' οὐδέν αὐταῖς ἦν ἂν ὀλλύναι πόσεις*, 'it were to them a thing of nothing to destroy their husbands.' (See Bothe's note on Soph. Antig. 35.) Herod. i. 120, *παρά σμικρὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν λογίων ἡμῖν ἐνια κεχώρηκε*, 'for some oracles even have turned out of little moment,' that is, 'as much as, equivalent to, a small matter;' Demosth. 1416, 21, *ἵνα μᾶλλον προτρέψω σε πρὸς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἐὰν μὴ παρά μικρὸν ποήσῃ*, 'unless you account philosophy a thing of little moment,' 'equal to a small thing;' Id. 593, 22, *ἐγὼ τοίνυν ταῦτα μὲν οὐ παρά μικρὸν ἀγωνιζόμενος παρ' ὁμῶν ἀπελυσάμην*, 'with no little struggle.' Here belong *παρά βραχὺ*, and *παρ' ὀλίγον*, which, like *παρά μικρὸν*, are rendered commonly by 'by a little,' and mean, properly, 'equal to a little,' 'as much as a little;' *παρά πολὺ*, 'by much,' 'equal to much,' *παρ' ὅσον*, 'by how much,' *παρά τοσούτον*, 'by so much.' (See Passow's Lex. s. v. *παρά*.)

In such examples, *παρά* with the accusative marks an object alongside of which another is placed for comparison, or, which is the same thing essentially, gives a standard to which any proposition is referred to determine its measure; and, when the circumstances suggest no idea of superiority nor of inferiority, the relation of equality is assumed to exist. Thus, in the last example, *παρά μικρὸν* is

added to the proposition *τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐὰν μὴ ποσῇ*, to give a standard of measure alongside of which it is placed, and with which, consequently, it is compared; 'unless you consider philosophy as standing alongside of, on the same footing with, equal to, a small matter.'

The accusative case, as here used with *παρὰ*, has the meaning of 'as regards,' 'as far as is concerned,' or shows with regard to what object, within what limits, the correspondence in measure or the exact conformity expressed by *παρὰ* is to be regarded as affirmed. Thus, *τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐὰν μὴ παρὰ μικρὸν ποσῇ*, 'unless you account philosophy as being of equal measure, exactly corresponding, . . . as regards a little matter.'

Of the same nature are a number of expressions in which *παρὰ* with the accusative denotes an object or action to which another answers. Thus, Aristoph. Ran. 643, *πληγὴν παρὰ πληγὴν ἑκάτερον*, 'I will give to each blow for blow,' the blow given to the one answering to a blow given to the other. This mode of expression has the same origin with the preceding, namely, in the idea of one thing placed alongside of another, and hence regarded as corresponding to it exactly in measure, number, or any other point of comparison. Demosth. 1360, 20, *συνεῖναι δὲ (Νέαιραν) ἑκατέρῳ ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν*, 'and that Neaira should spend a day with each of the two alternately;' that is, a day with one should answer to a day with the other, or, what is the same thing, should spend 'every other day' with one of the two. The phrase *παρ' ἓνα γέροντες καὶ νεανίαι*, 'old men and young men alternately,' cited in Passow's Lexicon, may mean 'old men and young men counted one for one,' 'one of the one age answering to one of the other age.' But, if this be the interpretation, it should be observed as being peculiar in this, that the objects intended to be counted one against the other are not formally placed one alongside of the other, as in *πληγὴν παρὰ πληγὴν* above; but they are named in contrasted classes, *γέροντες καὶ νεανίαι*, 'old men and young men,' and then *παρ' ἓνα*, 'alongside of, answering to, one,' is added to show that the two classes of persons are to be regarded as answering to each other, not as

classes merely, and generally, but individually, an old man to a young man, and a young man to an old man; and this it does by setting up a standard to which the two classes of old men and young men are equally referred, so as to answer to the standard of 'one.' Instead of saying, 'an old man for a young man,' that is, 'an old man alongside of, with (*παρὰ*), a young man,' *γέρον παρὰ νεανίαν*, and 'a young man for an old man,' *νεανίας παρὰ γέροντα*, a briefer form of expression is used, 'old men and young men arranged according to the standard of one' (*παρ' ἓνα*), the mind supplying, from the contradistinction in which the one class stands to the other, that they are not only generally arranged according to the standard of one, but that they answer to each other, one of the one class to another of the other class, one for one (*παρ' ἓνα*). The phrase *παρὰ μῆνα τρίτον*, cited from Arist. H. A. vii. 2, 1, in Passow's Lexicon, and translated 'every third month,' means, properly, 'answering to, coinciding with, the third month,' the notion of 'every' third month, or of a succession of actions occurring at equal periods of three months, is suggested by the circumstances of the case; for *παρὰ μῆνα τρίτον* furnishes merely the standard of measure to which the action corresponds, and, in order that the sense of 'every,' or of successive actions corresponding to the standard, may be conveyed, there must be present also some sign of a plurality of actions to be thus distributed. Soph. Aj. 475, *τί γὰρ παρ' ἡμᾶρ ἡμέρα τέρπειν ἔχει;* 'for what pleasure has day alternating with day?' that is, 'day answering to day;' Demosth. 467, 6, *οὐκοῦν παρὰ μὲν τὰς τριάκοντα μυριάδας μυρίους δίδωσι μηδὲ μινους ἡμῶν, παρὰ δὲ τὰς δέκα ὡσπερ ἀνεί τριαχιλίους;* 'for every three hundred thousand bushels (medimni) of corn he makes us a present of ten thousand bushels, and for every hundred thousand about three thousand bushels;' that is, 'answering to, correspondently with, three hundred thousand bushels he bestows on us ten thousand.' (For the examples, see Passow's Lexicon, s. v. *παρὰ*, and Index Orat. Att.)

β.) In some examples, *παρὰ* is used with the accusative to mark a comparison, but with the idea of a superiority on

the part of the subject of comparison to the standard with which it is compared, or alongside of which it is placed. E.g. Xen. Memor. i. 4, 14, *παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ὥσπερ θεοὶ ἀνδρῶν βιωτεύουσι*, 'compared with, and above, all other animals, men live as gods;' Id. Ages. v. 3, *ἐπὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους*, 'he toiled more than all the rest;' Id. Memor. iv. 4, *ὥστε διὰ δόξαν εἶναι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εὐτακτῶν*, 'so that he was manifestly of good order above all the rest.'

In such examples, it is plain that the notion of superiority to the standard of comparison is suggested by the circumstances of the case, *παρὰ* with the accusative serving only, as in the instances above considered, to mark the comparison with a standard. This being so, neither the preposition nor the accusative, as here used, require further explanation.

γ.) As was above mentioned, *παρὰ* with the accusative, in another set of examples, is employed to mark the amount by which a fact or statement fails or comes short of being true just as set forth; as, *παρὰ μικρόν*, 'by a little,' *παρ' ὀλίγον*, 'by a little,' *παρὰ βραχύ*, 'by a small amount,' or 'within a little,' 'wellnigh.' E.g. Isocr. 178, d, *ταύτην ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἰεῖσαι καὶ λυθῆναι παρὰ μικρόν ἐποίησαν*, 'this, in a little space of time, they caused to be agitated and wellnigh dissolved;' that is, 'to be within a little, to be wanting a little, of being dissolved.' But this form of the comparison made by *παρὰ* with the accusative is more appropriately referred to a distinct signification of *παρὰ* to be mentioned presently.

2. 'At or on one side of,' 'not coincident with.' *Παρὰ* with the accusative occurs, in a variety of cases, with a meaning clearly distinct from that of 'alongside of,' 'beside,' which has prevailed in all the examples of the use of *παρὰ* with the accusative hitherto considered; namely, with the meaning of 'at or on one side of,' in contradistinction to being coincident with. This is not contrary to the idea of 'alongside of,' and does not exclude it; but is, in fact, the same sense so modified as to make prominent the notion of being 'on one side of' as opposed to that of being in the same line with.

α. 'At or on one side of,' 'by,' 'past.' *Παρὰ* with the

accusative is used in the sense of 'at or on one side of,' 'by,' 'past:' e.g. Il. xxii. 145, *οἱ δὲ παρὰ σκοπὴν καὶ ἐρινεὸν ἡμερόεντα | τείχεος αἰὲν ὑπέκ κατ' ἀμαξίτων ἐσσεύοντο*, 'they rushed by, past, the watch-tower;' Od. iii. 172, *παρ' ἡμερόεντα Μίμαντα*, 'by, past, windy Mimas;' Xen. Cyrop. v. 2, 29, *παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν Βαβυλῶνα δεῖ παρῖέναι*, 'one must needs pass by Babylon itself;' that is, 'on one side of Babylon.' In these and many such examples, the meaning of *παρὰ* is that above indicated, 'at or on one side of;' and the signification of 'past,' and that of 'beyond' also, which *παρὰ* sometimes has, is partly due to the verb of motion with which the preposition is used. It hardly requires to be added, that the accusative, here also, has the meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards;' as in the last example, 'it is required to pass by . . . as regards Babylon itself.'

β. α.) 'Beside,' 'except.' *Παρὰ* with the accusative has also the meaning of 'beside,' 'except,' which is derived immediately from that of 'on one side of,' the idea of 'beside,' 'except,' as expressed by the preposition, being that the proposition thus qualified by *παρὰ* does not embrace the object introduced by *παρὰ*, but leaves it 'on one side.' E.g. Herod. ix. 33, *παρὰ ἐν πάλεισμα ἔδραμε νικῶν Ὀλυμπίδα*, 'he ran so as to be victorious in the Olympic games, excepting one contest;' Aristoph. Nub. 698, *οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταύτ' ἄλλα*, 'there is nothing else beside, except, this;' that is, 'apart from this.' So in the example cited from Polyb. iii. 110, 4, *παρὰ μίαν*, 'every other day,' that is, 'one day excepted, omitted,' 'left on one side.' (See, for other examples, Wessel. ad Herod. ix. 33.)

β.) 'Wanting,' 'lacking,' 'less by,' 'within.' Little different from the signification of *παρὰ* with the accusative just noticed is the case in which it is rendered by 'wanting,' 'lacking,' 'less by,' the sense here being that the action or proposition qualified by *παρὰ* and the accusative fails of being complete, or comes short, by the amount expressed by the accusative introduced by *παρὰ*. E.g. Isocr. 367, 6, *ὥστε παρὰ μικρόν ἡλθὼν ἀκριτος ἀποθανεῖν*, 'so that I came within a little of being put to death without a trial.' The statement is that the being put to death failed of occurring,

fell short of being effected, by a little (*μικρόν*); and *παρά μικρόν* conveys the idea of this limitation by showing that the matter affirmed fell on one side, did not meet the full measure, or did not coincide with (*παρά*), what the terms expressing the action imply, and that it thus comes short by the amount of a little (*μικρόν*). Putting *παρά μικρόν* aside, the proposition would be that he was put to death without a trial; *παρά* being added with *ἦλθον* shows that he came on one side of this, and so missed it, or came short of it; and *μικρόν* as an accusative marks how far he came short of or missed the being put to death without a trial. Demosth. 743, 21, (*Φιλίππου*) *μικροῦ μὲν ἀπεκτείνετε, χρημάτων δὲ πολλῶν . . . παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους ἡττηώσαστε*, 'you came near to putting Philip to death, and failed of this only by a few votes, visiting him, for a deal of money, with degradation instead.' The putting Philip to death fell short of being effected, and had another penalty substituted, by a few votes; properly, it fell on one side, and did not attain to completion, by the amount of a few votes. Isæus, 41, 36, *παρὰ τέτταρας ψήφους μετέσχε τῆς πόλεως*, 'he came within four votes of obtaining citizenship;' Jacobs Anthol., p. 695, cited by Passow, *Μάρκος, θηρίον εἰ παρὰ γράμμα*, 'you are a bear (*ἄρκος*), Marcus, but for a letter;' that is, 'missing a letter, coming short by a letter, if you wanted a letter, you would be a bear.' From such examples it may be considered as true that *παρά* obtains the meaning of 'wanting,' 'lacking,' 'less by,' 'within,' from that of 'on one side of,' 'not coinciding with,' and hence not reaching, a given line or measure; that this measure is an action or statement as it is set forth by the word qualified by *παρά*; and that the accusative case attending *παρά* is the measure of the amount by which this action or statement comes short of the proper standard.

Here belong such expressions as *παρά μικρόν*, *παρ' ὀλίγον*, *παρά βραχύ*, 'within a little,' 'wanting or lacking a little:' e.g. Isocr. 178, d, above cited, *ταύτην ἐν ὀλίγῃ χρόνῳ σαλεύσαι καὶ λυθῆναι παρὰ μικρόν ἐποίησαν*, 'this, within a little space of time, they caused to be agitated and wellnigh dissolved,' that is, to come only a little short of being dissolved.

c. 'Beside,' 'beyond,' 'against,' 'contrary to.' *Παρά* with

the accusative case has frequently the signification of 'beside,' 'beyond,' 'against,' 'contrary to.' This meaning is but another variety of 'on one side of,' that is, 'not coinciding with;' for when it is said, Plat. Phæd. c. 44, that a thing occurs *παρὰ δόξαν*, 'contrary to my expectation,' *præter opinionem*, the meaning really is, that it does not coincide with, but falls on one side of, and so is out of keeping with and contrary to, my expectation. In the same way, *παρὰ δίκαιον*, 'contrary to justice,' means, properly, what is 'beside,' 'on one side of,' 'not coinciding with,' and, hence, out of conformity with, opposed to, justice. E.g. Il. xiii. 787, *πᾶρ δ' ὄναρ μιν ὅ' οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἐσσύμενον πολεμίζειν*, 'a man cannot fight beyond his strength, even though he be eager to do it;' that is, 'a man cannot fight otherwise than according to, in keeping with, in proportion to, his strength;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 6, *παρὰ γὰρ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν δεσμούς πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι*, 'that all such things were contrary to the divine laws;' Id. Anab. v. 8, 17, *εἴ τι ὅπ' ἐμοῦ ἔπαθον παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον*, 'if in any thing they were treated by me contrary to justice;' Id. Anab. ii. 5, 41, *εἰ παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους ἔλυε τὰς σπονδὰς, τὴν δίκην ἔχει*, 'if he was breaking the truce in violation of the oaths;' Orat. Att. 121, 25, *συμβέβηκε πολὺ παρὰ τὴν γνώμην*, 'it has fallen out very much contrary to their mind,' 'otherwise than in conformity with their judgment.'

The accusative case, in these examples, has the signification of 'as to,' 'as regards.' Thus, in the last example, *συμβέβηκε παρὰ τὴν γνώμην*, 'it has occurred very much out of coincidence, contrariwise, . . . as regards their mind.'

(For the table of *παρά* with cases, see the next page.)

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USES OF *παρά* WITH CASES.

Significations of <i>παρά</i> .	Gen.: 'with respect to.'	Dative: 'for.'	Accusative: 'as to,' 'as regards,' 'as far as goes.'
1. 'Alongside,' 'beside.' a. Juxtaposition: 'alongside,' 'beside.' b. Proximity: 'by,' 'at,' 'near.' c. Parallel duration: 'during.' d. Conformity with: 'on account of,' 'by reason of.' e. Comparison: 'compared with.'	b. 'By,' 'at,' 'near.' From (beside.) 'By' (agent.)	b. 'By,' 'at,' 'near,' 'with,' 'among.'	1. a. 'Alongside,' 'beside,' 'along.' b. 'Beside,' 'by,' 'at,' 'near,' 'with.' c. 'During.' d. 'On account of,' 'by reason of,' properly, 'in conformity with,' 'according to the measure of.' e. 'As much as,' 'as good as,' 'as.' 'answering to,' — for — e.g. <i>πληθὺς παρὰ πληθὺς</i> , 'more than,' 'beyond,' properly, 'compared with.'
2. 'On one side of,' 'not coinciding with.' a. 'On one side of,' 'past,' 'by.' b. 'At one side of,' 'not including,' 'beside,' 'except.' c. 'At one side,' 'not conforming to a measure, coming short.' d. 'At one side,' 'not in conformity with, out of keeping with.'		b. 'Beside,' 'except.' c. 'Wanting,' 'lacking,' 'with- in.'	2. a. 'On one side of,' 'by,' 'past,' 'beyond.' b. 'Beside,' 'except.' c. 'Wanting,' 'lacking,' 'with- in.' d. 'Besides,' 'beyond,' 'against.'

*Περί.**Significations of περί.*

1. a. 'Around,' 'about.' *Περί*, the same with the Sanskrit *pari*, 'circum,' signifies, properly, 'around,' 'about,' including the idea of an entire circuit, more fully expressed by *περι κύκλῳ*, as in Plat. Phæd. c. 61, *ρέον περι κύκλῳ*, 'flowing round about in a circle,' and being hereby distinguished from *ἀμφί*. This proper sense of *περί* is seen in the derivative *πέριξ*, 'round about,' which seems to be formed upon *περί* by the addition of an ending *ς*, probably akin to *-εχός*. Many compounds also exhibit *περί* in this meaning; as, *περιανχένιος*, 'around the neck,' *περικείρειν*, 'to shear all around,' *περιλάμπειν*, 'to shine all around,' 'on every side.' And so, likewise, in many examples of its use with the cases of nouns *περί* has this same local sense of 'around:' e.g. Il.

Περί.

x. 139, . . . *τὸν αἶψα περί φρένας ἤλυθ' ἰωή*, 'quickly the cry came round about his heart,' 'reached his heart round about;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 4, *οἱ δὲ ἐφηβοὶ καὶ κοιμῶνται περί τὰ δόρχεια*, 'the ephebi sleep also round about the public buildings.'

b. 'About.' Sometimes *περί* is used in a sense different from the above, but nearly connected with it, namely, in that of 'about' with the idea of nearness or approximation to a thing, as distinguished from exact position, measure, and the like, as in regard to space, time, and numbers. E.g. Anab. ii. 1, 7, *καὶ ἤδη τε ἦν περί πλήθουσιν ἀγοράν*, 'it was now about the time of full market;' Id. Hell. ii. 4, 5, *συνελεγμένων ἐς τὴν Φυλὴν περί ἑκταχοσίους*, 'about seven hundred men,' that is, a number something near, not exactly, seven hundred. It will be remembered that *ἀμφί* has the same accommodated sense of 'about;' and the English word 'about,' by which both *ἀμφί* and *περί* in this use are translated, affords an instance of the same modification of a mere local meaning.

c. 'About,' 'of,' 'concerning,' the Latin *de*. *Περί*, in no distant connection with its primary sense, is very frequently used metaphorically to indicate an object about which the thoughts, feelings, words, or actions are employed, answering to the English 'about,' 'of,' 'concerning,' 'touching,' and to the Latin *de*. E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 5, 18, *εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω περί ὑμῶν*, 'if I say this of, about, concerning, you;' Id. Memor. i. 2, 19, *ἐγὼ δὲ περί τούτων οὐχ οὕτω γινώσκω*, 'I do not thus judge concerning these things.' Here, again, the English word 'about' furnishes precisely a similar instance of the accommodated use of a term properly expressing a merely local relation.

d. 'Respecting,' 'with respect to.' Very nearly related to the sense of *περί* just mentioned is that in which it corresponds to the English 'respecting,' 'with respect to.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 15, *ἐκ τούτου δὴ συνῆν τούτοις ἐγὼ οὐς μάλιστα φρονίμους περί τούτων ἤκουον εἶναι*, 'I had intercourse with those whom I understood to be most intelligent with respect to these matters.'

e. 'For,' 'on account of,' 'because of.' Immediately con-

ected with the two next preceding significations of *περί* is that in which it expresses the occasion, ground, or reason of an action, where it is rendered in English by 'for,' 'on account of,' 'because of.' E.g. Il. xvii. 146-7, οὐ γὰρ τις Λυκίων γε μαχησόμενος Δαναοῖσιν | εἶσι περί πτόλιος, 'will go to fight for, on account of, the city;' Il. xvi. 497, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμεῦ πέρι μάρναο χαλκῶ, 'do you yourself fight for me with the spear;' Il. vii. 301, ἡ μὲν ἐμαρνάσθην ἐριδος πέρι θυμοβόροιο, 'they fought on account of a quarrel;' properly, 'they fought about, touching, concerning, a quarrel or occasion of strife,' the fighting being referred to a quarrel for its subject or occasion, this being the thing to which it relates, and hence furnishing the occasion, ground, or reason of the action.

f. 'For,' object had in view. To this sense of *περί* may be referred also the case in which it introduces the final object or end of an action, where it is rendered in English by 'for.' E.g. Il. xxii. 161, ἀλλὰ περί φυγῆς θεόν Ἑκτορος ἱποδάμοιο (πόδες,) 'but the feet of Hector ran for life,' that is, properly, 'about, concerning, on account of, life;' Herod. viii. 26, οἳ οὐ περί χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῦνται, ἀλλὰ περί ἀρετῆς, 'who contend not for money, but about virtue.' The proper sense of *περί*, in these examples, is 'about,' 'concerning.' Thus, in the latter example, *περί χρημάτων ἀγῶνα ποιεῦνται* means strictly no more than 'they contend about money,' just as *περί ἀρετῆς* signifies 'about, concerning, the question of virtue or manhood,' *chrēmata* being, as *ἀρετή* is, the subject of the contest. But, when the matter about which an action is performed constitutes at the same time the motive to it, it is both its subject and its final object. The cases in which *περί* may have this signification can be determined only by the nature of the noun with which it is connected and that of the action which it qualifies.

g. 'Of the value of.' Of the same nature, most probably, is *περί* when used with πολλοῦ, πλείονος, πλείστου, παντὸς ποιῆσθαι, 'to consider of much, of more, of very great, of all possible moment or value.' E.g. Xen. Anab. v. 6, 22, οὐδὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐδὲν περί πλείονος ποιῆσθαι, 'to consider nothing of more value than Hellas;' Id. ib. i. 9, 7, ὅτι περί πλείστου

ποιῶτο μὴδὲν ψεύδεσθαι, '(he showed) that he considered it a matter of the highest moment not to prove false at all.' The meaning of *περί*, here also, is immediately connected with that of 'about;' for by giving a thing the relative position of about an object, there is suggested the idea of its belonging to the class or category of such object; so that *περί πολλοῦ ποιῆσθαι* signifies to consider or account a thing as being of the class or category of what is much, or of much value. This is what is meant by Passow, when he says that "the thing belongs to the sphere or region of great, small, &c." (See Passow's Lexicon, s. v. *περί*.) Compare for the genitive, as here used, the Latin genitives *magni*, *parvi*, &c., after such verbs as *æstimare*, signifying with them 'to value at much,' &c.; and, for the meaning of *περί* here assumed, compare its use in such phrases as *οἱ περί Πρίαμον*, 'those about Priam,' meaning, 'of the company of Priam.' The term *ποιεῖσθαι* containing the notion of valuing, and πολλοῦ, πλείονος, and the rest of these genitives, being expressions of value, 'much,' 'more,' 'very much,' and *περί* being added to show that it is about or around these signs of value that the object to be valued is to be considered as placed, and, hence, as being referred to or appertaining to them, and as belonging to the particular value which any one of them denotes; it is easy to see how *ποιεῖσθαι περί πολλοῦ* signifies 'to consider of much value,' and so of the rest. It is really the same thing as to say, 'to consider an object as being about, as having to do with, as appertaining to,' the several kinds of value expressed by πολλοῦ, πλείονος, &c.

2. a. 'Quite,' 'altogether,' 'exceedingly,' 'very.' In many compounds *περί* has the sense of 'quite,' 'altogether,' 'very,' 'exceedingly:' e.g. *περιαλγής*, 'exceedingly sorrowful,' *περίβαρυς*, 'very heavy,' *περίλαμπρος*, 'very brilliant,' *περισσός*, 'extraordinary.' This meaning would seem to be originally the intensive notion of around, namely, 'round and round,' 'quite round,' of which was retained only the intensive sense of 'quite,' 'altogether,' without any reference ordinarily to the primary idea of around. Compare the intensive sense of *κατά* above mentioned, that of the Latin *per*, and the English 'out and out.' In the case of the English 'out and

out, the notion of intensity is indicated by the repetition of the term. But in that of *κατά* and *περί* the same idea is conveyed without such repetition. There is agreement, however, in this, that the notion of intensity does not seem to belong to the primary meaning of the term used, but to spring from the manner of its employment. In English, as in the Hebrew, the notion of intensity is conveyed by repetition; in Greek it may have been indicated by mere emphasis. This does not exclude the opinion that this or that term in English or Greek is better fitted than another to take on it the sense of intensity; but it is affirmed only, that this notion is not inherent in the term itself. What is here said of the origin of the sense of 'quite,' 'altogether,' 'very,' as had by *περί*, may be confirmed by those compounds in which *περί* has at the same time the meaning of 'all around,' and of 'quite,' 'very,' as, *περιλαλεῖν*, 'to chatter all round,' and 'to chatter excessively,' *περίρρυπος*, 'dirty all round,' or, as we say, 'dirty all over,' and 'very dirty.'

b. 'Above,' 'more than,' 'beyond.' The signification of 'quite,' 'very,' 'exceedingly,' when employed relatively to one or more persons, conveys the idea of 'above,' 'more than,' 'beyond.' E.g. Il. i. 417, *νῦν δ' ἄμα τ' ὠκύμορος καὶ δίζυρος περί πάντων | ἐπλεο*. Here the sense is, 'of early death exceedingly . . . with respect to all men,' which is the same as to say, 'of early death above, or more than, all men.' Il. i. 287, *ἀλλ' ὅδ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλει περί πάντων ἔμμεναι ἄλλων*, 'this man wishes to be exceedingly (great, or the like,) . . . with respect to all others,' or 'to be in excess, to be above, . . . with respect to all others.'

It may be remarked that this relative sense of *περί* is seen in several compounds; as, *περιγίγνεσθαι*, 'to survive,' 'to outlive,' 'to overcome,' 'to excel,' *περιεῖναι*, 'to be above,' 'to surpass,' the same verb having also the sense of 'to be around,' *περιέχειν*, 'to surpass,' 'to overcome,' this verb signifying also 'to encompass,' 'to embrace,' 'to surround,' *περιτοξεύειν*, 'to out shoot,' also 'to shoot all round,' 'to shoot on all sides,' *περιφρονεῖν*, 'to be wiser than others,' as well as 'to turn over in the mind,' 'to consider on all sides.'

Summary of the significations of περί.

- Περί.* 1. a. 'Around,' 'about.'
 b. 'About,' 'near.'
 c. 'About,' 'of,' 'concerning;' (object.)
 d. 'For,' 'on account of,' 'because of;' (subject.)
 e. 'For,' 'with the view of;' (motive.)
 f. 'Respecting,' 'with respect to.'
 g. 'Of the value of.'
 2. a. 'Quite,' 'altogether,' 'very,' 'exceedingly.'
 b. 'Above,' 'more than,' 'beyond.'

SIGNIFICATION AND USE OF *περί* WITH CASES OF NOUNS.

I. *Περί with the genitive case.*

1. a. 'Around,' 'about.' *Περί* in its proper local sense of 'around,' 'about,' is employed rarely with the genitive case, and only in poetry. E.g. Od. v. 68-9, *ἥδ' αὐτοῦ τετάνυστο περί σπείους γλαφυροῖο | ἡμερὶς ἡβώωσα, τεθῆλει δὲ σταφυλῆσιν*, 'and there was spread about the hollow cave a flourishing vine, and it was full of clusters of grapes.' (See Passow's Lexicon.) The genitive as here used with *περί* has the sense of 'with respect to;' as in the example cited, 'a vine was spread about, around, . . . with respect to the cave.'

b. 'About,' 'of,' 'concerning,' 'touching,' the Latin *de*. *Περί* is very commonly used with the genitive case, as after verbs of hearing, knowing, speaking, and the like, in a metaphorical sense, to mark the object about which a persons hears, knows, speaks, &c., corresponding to the English 'about,' 'of,' 'concerning,' 'touching,' and to the Latin *de*. E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 3, *οὕτως ἐγγινώσκωμεν περί αὐτῶν*, 'we thus judged concerning them;' Id. ib. i. 2, 13, *εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω περί ὑμῶν*, 'if I say this of, concerning, about, you;' Id. Memor. i. 1, 16, *αὐτὸς δὲ περί τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο*, 'he was himself forever discoursing about human affairs.'

c. 'About,' 'for,' 'on account of.' In the same way *περί* with the genitive is used in the sense of 'about,' 'for,' 'on

account of,' to mark the object about which the thoughts, feelings, words, or actions are occupied: e.g. Il. xx. 17, ἡ τε περὶ Τρώων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν μεριμνῶντες; 'hast thou, indeed, some anxious care about the Trojans and the Achæi?' Xen. Cyrop. ii. 1, 22, ἐννοήσας ὅτι περὶ ὁπόσων ἂν γένωνται ἀνθρώποις φιλονεικίαι, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐθέλουσι ταῦτα ἀσχεῖν, 'all those matters about which men have emulation;' Id. ib. iii. 1, 25, οὐ μόνον περὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ, καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς, καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν τέκνων, δουλείας φοβεῖται, 'he stands in fear of bondage, not only for himself, but also for me, and for his wife, and for all his children;' Id. ib. iii. 3, 44, νῦν περὶ ψυχῶν τῶν ὑμετέρων ὁ ἀγὼν, καὶ περὶ γῆς, . . . καὶ περὶ οἴκου. . . , καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν δὲ καὶ τέκνων, καὶ περὶ πάντων ὧν πέπασθε ἀγαθῶν, 'now the struggle is for life, and for country, and for home, and for wives, moreover, and children, and for all the blessings you have.'

d. 'For,' object had in view. In some examples, *περὶ* with the genitive obtains more distinctly the sense of the object had in view in an action, or that which is its motive. Thus, Il. xxii. 161, cited above, ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς θέον Ἕκτορος ἱπποδάμοιο, 'Hector (the feet of Hector) ran for life;' and so Herod. ix. 37, ὥστε τρέχων περὶ ψυχῆς, 'running for his life;' and Id. viii. 26, οἱ οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῦνται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς, 'who contend not for money, but about virtue (manhood).' It is plain, however, that the proper sense of *περὶ* with the genitive, in these examples, as well as in those in which it expresses rather the occasion, ground, or reason of an action or feeling, is to mark that about which the action is employed. The nature of the object, and the relation in which it stands to the subject of whom the action is affirmed, as being naturally an object of his desire, or the subject merely of his thoughts, words, or actions, will suggest whether it constitutes the motive for an action, or its subject only.

e. 'For,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' 'from.' Differing somewhat from the above uses of *περὶ* with the genitive, although having the same proper sense of 'about,' 'concerning,' is that in which it marks the occasion, ground, or reason of an action, where it is rendered in English by

'for,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' 'from.' E.g. Il. vii. 301, ἡ μὲν ἐμαρινάσθη ἐριδος περὶ θυμοβόροισι, 'they fought, indeed, on account of, from, out of, strife,' that is, the occasion or ground of their fighting was a quarrel or strife. Strictly speaking, the sense is, 'they fought about, concerning, a strife or quarrel,' and it is only from the nature of the term *ἐριδος*, and from its obvious relation to the action and to the subject of whom it is affirmed, that it becomes apparent that the strife or quarrel is not merely the subject, but the occasion or ground of the fighting. It is in this way alone that the distinction is readily made between *περὶ ἐριδος μάχασθαι*, 'to fight from strife,' and *περὶ νίκης μάχεσθαι*, 'to fight for victory.' In both *περὶ* has the same sense, as has also the genitive; but, in the former, *περὶ ἐριδος*, from the nature and relations of the idea expressed by the term *ἐριδος*, marks the occasion or ground, and, in the latter, *περὶ νίκης*, from the like cause, denotes the final object or end had in view in the action.

f. 'Respecting,' 'with respect to,' 'relating to.' Not materially differing from the above uses of *περὶ* with the genitive is the case in which it is used to mark the object to which any thing is referred as having relation to it, where it is equivalent in English to 'respecting,' 'relating to.' E.g. Herod. vii. 102, ἀριθμοῦ δὲ πέρι, μὴ πύθῃ ὅσοι τινὲς ἐόντες ταῦτα ποιεῖν οἰοί τε εἶσι, 'but respecting, as relates to, numbers, do not inquire how many they are, that they are able to do this;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 15, συνῆν τούτοις ἐγὼ οὐς μάλιστα φρονίμους περὶ τούτων ἤκουον εἶναι, 'I had intercourse with those whom I understood to be most knowing respecting these matters;' Id. ib., καὶ περὶ μὲν τροφῆς ἐπείσθη ἱκανὸν εἶναι, 'and respecting subsistence, I was persuaded that it was sufficient.' Here there is no difficulty in admitting that by describing an object as being 'about' or 'around' another, as by its proper sense *περὶ* does, it is in fact marked as relating to it; and that *περὶ* with the genitive, only more distinctly and in a metaphorical way, expresses what the genitive alone conveys by its signification of 'with respect to.'

g. 'Of the value of.' *Περὶ* in connection with the verbs

εἶναι, 'to be,' and *ποιεῖσθαι* and *ἡγεῖσθαι*, 'to consider,' 'to account,' 'to esteem,' is used with the genitive case of several nouns containing a general expression of value, namely, *πολλοῦ*, 'much,' *πλείονος*, 'more,' *πλείστου*, 'very much,' *ὀλίγου*, 'little,' *ἐλάττωτος*, 'less,' *οὐδενός*, 'nothing,' *παντός*, 'every thing,' so as to express various estimates of worth: as, *περὶ πολλοῦ, πλείονος, πλείστου, ὀλίγου, ἐλάττωτος, οὐδενός, εἶναι*, 'to be of much, of more, of very much, of little, of less, of no, value;' *περὶ πολλοῦ, πλείονος, &c. ποιεῖσθαι* or *ἡγεῖσθαι*, 'to consider of much, of more, &c. value,' or 'to value highly,' &c. E.g. Herod. i. 73, *περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμενος αὐτούς*, 'accounting them of much value;' Id. i. 120, *ἡμῖν περὶ πολλοῦ ἐστὶ κατορθοῦσθαι ἀρχὴν τὴν σὴν*, 'it is of much moment to us that your dominion shall be maintained;' Xen. Anab. i. 9, 7, *ὅτι περὶ πλείστου κοίτο . . . μηδὲν ψεύδεσθαι*, 'that he considered it a matter of the highest moment not to prove false at all;' Id. Anab. i. 9, 16, *περὶ παντός ἐποιεῖτο τούτους πλουσιωτέρους ποιεῖν*, 'he accounted it altogether important (worth every thing) to make these persons richer;' Demosth. 341, 6, *δεήσομαι δὲ . . . μηδεμίαν μῆτε χάριν μῆτε ἄνδρα ποιεῖσθαι περὶ πλείονος ἢ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ὅρκον*, 'I shall beg you to set a higher value upon no favor, and upon no person, than upon justice and your oath.'

In such examples, *περί*, when used with the genitive, would seem, by virtue of its sense of 'about,' to mark the object to which any thing is to be referred as appertaining to it, as belonging to its class or category. If *οἱ περὶ Πρίαμον*, 'those about or around Priam,' may signify 'those belonging to the company of Priam,' and if *οἱ φρόνιμοι περὶ τούτων* may mean 'those who are intelligent about or in these matters,' *περί* in both cases denoting the object to which any thing is to be referred for a more exact designation of class or character, and this by giving to it a relative position of 'about' or 'around,' it is clear that *περί* with a genitive of value, standing in connection with an object of which the worth is to be determined, may indicate the kind of value to which this object is to be referred, that is, the particular category of values to which it belongs. When it is said, *φρόνιμός ἐστι περὶ τούτου*, 'he is intelligent respecting this,'

or in this particular, *περὶ τούτου* marks the thing to which the character of being 'intelligent' expressed by *φρόνιμος* is to be referred for its exact specification; and so, when it is said, *περὶ πλείστου ἐποιεῖτο μηδὲν ψεύδεσθαι*, 'he considered it of very great moment to prove false in nothing,' *περὶ πλείστου* denotes the particular kind of value to which *μηδὲν ψεύδεσθαι*, 'the being false in nothing,' is to be referred. The office of the preposition, and that of the genitive, is the same in both cases: in both *περί* with the genitive, by pointing out the relative position of a thing as being 'about' or 'around' another, shows the definite object to which it is to be understood as being referred. The only difference is, that in the case of *πολλοῦ, ὀλίγου*, and the rest of the genitives, the noun introduced by *περί* denotes value; and this peculiarity fits them to become the qualification of *ποιεῖσθαι, ἡγεῖσθαι*, and *εἶναι*, where estimation of value is concerned. See Passow's Lex. s. v. *περί*, A. iv, who explains this use of *περί* by saying that it expresses, properly, that "the thing belongs to the region or sphere of great, small," &c.

2. 'Above,' 'more than,' 'beyond.' *Περί* with the genitive is sometimes used in the sense of 'above,' 'more than,' 'beyond:' e.g. Il. i. 258, *οἳ περὶ μὲν βουλὴν Δαναῶν, περὶ δ' ἐστὲ μάχεσθαι*, 'who are above the Danaï in counsel, and above them in battle,' that is, 'superior to them;' Od. i. 66, *ὃς περὶ μὲν νόον ἐστὶ βροτῶν*, 'who is above, superior to, mortals in intelligence.'

In such instances *περί* obtains its meaning from the employment relatively of the intensive force of 'quite,' 'altogether,' 'very,' 'exceedingly,' which it had already acquired. Thus, in the example cited above, *ὃς περὶ μὲν νόον ἐστὶ βροτῶν*, 'who is above mortals in intelligence,' 'more intelligent than mortals,' the meaning, strictly regarded, is, that Odysseus is 'very, exceedingly, intelligent (νόον περὶ) . . . with respect to mortals;' and from this relative sense in which *περί* is employed springs that of 'above,' 'beyond,' 'more than.' If to any it should appear strange that the notion of 'above,' 'more than,' can have this origin, let it be considered that the idea of 'the most,' 'more than all others of a class of objects,' expressed by

the superlative and a genitive case, arises in the same way, πάντων σοφώτατος, 'the wisest of all,' properly meaning 'very wise, distinguished for wisdom, . . . with respect to all.' The superlative ending τατος, being no more than the demonstrative τος doubled with the substitution of a different vowel *a* with the former of the two demonstratives, τα-τος, serves, as the article or demonstrative τ-ο (τό) does, and as the ordinal numeral-ending τος (τ-ος) does, to point out, and so to distinguish or separate an object from others of its class; so that σοφώτατος means one that is distinguished from his class for wisdom. And when σοφώτατος is used with πάντων, it means, as was said above, 'distinguished for wisdom, very wise, . . . with respect to all;' the sense 'wisest of all' being conveyed by this form of expression precisely in the same way that 'more intelligent than mortals' is conveyed by that of 'very intelligent . . . with respect to mortals,' which is the proper meaning of νόον περι βροτῶν.

It was seen above that περί has this relative sense of 'above' in compounds also, such as περιγίγνεσθαι, 'to survive,' 'to come off superior,' and with such compounds the genitive case is used, just as with περί when employed in this sense as a preposition. As an adverb, moreover, that is, when used apart, and without being joined with a noun, περί has the meaning of 'very much,' 'exceedingly:' e.g. Il. viii. 161, Τυδείδῃ, πέρι μὲν σε τίον Δαναοὶ ταχύπῳλοι, 'very much have the Danaï honored you, Tydeides.'

II. Περὶ with the dative case.

1. *a.* 'About,' 'around,' marking relative position. The preposition περί is frequently used with the dative case in the local sense of 'about,' 'around.' E.g. Il. ii. 389, . . . περί δ' ἔρχεῖ χεῖρα χαμῆϊται, 'and he will be wearied in his hand about the spear;' Il. viii. 86, σὺν δ' ἵππους ἐτάραξε, κυλινδόμενος περί χαλκῷ, 'and together with himself disturbed the (other) horses, by rolling himself round about the arrow;' Od. ii. 244-5, . . . ἀργαλέον δὲ | ἀνδράσι καὶ πλεόνεσσι μαχῆσασθαι περί δακτί, 'it is hard to fight, and with a greater number of men too, around a feast;' Il. xviii.

453, πᾶν δ' ἡμᾶρ μάρναντο περί Σκαυῆσι πύλῃσιν, 'all the day they fought about the Scæan gate;' Il. xvi. 156-7, . . . of δὲ, λύκοι ὥς | ὠμοφάγοι, τοῖσιν τε περί φρεσὶν ἀσπετος ἀλκή, 'like ravenous wolves, about whose heart is invincible courage;' Herod. i. 171, περί τοῖσι αὐχέσι τε καὶ ἀριστεροῖσι ὤμοισι (τελαμῶνας) περικείμενοι, 'placing bands around their necks and their left shoulders;' Id. vii. 61, περί μὲν τῇσι κεφαλῇσι ἔχον τιάρας καλεομένους, 'around their heads they had what were called tiaras;' Plat. Repub. 359, ε, τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν, περί δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, 'he had nothing else, but had a golden ring about the hand;' Soph. Aj. 826-7, πρῶτος ὥς με βυστάδῃ | πεπτῶτα τῷδε περί νεοβρόντῳ εἴψει, 'that he may, in advance of all others, take me up when I shall have fallen upon (about) this reeking sword.'

In these examples, which have been borrowed from Passow's Lexicon, while it is plain that the preposition is to be taken in the sense of 'about,' 'around,' it might admit of a question whether the noun which follows it is to be considered as a dative or an ablative (locativus). It would seem to be more probable, taking into the account the examples to be adduced presently in which περί is used in the metaphorical sense of 'about' and 'for,' and where the noun is more palpably in the dative case, that in the instance under consideration the dative is employed. Admitting it to be the dative case, it depends on the preposition itself, that is, it follows as the final object upon the sense of 'around,' 'about,' contained in περί, just as this case follows upon ἐπὶ from its sense of 'upon' or superposition, upon ἀμφὶ from its meaning of 'about,' and upon ἴσος, ὁ αὐτός, ὁμοιος, from the notions of equality, sameness, and likeness, which these contain. It is not more difficult to conceive that the dative, as the sign of the object ultimately affected, may appropriately follow upon περί with the idea of 'round about' an object, than upon ἐπὶ with the meaning of 'upon;' nor is it greatly more difficult to consider the dative to be attached in this same sense to ἐπὶ and περί than to ἴσος, ὁ αὐτός, ὁμοιος. In all such cases the dative introduces an object that may be regarded, in a figurative sense at least, as concerned in, or affected by, the notions

of equality, identity, likeness, superposition, what is circumjacent, proximity, &c. expressed by ἴσους, ὁ αὐτός, ὁμοίως, ἐπὶ, περὶ, ἀμφί, &c.

b. 'About,' 'for.' In a metaphorical sense, *περὶ* is used with the dative in the signification of 'about,' 'for,' to mark the object concerning or for which an action is performed; such as is contained in the verbs meaning 'to fight,' 'to contend,' 'to struggle,' or for which a feeling is entertained, such as care, anxiety, fear. E.g. Il. xvi. 567-8, Ζεὺς δ' ἐπὶ νόκτ' ὀλοὴν τάνυσσε κρατερῇ ὑσμίνῃ, | ὄφρα φίλῳ περὶ παιδὶ μάχης δλοὸς πόνος εἴη, 'that there might be the destructive toil of battle about (for) his dear son;' Od. xvii. 471, ὀππότε' ἀνὴρ περὶ οἷσι μαχεόμενος κτεάτεσσιν | βλήεται, ἢ περὶ βουσίν, ἢ ἀργεννῆς διέσσιν, 'fighting for his possessions;' Il. xvii. 132-3, Αἴας δ' ἀμφὶ Μενοντιάδῃ σάκος εὐρύ καλύψας, | ἐστήκει, ὥς τις τε λέων περὶ οἷσι τέκεσσιν, 'like a lion about, or for, his young.' Cf. Il. xvii. 137 and 355. Il. v. 566, . . . περὶ γὰρ διέ ποιμένι λαῶν, | μὴ τι πάδῃ, 'for he feared for the shepherd of the people;' Il. xvii. 22-3, οὔτε μέγιστος | θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι περὶ σθένει βλεμναίνει, '(nor does that one) whose spirit in his breast is the greatest, vaunt himself about, on account of, for, his strength;' Plat. Phæd. 114, D, θαρβεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα, 'a man must be of good comfort about his soul.'

c. 'For,' 'on account of,' 'by reason of.' Of nearly the same nature is *περὶ* with the dative case used to mark the cause or the occasion of any thing, corresponding to the English 'for,' 'on account of,' 'by reason of.' E.g. Æsch. Pers. 691-2, σέβομαι δ' ἀντία λέξαι | σέθεν, ἀρχαίῳ περὶ τάρβει, 'I am ashamed to speak in your presence by reason of my old reverence for you;' Id. Choeph. 32-3, μυχόθεν ἔλαχε, περὶ φόβῳ | γυναικείοισιν ἐν δώμασιν βαρὺς πίτνων, 'out of fear.'

In these examples, the use of *περὶ* with the dative is to mark the object with reference to which a state or condition exists; and this relation is indicated by describing the state or condition as being 'about' the object, and so as being connected with it in the same way as when *περὶ* with the genitive signifies 'concerning.' In the first example cited, σέβομαι δ' ἀντία λέξαι σέθεν, 'I am ashamed to speak before

you,' is qualified by ἀρχαίῳ περὶ τάρβει, so as to show that the feeling of shame has reference to an old sense of veneration; and this is expressed by saying that the feeling of shame is 'about,' and is thus nearly associated with, an ancient sense of veneration. The further notion of cause or occasion, which the mind supplies from this immediate connection with and reference of the state or condition to an appropriate object, can hardly be said to be directly expressed by the preposition and case, but is readily inferred. When it is said, 'I am ashamed to speak before you,' and it is added that this feeling of shame is immediately connected with an ancient sense of veneration, being figuratively placed 'about' or 'around' it, it is at once and obviously inferred that the feeling of shame is occasioned by the ancient sense of veneration. It may be added, that there can be little room to doubt that the noun after *περὶ* is here in the dative case, depending upon the sense of 'about' contained in *περὶ*.

III. *Περὶ* with the ablative (*instrumentalis* and *locativus*).

Περὶ, in the sense of 'about,' 'around,' is found in connection with the ablative (both *instrumentalis* and *locativus*), the preposition, however, being used rather distinctly as an adverb, and the ablative denoting at one time the instrument and at another time position. E.g. Il. i. 317, κνίσσῃ δ' οὐρανὸν ἴκεν, ἐλισσομένη περὶ χαπνῷ, 'the odor went up to heaven, wrapped in smoke,' that is, 'enveloped with smoke round about,' χαπνῷ, as the ablative of the instrument, expressing the thing with which the odor was enveloped; Il. xxi. 577, ἀλλὰ τε καὶ περὶ δουρὶ πεπαρμένη οὐκ ἀπολήγει | ἀλκῆς, 'and yet, even when pierced with a spear round about, it ceases not from its bravery.' Here *περὶ* is to be considered as the qualification of πεπαρμένη, and as meant to describe the manner in which the piercing of the flesh with the spear is made, namely, so that the flesh is round about the spear. The case is, of course, to be interpreted independently of the preposition or adverb *περὶ*.

IV. *Περί* with the accusative case.

1. *a.* 'Around,' 'about.' *Περί*, as marking a merely local relation of 'around,' 'about,' is used with the accusative case of both persons and things. Thus: *a.*) With the accusative of nouns denoting things: e.g. Il. x. 139, τὸν δ' αἶψα περὶ φρένας ἤλυθ' ἰωή, 'and quickly the cry reached his heart round about;'; Il. xviii. 373-4, . . . τρίποδας γὰρ εἵκοσι πάντας ἔτευχεν, | ἐστάμεναι περὶ τοῖχον εὐσταθέος μεγάροιο, 'for he fashioned twenty tripods in all to stand around the wall of the well-built hall;'; Herod. ii. 95, τοῖσι δὲ περὶ τὰ ἔλεα οἰκέουσι τάδε ἀντὶ τῶν πύργων ἄλλα μεμηχανήνται, 'those who dwell about the marshes have contrived these other things instead of towers;'; Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 4, οἱ δὲ ἐφηβοὶ καὶ κοιμῶνται περὶ τὰ ἀρχεῖα, 'the ephebi sleep also round about the public offices;'; Thuc. i. 6, διαζώματα ἔχοντες περὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα, 'having girdles about the loins.'

β.) With persons: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 4, 18, ἐξεβοήθει . . . σὺν τοῖς περὶ αὐτόν, 'he went forth to give succor together with those about him;'; Id. Anab. i. 8, 27, καὶ ὅτε οἱ ἀριστοὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἔκειντο ἐπ' αὐτῷ, 'and upon him fell eight of the noblest about him;'; Id. Hell. iii. 2, 27.

Hence *περὶ* is frequently used with the accusative of a person to show that to him certain other persons are referred as being about or around him, in the sense of his party or friends: e.g. Xen. Hell. iii. 2, 27, οἱ περὶ Ξενίαν, 'the party of Xenias,' properly, 'the persons about Xenias.'

In many examples, the sense of *περὶ* with the accusative of a person is so modified as to mean little more than the person himself, who is to be regarded, however, as a chief or leader with his attendants. E.g. Xen. Anab. ii. 4, 2, ἐνδηλοὶ ἦσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀριαῖον ἦττον τοῖς Ἑλλήσι προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν, 'Ariæus and his attendants,' or, simply, 'Ariæus;'; Thuc. i. 5, πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῇ παλαιᾷ τρόπῃ νέμεται, περὶ τε Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ὀζόλους καὶ Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ Ἀκαρνανάς, 'the Locri Ozolæ, Ætolians, and Acarnanians.' In this last example, the object of the author may be to include with the Locri Ozolæ, Ætolians, and Acarnanians severally, their imme-

diately neighbors, or, at least, to show that he would not confine his remark too strictly to the very limits of the people named.

β. 'About,' 'near,' 'in the region of.' *Περί* with the accusative is frequently used in the sense of 'about,' 'near,' 'in the region of,' that is, to describe an object as being 'about,' as distinguished from 'at,' 'on,' 'in,' a place. E.g. Xen. Hell. i. 3, 10, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ . . . οὐκ ἐτύγγανε παρῶν, ἀλλὰ περὶ Σαλυμβρίαν ἦν, 'was about, near, in the region of, Salymbria;'; Id. Hell. ii. 1, 20, ἀγγέλλεται αὐτοῖς τὰ περὶ Λάμψακον, 'the events that had occurred near Lampsachus,' or 'about Lampsachus.' Here, however, the sense may be, 'the matters concerning Lampsachus.'

In the same way *περὶ* is employed with the accusative of numbers, and of denominations of time, to mark a mere approximation, and to exclude the idea of exactness as to the number or time given. E.g. Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 5, ἡδὴ συνειλεγμένων ἐς τὴν Φυλὴν περὶ ἑπτακοσίους, 'about seven hundred;'; Id. Anab. ii. 1, 7, καὶ ἡδὴ ἦν περὶ πλήθουσιν ἀγορὰν, 'it was now about the time of full market;'; Id. Hell. i. 1, 33, περὶ δὲ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους, 'and about this time.' Compare the use of *ἀμφὶ* with the accusative in the same meaning.

γ. 'About,' 'concerning,' the Latin *de*. *Περί*, taken metaphorically, is employed with the accusative case in the sense of 'about,' 'concerning,' the Latin *de*, to denote the object about or concerning which an action is performed, or any thought or feeling is had. E.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 5, 7, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι περὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἦσαν, 'the rest were occupied about the supply of provisions;'; Id. De re Eq. vi. 3, εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τὸν περὶ τὸν ἵππον, 'it is requisite for the person occupied about the horse,' 'whose business is with the horse;'; Id. ib. § 1, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἵππον καὶ περὶ τὸ χαλινοῦσθαι καὶ περὶ τὸ ψήχεσθαι δυσκολώτερον εἶναι, 'the horse is necessarily more ill-tempered about, in relation to, the being bridled and rubbed;'; Id. Cyrop. vi. 1, 54, ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα συνεστήκει αὐτῷ τὰ περὶ τοὺς πύργους, 'every thing relating to the towers;'; Id. Anab. ii. 1, 7, ἐπιστήμων περὶ τὰς τάξεις τε καὶ ὀπλομαχίαν, 'knowing about, in matters relating to,

otics and the use of arms;' Id. Hell. i. 6, 87, πάντα ἐξήγγελε τὰ περὶ τὴν ναυμαχίαν, 'he reported every thing that related to, about, the sea-fight.'

When used in this sense with the accusative of persons, *περὶ* may sometimes be rendered by 'towards,' 'for,' 'of,' as Latin *erga* and *in*. E.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 7, οἴονται γὰρ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους καὶ περὶ θεοὺς ἂν μάλιστα ἀμελῶς ἔχειν, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνέμων καὶ πατρίδων καὶ φίλων, 'they suppose that those who are ungrateful will also be more than all others neglectful of the gods, of their parents, of their country, and of their friends;' Id. Anab. vii. 6, 11, ὃ πλείστην προθυμίαν ἐμαυτῷ γε ἀποδιδόναι περὶ ὁμῶς παρεσχημένος, 'wherein I think I am anxious of having shown the greatest zeal for you,' 'the most ready service towards you.'

In the above uses of *περὶ* there is no difficulty in seeing that the meaning of 'about,' from which that of 'concerning,' 'relating to,' 'towards,' 'of,' is immediately derived, is the same with the local sense of 'about,' used metaphorically, just as the English 'about,' in like cases, is the local term 'about' employed figuratively. Thus, as we say, 'he went about (around) the city,' we say also, 'he went about his task,' 'he wrote about the war.'

In all the instances of the use of *περὶ* with the accusative above noticed, this case is to be taken in the sense of 'as regards,' 'as respects.' Thus, in Ἀλκιβιάδης περὶ Σαλυμβρίαν ἦν, 'Alcibiades was about Salymbria,' the meaning is, 'Alcibiades was about, near, . . . as regards Salymbria;' and in περὶ τοὺς ἀμελῶς ἔχειν, 'to be careless about . . . as regards the gods,' 'as far as the gods are concerned.'

(For the table of the significations and use of *περὶ* with cases, see the next page.)

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *περὶ* WITH CASES.

Significations of <i>περὶ</i> .	Gen.: 'with respect to.'	Dative: 'for.'	Accusat.: 'as to.'	Instr. and Locat.: 'by,' 'with,' 'in.'
1. a. 'Around,' 'about.' b. 'About,' 'near.' c. 'About,' 'of,' 'concerning.' d. 'For,' 'on account of.' e. 'For,' 'object had in view.' f. 'For,' 'by reason of.' g. 'Respecting,' 'with respect to.' h. 'Of the value of.'	1. a. 'Around,' 'about.' c. 'About,' 'of,' 'concerning.' d. 'About,' 'for,' 'on account of.' e. 'For,' 'object had in view.' f. 'For,' 'by reason of.' g. 'Respecting,' 'with respect to.' h. 'Of the value of.'	1. a. 'Around,' 'about.' c. 'About,' 'for.' d. 'For,' 'on account of,' 'by reason of.'	1. a. 'Around,' 'about,' 'near.' b. 'About,' 'near.' c. 'About,' 'for,' 'towards.'	Preposition used only adverbially.
2. 'Quite,' 'very.'	2. 'Above,' 'more than,' 'beyond.'		

Πλήν.

Πλήν is said to be the same with the comparative *πλέον*, 'more.' See Passow's Lexicon, s. v. and Pott's Etym. Forsch. ii. pp. 30 and 323. It has the signification of 'except,' which prevails in all its uses, being varied only as it is modified by the terms with which it is coupled, such as *εἰ, ἐάν, ἢ, ἀλλὰ*. The signification of 'except' belonging to *πλήν* would seem to be hardly consistent with either the common meaning of 'more' in which *πλέον* is used, or with its primary sense of 'fuller;' and, until this apparent inconsistency shall have been removed, the common origin of *πλήν* and *πλέον* must be doubted. Its connection with *πελάω*, *πελάζω*, is quite as doubtful.

Πλήν is employed both as a preposition and as an adverb; that is, both with and without being connected with the case of a noun.

1. As a preposition, *πλήν* is used with the genitive case alone, and thus employed is frequently met with in Herodotus and the Attic writers. Homer and Hesiod furnish but one example each, namely, Od. viii. 207, . . . πλήν γ' αὐτοῦ Λαοδάμαντος, 'except Laodamas himself,' and Hesiod, Scut. 74. Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 4, οἱ δὲ ἐφηβοὶ καὶ κοιμῶνται περὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα . . . πλήν τῶν γεγαμηκότων, 'except those who are married.' (See Passow's Lexicon.) In such examples the

genitive is used in the sense of 'with respect to,' or 'in the case of.'

2. As an adverb, *πλήν* occurs in connection with other cases also besides the genitive; but so that the case of the noun cannot be considered to depend in any way upon *πλήν*, but upon other parts of the sentence. Thus, it is found with *ἐν* and the ablative (locativus): e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 4, *πλήν ἐν ταῖς τεταγμέναις ἡμέραις*, 'except on the appointed days;' with the nominative: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 13, *αἱ ἀρχαὶ πᾶσαι ἐκ τούτων καθίστανται, πλήν οἱ τῶν παιδῶν διδάσκαλοι*, 'except the teachers of the boys;' and with the accusative: e.g. Id. ib. ii. 4, 17, *ἐγὼ δέ σοι οὐκ ἐδελήσω δοῖναι πλήν μετρίου τινός*, 'and I, on my part, will refuse to give them, except some moderate number.'

It may be added, that *πλήν*, considered as an adverb, is found coupled with several particles; thus, with *εἰ* and *ἐάν*, 'if,' 'if perchance:' e.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 1, 14, *οἱ δ' ἐπειθοντο, πλήν εἴ τις ἐκλεψεν*, 'except in the case (if) any one secreted something;' also with *εἰ μή*; with *ὅτι*, the two words meaning 'except that;' with *ἀλλὰ*, 'but,' 'on the other hand,' giving the sense of 'except on the other hand,' 'on the contrary,' and 'notwithstanding;' and with *ὅσον*, the united meaning being, 'except in so far as.' (See Passow's Lex. s. v.)

A consideration of the uses of *πλήν*, both as a preposition and as an adverb, would seem to lead to the conclusion that it has the proper meaning of 'except,' or possibly that of 'beside,' which would be not very far removed from that of 'except.' This same sense is found also in the compounds *πλημμελής*, 'out of tune,' and, hence, 'erring,' 'failing,' composed of *πλήν* and *μέλος*, 'tune,' and *πλημμελεῖν*, 'to be out of tune,' 'to make a false note,' 'to err,' 'to do wrong.' The origin of *πλήν*, however, and the way in which the sense of 'except,' 'beside,' arises, can hardly be derived from these forms.

In the compound *πλήμυρα*, 'a flood' or 'tide,' and *πλημυρίς*, 'a flood-tide,' which have probably the proper sense of 'over-fulness,' *πλήν*, if it be really the former part of the compound, and this be not rather *πλη* for *πλε* in *πλέος*, 'full,'

(cf. *πλήθος*, 'a crowd,' which has the same radical with *πλέος*;) the *μ* being doubled merely, has the sense of *πλέον*, at least of its radical *πλε*, 'full.' But the marked difference between the signification of these compounds and that of *πλημμελής* and *πλημμελεῖν*, so far as it depends on the former part of the compound, goes rather to show that this is not the same in both sets of words. And as *πλήν*, 'except,' is more obviously related to *πλήν* in *πλημμελής* and *πλημμελεῖν*, the greater probability is that it is different from *πλέον*. Certainly, until something more satisfactory shall have been adduced, it will be safer not to assume that *πλήν* is connected with the comparative *πλέον*, 'more.'

Πρό.

Πρό corresponds to the Sanskrit *pra*, the Latin *pro* and *præ*, the German *vor*, the Slavonic *pro* and *pri*, the Gothic *fru* and *fri*, the Irish *fur*, *for*, *foir*, and the English *for*, and *fro*, as seen in the compound *fro-ward*. (See Bopp, Glossar. p. 225.)

Significations of πρό.

1. a. The proper sense of *πρό* is 'before,' 'in front,' as opposed to *ὀπισθε*, 'behind.' E.g. Herod. ix. 52, *τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶ τῆς Πλαταιῶν*, 'this is in front of the city of the Plataeans;' Xen. Cyrop. iii. 3, 33, *πυρὰ πολλὰ δὲ πρὸ τῶν φυλάκων καύσαντες*, 'having kindled many fires in front of the guards.' The same meaning is common in compounds; as, *προέχειν*, 'to hold before,' or 'in front:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. ii. 3, 10, *τῷ χεῖρι προέχων*, 'holding out my hands before me;' *προθεῖν*, 'to run before,' 'to run in front of,' *προίστασθαι*, 'to stand before,' 'to stand in front of:' e.g. Xen. Hell. iv. 1, 18, *προσστησάμενος τὰ ἄρματα, αὐτὸς δὲ ὀπισθεν γενόμενος*, 'having stationed chariots in front;' *προβάμιος*, 'before, in front of, the altar.'

b. 'Forwards,' 'onwards.' Immediately connected with the notion of 'before,' 'in front,' is that of 'forwards,' 'onwards:' e.g. Il. iv. 382, *οἱ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν ὤχοντο, ἰδὲ πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἐγένοντο*, 'and were on their way,' that is, 'were forwards . . . with respect to their journey.' Compare the derivative *πρόρῳ* and *πρόσω*, Æol. *πόρσω*, and the Latin *porro*, which

properly means 'forwards,' 'forth.' The same meaning of *πρό* is seen in compounds also; as, *προβάλλειν*, 'to throw or put forward,' *προιέναι*, 'to go forward,' 'to advance,' *προβαίνειν*, 'to step forward,' 'to advance.'

c. 'Before,' 'in advance of.' Very nearly allied to the preceding significations of *πρό* is that of 'before,' 'in advance of,' with the idea of preceding: e.g. Il. x. 285-6, *σπεῖδ μοι, ὥς δτε πατρὶ δμ' ἔσπεο Τυδείδι δίφῳ | ἐς θήβας, δτε τε πρὸ Ἀχαιῶν ἀγγελος ἦει*, 'when he went as a messenger before, in advance of, the Achæi.' And so in compounds; as, *προγράφειν*, 'to write before or first,' *προδεικνύειν*, 'to show beforehand.'

In the same sense *πρό* is used also with reference to time; as in *πρό τούτου* and *πρό τοῦ* (*πρωτοῦ*), 'before this time;' Herod. i. 122, *φᾶς πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὐκ εἰδέναι*, 'saying that hitherto he did not know.' (See Passow's Lex.)

d. 'Before,' 'sooner than,' 'rather than.' This same meaning of 'before,' when used of one object relatively to another, gives the idea of preference, expressed in English by 'before,' 'sooner than,' 'rather than.' E.g. Herod. i. 62, *οἷσι ἢ τυραννὶς πρὸ ἐλευθερίας ἦν ἀσπαστότερον*, 'by whom the tyranny was preferred before freedom;' *αἰρεῖσθαι τι πρὸ τινος*, 'to choose a thing before another,' *πρὸ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι*, 'to value before, above, much,' 'to value highly.' So, likewise, in compounds; as, *προτιμᾶν*, 'to honor before or above.'

e. 'For,' 'in behalf of.' With various actions, such as fighting, contending, *πρό* obtains the secondary sense of 'for,' 'in behalf of:' e.g. Il. xxiv. 215, *ἀλλὰ πρὸ Τρώων καὶ Τρωιδῶν βαθυκόλπων | ἕστασθ'*, 'standing (as a defender) before, in front of, on behalf of, the Trojans;' Il. iv. 156, *(μάχεσθαι)* . . . *πρό τε παίδων καὶ πρὸ γυναικῶν*, 'to fight for both children and wives;' properly, 'to fight before, in front of,' the notion of 'for,' 'on behalf of,' being immediately suggested by this.

f. 'For,' 'in the room of,' 'instead of.' In many cases *πρό* has a sense somewhat different from that just mentioned, namely, that of 'for,' 'in the room of,' 'instead of.' Here *πρό* properly means 'before,' whence comes the idea of occupying the place of another, or becoming his substitute:

e.g. *δοῦλος πρὸ δεσπότου*, 'a slave for, instead of, a master;' *γῆν πρὸ γῆς ἐλαύνεσθαι*, 'to be driven from land to land,' that is, 'to one land in the room of, in the stead of, another land;' or, more obviously, the sense may be, 'driven forwards, onwards, from land to land;' *πρό* retaining the meaning of 'forwards.' (See Passow's Lex.)

g. 'For,' 'out of,' 'from;' properly, 'before,' 'in view of,' 'looking to.' *Πρό* is occasionally used in the sense of 'out of,' 'from,' 'by reason of;' that is, to express the ground or reason of an action. Thus, Il. xvii. 667, *πρὸ φόβοιο λίποιεν*, 'might leave out of fear,' 'from fear,' or 'because of fear.' E.g. Il. xxiv. 734, *ἀεθλεύειν πρὸ ἀνακτος*, 'to contend because of, under the eye of, at the bidding of, a lord;' properly, 'before,' 'in the presence of,' 'in view of.' The proper sense of *πρό*, in this construction, is 'before,' 'in the presence of,' 'in the view of;' and that of the ground or reason, expressed by 'for,' 'from,' 'out of,' 'by reason of,' is derived from the relation into which *πρό*, with the meaning of 'before,' places the parties to the action. (For the examples, see Passow's Lexicon.)

Summary of the significations of πρό.

- Πρό.* a. 'Before, in front.'
 b. 'Forwards,' 'onwards.'
 c. 'Before,' 'in advance of.'
 d. 'Before,' 'sooner than,' 'rather than.'
 e. 'For,' 'on behalf of.'
 f. 'For,' 'in the room of,' 'instead of.'
 g. 'For,' 'from,' 'out of,' 'by reason of;' properly, 'before,' 'in the view of.'

Πρό with the genitive case.

The preposition *πρό* is used with the genitive case alone, and, as employed with this case, presents the meanings above given.

a. 'Before,' 'in front of.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. iii. 3, 33, *πυρὰ πολλὰ πρὸ τῶν φυλάκων καύσαντες*, 'having kindled many fires in front of the guards;' Id. Anab. i. 4, 4, *τὸ μὲν ἔσωθεν πρὸ τῆς Κιλικίας*, 'the wall over against or facing Cilicia,' that

is, 'fronting Cilicia;' Id. Hell. ii. 4, 33, καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ τεθαμμένοι Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἐν Κεραμεικῷ, 'buried before, in front of, the gates in Ceramicus;' Id. Anab. i. 7, 11, οὗτοι δὲ πρὸ αὐτοῦ βασιλέως τεταγμένοι ἦσαν, 'these were posted in front of the king himself;' Herod. viii. 53, ἔμπροσθε ὧν πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως, ὁπισθε δὲ τῶν πυλέων καὶ τῆς ἀνόδου, . . . ταύτῃ ἀνέβησαν τινες, 'before the citadel, but behind the gates and the road that leads up to the citadel.'

b. 'Forwards,' 'onwards.' A modification merely of this meaning of πρὸ with the genitive is that in which it may be rendered in English by 'forwards,' 'forth,' 'onwards.' In this sense, πρὸ with the genitive is connected with an action or motion, and marks it as directed 'forwards' or 'onwards,' that is, 'in front,' 'forth,' from a given point. E.g. Il. iv. 182, οἱ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν ὤχοντο ἰδὲ πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἐγένοντο, 'when they had departed and were on their road,' that is, 'forwards on their way,' 'forwards . . . with respect to their journey.'

c. 'Before,' with the idea of antecedence. From the mere local sense of 'before,' 'in front of,' comes the relative notion of 'before' implying the antecedence of one object with respect to another. In this meaning πρὸ occurs with the genitive case in several ways: a.) To denote any object with respect to which another is represented as being 'before' or 'in advance:' e.g. Il. x. 286, ὅτε τε πρὸ Ἀχαιῶν ἀγγελος ἦεν, 'when he went as a messenger before, in advance of, the Achæi.'

β.) To mark a period of time 'before,' 'in advance of' which an event is said to have occurred: e.g. Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 13, οὐκ εἰσαφῆξαν αὐτοὺς πρὸ ἡμέρας, 'they did not admit them before daylight;' Id. Anab. i. 7, 12, ταῦτα δὲ ἡγγέλλον πρὸς Κύρῳ . . . πρὸ τῆς μάχης, 'and this they reported to Cyrus before the battle;' Id. Memor. iii. 5, 11, οὐ πολὺ δὲ πρὸ ἡμῶν γεγυρότες, 'born not long before our time.'

γ.) 'Before,' 'sooner than,' 'rather than.' Πρὸ with the genitive is used also in a more general way to express preference, that is, relative priority of one object with respect to another, where it is rendered in English by 'before,' 'sooner than,' 'rather than:' e.g. Herod. i. 62, οἱσι ἢ τυραννίς πρὸ ἐλευθερίας ἦν ἀσπαστότερον, 'who preferred the

tyranny before freedom;' Xen. Memor. ii. 5, 3, τὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸ δέκα μινῶν ἐλοίμην ἂν, τὸν δὲ πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πόρων πρῆναι μιν εἶλον μοι εἶναι, 'I would choose before, in preference to, ten minæ.'

d. 'For,' 'in behalf of.' Πρὸ with the genitive is used in the sense of 'for,' 'in behalf of,' this meaning being immediately connected with that of 'before,' 'in front of,' and occurring more commonly after such actions as μάχεσθαι, 'to fight:' e.g. Il. xxiv. 215, ἀλλὰ πρὸ Τρώων καὶ Τροϊάδων βαθυκόλπων | ἕσταός τ', 'standing (in battle) before the Trojans and Trojan dames,' that is, 'to stand in battle on behalf of;' Il. iv. 156, οἷον προστήσας πρὸ Ἀχαιῶν Τρωσὶ μάχεσθαι, 'when I exposed you to fight alone with the Trojans on behalf of the Achæi;' Herod. ix. 48, τί δὴ οὐ πρὸ μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡμεῖς, πρὸ δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων ἡμεῖς, ἴσοι πρὸς ἴσους ἀριθμὸν μαχεσόμεθα; 'why, then, shall we not fight, an equal number with an equal number, you on behalf of the Greeks, and we on behalf of the barbarians?' Xen. Anab. vii. 6, 27, κακῶς ἂν ἐδόχουν ὑμῖν βεβουλεύσθαι πρὸ ὑμῶν; 'would I appear to you to have taken an unwise measure on your behalf?'

e. 'For,' 'in the room of,' 'instead of.' Πρὸ with the genitive is used also in the sense of 'for,' 'in the room of,' 'instead of;' and this meaning of πρὸ, it has been seen above, comes from that of 'before,' 'in front of,' and is very nearly related to the one just mentioned. It supposes one object to stand before another, just as where the sense is 'for,' 'on behalf of,' and thus to occupy its place or become its substitute. Thus, δοῦλος πρὸ δεσπότου, 'a slave instead of a master;' Æsch. Prom. Vinc. 682-3, . . . οἰστρόπληξ δ' ἐγὼ | μάσταινι θείῃ γῆν πρὸ γῆς ἐλαύνομαι, 'I am driven from land to land,' that is, 'to one land in the room of another.' But, in this example, it would, perhaps, be better to understand πρὸ in the sense of 'forwards,' 'onwards;' 'I am driven onwards from land to land.' (See Passow's Lexicon.)

f. 'For,' 'out of,' 'from;' properly, 'before,' 'in view of,' 'looking to.' In some examples πρὸ with the genitive case expresses the ground or the motive of an action. The object introduced by πρὸ is that 'in view of' which, or 'looking to' which, the action is performed, and so is regarded as

its ground or its motive. And, again, it is obvious that the notion of 'looking to,' or 'having in view,' is to be referred immediately to the primary sense of 'before,' 'in front of,' belonging to *πρό*. E.g. Il. xvii. 666-7, . . . *περὶ γὰρ διέ μὴ μιν Ἀχαιοὶ | ἀργαλέου πρό φόβου ἔλωρ δῆιοισι λίποιεν*, 'he very much feared lest the Achæi out of great fear might leave him a prey to the enemy;' that is, 'before, in the presence of, in view of,' and hence, 'from, out of, because of, great fear;' Il. xxiv. 734, *δεδλεύων πρό ἀνακτος ἀμειλίχου*, 'toiling for a relentless lord,' that is, 'because of him,' 'in view of his authority,' properly, 'before him;' Soph. Electr. 495, *πρό τῶνδε*, 'in view of these things,' 'therefore,' (For the examples, see Passow's Lexicon, s. v. The explanation of this meaning of *πρό* there given is different.)

In all these various uses of *πρό* with the genitive the case has the meaning of 'with respect to,' that is, marks the specific object to which exclusively the preceding term, as qualified by *πρό*, is to be referred. Thus, in the phrase *αὐτοῦ βασιλέως τεταγμένοι*, the sense is, 'posted before, in front, . . . with respect to the king himself;' and in *γῆν πρό γῆς ἐλαύνομαι*, the construction would be, adopting the common interpretation, 'I am driven to one land so that it occupies the room of another land;' or, allowing *πρό* to have its sense of 'forwards,' 'onwards,' 'I am driven onwards from one land to another,' that is, 'I am driven to one land onwards with respect to another.'

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *πρό* WITH ITS CASE.

Signification of <i>πρό</i> .	Genitive: 'with respect to.'
a. 'Before,' 'in front of.'	a. 'Before,' 'in front of.'
b. 'Forwards,' 'onwards.'	b. 'Forwards,' 'onwards.'
c. 'Before,' 'in advance of.'	c. 'Before,' 'in advance of.'
d. 'Before,' in point of time.	d. 'Before,' in point of time.
e. 'Before,' 'sooner than,' 'rather than.'	e. 'Before,' 'sooner than,' 'rather than.'
f. 'For,' 'in behalf of.'	f. 'For,' 'on behalf of.'
g. 'For,' 'in the room of,' 'instead of.'	g. 'For,' 'in the room of,' 'instead of.'
h. 'For,' 'from,' 'out of,' properly, 'in view of.'	h. 'For,' 'from,' 'out of,' properly, 'in view of.'

Πρός.

The preposition *πρός* has also a Doric form *προτί*, which, in a form called Cretan, by transposition becomes *πορτί*; and this corresponds to the Sanskrit *prati*. In Homer the words *ποτί* and *πότ* occur in the sense of *πρός*, and appear to be shortened forms of it. *Πρός* is only an augmented form of *πρό*, just as *εἰς* (*ἐνς*) is a fuller form of *ἐν*, and as *οὐκ* is of *οὐ*, and has the same root with the Latin *pro* and *præ*, with the English *for* and *fore*, seen in *forehead*, *forecast*, and *fro*, a transposed form of *for*, seen in *froward*. The radical *fir* in *fir-st* is only another form of *for*, as *pri* in *pri-or* and *pri-mus* is of *pro* or *præ*. Whether the *ς* at the end of *πρός* is inflectional, or merely formative, may admit of question. Of the same radical with *πρός* and *πρό* is *πὸρρῶ*, 'onwards,' 'forwards,' having the same relation to these that the Latin *porro* has to *pro*. Akin to *πρό* and *πρός*, both in form and sense, are *πῶρος* and *πῶριθεν*. In these words the radical *παρ* would seem to be the same with *πρό*, and has the same form, allowing for the metathesis, with the Sanskrit *prā*. See also what has been said above of *πρό*, p. 407.

Significations of *πρός*.

1. a. 'Before.' The primary signification of *πρός* is 'before,' with the idea of 'fronting,' or 'having the face forwards,' which is also the meaning of *πρό*. This sense is attributed to *πρός* by the ancient grammarians. Thus, Moschopulus, cited by Sturtz, Lex. Xenoph. s. v., says, *ἡ πρόθεσις πρὸς . . . καὶ (ἔστιν) ὅτε ἀντὶ ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸςθεν λαμβάνεται*, and Phavorinus, *λαμβάνεται ἡ πρόθεσις πρὸς καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς*. This meaning is seen slightly modified in those compounds that have the sense of 'towards,' 'looking to,' as, *προσβλέπειν*, 'to look towards or upon,' *προσβόρρῶς*, 'towards, looking towards, the north wind,' *προσεῖρος*, 'looking towards the east,' 'eastward,' *προσήλιος*, 'towards the sun,' 'sunny,' *προσχαίνειν*, 'to gape in the face,' and, figuratively, *προσεγλῶν τινα*, 'to look at one with a laugh,' (Aristoph. Pax, 600,) *προσηγορεῖν*, 'to accost,' that is, 'to speak to face to face.' It is seen also in many instances of the use of *πρός*

with the cases, as Il. i. 338-9, . . . *μάρτυροι δ' ἔστων | πρὸς τε θεῶν μακάρων, πρὸς τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων*, 'before, in the presence of, the blessed gods, and before mortal men;' *πρὸς τοῖς κριταῖς*, 'before the judges.'

b. 'By,' 'before,' in adjurations. The sense of 'by,' 'before,' 'in the presence of,' the Latin *per*, which *πρὸς* has in adjurations, is really the same with that just mentioned: e.g. *πρὸς θεῶν*, 'by,' that is, 'before, in the presence of, the gods;' and so *πρὸς θεοῦς*, *per deos*, 'by,' that is, 'before, in the presence of, the gods.' The English language employs the word 'before,' which has the same radical and the same sense with *πρὸς*, in the same way.

c. 'Towards,' 'on the quarter of.' The sense of 'towards,' 'looking to,' 'on the quarter of,' which *πρὸς* frequently has in marking the relative position of objects, as with regard to the points of the compass, is the same in fact with that of 'before,' 'having the face towards.' E.g. Herod. i. 84, *χωρίον πρὸς τοῦ Τμώλου τετραμμένον*, 'a place looking towards Tmolus,' properly, 'facing, having the direction towards, Tmolus;' Id. iii. 101, *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου*, 'on the quarter of the south,' that is, 'looking towards, facing, the south.' For the Greeks, in marking the point of the compass to which the position of an object is referred, either suppose the object described to look towards the point of the compass, as here, where *πρὸς* is used, or regard it as looking from the point of the compass towards the speaker, as where *ἀπὸ* is used, or consider it as having the relative direction of 'upon,' or as 'looking upon' the point of the compass, as where *ἐπὶ* is used. And the same may be said of their mode of denoting the position of an object generally by means of these prepositions.

'Against.' To this place belongs the case in which *πρὸς*, employed in describing the relative position of an object, and having the meaning of 'on the quarter of,' is expressed in English by the term 'against.' E.g. Herod. ii. 30, *φυλαχὰ κατέστασαν πρὸς Αἰθιοπῶν*, 'garrisons were established on the quarter of, on the side of, or against, the Æthiopians.' Here, obviously, the preposition has the same signification as in *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου* above, and allows the term 'against'

to be employed in translating it only because of the understood hostile relations of the parties whose position towards each other is indicated by *πρὸς*.

d. 'On or by the side of,' 'near.' Hence, again, *πρὸς* is used also to convey the idea of proximity, expressed in English by 'on or by the side of,' 'near,' and by the Latin *juxta*. E.g. Il. xxii. 198, *αὐτὸς δὲ ποτὶ πτόλιος πέτερ' αἰεὶ*, 'himself sped ever on the side of, near, the city;' Herod. ii. 154, *εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ χῶροι πρὸς θαλάσσης*, 'these places are near, on the side of, the sea.' Admitting the explanation above given of *πρὸς* in the sense of 'towards,' 'on the quarter of,' it will scarcely be doubted that in *πρὸς (ποτὶ) πτόλιος, πρὸς θαλάσσης*, the preposition has the same force materially, nor, consequently, that the signification of 'on the side of,' 'near,' has its origin in that of 'before,' 'looking towards.'

e. 'On the side of,' the Latin *a* or *ab* c. Abl. Hence, again, *πρὸς* is used in denoting descent, expressed in English by 'on the side of;' as, *πρὸς πατρός*, 'on the father's side:' e.g. Isocr. 228, v, *πρὸς δὲ μητρός ἀπὸ Διὸς ὦν*, 'on the mother's side descended from Jove.' The meaning of *πρὸς μητρός* is, properly, 'looking to,' 'on the quarter of, on the side of, the mother,' *πρὸς* and the noun *μητρός* defining in what view, with reference to what specific object, that is, literally, with the face turned towards what object, a person is said to be descended from Jove. Precisely in the same way that *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου*, 'on the quarter of the south wind,' defines the position of an object with reference to the points of the compass by marking which way it looks, *πρὸς μητρός* defines the relation in which a person's descent from Jove stands to his human parents by marking which way the divine descent is to be taken as looking, or in what specific view it is to be understood that he is Jove-descended. The only difference is to be found in the nature of the objects to which the thing described is referred for the determination of its relative position, and in the fact that in the one case the thing to be determined is a local position, in the other a natural descent.

f. 'On the side of,' 'of the party of,' 'in favor of.' Hardly to be distinguished from the immediately preceding sense

of *πρός*, except in regard to the nature of the objects the relative position of which is defined, is that in which it marks the party or sect to which a person belongs, expressed in English by 'on the side of,' 'of the party of,' 'in favor of.' E.g. Herod. viii. 22, *ἵνα ποσῇ Ἰωνας μεταβαλέειν καὶ γενέσθαι πρὸς ἑωυτῶν*, 'that he may cause the Ionians to change sides and become of their party;' Eurip. Alc. 58, *πρὸς τῶν ἐχόντων, Φοῦδε, τὸν νόμον τίθης*, 'you make your law in favor of the rich.' For, here also, the sense which *πρός* has is immediately derived from that of 'on the quarter of,' which has been above explained to be one of the applications of the meaning of 'before,' 'with the face to,' or 'looking towards.' To be of the party of, as expressed by *πρός*, means, strictly considered, to have the inclinations turned that way, to stand in the same relative position to a person or party that an object described as being *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου* does to a point of the compass.

g. 'On the part of,' 'with,' 'among.' A merely different application of the above sense of *πρός* is that in which it marks the party to whom any state or quality is referred as existing 'on its part,' where in English are used the terms 'with,' 'among,' 'on the part of,' and in Latin the preposition *apud*. E.g. Herod. iv. 144, *εἶπας τότε τὸ ἔπος ἐλείπετο ἀθάνατον μῆμιν πρὸς Ἑλλησποντίων*, 'he left behind him an undying memory on the part of, with, among, the people of the Hellespont,' *apud Hellespontinos*. Here *πρός Ἑλλησποντίων* defines the people with reference to whom, on the part of whom, there is said to be left a deathless memory, in the same way that *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου* describes locally the point of the compass to which the position of an object is referred. In the former case, just as in the latter, *πρός* shows towards what object another looks or has its aspect; and this it does, in both cases alike, by representing that it has the relative position of 'before,' 'fronting,' and, hence, 'looking towards.'

h. 'According to the custom, character, or nature of.' In the same way is to be explained the case in which an action or quality is referred by *πρός* to an object as belonging to it, as comporting with, or being according to, its

character, as being its property, where in Latin the genitive stands alone, and where in English such phrases are used as, 'it belongs to,' 'it is the property of,' 'it is according to the custom, character, &c. of.' E.g. Herod. v. 12, *οὔτε Περσικὰ ἦν οὔτε Λύδια τὰ ποιούμενα, οὔτε πρὸς τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας οὐδαμῶν*, 'nor according to the practice or customs of any of the Asiatics.' *Πρός*, as here used, simply refers the actions described to certain persons, the people of Asia, as those on the part of whom they are found existing; so that *πρὸς τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας οὐδαμῶν* points out the parties to whom certain acts (*τὰ ποιούμενα*) are referred by way of determining their character, in the same way that *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου* marks the point of the compass to which an object is referred for its position. In the one case, as in the other, *πρός* obtains this force from its sense of 'towards,' 'looking to;' and this is but another phase of the primary signification of 'before,' 'fronting,' 'having the face towards.'

To this place may be referred the use of *πρός* in such expressions as *πρὸς δίκης*, 'conformably to justice,' *πρὸς γυναικός ἐστι*, 'it is according to a woman's way or nature,' Od. vi. 207-8, *πρὸς γὰρ Δίος εἰσιν ἅπαντες | ξείνοί τε πτωχοί τε*, 'for both strangers and the poor all appertain to Jove,' 'are under his protection.'

i. 'From,' 'at the hands of,' 'by,' 'by means of.' Not really different is the sense of *πρός* where it is employed with various actions to denote the persons from whom they proceed, or, properly speaking, to whom they are referred as done on their part, and where the English uses the expressions 'from,' 'at the hands of,' 'by,' 'by means of.' E.g. Od. xi. 302, *ἔχει τιμὴν πρὸς Ζηνός*, 'to have honor from Jove,' that is, 'to be honored on the part of Jove;' Herod. iii. 115, *οὔτε γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐνδέχομαι Ἡριδανὸν τινα καλεῖσθαι πρὸς βαρβάρων ποταμὸν ἐκδιδόντα ἐς θάλασσαν*, 'called Eridanus by the barbarians,' 'on the part of the barbarians;' that is, by means of *πρός* the calling the river by the name of Eridanus is referred to the barbarians as an act done on their part, in the same way that by *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου* the position of an object is referred to the south wind. And this reference is made in the same way, namely, by representing the action

as 'looking towards' the object, and hence as being 'on the part of,' or belonging to it.

2. Thus far the proper signification of *πρός*, namely, that of 'before,' 'having the face towards,' or 'looking towards,' has been seen to be easily traced in a variety of the uses of the preposition where it has been more or less modified by the circumstances in which it is employed. The same signification is present, furthermore, in a considerable number of the uses of *πρός* in which it is, perhaps, even more obscured, either by the complication of the meaning of *πρός* with that of the case, and with that of the action of the verb which it qualifies, or by its being thrown almost entirely out of view by the predominating influence of the case and verb. It may be better, on this account, to refer these uses of *πρός* to a separate head, although it will appear, as the result of the consideration of them, that *πρός* has throughout one and the same fundamental notion.

a. 'At,' 'near.' When *πρός* is translated by 'at,' 'near,' answering to the Latin *ad*, *apud*, as *πρός τὰ ἱερά παρῆναι*, 'to assist at the sacrifices,' its proper sense is that of 'before,' 'in the presence or face of.' Thus, in the example cited, the meaning is 'to be near at hand before, in the face of, the sacrifices.' And in the same way *πρός* obtains the signification of 'near:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. vii. 5, 1, *ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς Βαβυλῶνι ἦν ὁ Κῦρος*, 'when Cyrus was near to Babylon,' that is, 'when Cyrus was before, in the presence of Babylon;' Id. Anab. i. 8, 4, *Κλέαρχος μὲν . . . πρὸς τῇ Εὐφράτῃ ποταμῷ (καθίστατο)*, 'Clearchus was posted at, or near, the river Euphrates.' In this and other examples, *πρός* having once obtained the sense of nearness, readily suggested by its proper notion of 'before,' 'in the presence of,' seems to be used with little reference to its primary signification. Although Clearchus was posted in view of the river Euphrates, and, accordingly, might justly be said to be 'at' or 'near' the river, in the sense of *πρὸς τῇ Εὐφράτῃ ποταμῷ*, it would not be correct to say that he was posted 'before,' 'fronting,' 'with the face to' it.

b. 'At,' 'about.' The same interpretation is to be adopted when *πρός* is used apparently in the sense of 'at,' 'about,'

in such phrases as *πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασι εἶναι*, 'to be at or about one's business.' From its proper meaning of 'before,' 'in the presence of,' *πρός* has here obtained that of 'at,' 'about,' 'near,' as in the preceding case, and this idea of proximity it is that, in such examples as *πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασι εἶναι*, suggests the peculiar sense in which the preposition is there employed. The mode in which this peculiar meaning arises from the source referred to, is so exactly the same with that in which the English 'at' and 'about' obtain the same signification, that it can occasion no difficulty to a person familiar with this language. Just as 'at,' 'about,' are used with words expressing occupation, the being employed, and the like, and even with the word 'to be,' to mark the thing with which one is engaged, and this by merely expressing the proximity to it of the person employed, so *πρός*, having acquired the same meaning of nearness, may serve the same purpose. *Πρός* is, perhaps, all the more suited to assume this peculiar sense of 'at,' 'about,' from the fact that there is involved in it, from its proper notion of 'before,' 'in the presence of,' the signification also of 'towards' or 'looking towards;' so that *πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασιν εἶναι* may mean, not only the being 'near' to, and hence the being employed at or about, one's business, but also the having the interest or attention directed towards it. This point, however, need not be insisted upon as necessary to the interpretation.

c. 'To.' *Πρός* is very frequently used in the sense of 'to,' as after verbs of motion: e.g. Xen. Anab. v. 9, 20, *νομίζων πρὸς τοὺς φίλους καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν τοῦνομα μεῖζον ἀφίξεισθαι αὐτοῦ*, 'considering that a greater report of himself would come to his friends.' In such examples *πρός* is rendered by 'to;' and yet, strictly speaking, this meaning is due to the verb of motion and the accusative case. The proper meaning of *πρός* is 'before,' 'in the face or presence of,' and it expresses the relative position or direction in which the action, or that of which the action is affirmed, stands to the object named by the noun in the accusative case. The phrase *νομίζων πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τοῦνομα μεῖζον ἀφίξεισθαι* might be literally rendered, 'thinking that a greater report of him

would come before, into the presence of, his friends.' So, in the expression *λέγειν πρὸς τινα*, 'to speak to or with a person,' the meaning is, 'to speak before a person,' 'to speak face to face with a person.'

d. 'Against,' the Latin *contra*, *adversus*, *in*, *cum*. When *πρὸς* is translated by 'against,' or by 'with' in the sense of 'against,' namely, after such verbs as *μάχεσθαι*, 'to fight,' *πολεμεῖν*, 'to be at war,' *ἀγορεύειν*, 'to speak,' this signification arises from the relation of hostility or opposition in which the parties to the action stand to each other, and the preposition itself really expresses no more than the being 'before,' 'in the presence of,' 'face to face,' 'towards.' Thus, *μάχεσθαι πρὸς τινα*, 'to fight against a person,' properly means, 'to fight face to face with a person,' and *ἀγορεύειν πρὸς τινα*, 'to speak against one,' is 'to speak with the face towards one,' that is, so that the speech is made 'in one's presence,' 'face to face' with a person.

'With,' in Latin *cum*. In the same way, again, when *πρὸς* is used in the sense of 'with,' and of the Latin *cum*, in such phrases as *σπονδὰς ποιῆσθαι πρὸς τινα*, 'to make a truce with a person,' *εἰρήνην ἄγειν πρὸς τινα*, 'to be at peace with a person,' the proper meaning of *πρὸς* is 'before,' 'in the presence of,' 'face to face,' answering to the Latin *coram*. And this sense of 'in the presence of' is altogether suitable to the circumstances in which it is here used; and these, again, suggest the sense of 'with' by which the preposition is rendered in English. Thus, when a truce is made, and when a period of peace is passing, there must be parties to the truce and to the peace, and they are properly conceived as standing, as it were, 'face to face,' as being 'in the presence of' each other; that is, they have the relative position the one to the other which is expressed by *πρὸς*. On the other hand, the connection which they have with each other as parties to a common action or state, or the mutuality of their relations, is expressed by the English 'with' and the Latin *cum*, and arises not from the word *πρὸς* itself, but from the relation to each other of the parties to an action or state.

e. 'For,' 'with a view to.' *Πρὸς* is also used to express

the object, purpose, or view, with which a thing is done, and is rendered in English by 'for,' 'with a view to:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. v. 4, 7, *ἐκέλευε διώκειν τοὺς πρὸς τοῦτο τεταγμένους*, 'those appointed for this,' 'with a view to this.' Here, again, the proper sense of *πρὸς* is that of 'before,' with the modified meaning of 'looking towards,' 'with the face turned towards,' and has exactly corresponding to it the English phrase 'with a view to,' which conveys the same idea in the same way. From the use of this expression in English, and of the very similar one 'with an eye to,' as well as from the employment of the Greek *πρὸς* to mark object or purpose, or the end had in view, it is obvious that the designating an object as that towards which a person looks in doing any thing is equivalent, under certain circumstances, to marking it as the end aimed at, as the object or purpose of the action.

'For,' the purpose served. To be distinguished from this use of *πρὸς*, although having almost exactly the same translation, is that in which it is employed to denote the end attained, the purpose served, and is rendered by 'for.' E.g. Soph. Electr. 909, *οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὴν λέγω τάδε*, 'I do not say this to please you,' or 'for your pleasure,' that is, 'so as to give you pleasure.' Here *πρὸς* has the same sense of 'towards,' 'looking to,' that belongs to it in the expression of purpose or end had in view; but the object with a regard or with reference to which the action is performed is not the thing aimed at, but the result of the action or the end attained. The difference of meaning in *πρὸς* as here used, compared with its meaning when employed to express the object had in view, is not owing to any change in the signification of *πρὸς* itself, but to the predominance of the case. This being the accusative, and marking the extent of the action, goes at the same time to express its attained end or result.

f. 'For,' 'in exchange for.' The same explanation that was given in the case of *πρὸς* used to express purpose applies when this preposition is rendered by 'for,' and is the sign of the exchange of one thing 'for' or 'against' another: e.g. *ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς ἀμείβεσθαι*, 'to exchange

pleasures for pleasures.' For, here also, *πρός* properly means 'towards,' 'looking to,' 'with the face towards;' and from this comes the notion of 'over against,' and then that of 'for.' The objects interchanged are regarded as having a direction or aspect towards each other, and this is sufficiently denoted by *πρός*. And when objects are standing face to face, the one looking towards the other, the relation of 'over against' is of obvious suggestion. The only thing wanting to express exchange, when objects stand in this mutual relation, is some action, such as *ἀμείβεσθαι*, 'to pass from one to the other,' 'to answer.' The introduction of some such action as would serve to mark mutual transfer would seem to be required to make the sense of exchange complete. *Πρός* with the help of the case may convey the notion of mutual correspondence, of one thing being over against another, and tallying with it; but it can hardly suffice to mark exchange, which implies, not only that the objects answer the one to the other, but that the one is made by actual transfer to take the place of the other. It should be observed that the English 'for,' having the same origin and primary signification with *πρός*, is like it used to express purpose or object had in view, and as a sign of exchange; and that 'for' in English, as well as *πρός* in Greek, requires, in the case of exchange, some suitable action to render the expression complete.

g. 'In regard to,' 'concerning.' *Πρός* is rendered also by 'in regard to,' 'concerning:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 26, *ἵνα εἰδῶς αὐτὰ ὁμολογῆς ἂν τί σε πρὸς ταῦτα ἐρωτᾷ*, 'if he ask you any question in regard to, concerning, these matters;' Id. Anab. ii. 3, 21, *πρὸς ταῦτα οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐβουλευόντο*, 'in regard to these things the Greeks held a consultation.' Very commonly *πρὸς ταῦτα* is rendered in English by 'therefore;' and this is equivalent to 'with regard to this.' In this use of *πρός* it is easily seen to have properly the meaning of 'with the face towards,' or 'looking towards,' which is also the notion of the phrase 'with regard to' in English; and the idea of 'looking towards' is to be referred to the primary sense of *πρός*.

h. 'By,' &c. Adverbial phrases. To the same case with

the preceding, so far as the interpretation is concerned, belongs the use of *πρός* in a number of phrases called adverbial, such as *πρὸς βίαν*, 'by force,' 'despite of,' *πρὸς ἀνάγκην*, 'by necessity,' 'of necessity,' *πρὸς πάντα*, 'in every regard.' In such expressions, *πρός* has the meaning of 'looking to,' 'having regard to,' and retains, accordingly, the original sense of 'before,' 'having the face towards,' that belongs to this preposition. Thus, *πρὸς βίαν* means 'looking to, having regard to, force,' *πρὸς ἀνάγκην*, 'looking to, having regard to, necessity.'

i. 'In accordance with,' 'according to,' 'conformably with.' Among the significations of *πρός* is that of 'in accordance with,' 'according to,' 'conformably with:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. viii. 5, 16, *πρὸς τὸ συμπίπτον δεῖ διατάττων ἐπορεύετο*, 'in marching he always arranged the men according to the occasion;' Id. ib. viii. 4, 29, *ἐδίδου πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ*, 'he gave to each according to his merit.' Here the meaning of *πρός* is the same as in the preceding cases; namely, it signifies 'looking to,' 'having regard to,' which is the same thing as 'having the face towards,' or being 'before,' 'in front of.'

k. 'Compared with,' 'in comparison with.' *Πρός* is sometimes translated by 'compared with,' 'in comparison with,' answering to the Latin *præ*: e.g. Xen. Anab. vii. 7, 41, *καίτοι γε Ἡρακλείδῃ λῆρος πάντα δοκεῖ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ ἀργύριον ἔχειν*, 'in comparison with having money;' Id. Memorab. i. 2, 52, *ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν*, 'compared with himself.' Here, again, *πρός* properly signifies 'looking to,' 'having regard to,' as in the first example cited, 'to Heracleides every thing appears worthless compared with money,' that is, 'when looking to, if regard be had to, money;' and this, again, is the same thing as 'having the face towards' money. So that, in this case also, *πρός* may be said to retain its primary sense of 'before,' 'fronting.'

3. 'Before,' 'forwards,' 'in advance.' In the cases which have thus far been considered, *πρός* has presented the signification of 'before,' 'in the presence of,' 'looking towards,' and expresses one prevailing relation, that of an object

facing another, standing in its presence, and looking towards it. There are, however, other instances of its use in which it has the meaning of 'before,' it is true, but differently applied, and so that it conveys the notion of an object being 'forwards,' 'in advance,' with respect to another object, and looking or facing, not towards this object, so as to be 'face to face,' but 'forwards,' 'onwards,' 'in advance of it,' and with the face from it. The sense of the preposition is in one view, and that the most essential, the same that it has been found to have in other cases, namely, that of 'fronting,' and 'looking forwards;' and the only difference is to be found in the direction of the looking, relatively considered, or in the way in which the face is turned.

a. 'On.' To this head should probably be referred the examples, occasionally met with, in which *πρός*, standing in connection with a verb of action or motion, and a dative case, bears apparently the sense of 'on,' by which it is rendered. E.g. Il. i. 245, . . . *ποτὶ (πρός) δὲ σκήπτρον βάλε γαίῃ*, 'and cast his sceptre on the ground.' The proper notion conveyed by *πρός*, in this and like examples, would seem to be that of 'before,' 'forwards,' with reference to the subject of the verb; so that, while the action looks, so to speak, with the face forwards, towards some other object, it has also the relation of 'forwards,' 'in advance,' with respect to the subject of the verb. Thus, *ποτὶ δὲ σκήπτρον βάλε γαίῃ* would be rendered, strictly, 'he cast his sceptre forwards, in front of him, on the ground.' If so, *πρός* is to be considered as the immediate qualification of the action of throwing, and has the same meaning with *πρό* in *προβάλλειν*, 'to throw forward.'

b. 'In addition to,' 'besides.' Here belongs also another instance of the use of *πρός*, where it has a sense seemingly very different from its meanings hitherto considered, and which is yet probably referable to the primary sense of the preposition, namely, that in which it is rendered by 'in addition,' 'besides.' E.g. Soph. Trach. 45, *δέκα μῆνας πρὸς ἄλλοις πέντε*, 'ten months in addition to five other months;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 8, *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μανθάνουσι τοξεύειν καὶ*

δρουντίζειν, 'and in addition to, besides this, they learn to shoot with the bow and to throw with the dart.' Here the proper sense of *πρός* would seem to be 'in front of,' 'towards,' so that the action which it defines shall be regarded as 'before' relatively to some object, not with the idea of 'face to face' or 'fronting' it, but with that of being 'in advance,' 'forwards,' 'onwards,' with respect to it, and counting from it. This is the same sense that is so often seen to belong to the preposition *πρό*, as in *προεῖναι*, which signifies 'to go forwards,' *progredi*, as well as 'to go before,' *anteire*. From this meaning of 'forwards,' 'onwards,' 'in advance,' relatively to some object, that of 'in addition to,' 'besides,' is derived; for the being 'before,' 'forwards,' 'onwards,' 'in advance,' with regard to an object, is in certain circumstances the same as being counted 'in addition to.' Thus, in the example from Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 8, when, in describing the discipline of the Persian youth, their learning to shoot with the bow and to throw with the dart is represented as something that is 'forwards,' 'in advance,' with regard to the other parts of their discipline already mentioned, *πρὸς τούτοις*, that is, as an advance upon it, it is easy to see that the exercises thus presented are intended to be set forth as an addition to them, either actually or in the order of narration. The Latin *porro*, used in the meaning of 'henceforward,' of 'moreover,' 'for the future,' presents the two significations of 'forwards' and 'in addition' in the same word, and so may be adduced in confirmation of the above explanation. It may be observed, further, that in many compounds also *πρός* has the sense of 'in addition,' as, *προσδεῖν*, 'to be wanting besides,' *προσδιδόναι*, 'to give in addition.'

Summary of the significations of πρὸς.

- Πρός.* 1. 'Before,' 'fronting,' 'with the face towards,' 'in the presence of.'
- a. 'Before,' 'with the face towards,' 'towards.'
- b. 'Before,' 'in the presence of,' 'by;' as in adjurations.

- c. 'At,' 'near;' properly, 'before,' 'in the presence of.'
 - d. 'At,' 'about;' properly, 'before,' 'in the presence of,' 'near.'
 - e. 'Looking towards,' 'towards;' 'on the quarter of,' 'on,' 'against;' Latin, *ex, a parte*.
 - f. 'On the side of,' 'near.'
 - g. 'On the side of,' in marking descent; Latin, *e, ab*.
 - h. 'On the side of,' 'of the party of.'
 - i. 'On the part of,' 'with,' 'among.'
 - k. ('On the part of,') 'according to the customs, character, &c. of.'
 - l. 'At the hands of,' 'from,' 'by;' marking the agent, author, means.
2. 'Before,' 'with the face towards,' 'looking towards;' the signification of *πρός* obscured by the case, &c.
- a. 'To (before);' with verbs of motion.
 - b. 'Against,' 'with;' in relation to hostile parties; Latin, *contra, adversus, in, cum*; properly, 'face to face.'
 - c. 'With,' in relation to parties to a mutual action; properly, 'face to face.'
 - 'With,' 'in the eyes of.'
 - d. 'That concerns,' 'having relation to;' properly, 'with the face towards,' 'looking towards.'
 - e. 'In regard to,' 'concerning;' *πρός ταῦτα*, 'therefore.'
 - f. 'For,' 'with a view to;' properly, 'looking towards.'
 - 'For;' the end served.
 - g. 'For,' 'in exchange for;' properly, 'looking towards,' 'over against.'
 - h. 'In accordance with,' 'conformably to;' properly, 'looking towards,' 'having regard to.'
 - i. 'By,' &c., adverbially; *πρός βίαν*, 'by force.'

- k. 'Compared with,' 'in comparison with;' 'in proportion to;' properly, 'looking towards,' 'having regard to.'
3. 'Before,' 'forwards,' with respect to an object, 'onwards,' 'in advance.'
- a. 'On;' properly, 'forwards,' 'before,' with respect to one object, and 'with the face towards' another: e.g. *ποτὶ (πρός) δὲ σκῆπτροι βόλε γαίῃ*.
 - b. 'In addition to,' 'besides;' properly, 'before,' 'forwards,' 'in advance,' relatively.

SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *πρός* WITH CASES.I. *Πρός with the genitive case.*

1. a. 'Before,' 'in the presence of,' 'by,' in adjurations. *Πρός* with the genitive case is used in the sense of 'before,' 'in the presence of,' equivalent to the Latin *coram*, and in adjurations to 'by,' and to the Latin *per*. E.g. Il. i. 338-9, *μάρτυροι ἔστων | πρὸς τε θεῶν μαχάρων, πρὸς τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων*, 'let them be witnesses before, in the presence of, both the blessed gods and mortal men;' Il. xix. 188, *οὐδ' ἐπιорκῆσω πρὸς δαίμονος*, 'nor will I swear falsely by the divinity;' Demosth. 842, 7, *ἱκετεύω, ἀντιβολῶ, πρὸς παίδων, πρὸς γυναικῶν, πρὸς τῶν ὄντων ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν*, 'I beseech, I implore you, by your children, by your wives, by whatever blessings you have;' Xen. Cyrop. iii. 1, 35, *πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἔφη, ὦ Κύρε, μὴ οὕτω λέγε*, 'before, by, the gods, do not speak thus;' Id. ib. iii. 3, 31, *μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν . . . οὕτω ποτήσωμεν*, 'before the gods, let us by no means do so.' In such examples, the preposition obviously means 'before,' 'in the presence of,' and the genitive has its ordinary signification of 'with respect to.' Thus, in the first example cited, the meaning is, 'let them be witnesses before, in the presence of, . . . with respect to the gods,' the genitive defining the precise object with respect to which the term *πρός*, and the action or state which it qualifies, *μάρτυροι ἔστων*, are to be understood as set forth.

b. 'Towards,' 'on the quarter of,' 'on.' *Πρός* with the

genitive case is frequently used in describing the position of an object with reference to the points of the compass and to other objects, being rendered in English by 'towards,' 'on the quarter of,' 'on.' E.g. Od. xiii. 109-11, *δύω δὲ τέ οἱ θύραι εἰσίν* | *αἱ μὲν πρὸς Βορέαο, καταβαταὶ ἀνδρώποισιν*, | *αἱ δ' αὖ πρὸς Νότου εἰσὶ, θεώτεραι*, 'they have two doors, one towards, on, the north, the other towards, on, the south;' Herod. i. 84, *χωρίον πρὸς τοῦ Τμώλου τετραμμένον*, 'a place towards Tmolus;' Id. iii. 101, *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου (οἰκέουσι)*, 'they dwelt towards, on the quarter of, the south wind;' Æsch. Suppl. 252, *Στρυμών τε πρὸς δύνοντος ἡλίου*, 'and the Strymon on the west, on the quarter of the setting sun.' In such examples, *πρὸς* signifies 'towards,' 'looking towards,' 'on the quarter of,' and the genitive defines it by marking the object with respect to which this relative position is affirmed. Thus, in the last example, the Strymon has its position determined by saying that it 'looks towards,' (*Στρυμών τε πρὸς*), and, to complete the definition, the genitive is added, showing with respect to what specific object it has this relation of looking towards, namely, 'with respect to the setting sun,' (*δύνοντος ἡλίου*.)

c. 'Towards,' 'on the quarter of,' 'on the side of,' 'against.' To this construction belongs the case in which *πρὸς* with the genitive is rendered either by 'on the quarter of,' 'on the side of,' or by 'against.' E.g. Herod. ii. 80, *φυλακαὶ κατέστασαν . . . πρὸς Αἰθιοπῶν*, 'guards were stationed against the Æthiopians,' that is, 'on the side or quarter of the Æthiopians;' Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 26, *πρὸς τῶν Καρδούχων ἵέναι*, 'to move against the Carduchi,' properly, 'on the side or quarter of the Carduchi.'

d. 'Towards,' 'on the side or quarter of,' 'near.' To this same use of *πρὸς* with the genitive is to be referred the case in which it has the meaning of 'on the side of,' 'near.' E.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 26, *οὐραγούς δὲ καταστήσασθαι πρὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ*, 'to station the rear-guards on, near, the river,' that is, 'on the side or quarter of the river;' Herod. ii. 154, *εἰσὶ οὗτοι οἱ χώροι πρὸς θαλάσσης*, 'these places are near the sea,' properly, 'towards, on the quarter of, the sea;' Id. i. 145, *Πελλήνη πρὸς Σικυῶνος*, 'Pellene on the side of, or near,

Sicyon.' Here both the preposition and the genitive have the same explanation as in the preceding cases.

e. 'Towards,' 'in the eyes of.' Of the same nature is the case in which *πρὸς* with the genitive has the sense of 'towards,' 'in the eyes of:' e.g. Xen. Anab. v. 7, 12, *ὥρα ἡμῖν βουλευέσθαι μὴ κάκιστοί τε καὶ αἰσχιστοὶ ἄνδρες φανώμεν καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων*, 'lest we shall be seen to be the vilest and basest men in the eyes both of gods and men.' Herod. vii. 139, *γνώμην ἐπιφθονοῦ πρὸς τῶν πλειονῶν ἀνθρώπων*, 'an opinion invidious in the view of the majority of men.' Id. i. 121.

f. 'On the side of,' referring to natural descent or pedigree. To this construction of *πρὸς* with the genitive belong also the examples in which it is used to mark natural descent or pedigree, expressed in English by 'on the side of.' E.g. Isocr. 228, b, *πρὸς δὲ μητρός ἀπὸ Διὸς ὢν*, 'being on the mother's side descended from Jove;' Demosth. 1803, ult., *ἐμαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὄντα καὶ τὰ πρὸς πατρός καὶ τὰ πρὸς μητρός*, 'myself, who am an Athenian both on my father's and on my mother's side;' Id. 1805, 16, *τῶν συγγενῶν τοῦ πατρός καὶ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν καὶ πρὸς γυναικῶν*, 'the father's kindred, both on the male and on the female side.' It has been already explained, that *πρὸς* has here also the sense of 'towards,' 'looking towards,' and, hence, 'on the quarter or side of,' just as in *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου*, 'on the quarter of the south wind,' the only difference being in the nature of the objects the relation of which is defined by *πρὸς*. See above, p. 415, e. The genitive, as in the preceding cases, has the meaning of 'with respect to,' marking the specific object to which another holds the relation indicated by *πρὸς*.

g. 'On the side of,' 'of the party of,' 'in the interest of,' 'favorable to.' Here belong also the examples in which *πρὸς* with the genitive is rendered in English by 'on the side' or 'of the party of,' 'in the interest of,' 'favorable to.' E.g. Herod. viii. 22, *ἵνα ποιήσῃ Ἴωνας μεταβαλέειν καὶ γενέσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτῶν*, 'with a view to cause the Ionians to change sides and become of their party,' 'favorable to them;' Xen. Hell. vii. 1, 17, *σπονδὰς ποιησάμενος . . . πρὸς*

θηβαίων μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν, 'having made a treaty rather in the interest of the Thebans than in their own interest;' Demosth. 921, ἀποπὼν εἰ τῆς ἐκείνου μαρτυρίας τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοῦ ἀποστεροῦντος πιστῶς ἀκούσεσθε, τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀποστερουμένων ἀπιστον ἔσται παρ' ὑμῖν, 'it is unreasonable if you shall hear and give credit to that part of his testimony which favors him that robbed, while faith shall not be given to the part which favors the persons robbed.' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1434, πρὸς σοῦ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐμοῦ φράσω, 'I will mention what is for your advantage, not for mine;' Id. Trach. 150, ἤτοι πρὸς ἀνδρὸς ἢ τέκνων φοβουμένη, 'through fear either for a husband or for children;' Od. vi. 207, πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσιν ἄπαντες | ξεινοὶ τε πτωχοὶ τε, 'for all, both strangers and the poor, are under the protection of Jove,' that is, 'appertain to Jove,' 'belong to his side or party;' Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 511, πρὸς τῶν κρατούντων δ' ἐσμέν οἱ δ' ἡσσωμένων, 'we are on the side of the conquerors, they on the side of the conquered.' In such examples, both the preposition and the genitive case are so obviously to be interpreted in the same way with the cases of this class already considered, that they need not special remark.

h. 'On the part of,' 'with,' 'among.' To be assigned to this same class of the uses of πρὸς with the genitive case are the examples in which it is employed to denote the party to whom a sentiment is referred as existing 'on his part,' where in English we use the expressions 'on the part of,' 'with,' 'among,' and in Latin *apud*. E.g. Herod. iv. 144, εἶπας τότε τὸ ἔπος ἐλείπετο ἀθάνατον μνήμην πρὸς Ἑλλησποντίων, 'he left behind him an undying memory among, on the part of, the people of the Hellespont;' Xen. Anab. i. 9, 20, ὁμολογεῖται πρὸς πάντων κρᾶτιστος δὴ γενέσθαι θεραπεύειν, 'it is agreed among all,' *apud omnes constat*; Id. ib. ii. 3, 18, ὁμαι γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀχαρίστως μοι ἔχειν, οὔτε πρὸς ὑμῶν οὔτε πρὸς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης, 'for I think I shall fail of meeting with gratitude neither on your part nor on that of all Greece;' Id. Œcon. vi. 10, διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐνδοξοτάτη εἶναι πρὸς τῶν πόλεων αὐτῇ ἡ βιοτεία, 'for this reason this occupation is most respected on the part of states.' See *Lex*. Xenoph. Here, again, the same interpretation of both the

preposition and the case applies, the former having the sense of 'looking towards,' and, hence, being 'on the side of,' 'on the part of,' just as in the phrase πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου, and so being 'with,' 'among;' and the latter meaning 'with respect to,' or marking the specific object to whom a preceding sentiment or the like is placed in the relation expressed by πρὸς.

i. 'According to the custom, character, or whatever is proper' to a person. Of the same nature with the foregoing uses of πρὸς with the genitive is that also in which it marks the object to which any thing is referred as belonging to, or being conformable to, its character, habits, disposition, or whatever else is proper to it, corresponding to the English phrases 'it belongs to,' 'is the part of,' 'is according to, or conformable to, the character, &c. of.' E.g. Herod. v. 12, οὔτε Περσικὰ ἦν οὔτε Δύδια τὰ ποιούμενα, οὔτε πρὸς τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας οὐδαμῶν, 'nor according to the practice of any of the Asiatics;' Anab. i. 2, 11, οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρὸς τοῦ Κύρου τρόπου ἔχοντα μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, 'for it was not according to the character of Cyrus not to pay if he had the means;' Id. Memor. ii. 3, 15, ἀποπα λέγεις . . . καὶ οὐδαμῶς πρὸς σοῦ, 'you say what is unreasonable and not becoming your character;' Soph. Aj. 1071, καίτοι καχοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρός, 'yet it is the part of a base man;' Æsch. Agam. 578, ἡ χάρις πρὸς γυναῖκος αἵρεσθαι κέαρ, 'surely it quite belongs to the disposition of a woman to be excited.' In such examples, πρὸς has the meaning of 'looking towards,' 'on the part of,' and the genitive signifies 'with respect to,' both just as in the preceding cases of this class.

To this head may be referred the expression πρὸς δίκης, 'justly,' 'according to justice,' having a sense nearly equivalent to *δικαίως*: e.g. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1014, ἄρ' οἶσθα δῆτα πρὸς δίκης οὐδὲν τρέμων; 'dost know now that thou art alarmed wholly without just cause?' that is, 'not at all conformably to what is right.' The idea conveyed by πρὸς δίκης is that, in being alarmed, the person spoken of is not of the part of, on the side of, right, does not belong to right, does not conform to right; and the notion of being 'on the side of,' 'of the party of,' in this, and in the imme-

diately preceding examples, very readily suggests that of being 'in accordance or in conformity with.'

k. 'At the hands of,' 'from,' 'by.' *Πρός* with the genitive case is used also in the sense of 'at the hands of,' 'from,' 'by;' that is, to express the personal object chiefly to which an action is referred as being done on its part, or as proceeding from it, and thus to denote the author, source, or agent of such action. E.g. Od. xi. 302, *οὗ καὶ νέρθεν γῆς τιμὴν πρὸς Ζηνὸς ἔχοντες*, 'honored by Jove,' properly, 'having honor on the part of, at the hands of, Jove.' *Πρός*, having regard to its original sense, here means 'looking to,' and hence 'on the part of,' just as in *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου* it signifies 'on the quarter of;' and the genitive denotes the personal or other object with respect to which any thing is to be understood to have this relation of *πρός*, 'on the part of.' The only difference, strictly speaking, between *πρὸς νότου ἀνέμου*, 'on the quarter of the south wind,' and *πρὸς Ζηνὸς τιμὴν ἔχειν*, 'to have honor at the hands of Jove,' is due to the presence in the latter case of an action and of a personal object; 'to be honored on the part of Jove' being the same thing as 'to receive honor at the hands of Jove.' And it is plain that when it is said of persons that they have honor 'on the part of' or 'at the hands of' Jove, Jove is the personal object 'from' whom they receive honor, or 'by' whom they are honored; that is to say, the author or agent of the conferring honor upon them. A few additional examples may be given. Soph. Œd. Col. 73, *καὶ τίς πρὸς ἀνδρὸς μὴ βλέποντος ἀρχεῖς;* 'and what help is there from a man if he see not?' Id. Antig. 910, *ἐρήμιος πρὸς φίλων*, 'deserted by friends;' Id. Œd. Tyr. 1235-6, *τέθνηκε θεῖον Ἰοκάστης χάρα.* | *Χορ.* *πρὸς τίνος ποτ' αἰτίας;* | *Ἐξαγ.* *αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτῆς*, 'Iocasta is dead. Chor. From what cause? Mess. By her own hand.' In this example, *πρὸς τίνος ποτ' αἰτίας* furnishes an instance of a noun not personal used in the genitive with *πρός* in the sense under consideration. And although *πρός* with the genitive of such nouns may not admit of the same rendering throughout as when joined with personal nouns, the sense which it conveys is essentially the same, and has the

same origin; namely, *πρός*, by marking an action as 'looking towards' and being 'on the part of' an object, to which the genitive shows that it is specifically referred, sufficiently indicates that it appertains to this object; and as, in the case of *πρός* with the genitive of a personal noun, the idea of author or agent is readily suggested by the relation of 'on the part of,' 'at the hands of,' so here that of origin or source is suggested by the same relation. Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 5, *ὕποπτεύσας μὴ τι πρὸς τῆς πόλεως οἱ ὑπαίτιον εἶη*, 'apprehending that there might be attached to him some blame on the part of the state;' Soph. Electr. 783-4, . . . *ἡμέρα γὰρ τῇδ' ἀπήλλαγμαί φόβου | πρὸς τῇσδ' ἐκείνου τε*, 'for this day am I freed from fear both from her and from him.'

II. *Πρός* with the dative case.

1. a. 'Before,' 'in front of,' 'in the presence of.' *Πρός* is employed with the dative case in the sense of 'before,' 'in front of,' 'in the presence of:' e. g. Œd. Tyr. 20, *ἀγοραῖα θακεῖ, πρὸς τε Παλλάδος διπλοῖς | ναοῖς*, 'is sitting in the market-place, and before, in front of, the double temple of Pallas.' The sense of 'at,' 'near,' might, however, be admitted for *πρός* in this example, it being easily derived from that of 'before,' 'in front of,' 'in the presence of.' Id. ib. 180, *ἡ ποικιλωδὸς Σφίγξ τὰ πρὸς ποσὶ σκοπεῖν | μετέντας ἡμῶς τὰφανῇ προσηγγετο*, 'led us to attend to what was urgent,' properly, 'to the things before our feet;' Demosth. 520, 22, *δσα ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γέγονεν, ἣ πρὸς τοῖς κριταῖς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ*, 'what has occurred before, in the presence of, the judges.' In such examples it admits of no doubt that the preposition *πρός* has the sense of 'before,' either in the local meaning of 'in front of,' as in the first and second, or in the figurative one of 'in the presence of,' as in the last example. Nor is it difficult to admit that the dative case is used to mark the object ultimately affected, and depends on the meaning contained in the preposition itself. Thus, in the first example, the dative case *διπλοῖς ναοῖς* follows upon *πρός*, 'before,' in the same way that the dative attends upon *δμοιος*, 'like,' *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same,' *ἴσος*, 'equal.' That is, the idea of 'before,' 'fronting,' contained in *πρός*, requires a

dative case to denote the object ultimately affected by this relation, in the same way that the notions of likeness, identity, and equality contained in *δμοιος*, *ὁ αὐτός*, *ἴσος*, require the same case to mark the final object of these relations.

b. 'At,' 'near.' *Πρός* with the dative case occurs also in the sense of 'at,' 'near:' e.g. *Æschyl. Prom.* 810, *πρὸς ἡλίου ναίουσι πηγαῖς*, 'they dwell at the fountains of the sun.' Here *πρὸς* means, properly, 'before,' 'facing,' 'in the presence of;' that is, it shows the position of the dwellers spoken of relatively to the fountains of the sun by declaring that they dwell 'before, in the presence of them,' and 'looking towards' them. And from this notion of standing before or in the presence of an object is very readily derived that of nearness to it. *Id. ib.* 849, *ἔστιν πόλις . . . Νείλου πρὸς αὐτῷ στόματι*, 'there is a city at the very mouth of the Nile,' that is, 'before, in the presence of, facing, the mouth of the Nile,' *Id. Sept. c. Theb.* 359, *πρὸς πύλαισι Προκτίσι βρέμει*, 'he is raging at or near the gate of Proetus;' *Id. Eumen.* 272-3, *ποταίνον γὰρ ὃν (sc. μητροκτόνον μίασμα) πρὸς ἐστία θεοῦ | Φοίβου καθαρμοῖς ἡλδδθῃ χοιροκτόνοις*, 'the pollution of my mother's murder was driven away by purifications at the altar (hearth) of the god Phœbus;' *Id. ib.* 295, *πρὸς βωμῷ σφαγεῖς*, 'slain at the altar;' *Id. Aj.* 579, *θρηγνέειν ἐπὶ φῶδας πρὸς τοιμῶντι ἤματι*, 'to utter cries of lamentation for keen affliction.' In this last example *πρὸς* has the same sense of 'before,' 'in presence of,' but is used figuratively with the meaning of 'at,' 'for.'

In all these examples alike, the use of the dative, as already stated, is to designate the object ultimately affected by the relation of 'before,' 'looking towards,' 'fronting,' expressed by *πρὸς*; or, which is the same thing in effect, the dative depends for its use upon the relation of 'before,' 'looking towards,' 'fronting,' in which some action or object is placed to it by *πρὸς*. If such terms as *ἀντίος*, 'opposite,' *ἴσος*, 'equal,' *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same,' *δμοιος*, 'like,' are followed by the dative case, so may *πρὸς*, 'before,' 'looking towards,' be followed by the same case used for the same purpose.

c. 'At,' 'about,' said of employments. *Πρός* with the

dative is used in the sense of 'at,' 'about,' to denote the thing about which a person is employed, at which he is engaged. E.g. *Demosth.* 92, 22, *οὐδενὶ πλέον κεκράτηκε τῆς πόλεως Φίλιππος ἢ τῷ πρότερος πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασι γίνεσθαι*, 'Philip has got the better of our state by nothing more than by being beforehand in occupying himself about his affairs;' *Id.* 287, 3, *ἂν πείσθῃτ' ἐμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τῷ σκοπεῖν . . . γένησθε*, 'if you be persuaded by me, and be employed about considering.' *Πρός* in such examples, as has been explained when speaking of the preposition apart, may with most probability be interpreted as having the sense of 'at' or 'near,' that is, as conveying the idea of proximity, and as denoting the being engaged at or employed about a thing by representing a person as having a nearness to it. 'At' and 'about' in English express the same idea in the same way, and these and the Greek *πρὸς*, as here used, admit a like interpretation. The notion of nearness, common to the English 'at,' 'about,' and to the Greek *πρὸς*, as they are here employed, arises, in the case of *πρὸς*, from that of standing 'before,' 'in the presence of;' and, if there be involved in it the idea of 'looking towards,' 'facing,' this will render *πρὸς* peculiarly fitted to express the being employed about a thing, seeing that it may indicate also the direction of the attention towards the object to which *πρὸς* points. The reason for the employment of the dative case is that set forth in the foregoing paragraph.

2. 'To,' 'on,' &c. *Πρός* with the dative case is further used in a variety of other significations more or less distinctly traceable to the primary sense of the preposition, the dative retaining all the while the meaning proper to this case.

a. 'To.' *Πρός* with the dative has the sense of 'to,' or at least may be so rendered in English. E.g. *Od. v.* 329, *πυκναὶ δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλησιν ἔχονται*, 'they cling together in crowds,' namely, the *ἀκάνθαι*, 'thistles' or 'burrs.' *Πρός* has here the signification of 'towards,' 'looking towards,' and shows that the objects spoken of as clinging to each other have the mutual direction of 'towards,' or are 'facing' each other.

b. 'To,' 'on,' or 'against,' the Latin *ad*. *Πρός* with the dative case is sometimes used in the sense of 'on' or 'against,' conveying, even when rendered by 'on,' not the idea of superposition, as *ἐπί* does, but rather that of being connected by the relation of 'looking towards,' 'facing.' E.g. Herod. iii. 111, *φορέειν δὲ τὰς δρυϊδας ἐς νεοσσῶν προσπεπασμένους ἐκ πηλοῦ πρὸς ἀποκρήμνοισι οὖρεσι*, 'the birds carry it (the cinnamon, *κιννάμωμον*) into nests built against, or attached to, precipitous mountains.' Here it is seen from the facts of the description that *πρὸς* means 'against,' with the notion of having the face towards, looking towards; the nests being formed of soft clay and attached to precipitous cliffs, the relative position which they hold to the rocks is precisely that expressed by *πρὸς* in its proper sense of 'looking towards,' 'with the face towards,' and is that which would be conveyed in English by the phrase 'against the face of.'

In Æsch. Choeph. 883-4, *μαστὸν πρὸς ᾧ σὺ πολλὰ δὴ βρίζων ἄμα | οὖλοισιν ἐξήμελξας εὐτραφέες γάλα*, 'the bosom on which you often slept, and at the same time sucked with your gums nutritious milk,' the meaning of *πρὸς* seems, at first view, to be more distinctly that of 'on;' but, more nearly considered, and having regard to the proper notion of the preposition as seen in all the examples hitherto examined, it will be found to have the meaning of 'looking or having a direction towards,' and to mark the position which the infant has relatively to the mother's breast. *Πρός* is used in the same way in Soph. Antig. 1188-9, . . . *ὀπίτῃα δὲ κλίνομαι | δέισασα πρὸς δμῳαῖσι, καποπλήσσομαι*, 'and in my fright I recline backwards upon my attendants;' for the preposition shows that the act of reclining had its direction 'towards' or 'facing' the attendants. And so in other examples, with different actions and motions; as, Æsch. Prom. 887-8, *θαλεροὶ δὲ λόγοι παίουσ' εἰσὴ | στῆγνῃς πρὸς κύμασιν ἄτης*, 'stout words strike in vain against the waves of a hated fate,' that is, 'strike in the face of,' 'with a direction towards,' 'facing,' the waves of fate; Id. ib. 928, *πτύσας δὲ τῷδε πρὸς κακῷ*, 'when he shall have incurred this calamity,' properly, 'when he shall have struck against

this calamity,' *πρὸς* showing that the direction of the action is with the face towards the object struck; Il. i. 245, . . . *ποτὶ (πρὸς) δὲ σκῆπτρον βάλε γαίῃ*, 'he cast his sceptre on the ground,' that is, 'forwards,' 'towards,' the ground; Æsch. Prom. 5, *τόνδε πρὸς πέτραις ὑψηλοκρήμνοισι τὸν λεωργὸν ὀχυράσαι*, 'to secure this evil-doer on high precipitous rocks,' properly, 'with a direction towards, against the face of, the rocks;' see Id. ib. 15, and 56, and Soph. Œd. Tyr. 181, *θῆλέα δὲ γένεθλα | πρὸς πέδῳ θανατηφόρῳ | κεῖται ἀνοίκτως*, 'and women lie unpitied on the deadly plain.' In this last example *πρὸς* does not express mere superposition, but shows the relative direction of 'forwards,' 'with the face towards,' that would be natural to suppliants lying on the ground.

3. 'In addition to,' 'besides.' *Πρός* with the dative case is furthermore employed in the sense of 'in addition to,' 'besides:' e.g. Æsch. Prom. 252, *πρὸς τοῖσδε μέντοι πῦρ ἐγὼ σφιν ὤπασα*, 'in addition to these things, however, I gave them fire;' Id. ib. 625, *καὶ πρὸς γε τοῦτοις τέρμα τῆς ἐμῆς πλάνης δειξόν*, 'in addition to, besides, this;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 8, *πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις μανθάνουσι τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν*, 'besides this, they learn how to shoot with the bow, and to throw the dart;' Id. Hell. i. 7, 1, *πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ εἴλοντο Ἀδείμαντον*, 'in addition to him they chose Adeimantus;' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1223, *πρὸς δ' ἐκείνοισι τί φῆς*; 'in addition to that, what do you say?' Id. Œd. Col. 601, *πέπονθα δεῖνα πρὸς κακοῖς κακῷ*, 'I have suffered terrible ills upon ills.' How *πρὸς* obtains this sense of addition has been sufficiently explained in treating of the meanings of the preposition separately; and it only remains to be added, that the dative, as here used, is to be interpreted in the same way as in the preceding cases.

III. *Πρός* with the accusative case.

1. a. 'Before,' 'in the presence of,' in Latin *apud*. *Πρός* with the accusative case is used in the sense of 'before,' 'in the presence of,' corresponding to the Latin *apud* in such expressions as *apud senatum dicere*. E.g. Demosth. 529, 16, *γραφῆσθω πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας ὁ βουλευόμενος*, 'let him that

chooses be enrolled before, in the presence of, the thesmothetæ; Id. 602, 3, *πρὸς διατητὴν ἦν αὐτῷ λαχεῖν*, 'he had opportunity to obtain it by lot before the court of diastetæ;' Id. 1075, 1, *οἱ ἄρχοντες πρὸς οὐδ' ἂν ἢ ἡ δίκη*, 'before whatever archons the trial may be;' Æsch. Prom. 614, *ὥσπερ δίκαιον πρὸς φίλους οἶκειν στόμα*, 'since it is right to speak out in the presence of friends;' Id. Agam. 818, *τὰ δ' ἄλλα πρὸς πόλιν τε καὶ θεοὺς* | . . . *βουλευσόμεσθα*, 'the rest we will consult about in the presence of the city and of the gods.' It is obvious, in such examples, both that the preposition has the sense assigned to it, and that the accusative is used in the meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards,' and further explanation is not required.

'In the eyes of,' 'with.' Very nearly in the same sense *πρὸς* is used with the accusative to mark the personal object 'with' or 'in the eyes of' whom, that is, in whose opinion or judgment, any thing is affirmed to be as it is represented. E.g. Xen. Memorab. i. 2, 61, *ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κόσμον τῇ πόλει παρείχε*, 'Socrates brought honor to the state in the eyes of the rest of men also;' Id. Anab. v. 9, 20. Here, as in the examples just before cited, it is plain that *πρὸς* has the meaning of 'before,' 'with the face towards,' 'in the presence of,' and that the accusative has that of 'as to,' 'as regards.' Thus, when it is said that 'Socrates brought honor to the state in the eyes,' that is, 'in the view or opinion, of the rest of men also,' the proper meaning is, 'he brought honor to the state before, in the presence of, . . . as regards the rest of men,' 'as far as the rest of men were concerned.'

b. 'Towards,' 'to,' Latin *versus*, *in*. *Πρὸς* is used with the accusative case in the sense of 'towards,' 'to,' the preposition, however, having properly the force of 'before,' 'with the face towards,' 'looking towards,' and the accusative that of 'as to,' 'as regards.' This construction occurs, α.) in cases of actual motion and local direction: e.g. Il. xii. 239, *εἴτ' ἐπὶ δεξιῇ ἵωσι πρὸς Ἥῳ τ' Ἥελίον τε*, | *εἴτ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τοίγε ποτὶ ζόφον ἱερόεντα*, 'whether they go to the right hand towards the east and the sun, or to the left hand towards the murky west;' Æsch. Prom. 709, *ἡλίου πρὸς ἀντολάς* |

στρέψασα σωτήν, 'having turned thyself towards the east;' Soph. Electr. 564, *λύσις στρατοῦ πρὸς οἶκον*, 'a dismissal of the army to its home;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 5, *οἳ δ' ἄν ἀρξῆται τις πορεύεσθαι, ἑάν τε πρὸς ἔω, ἑάν τε πρὸς ἐσπέραν, ἦν τε πρὸς ἀρχτον, ἦν τε πρὸς μεσημβρίαν*, 'whithersoever one shall begin to journey, whether towards the east, or towards the west, or towards the north, or towards the south;' Id. ib. i. 4, 11, *αἱ δ' ἔλαφοι ἤλλοντο πρὸς οὐρανόν*, 'leapt towards heaven.'

β.) In other examples, again, *πρὸς* with the accusative is used in the same sense materially, where it is not preceded by a verb of motion: e.g. Il. viii. 364, *ἦτοι δ' μὲν κλαίεσκε πρὸς οὐρανόν*, 'he wept towards heaven,' that is, 'with the face towards heaven;' Herod. vi. 22, *ἡ δὲ Καλὴ αὐτῇ Ἀκτὴ καλεομένη ἔστι μὲν Σικελῶν, πρὸς δὲ Τυρσηνίην τετραμμένη τῆς Σικελίης*, 'lying (turned) towards Tyrænia.'

γ.) 'By,' 'to.' Here belong such expressions as *πρὸς τὴν σελήνην*, 'by moonlight,' *πρὸς αὐλὸν ὀρχεῖσθαι*, 'to dance to the flute.' E.g. Xen. Hell. v. 9, 1, *ναυμαχίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σελήνην γενομένης*, 'a sea-fight having occurred by moonlight,' that is, 'in the face, in the presence of, the moon;' or, according to the proper meaning of *πρὸς* and of the accusative, 'before, in the presence of, . . . as regards the moon.' Id. Anab. v. 9, 5, *πρὸς αὐλὸν ὠρχοῦντο σὺν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς*, 'they danced to the flute,' keeping time to its music, and regulating their movements by it. This *πρὸς* expresses by marking the dancing as performed 'before,' 'with the face to,' 'towards,' and, hence, 'with a direction towards,' and an implied conformity with, the flute.

δ.) To this place may be referred the use of *πρὸς* with the accusative after verbs of speaking, and the like, where it is rendered in English by 'to,' but has properly the meaning of 'in the presence of,' 'face to face.' Thus, after *εἰπεῖν*, *φασθαι*, &c.: e.g. Æsch. Agam. 1375, *πρὸς εἰδότας λέγω*, 'I speak to persons who are aware,' that is, 'I speak before, in the presence of, face to face, . . . as regards persons who are aware;' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1419, . . . *τί δῆτα λέξομεν πρὸς τόνδ' ἑπος*; 'what, then, shall I say to him?' Id. Trach. 369, *ἔδοξεν οὖν μοι πρὸς σε δηλώσαι τὸ πᾶν*, 'I determined, therefore, to

reveal every thing to you.' (For other examples, see Ellendt, Lex. Sophocl.)

ε.) 'Towards,' 'for.' Slightly different is the case in which *πρός* with the accusative is used metaphorically, after words expressing moral affections and inclinations, in the sense of the Latin *erga* and *in*, where it is rendered in English by 'towards' and 'for:' e.g. *Æsch. Prom. 489, πρὸς ἀλλήλους τίνες | ἐχθραὶ τε καὶ στέργηθρα καὶ συνεδρίαί, 'what enmities and affections they have for each other, and what occasions of concourse;'* Id. *Suppl. 335, πῶς οὖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εὐσεβὴς ἐγὼ πέλω; 'how, then, shall I show you kindness?'* Soph. *Aj. 157, πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἔχονθ' ὁ φθόνος ἔρπει, 'envy is indulged towards him that is rich;'* Id. *Ced. Tyr. 1421, πρὸς αὐτῶν πάντ' ἐφεύρημαι καχός, 'I am discovered to be utterly base towards him.'* In such examples, *πρός* has properly the same meaning of 'before,' 'with the face towards,' and thus marks the object towards which any feeling, disposition, or quality is directed. The accusative, as in the other cases already considered, has the force of 'as to,' 'as regards,' or defines the limits as to its objects within which the feeling, disposition, or quality is to be understood as existing.

γ. 'To.' *Πρός* with the accusative case is very frequently used with verbs of motion, where it is rendered in English by 'to:' e.g. *Æsch. Eum. 734, ἀπειμ πρὸς δόμους, 'I will go back to my home;'* Soph. *Phil. 915-16, . . . δεῖ γὰρ ἐς Τροίαν σε πλεῖν | πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τὸν Ἀτρεΐδῶν στόλον, 'you must needs sail to Troy, and to the host of the Atreidæ;'* *Æsch. Prom. 655, ἐξελθε πρὸς Λέρνης βαθὺν λεμῶνα, 'go forth to the deep meadow of Lerne;'* Id. *ib. 721, πρὶν δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν Καύκασον μόλῃς, 'before you come to Caucasus itself;'* Id. *Sept. c. Theb. 449, στείχει πρὸς ἐχθρῶν πύργον, 'he goes to, against, the tower of the enemy;'* Xen. *Anab. v. 9, 20, νομίζων . . . πρὸς τοὺς φίλους . . . τοῦνομα μνῆζον ἀφίξασθαι αὐτοῦ, 'thinking that a greater report of himself would come to his friends.'* In such examples, the signification of 'to' does not belong to *πρός* itself, but is due rather to the verb of motion and the accusative case. *Πρός*, as already explained, marks, properly speaking, the relative position of 'before,' 'in the presence of,' into which

the subject of the motion is brought with regard to the object denoted by the accusative case; and this case has the meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards,' or shows in what regard the relative position described by *πρός* is to be admitted. Thus, in the example *δεῖ σε πλεῖν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς, 'you must sail to the Achæans,'* the meaning is, 'you must sail into the presence, so as to be face to face, . . . as regards the Achæans,' or, which is the same thing, 'you must sail into the presence of the Achæans.' But although this may be safely taken as the true meaning of *πρός* with the accusative in the examples in which it is rendered by 'to' after verbs of motion, yet instances may be cited in which the proper sense of the preposition seems to be disregarded. Thus, Xen. *Anab. iv. 5, 2, διέβαινον αὐτὸν βρεχόμενοι πρὸς τὸν ὀμφαλόν, 'wetted up to the waist;'* where *πρός* with the accusative is equivalent to the Latin *usque ad*. (See Lex. Xenoph.) Yet, even here, the proper meaning may be 'in front of,' 'facing,' the idea of 'up to,' that is, of corresponding in measure or height, arising in the same way that it does where *πρός* obtains the sense of 'at,' 'near,' and, especially, where it has that of 'in proportion to,' 'in comparison with.'

δ. 'Against,' the Latin *contra, adversus, in*. *Πρός* with the accusative is used in the sense of 'against,' answering to the Latin *contra, adversus, in*. E.g. Il. xvii. 471, *οἶον πρὸς Τρῶας μάχεται πρῶτῳ ἐν ὀμίλῳ, 'that thus you fight single-handed against the Trojans in the foremost throng;'* Il. xvii. 98, *ὅππότε ἀνὴρ ἐθέλῃ πρὸς δαίμονα φωτὶ μάχεσθαι, 'whenever a man wishes to fight against a divine being;'* *Æschyl. Prom. 323, οὐκ οὖν ἐμοίγε χρώμενος διδασκάλῳ | πρὸς κέντρα κῶλον ἐκτενεῖς, 'if you take me for your instructor, you will not kick against the goads;'* Id. *Choeph. 453, εὖν δὲ γενοῦ πρὸς ἐχθρούς, 'unite with us against our enemies;'* Xen. *Cyrop. i. 4, 21, ὥσπερ δὲ κύων γενναῖος . . . φέρεται πρὸς κῆπρον, 'as a spirited dog rushes against a boar;'* Id. *Anab. i. 8, 8, τῆς μὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιβουλῆς οὐκ ᾔσθάνετο, 'he did perceive the design against himself;'* Demosth. 1089, 10, *πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἡμῶς πένητας πολὺν περιέσσι, 'he has much the advantage against us who are poor.'*

In such examples, the preposition *πρός*, as has been explained above, has properly the meaning of 'with the face towards,' 'face to face,' which is materially the same with the signification of 'before,' 'in the presence of;' that of 'against,' by which it is here rendered, arising from the hostile relations of the parties to the action, or being suggested by the nature of the action itself. The accusative, meantime, has the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' or denotes the object with regard to which alone the action qualified by *πρός* is to be understood as affirmed. Thus, in the first example cited, *πρός Τρώας μάχεαι*, 'you fight against the Trojans,' the meaning is, 'you fight face to face . . . with regard to the Trojans,' that is, 'so far as the Trojans are concerned.' And in that from Xenophon, *Cyrop.* i. 4, 21, the idea presented is that of a dog rushing 'in the face of' a boar, or 'with his face towards' a boar; that is, 'rushing in the face, or with the face towards, . . . as regards a boar;' the preposition showing merely the relative direction of the action, the accusative that the action having this relative direction is affirmed only within definite limits, namely, 'as far as a boar is concerned;' and, for the rest, the known relations of the dog and the boar in the chase, and partly, also, the character of the action itself, showing that the movement is one of hostility, and that *πρός*, accordingly, is to be rendered by 'against.'

e. 'At,' 'near.' *Πρός* with the accusative has also the signification of 'at,' and that of 'near,' corresponding to the Latin *apud* and *juxta*; but both these meanings arise from the idea of an object standing 'with the face towards' a thing, or 'looking towards' it, and being 'in its presence.' This was seen above, and may be readily gathered from the examples in which *πρός* has these meanings of 'at' and 'near.' E.g. Xen. Hell. vi. 5, 8, *ἀναχωρηκότες ὑπὸ τὸ πρὸς Μαντινείων τείχος καὶ τὰς πόλεις*, 'having retired under the wall and gates at Mantinea,' properly, 'before, facing, Mantinea;' Id. *Cyrop.* iii. 3, 34, *παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις . . . πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ παρῆναι*, 'he gave orders to the rest also to assist at the sacrifices,' that is, 'to be near at hand, before, in the presence of, the sacrifices;' Id. Hell. ii. 1, 25,

κατιδὼν τοὺς πολεμίους (ὁρμοῦντας) ἐν λεμένι καὶ πρὸς πόλιν, 'when he saw that the enemy were anchoring in a harbor and near a city,' properly, 'before, in the front or face of, a city;' Id. de re Eq. iv. 3, *λίθους ἔχοντα κατορωρυμένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, 'having stones buried in the ground near each other;' Æsch. Agam. 1027, *ἔστηκεν ἤδη μῆλα πρὸς σφαγὰς πυρός*, 'sheep already stand at, near, the sacrifice (to be burnt) with fire;' Id. Choeph. 918, *ἔοικα θρηνεῖν ζῶσα πρὸς τύμβον μάτην*, 'I seem while living to be uttering vain lamentations at, in the presence of, a tomb.'

'Near,' 'towards,' of time. In the sense of 'near' *πρός* with the accusative is used likewise with reference to time, and then may be rendered also by 'towards.' E.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 21, *ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρὸς ἡμέραν ἦν*, 'and when, now, it was near, or towards, day,' properly, 'looking towards' day; Id. Hell. i. 1, 30, *τὸ πρωὶ καὶ πρὸς ἑσπέραν συναλίζων*, 'convening them early in the morning and towards evening.'

'Near,' 'towards,' of numbers. And so likewise is *πρός* with the accusative used of numbers in the sense of 'towards,' 'near,' where it is rendered also by 'about,' but not quite accurately: e.g. Xen. Hell. i. 2, 18, *ὥστε ἀπολέσθαι αὐτῶν πρὸς ἑπταχοσίους*, 'so that there perished of them towards seven hundred.' The English use of 'towards' in the same sense renders it easily intelligible how the idea of 'having the face towards,' or of 'looking towards,' may give the sense of 'nearly,' 'approaching to.'

f. 'With,' the Latin *cum*. *Πρός* with the accusative case is used in a variety of expressions, such as, *σπονδὰς ποιῆσθαι πρὸς τινα*, 'to make a treaty with a party,' *εἰρήνην ἄγειν πρὸς τινα*, 'to be at peace with a person,' where there are parties to an action, and where the relation denoted by *πρός* is conveyed in English by 'with.' E.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 5, 16, *ὁπότε μέντοι πρὸς τὸν σατράπην . . . σπείσαντο*, 'yet whenever they made a treaty with the satrap;' Id. Vectig. v. 13, *ἢ καὶ λέγεις ὥς χρὴ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον εἰρήνην ἄγειν*; 'do you indeed say that we must be at peace with him too?' That is, in the former example, 'whenever they poured out libations face to face . . . as regards the satrap;' and, in the latter, 'do you say that we must be at peace towards him too?'

Id. Rep. Athen. i. 12, *ἰσηγορίαν καὶ τοῖς δούλοις πρὸς τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἐποίησαμεν*, 'we created even for the slaves equality with the freemen,' that is, 'towards, with regard to, looking to, the freemen;' Demosth. 143, 27, *αἱ μέγιστα τῶν πόλεων πρὸς αὐτὰς διεφέροντο*, 'the greatest states were at variance with themselves,' that is, 'towards, with regard to, themselves;' Id. 528, 16, *οὐδὲν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐστίν*, 'he has nothing to do with the state;' literally, 'there is nothing for him, he has nothing, he has no business, with regard to the state,' that is, 'looking towards,' 'having the face towards, . . . as regards the state.' In such examples, while it is plain that the preposition has the sense of 'looking towards,' 'having the face towards,' and hence 'having regard to,' it is equally manifest that the accusative has the meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards,' or is introduced to mark the extent in which the preceding action qualified by *πρὸς* is to be taken.

'Pertaining to,' 'having relation to,' 'that concerns.' Very nearly related to the use of *πρὸς* with the accusative just mentioned is that in which it is equivalent to the English expressions 'pertaining to,' 'having relation to,' 'that concerns.' E.g. Demosth. 232, 6, *οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τούτων πρὸς ἐμέ*, 'none of these things concerns me;' that is, 'has relation to, looks to, me;' Id. 1026, 21, *ἐὰν δὲ βοᾷ . . . μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα*, 'if he vociferate nothing to the purpose,' 'nothing that relates to,' literally, 'that has its face towards, looks to, the subject in hand.' Here, also, *πρὸς* signifies, properly, 'looking to,' 'having regard to,' and from this comes the sense of 'that concerns;' and the accusative has the meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards.'

g. 'In regard to,' 'concerning.' *Πρὸς* with the accusative, having a meaning and an interpretation almost identical with that just mentioned, is sometimes to be rendered by 'in regard to,' 'concerning.' E.g. Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 26, *ἂν τί σε πρὸς ταῦτα ἐρωτή*, 'if he ask you any question in regard to, concerning, these matters;' Id. Anab. ii. 3, 21, *πρὸς ταῦτα οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐβουλευόντο*, 'in regard to these things the Greeks held a consultation.'

Here properly belongs the use of *πρὸς* with the accusative

to give the ground or reason of a statement, in such expressions as *πρὸς ταῦτα*, *πρὸς τὰδε*, 'therefore,' that is, 'looking to, having regard to, these things.' E.g. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 426, *πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ Κρέοντα καὶ τοῦμὸν στόμα προπηλάκιζε*, 'therefore, looking to this, treat with contempt both Creon and my words;' Id. ib. 456, *πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ Κρέοντα πεμπόντων*, 'therefore let them send Creon also.' (See Ellendt, Lex. Soph.) Of the same nature also is the expression *πρὸς πάντα*, 'in every way,' 'in every regard:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. iii. 3, 10, *καὶ ἐμῷ βέλτιον εἶναι δοκεῖ πρὸς πάντα*, 'and to me it seems better in every way,' 'better in every regard.' In all these examples, both *πρὸς* and the accusative have the same meaning as in the preceding case, the preposition signifying 'looking to,' 'having regard to,' and the accusative 'as to,' 'as regards.'

h. 'For,' 'with a view to.' Of the same nature essentially with the case just mentioned, so far as the construction is concerned, is that in which *πρὸς* with the accusative is used in the sense of 'for,' 'with a view to,' that is, to mark the object had in view. E.g. Æsch. Eumen. 238, *τετραυματισμένον γὰρ ὡς κύων νεβρόν, | πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σταλαγμὸν ἐκμαστεύομεν*, 'for as a dog a wounded fawn, we hunt for dripping blood;' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1027, *ὥδοιπόρεις δὲ πρὸς τί τοῦσδε τοὺς τόπους;* 'for what did you journey to this place?' Xen. Cyrop. v. 4, 7, *ἐκέλευε διώκειν τοὺς πρὸς τοῦτο τεταγμένους*, 'he ordered on the pursuit those who had been appointed for this service;' Id. Anab. vii. 2, 12, *καὶ ἐμὲ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπεμψεν ἐνθάδε*, 'he sent me hither for this;' Id. Hell. i. 7, 34, *τοὺς πρὸς τὴν ἀναίρεσιν (ταχθέντας)*, 'those who were appointed to recover the men,' or 'for the recovery of the men;' Id. Cyrop. i. 6, 40, *πρὸς δ' αὖ τὸν λαγῶ . . . κύνας ἔτρεφες, αἱ τῇ δαμῇ αὐτὸν ἀνέυρισκον*, 'for the hare,' that is, 'to hunt the hare, you kept dogs that found it by the scent.' In this example, *πρὸς τὸν λαγῶ* may be also rendered by 'with regard to the hare,' and it is thus seen very plainly that the preposition has the meaning of 'looking to,' 'having regard to,' and that the accusative has that of 'as to,' 'as regards.' What is obviously true of this example is equally to be

admitted in the other instances of this use of *πρός* with the accusative.

i. 'For,' denoting the end served. To be distinguished from *πρός* with the accusative as above used to express the object had in view, is the case in which it denotes the end to which a thing serves, the object subserved, in which, however, equally, it is rendered by 'for.' E.g. *Æsch. Agam.* 278, *ἰσχύς πορευτοῦ λαμπάδος πρὸς ἡδονήν*, 'the power for pleasure of a moving torch,' that is, 'the power of a moving torch to give pleasure;' *Soph. Electr.* 909, *οὐ πρὸς ἡδονήν λέγω τάδε*, 'I say not this so as to please you, for your pleasure;' *Id. ib.* 369, *μηδὲν πρὸς ὀργήν*, '(say) nothing angrily,' or rather, perhaps, 'that will excite anger.' *Plat. Symp.* 176, D, *πίνοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν*, 'drinking for pleasure,' 'so as to give pleasure.' Both the preposition and the accusative have the same interpretation here as where they express purpose, or the object had in view. And it may be observed, that whether the meaning that results from the employment of *πρός* with the accusative case shall be the ground or reason of an action, or the object had in view, or the end to which it serves, must depend on the connection. For, when an object is pointed to by *πρός* as being that to which the view is directed, or which is had in view, it may stand in any one of these relations equally; which one of them is intended in any particular instance can be determined only by the attending circumstances.

k. 'For,' 'in exchange for,' 'against,' 'with.' *Πρός* with the accusative case is used also in the sense of 'for,' 'in exchange for,' 'against,' 'with.' E.g. *Plat. Phæd.* 69, A, *ἡδονάς πρὸς ἡδονάς, καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας, καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι*, 'to exchange pleasures for pleasures,' or 'pleasures with pleasures,' or 'pleasures against pleasures;' *Il. vi.* 235, *ὃς πρὸς Τυδείδην Διομήδεα τεύχε' ἀμείβεν*, 'who exchanged arms with Diomedes son of Tydeus;' where it is to be remarked that *πρός* with the accusative marks the person 'with' whom the exchange is made, not the thing 'for' which another is exchanged. In such a case *πρός* could not be rendered by 'for' or 'against,' but only by 'with.' Yet the interpretation of both the preposition and

the accusative case is the same as where the object for which another is exchanged is intended. As above explained, *πρός* here, properly speaking, marks merely the relative position of the objects interchanged, namely, that the one is regarded as 'looking towards' the other, as standing 'face to face' with regard to it; whence comes the idea of the one being 'over against' the other. The notion of actual exchange, which alone distinguishes this from a number of other cases in which *πρός* has the sense of 'looking towards,' standing 'face to face,' is suggested chiefly by the nature of the action qualified by *πρός*. This remark applies only where one thing is exchanged for another. Where *πρός* with the accusative denotes the person with whom the exchange is made, it is to be considered as expressing simply the meaning of 'face to face.' The accusative in this construction has plainly the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards.' Thus, in the first example given, *ἡδονάς πρὸς ἡδονάς καταλλάττεσθαι*, 'to exchange pleasures for pleasures,' the meaning is, 'to exchange pleasures for or against . . . as regards pleasures,' 'as far as pleasures are concerned,' the accusative showing that the exchange is confined within the limits marked by it.

l. 'In accordance with,' 'as becomes,' 'suitably to.' Immediately connected with the preceding uses of *πρός* with the accusative is that in which it expresses conformity with, where it is rendered in English by 'in accordance with,' 'as becomes,' 'suitably to.' E.g. *Æsch. Prom.* 1002-3, *τόλμησόν ποτε | πρὸς τὰς παρούσας πημονὰς ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν*, 'have the heart to think rightly, as becomes, in accordance with, your present ills;' *Id. Soph. c. Theb.* 501, *πρὸς λόγον τοῦ σήματος*, 'suitably to the expression (legend) of the device.' The office of *πρός* in this construction is to show that an action or statement 'looks towards' or has regard to an object, which is introduced by the accusative case as defining the extent to which this relation is to be admitted. The idea of conformity on the part of the action to the object towards which it looks, with which it stands 'face to face,' as expressed by *πρός*, is not directly conveyed by the preposition, but is supplied by the mind, just as, in other

cases, it is left to be inferred that the relation between a foregoing statement and the object towards which it looks is that of ground or reason, object had in view, proportion, comparison, &c. As additional examples may be cited, Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 43, *δεῖ οὖν πρὸς τὰ συνβαίνοντα, οἶμαι, τοῦτο χρῆσθαι*, 'it behooves us, therefore, methinks, to use these things according to circumstances;' Id. ib. ii. 2, 18, *ἢ (κράτιστον ἡμῖν) σκοποῦντας τὰ ἔργα ἐκάστου, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τὰς τιμὰς ἐκάστῳ προστεθέναι*; 'or is it best for us to consider each man's deeds, and to bestow upon each honors also in conformity with these?'

To this place belong the examples in which *πρὸς* is used with the accusative case of pronouns in the sense of 'in conformity with one's mind or views,' of 'what is agreeable to or suits' a person, and, hence, with the idea of being 'of one's party.' E.g. Xen. Anab. vii. 7, 30, *ποτέρως οὖν οἶμι μᾶλλον ἂν . . . φρονεῖν τὰ πρὸς σε*; 'do you suppose that they would think more in accord with you?' properly, 'that they would more entertain the thoughts that look to or have regard to you?'

Here also belong certain forms of expression called adverbial; as, *πρὸς βίαν*, 'by force of,' 'by dint of,' that is, 'according to, as belongs to, after the way of, force.' E.g. Æsch. Prom. 208, *ῥοντ' ἀμοχθεὶ πρὸς βίαν τε δεσπόσειν*, 'they supposed that they would exercise dominion without trouble and by dint of force.' In the same way, *πρὸς ἀνάγκην*, 'by necessity,' that is, 'conformably to necessity,' 'as accords with necessity,' *πρὸς ἰσχύος κρᾶτος*, 'by the force of strength,' 'by dint of might,' Soph. Phil. 594, and some others. (See Passow's Lex. s. v. *προς*, c. iv.) But *πρὸς ἡδονήν*, 'to please,' 'for the pleasure of,' *πρὸς χάριν*, 'to gratify,' 'for the gratification of,' and, hence, 'for the sake of,' mentioned in this connection by Passow, have a different interpretation, and should be referred to the case in which *πρὸς* with the accusative marks the end to which a thing serves. (See above, p. 446.) To the above list may be added *πρὸς τὸ χαρτερόν*, 'by might,' that is, 'according to the rule of the stronger,' Æsch. Prom. 212; *πρὸς ἀλκήν*, 'vigorously,' that is, 'in accordance with, as becomes, energetic action,' Id. Suppl.

812; Id. Pers. 561, *λειψθέντες πρὸς ἀνάγκην*, 'left of necessity,' that is, 'as belongs to, in accordance with, necessity;' Id. Choeph. 871, *πρὸς δίκην πεπληγμένης*, 'struck justly,' that is, 'in accordance with justice.' (See, for the examples, Lex. Æschyl. Ed. Wunder.)

m. 'In proportion to,' 'in comparison with,' 'in relation to.' *Πρὸς* with the accusative is used also in a sense kindred to the above, when it conveys the idea that an object is to be considered as bearing a proportion to another, or as being compared with it, and may be rendered in English by 'in proportion to,' 'in comparison with.' E.g. Xen. de re Equest. i. 16, *πρὸς δὲ ταύτας (τὰς κνήμας), ὡς ἂν συμμετρῶς ἔχῃ, συναύξεται καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα*, 'the rest of the body also, in order to be symmetrical, grows in proportion to the knees;' Id. ib. xii. 1, *φαμέν χρῆναι τὸν θώρακα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα πεποιῆσθαι*, 'we say that it is necessary that the breastplate should be in proportion to the body;' Herod. iii. 34, *εἶρετο Καμβύσης κοῖος τίς δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τέλει Κῦρον*, 'Cambyses asked what sort of a man he appeared to be in comparison with his father Cyrus;' Id. viii. 44, *Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους παρέχομενοι νῆας ὀγδώκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν*, 'the Athenians furnished a hundred and eighty ships, compared with, counted against, in proportion to, all the rest;' Id. iii. 94, and ii. 35, *ἔργα λόγου μέζω παρέχεται πρὸς πᾶσαν χώραν*, 'exhibits greater works in comparison with every other country,' that is, 'above every other country.' (See, for the examples, Schweigh. Lex. Herod.) The notion of 'in proportion to,' and 'in comparison with,' conveyed by *πρὸς*, arises from the preposition representing an object as standing 'face to face' with another, and so 'over against' it. And this second object is appropriately introduced by the accusative case in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards,' or as marking the object with regard to which exclusively the relation signified by *πρὸς* is affirmed.

(For the table of the significations and use of *πρὸς* with cases of nouns, see the next page.)

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *πρός* WITH CASES.

Significations of <i>πρός</i> .	Gen.: 'with respect to.'	Dative: 'for.'	Accusative: 'as to,' 'as regards.'
1. 'Before,' 'fronting,' 'in the presence of.' Looking towards.	1. a. 'Before,' 'in the presence of,' 'by,' in adjurations. (Looking towards.) b. 'On the quarter of,' 'on,' 'against.' c. 'On the side of,' 'near.' d. 'In the eyes of.' e. 'On the side of,' 'descent.' f. 'On the side of,' 'of the party of.' g. 'On the part of,' 'with,' 'among.' h. 'According to the character of.' i. 'At the hands of,' 'from,' 'by.'	1. a. 'Before,' 'in front of.' b. 'At,' 'near,' 'about.' (Looking towards.) c. 'To,' 'on,' 'against.'	1. a. 'Before,' 'in the presence of,' 'in the eyes of,' 'with.' b. 'At,' 'near.' (Looking towards.) c. 'Towards,' 'to,' 'for,' 'Let ergo, in.' d. 'To.' e. 'Against.' f. 'With,' where parties are concerned. 'That concerns,' 'relating to.' g. 'In regard to,' 'concerning.' h. 'For,' 'with a view to.' i. 'For,' 'the end served.' k. 'For,' 'in exchange for,' 'against,' 'with.' l. 'In accordance with,' 'as becomes,' 'suitably to.' m. 'In proportion to,' 'in comparison with.'
2. 'Before,' 'forwards' relatively, 'in advance of.' 'Besides,' 'in addition to.'		2. ('Before,' 'forwards' relatively, 'in advance of.') 'Besides,' 'in addition to.'	

Πρόσθεν.

Πρόσθεν, which has also a poetic and Ionic form *πρόσθε*, is compounded of the preposition *πρός*, 'before,' and the ending *θεν*, signifying 'from,' seen also in *οἶκο-θεν*, 'from home,' *οὐρανό-θεν*, 'from heaven,' *Διό-θεν*, 'from Jove,' *ἐν-θεν*, 'thence,' 'from thence.' In some cases, *θεν* seems to be equivalent in meaning to the genitive-ending, as *σέ-θεν*, 'of thee,' *ἐμέ-θεν*, 'of me,' *ἑ-θεν*, 'of himself.' (See Passow's Lex.)

Signification and use of πρόσθεν with the genitive case.

1. 'Before,' 'in front of.' a.) Of space: e.g. Il. xii. 145, *ἐκ δὲ τῷ ἀΐξαντε πυλάων πρόσθε μαχέσθην*, 'they fought before, in front of, the gates;' Il. xxii. 463-4, . . . *τὸν δ' ἐνόησεν | ἐλκόμενον πρόσθεν πόλιος*, 'he saw him dragged before, in front of, the city;' Æsch. Pers. 439, *νῆσός τις ἐστὶ πρόσθε Σαλαμῶνος τόπων*, 'there is an island in front of Salamis.' b.) Of time: e.g. Il. ii. 359, *ὄφρα πρόσθ' ἄλλων θάνατον καὶ πότμον ἐπίσπῃ*, 'that he may reach death and his fate before others;' Soph. Phil. 767, *ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τῷ πρόσθ' ἐμοῦ κεκτημένῳ*, 'that possessed them before me.' (See Passow's Lexicon.) In

such examples, allowing that *πρόσθεν* has the proper sense of 'from before,' its use may be explained by observing that, in Greek, the position of an object is sometimes marked by regarding the point to which it is referred as that from which it looks towards the speaker; as in *πατρώ-θεν*, 'from his father,' where we would say, 'on his father's side.' (See Herod. ii. 14, and what has been said on this subject above in treating of *ἀπὸ*, p. 183.) With this use may be compared the Latin *ab oriente*, 'on the east,' properly, 'from the east.' So that the expression *πυλάων πρόσθε* properly means, 'from before,' or rather 'looking forth from the front or face, and, hence, on the quarter of the face or front of the gates;' and this would be equivalent to 'before or in front of the gates,' just as *ἀπὸ νότου ἀνέμου*, 'from the south wind,' would be equivalent to 'on the south.' In the same way may be understood *πρόσθε ποδός*, 'before the foot:' e.g. Il. xxiii. 877, *πρόσθεν Μηριόναο πάγῃ ποδός*, 'stuck fast before the foot of Meriones.'

2. 'Before,' in the sense of 'in defence of.' This is merely another application of the sense of 'before' just mentioned, where the object which stands before another is a shield or protection from danger. E.g. Il. vii. 224, *τὸ πρόσθε στέρνοιο φέριων Τελαμώνιος Αἴας*, 'bearing this before his breast,' that is, 'in defence of his breast,' spoken of the shield of Aias.

'For,' 'in behalf of.' So also, in the sense of 'for,' 'in behalf of:' e.g. Il. xxi. 587, *οἳ κε πρόσθε φίλων τοκέων, ἀλόχων τε καὶ υἱῶν | Ἴλιον εἰρυόμεσθα*, 'who defended Ilium on behalf of our dear parents, and wives, and children;' properly, 'before, in front of, our dear parents;' or, recurring to the proper notion of *πρόσθεν* and the genitive, as above explained, 'on the quarter of, that is, before or in front . . . with respect to our dear parents.' (For the examples, see Passow's Lexicon.)

Σύν.

Σύν, of which the fuller form *ξύν*, equivalent to *γούν* or *χούν*, was common in the more ancient Attic dialect, as in Thucydides and the tragic writers, and occurs more rarely

in Homer and Hesiod, is the same with the Latin *cum*, which retains the guttural of the form *ξύν*, (*γσύν* or *χσύν*), but loses the *σ*, and has *ν* instead of *ν* at the end. It is supposed to be related to the Sanskrit *sa-*, *sam-*, and to the Greek *σύν* in *δμα*. (See Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, s. v., Pott Etym. Forsch. i. 130, and P. Knight, Proleg. ad Homerum.)

Signification of σύν.

The proper sense of *σύν* is 'together with,' 'with,' having the notion of conjunction. Thus, in compounds, as *συλλέγειν*, 'to collect,' 'to gather together,' *σύλεκτρος*, 'a bed-fellow,' *συλλογίζεσθαι*, 'to reckon up together,' *συμβάλλειν*, 'to throw together.' And so when used with nouns: as, Soph. Phil. 920, *ξύν σοι τὰ Τροίας πεδία πορθῆσαι μολών*, 'to waste the plains of Troy in company with you;' Æschyl. S. c. Theb. 445, *σύν τ' ἄλλοις θεοῖς*, 'in company with the other gods.' And this same sense of accompaniment and conjunction is involved in the other uses of *σύν*, even in the case where it seems to express the instrument or means, and is translated by 'with' and 'by:' e.g. Æsch. Pers. 741, *πλοῦτον ἐκτήσω σὺν αἰχμῇ*, 'you acquired wealth with the spear;' for here the sense is, 'with the help of the spear,' just as where it is said, Soph. Œd. Tyr. 146, *ἡ γὰρ εὐτυχεῖς ξὺν τῷ θεῷ φανούμεθα ἡ πεπτωκότες*, 'with the help of the god.' *Σύν*, having this sense, differs from *δμα* in expressing merely conjunction and accompaniment, while the latter conveys the idea of contemporaneousness, being equivalent to 'at the same time with.'

Signification and use of σύν with its case.

Σύν is employed with the dative case alone, the case being dependent upon the signification of conjunction or accompaniment contained in the preposition itself, just as it depends upon the notion of equality in *ἴσος*, 'equal,' upon that of likeness in *δμοιος*, 'like,' and upon that of identity in *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same.'

1. *a.* 'With,' 'together with.' *Σύν* is used with the dative case to denote the companionship or conjunction of one object with another in any action, or the accompaniment of

one action by another, and is expressed in English by 'with,' 'together with.' E.g. Il. v. 473-4, *φῆς που ἄτερ λαῶν πόλιν ἐξέμεν ἡδ' ἐπικούρων | ὅλος σὺν γαμβροῖσι κιαστῆταισι τε σοῖσιν*, 'you will say that you will hold the city without the people and the allies, alone with your brothers-in-law and your brothers,' that is, 'together with,' 'in conjunction with;' Id. ib. 494, *αὐτίκα δ' ὀχέων σὺν τεύχεσιν ἄλτο χαμᾶζε*, 'he leapt upon the ground with his arms,' that is, 'together with his arms;' Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 586, *ὄλωλεν ἀνδρῶν ξὺν θεοπτύστῳ γένει*, 'he perished together with the god-hated race of men;' Id. ib. 746, *δέδοικα δὲ σὺν βασιλεῦσι | μὴ πόλις δαμασθῇ*, 'I fear lest the city be subdued together with the kings.'

b. 'With,' in the sense of 'against.' Remarkable is the case in which *σύν*, in connection with *μάχεσθαι*, 'to fight,' is used in the sense of 'against:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. v. 3, 5, *καὶ αὐτὸς σὺν ἐκείνῳ μάχοιτο*, 'himself too would fight with him,' that is, 'against him.' Here the community of which *σύν* is the sign refers to the act of fighting considered as between enemies. Two persons fighting the one with or against the other have community in the action, though it be one of hostility. Whether they join in an act of fighting as friends against a third party, or as enemies one with the other, the sense of conjunction expressed by *σύν* is equally appropriate, and is the same in both cases. The sense of 'against,' as attributed to *σύν*, arises wholly from the hostile relations of the parties to a conjoint action. The Latin *cum* and the English 'with' are employed in the same way; as, *pugnare cum hostibus*, 'to fight with the enemy,' that is, 'against the enemy.'

2. 'With.' *Σύν* is further used with the dative in a variety of cases, in all of which, however, the preposition has the same idea of accompaniment or conjunction. They deserve to be noticed separately on account of the peculiarities of signification which *σύν* acquires from the circumstances attending its use. Thus:

a. 'With the help of.' In such examples as *σὺν θεῷ*, 'with the help of god:' e.g. Soph. Aj. 766, *τάχ' ἂν γενοίμεθ' αὐτοῦ σὺν θεῷ σωτήρι*, 'we shall soon be there as saviors, with the help of god;' Id. ib. 752, *βοῦλον κρατεῖν μέν, σὺν θεῷ*

δ' *δεὶ κρατεῖν*, 'with the help of god to be always superior.' It is obvious that the only sense, properly speaking, conveyed by *σύν*, in such examples, is that of 'together with,' 'in company or conjunction with,' and that the notion of help afforded is suggested by the character and attributes of the being represented by the term *θεῶν*.

b. 'With,' to mark an accompanying quality. Again, *σύν* introduces an accompanying quality of an object: e.g. Od. xxiv. 193, *ἦ δ' ἄρα σύν μεγάλῃ ἀρετῇ ἐκτήσω ἄκοιτιν*, 'surely, then, you obtained a spouse with (having) great virtue.' Here, also, the sense of *σύν* is the same as in the cases already mentioned, for it merely shows that the quality added is something accompanying, or found in conjunction with, a person.

In the same way are to be regarded the examples in which *σύν* introduces any accompanying circumstances or condition of an action: e.g. Il. v. 219, *σύν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν | ἀντιθίην ἐλδόντε*, 'coming against us with horses and chariots,' that is, 'with the accompaniment of horses and chariots;' Soph. Antig. 116, *ξύν θ' ἵπποκόμοις κορύθεσσιν*, 'with crested helmets,' that is, 'with the accompaniment of crested helmets;' Id. Œd. Tyr. 585, *εἴ τιν' ἄν δοκεῖς ἀρχειν ἐλῆσθαι ξὺν φόβοισιν*, 'if you think that any one will choose to reign attended by alarms,' that is, 'with the attendant condition of alarms.'

Here belong such expressions as *σύν τύχῃ*, 'happily,' 'with good success:' e.g. Soph. Philoct. 775, . . . *ξὺν τύχῃ δὲ πρόσφερε*; *σύν σπουδῇ*, 'with haste,' 'hastily,' 'with earnestness,' 'earnestly:' e.g. Id. ib. 1222-3, *οὐκ ἄν φράσεαις ἦεν | αὐτὸν παλίντροπος | κέλευθον ἔρπεις ὧδε σύν σπουδῇ ταχύς*; (see Ellendt, Lex. Sophocl.)

c. 'On the side of.' *Σύν* admits of the same explanation when it occurs with the dative after *εἶναι* and *γίνεσθαι* in the sense of 'on the side of:' e.g. Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 21, *ἀγωνοθέται δ' οἱ θεοὶ εἰσιν, οἱ σύν ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἶδος, ἔσονται*, 'who will be on our side,' that is, 'who will be conjoined with us.'

d. 'With,' 'in accordance with.' *Σύν* with the dative is used also in the sense of 'with,' 'in accordance with:' e.g. Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 18, *ἀλλὰ σύν τῷ δεκαίῳ καὶ καλῷ ᾤετο δεῖν τούτων τυχεῖν*, 'but he considered that he ought to obtain

these things in accordance or conformity with justice and honor,' or 'fairly and honorably,' that is, 'with accompanying justice and honor.'

e. 'With,' marking the instrument or means. *Σύν* with the dative case is used seemingly to express the instrument or means with which an action is performed: e.g. Soph. Phil. 1334-5, (*πρὶν*) *τὰ πέρραμα | . . . ξὺν τοῖσδε τόξοις . . . πέρσας φανῆς*, 'before you shall be seen to have destroyed the citadel with these arrows.' Here, however, *σύν* does no more, in fact, than introduce the concomitant circumstances or conditions of an action, or the accompanying means, and not the simple instrument: the arrows of Philoctetus are not represented simply and directly as the instrument to be employed for the destruction of the Trojan citadel, but as that with which as a concomitant means the deed is to be accomplished. Ellendt, Lex. Sophocl., p. 763, vol. ii., correctly interprets the passage by "*juvant enim excidium tela non sola efficiunt*." The Latin *cum* is used in the same way with *σύν*, so far as the meaning of the preposition itself is concerned, in such examples as *oppidum cum vi cepit*, 'he took the town by (with an) assault,' that is, 'he took the town, and with attending force (storming) as a means.' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 123-4, *| ληστές κτανεῖν νῦν . . . σύν πλήθει χειρῶν*, 'that robbers slew him with a multitude of hands,' that is, 'with the accompanying agency of many hands;' Id. Antig. 1252, *νέος νέφ ξὺν μόρῳ ἔθανες*, 'you died in youth with a strange fate,' that is, 'the circumstances by which your death was attended and procured were strange;' Xen. Œcon. v. 13, *πολλάκις δ' ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ ασφαλέστερόν ἐστι σύν τοῖς δπλοῖς τὴν τροφὴν μαστεύειν ἢ σύν τοῖς γεωργικοῖς ὀργάνοις*, 'in war also it is oftentimes safer to seek subsistence with arms than with implements of husbandry,' that is, 'with the employment of arms rather than with the employment of implements of husbandry as an accompanying means.' In these and similar cases, the chief attention of the speaker or writer is directed to the action itself by which any thing is effected, while the means by which the result is attained are regarded as merely attendant or concomitant. (See Ellendt, l. c.) This signification of *σύν* is obvious in the expression *σύν βίῃ*,

'with (accompanying) force,' frequently met with in Attic Greek.

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS OF *σύν* WITH ITS CASE.

Signification of <i>σύν</i> .	Dative: 'for.'
'With,' 'together with.'	1. a. 'With,' 'together with.' b. 'With,' 'against;' as with <i>μάχεσθαι</i> . c. 'With the help of;' as, <i>σύν θεῷ</i> . d. 'With,' 'having,' marking an attendant quality, circumstance, or condition; as, <i>σύν μεγάλῃ ἀρετῇ ἐκτίσω ἀκοίτην</i> . e. 'With,' 'on the side of.' f. 'With,' 'in accordance with;' as, <i>σύν δικῷ</i> . g. 'With,' marking the accompanying means; as, <i>σύν βίᾳ</i> .

Υπέρ.

'Υπέρ, in Epic Greek written also *υπείρ*, is the same with the Sanskrit *upari*, the Latin *super*, the German *über*, old-German *obar*, the Gothic *ufar*, the Anglo-Saxon *ofer*, English *over*, and is probably nearly akin to *up* and *upper*, the German *auf*. (See Bopp, Glossar. Sanskr.) If it should be found to have the same radical with the English *up* and the German *auf*, then its formation would be *ὑπ* + *ερ*, just as *upper* is composed of *up* + *er*, the *p* being doubled by the stress of the voice in the pronunciation, and its ending *ερ*, like *er* in *ov-er*, *up-per*, *wis-er*, *bold-er*, may possibly give it the relative sense which, in the same way with *upper* and *over*, it always has. But this is at least doubtful.

Significations of *υπέρ*.

1. 'Over.' The proper signification of *υπέρ* is 'over,' with the idea of a relative position 'above' or 'up' with respect to an object that is 'under' or 'below.' Accordingly, it stands opposed to *ὑπό*, 'under.' If *υπέρ* be a compound form, as above suggested as being not impossible, this relative sense will be appropriate to the form. That this is the meaning of *υπέρ* is seen from its use in compounds; as, *υπερβαίνειν*, 'to lift above or over,' *υπερβαίνειν*, 'to step over,' 'to ascend above:' e.g. Il. xii. 468, *τείχος υπερβαίνειν*, 'to pass, to go over, the wall;' Od. viii. 80, *Πυθῶϊ ἐν ἀγαθέῃ, ὅδ' ὑπέρβη λάϊνον οὐδὸν | χρησόμενος*, 'when he

crossed the stone threshold to consult the oracle;' Herod. iv. 25, *οὐδείς σφρα (τὰ οὐρεα) υπερβαίνει*, 'no one passes over, or crosses, the mountains;' Id. ii. 13, *οὐκ υπερβαίνει (ὁ ποταμὸς) ἐς τὴν χώραν*, 'the river does not overflow upon the district;' *υπερέχειν*, 'to hold over or above;' e.g. Il. ii. 428, *(σπλάγχνα) υπερέχον Ἡφαίστου*, 'they held the entrails over or above the fire;' *υπερθύριον*, 'the lintel of the doorway;' Od. vii. 90, *υπερκύπτειν*, 'to stoop over,' 'to peep;' *υπερτείνειν*, 'to stretch over;' e.g. Herod. iv. 71, *παραπήξαντες αἰχμὰς ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν τοῦ νεκροῦ ξύλα υπερτείνουσι*, 'they fasten spears (in the ground) alongside of the dead body on this side and that, and place pieces of wood over these.' This sense of *υπέρ* is seen also in its use with nouns: e.g. Il. iv. 527-8, *βάλε δουρὶ | στέρνον ὑπὲρ μαζοῖο*, 'he struck him with his spear on the breast above or over the paps;' Id. ib. ii. 20, *στῇ δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς*, 'stood over, above, his head.' (See Passow's Lexicon, from which the above examples have been borrowed.)

2. a. 'For,' 'on behalf of.' From the signification of 'over,' 'above,' is derived that of 'for,' 'on behalf of,' which *υπέρ* very often has. Thus, in compounds, as, *υπερδικεῖν*, 'to plead for, in behalf of;' *υπερέχειν*, 'to hold over' as a protection; e.g. Il. v. 433, *ὁ οἱ αὐτὸς ὑπέριχε χεῖρας Ἀπόλλων*, 'on which account Apollo himself held his hands over him,' that is, 'covered or protected him with his hands;' *υπερ-κλμνεν*, 'to toil for' or 'on behalf of;' *υπερπονεῖν*, 'to labor for' or 'on behalf of.' And so in its use with nouns: e.g. Il. vii. 449, *τείχος ἐτείχισσαντο νεῶν ὑπὲρ*, 'they built a wall for the protection of the ships;' *υπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀμύνειν*, 'to fight for one's country.' (For the examples, see Passow's Lexicon.) That the meaning of 'for,' 'on behalf of,' springs immediately from the local relation of 'over,' 'above,' is plain from such instances as the second above cited, in which the action that affords protection, or that is done 'for,' 'on behalf of,' an object, is one that contains the local relation of 'over,' 'above.'

b. 'For,' 'to the end that.' Obviously referable to the sense of 'for,' 'on behalf of,' is that of 'for,' 'to the end that,' 'for the purpose of,' in which *υπέρ* is not uncommonly employed with the infinitive: e.g. Xen. Hieron, iv. 3,

δορυφοροῦσι δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς κακούργους ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν βιαίῳ θανάτῳ ἀποδινήσκειν, 'to the end that no one of the citizens may perish by a violent death,' that is, 'on the behalf of their not dying by a violent death.'

c. 'For,' 'instead of.' Very nearly related to the sense of 'for,' 'on behalf of,' is that in which it is rendered by 'for,' 'instead of,' 'in the name of:' e.g. Thuc. i. 141, μέλειν δέ τινι καὶ ἄλλῳ (οὔτεται) ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ τι προῖδεῖν, 'he considers that it is the concern of some other one, in fact, to have forecast in his room;' Xen. Anab. vii. 4, 9, ἢ καὶ ἐθέλως δν . . . ὑπὲρ τούτου ἀποθανεῖν; 'would you, indeed, be willing to die for, in the room of, this lad?' The proper sense of ὑπέρ, in such examples, is 'on the behalf of,' which, however, in certain circumstances, and with certain actions, is the same as 'in the place or room of.' To die 'for,' 'on behalf of,' another, when the alternative is that he shall die himself, is to die 'in his stead.'

3. a. 'Of,' 'concerning,' 'about,' the Latin *de*. Another meaning of ὑπέρ figuratively employed is that of 'of,' 'concerning,' 'about,' answering to the Latin *de*. E.g. Il. vi. 524, ὅδ' ὑπὲρ σέθεν αἶσχε' ἀκούω | πρὸς Τρώων, 'when I hear words of reproach about you from the Trojans;' Herod. ii. 128, τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὲρ ἐκάστων ἀκοῇ γράφω, 'I write from hearsay what is said about each matter.' Here the meaning of ὑπέρ would seem to be the proper signification of the preposition used metaphorically. As the Greeks said, ὑπέρ τινος μάχεσθαι, 'to fight over a person,' in the sense of 'to fight for, in behalf of, a person,' so also they said ὑπέρ τινος λέγειν, 'to speak over, above, a person or thing,' in the sense of 'to speak about a person or thing.' And, although this mode of speaking is utterly foreign to our ideas, there does not appear to be any ground in the nature of things to doubt that a thing may be represented as said or done about, concerning, an object as well by placing it 'over' (ὑπέρ) as by making it to stand 'about' it (περί), which is continually done both in English and Greek. The only difference would be that, when περί was employed, the action of speaking, for example, was referred to an object by being made to occupy the relative position of 'around,' 'about' it,

while, when ὑπέρ was employed, it was regarded as standing to it in the relative position of 'over,' 'above.'

b. 'For,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' 'on account of,' 'in regard to.' Admitting what has just been said, there may be found a tolerably satisfactory solution of the case in which ὑπέρ has the sense of 'for,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' and 'on account of,' 'in regard to,' the meaning here being immediately connected with that of 'concerning,' 'about.' The transition is easy from the notion of 'concerning,' 'about,' to that of 'in regard to,' 'on account of,' 'because of,' 'by reason of:' e.g. Xen. Cyrop. vii. 1, 7, θάρρει ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων, 'be confident about them,' or 'in regard to them;' Id. Anab. i. 7, 3, τῆς ἐλευθερίας . . . ὑπὲρ ἧς ὑμῶς ἐγὼ εὐδαιμονίζω, 'concerning, in regard to, on account of, which I congratulate you;' Eurip. Suppl. 1130, βάρος μὲν οὐκ ἀβριθὲς ἀλγέων ὑπερ, 'a burthen not light because of, in regard to, on account of, by reason of, my sorrows;' Æsch. Prom. 66, σῶν ὑπὲρ στένω πόνων, 'I am sorry for, because of, on account of, your afflictions,' or the rendering might be, 'concerning, and, possibly, on behalf of, your afflictions;' there is seen, at least, in this example, how very near the sense of 'for,' 'because of,' 'on account of,' is to being confounded with that of 'about,' 'concerning.' Such instances go far to show that the relative position of 'over,' 'above,' may give not only the notion of 'concerning,' 'about,' but also that of 'in regard to,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' and that the latter is nearly related to the former.

4. a. 'Over,' 'beyond.' 'Υπέρ has also the signification of 'over,' 'beyond;' and this, considered in a local relation, may be regarded as springing directly from the proper meaning of 'over,' 'above.' For, confining the view to the relation had by 'above,' 'over,' to its opposite 'below' or 'under,' it is easy to see that an action that goes 'above' or 'over' an object does, in fact, go 'beyond' it in the direction of above, and as regards a point from below. And, to provide for the case in which ὑπέρ expresses 'beyond' for other directions also, as it very often does, it is only necessary to observe that an object may reach a position 'be-

yond' another by passing 'over' it in any direction; and then, further, that *ὑπέρ*, 'over,' in its secondary meaning of 'beyond,' is used generally of other directions besides the proper one of above. Thus, in *Od. viii. 192*, *ὃ δ' ὑπέρπτατο σήματα πάντα*, 'it (the discus) flew beyond every mark,' it is plain that the discus reached a point 'beyond' the marks made for previous throws by passing 'over' them. And so in many compounds; as, *ὑπερβαίνειν*, 'to step over,' and, hence, 'to pass beyond;' e.g. *Od. viii. 80*, *ὃδ' ὑπέρβη λῆϊνον οὐδὸν*, 'when he passed the stone threshold,' that is, 'stepped over' and 'went beyond;' *Herod. iv. 25*, *οὐδεὶς σφεα (τὰ οὐρεα) ὑπερβαίνει*, 'no one passes over, or crosses, the mountains,' that is, 'goes beyond them.' In such examples, the notion of 'beyond' follows upon that of 'over,' though the reference may be to other directions than that of 'above' or upwards. The English 'over' obtains in many compounds the same secondary sense of 'beyond;' as, 'to overleap,' 'to overdo,' 'to overwork.'

b. 'Beyond,' 'against,' 'contrary to.' To the sense of *ὑπέρ* just mentioned belongs also that of 'beyond,' 'against,' 'contrary to,' in such expressions as *ὑπὲρ αἰσαν*, 'contrary to destiny,' *ὑπὲρ μοῖραν*, 'against one's fate or allotment,' and others. E.g. *Il. xx. 336*, *μὴ καὶ ὑπὲρ μοῖραν δόμον Ἅϊδος εἰσαφίκηαι*, 'lest you enter the abode of Hades contrary even to your appointed lot.' (See Passow's *Lexicon*.) So likewise in some few compounds; as, *ὑπερβαίνειν*, 'to go beyond,' and, hence, 'to transgress;' thus, *ὑπερβαίνειν τοὺς νόμους*, 'to transgress the laws;' *ὑπερπηδᾶν*, 'to overleap,' and 'to transgress;' thus, *ὑπερπηδᾶν τὰ νόμιμα*, 'to transgress what is lawful.' Here *ὑπέρ* has properly the sense of 'over,' 'above,' and, hence, of 'beyond;' and from this comes that of 'against,' 'contrary to;' or, rather, the meaning of 'beyond' is equivalent in certain circumstances to that of 'against,' 'contrary to.'

Summary of the significations of ὑπέρ.

'*Υπέρ*. 1. 'Over,' 'above.'

2. a. 'For,' 'on behalf of.'

b. 'For,' 'to the end that.'

c. 'For,' 'instead of.'

3. a. 'Of,' 'concerning,' 'about,' Latin *de*.

b. 'For,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' 'on account of,' 'in regard to.'

4. a. 'Over,' 'above,' 'beyond.'

b. 'Beyond,' 'against,' 'contrary to.'

SIGNIFICATION AND USE OF *ὑπέρ* WITH CASES.

I. '*Υπέρ* with the genitive case.

1. 'Over,' 'above.' '*Υπέρ* with the genitive case is used in the local sense of 'over,' 'above,' the genitive indicating the object with respect to which specifically any thing occupies this relative position. E.g. *Il. xv. 381-2*, . . . *ὥστε μέγα κύμα θαλάσσης εὐρυπόροιο | νηὸς ὑπὲρ τοίχων καταβήσεται*, 'as a huge wave of the wide sea will come down over the sides (walls) of a ship;' *Il. xx. 279*, . . . *ἐγχείη δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ νώτου ἐνὶ γαίῃ | ἔστη ἱεμένη*, 'but the spear flying over his back stood in the ground;' *Soph. Antig. 117*, *στάς δ' ὑπὲρ μελάρων*, 'standing over, above, the house;' *Id. Aj. 1258*, *πηδῶντος Ἑκτορος τάρφρων ὑπὲρ*, 'as Hector leapt over the ditch;' *Xen. Cyrop. vi. 3, 24*, *τοξεύοντος ὑπὲρ τῶν πρόσθεν*, 'shooting over those in advance of them;' *Id. iii. 4, 29*, *ἐπεὶ δ' οὗτοι ἐγένοντο ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐπομένων*, 'when these were above those who came after,' that is, 'when they were above, on higher ground, with respect to those who were following;' *Æsch. Agam. 559*, *ὑπὲρ θαλάσσης καὶ χθονὸς ποταμένους*, 'that fly over the sea and the land;' that is, 'over . . . with respect to the sea and the land.'

2. a. 'For,' 'on behalf of.' '*Υπέρ* with the genitive is used, further, in the sense of 'for,' 'on behalf of,' in a great variety of applications, the preposition having properly the notion of 'over,' and, hence, of protection or defence afforded by an object covering and shielding another by being over or above it, and, in a more general way, of the performing an action 'for' or 'on behalf of' a person. The genitive, in this construction, according to its common office, marks the object with respect to which it is affirmed that an action is performed for it, or on its behalf. E.g. *Il.*

i. 443-4, . . . Φοίβῳ δ' ἱερὴν ἑκατόμβην | ῥέξαι ὑπὲρ Δαναῶν, 'to offer to Apollo a sacred hecatomb on behalf of the Danaï;' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 253, ἐπιστήπτω τελεῖν | ὑπὲρ τ' ἐμῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τε τῆσδ' ἐγὼ γῆς, 'I enjoin it upon you to perform it for both myself, and the god, and this land;' Xen. Anab. vii. 7, 21, ὡς οὐ δικαίως μοι ἡχθρόσθης ὅτι ὑπὲρ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπήρουν σε, 'because I demanded it of you on behalf of the soldiers,' that is, 'on the behalf . . . with respect to the soldiers;' Id. Cyrop. ii. 1, 13, εἰ Κύρῳ συμβουλευέσσω τι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, 'to say any thing on our behalf.'

b. 'For,' 'instead of,' 'in the room of.' To this class of the uses of ὑπὲρ with the genitive belongs the case in which it is rendered in English by 'for,' 'instead of,' 'in the room of.' E.g. Xen. Anab. vii. 4, 9, ἡ καὶ ἐθέλωις ἄν . . . ὑπὲρ τούτου ἀποθανεῖν; 'indeed, would you be willing to die for, in the stead of, this lad?' Id. Hell. iii. 4, 15, ὥσπερ ἄν τις τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἀποθανοῦμενον προθύμως ζητοίη, 'as if a person were to be seeking eagerly for him who was going to die in his stead;' Id. Cyrop. iii. 3, 14, ἐπεὶ οὖν σὺ σιωπᾷς, ἐγὼ λέξω ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, 'I will speak for you and for us,' that is, 'in the place of you and us.' The genitive, here also, retains its proper sense of 'with respect to,' and the preposition contains the notion of being 'over,' and so of receiving or doing an action in the place of another, just as a shield that covers a person receives the blow aimed at him.

c. 'For,' 'to the end that.' Ὑπὲρ is used with the infinitive attended by the article in the genitive case to mark a purpose, or the end had in view, expressed in English by 'for,' 'to the end that,' 'with the view of.' E.g. Xen. Hieron, iv. 3, δορυφοροῦσι δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς κακούργους ὑπὲρ τοῦ μεγάλου τῶν πολιτῶν βλαψῆς θανάτῳ ἀποδιδόναι, 'to the end that no citizen may die a violent death;' Demosth. Phil. 52, 20, τὴν δὲ τελευταίαν (ὁρῶν) οὖσαν ἤδη ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν αὐτοὺς κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου, 'seeing, as he does, that the putting an end to the war has now for its aim that we may not ourselves be injured by Philip,' or, 'that the end of the war is now made with a view to ourselves not being injured by Philip.' Properly, the meaning of ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν αὐτοὺς κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου is, 'on behalf

of, for, the not being ourselves injured by Philip,' the preposition having really the same sense as in the preceding cases under this head. The genitive case has here, as elsewhere, the signification of 'with respect to.'

d. 'Of,' 'concerning,' 'about.' Among the significations of ὑπὲρ with the genitive case is to be mentioned that in which it is rendered in English by 'of,' 'concerning,' 'about,' and in Latin by *de*. E.g. Demosth. 9, 18, εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε, 'if you care about their safety,' where there may be discerned, perhaps, some indistinct notion of 'on behalf of;' 'if you have a concern on the behalf of their safety;' Il. vi. 524, 88, ὑπὲρ σέθεν αἰσχεῖ δακρύου | πρὸς Τρώων, 'when I hear from the Trojans words of reproach touching you.' Here, also, the sense may be, 'when, on your account, I hear reproaches from the Trojans;' but this is less probable. In Herod. ii. 123, cited by Passow, ὅτι τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἀκοῇ γράφω, 'that I write from hearsay what is said touching each matter,' the sense of ὑπὲρ is apparently the same as that of *περί* with the genitive; and so in Demosth. 554, 11, ἡ εἰσαγγελία ἐδόθη εἰς τὴν βουλὴν ὑπὲρ Ἀριστάρχου τοῦ Μόσχου, 'the information was given in to the council concerning, touching, Aristarchus son of Moschus;' and in Æschin. 22, 12, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ψηφισθαι ὧν ἂν ἡ δίκῃς ᾖ, 'to vote on whatever is the subject of the prosecution.' Assuming, then, that ὑπὲρ has the meaning here attributed to it, it may be explained, as above shown, by considering it to arise from the proper sense of 'over,' 'above,' in the same way that the signification of 'about,' 'concerning,' belonging to *περί* has its origin in the local relation of 'about,' 'around,' and that the English word 'about' obtains metaphorically the notion of 'concerning,' 'touching.' Namely, as 'the speaking about a person,' τὸ *περί* τινος λέγειν, means, in an accommodated sense, 'to speak of, concerning, a person,' so 'the speaking over a person,' τὸ ὑπὲρ τινος λέγειν, obtains the meaning of 'the speaking of, concerning, about, a person.' Apart from our familiarity with the English use of 'about,' so exactly resembling that of *περί*, it would seem to be as easy to pass from the local to the metaphorical sense in the one case as

in the other. It will be admitted, however, should this explanation be accepted, that the much rarer occurrence of *ὑπέρ* in this signification compared with *περί*, and the shade, at least, of the notion of 'on behalf of,' 'on account of,' which is seen in some of the instances in which *ὑπέρ* is rendered by 'concerning,' 'about,' go some good way to prove that this preposition was not confounded by the Greeks with *περί* even where we translate them by the same terms.

c. 'For,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' and 'on account of,' 'in regard to.' *Υπέρ* with the genitive has, lastly, the sense of 'for,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' and that of 'on account of,' 'in regard to,' and this signification is nearly related to that of 'concerning,' 'about.' E.g. Xen. Anab. i. 7, 3, *τῆς ἐλευθερίας . . . ὑπὲρ ἧς ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ εὐδαιμονίζω*, 'on account of, in regard to which, I congratulate you;' Eurip. Suppl. 1130, *βάρος μὲν οὐκ ἀβριθὲς ἀλγέων ὑπερ*, 'a heavy burden because of, on account of, my sorrows;' Lys. 148, 41, *ὑπὲρ ἀδικημάτων τιμωρία*, 'requital for, on account of, wrongs done;' Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 107, *ἴδετε παρθένων ἱέσιον λόχον δουλοσύνας ὑπερ*, 'ye behold a company of virgins suppliant because of, on account of, their bondage.' In such examples *ὑπέρ* not only has obviously a sense not far removed from that of 'concerning,' 'about,' but one that seems to connect the latter with that of 'on behalf of.'

In both the last cases of *ὑπέρ* with the genitive, this case has its proper signification of 'with respect to,' and requires no further explanation.

II. *Υπέρ* with the accusative case.

1. 'Over,' 'above,' 'beyond.' *Υπέρ* is employed with the accusative case in the sense of 'over,' 'beyond;' that is, to mark the object or limit over or beyond which an action or state goes or extends, whether this object or limit refers to space, to time, or to measure of any kind.

a. Of space, or any object in space: e.g. Il. v. 16, *Τυδείδω δ' ὑπὲρ ὤμων ἀριστερόν ἤλυθ' ἀκωχὴ | ἔγχεος*, 'the point of the spear passed over, beyond, the left shoulder of Tydeides.' Here the preposition plainly derives the notion of 'beyond'

from that of 'over,' 'above,' by which terms it may, indeed, be rendered; and the accusative case is used in its signification of 'as to,' 'as regards;' 'the point of the spear went beyond . . . as regards the left shoulder of Tydeides.' So Od. vii. 135, *καρκαλίμως ὑπὲρ οὐδὸν ἐβήσατο δόματος εἶσω*, 'he went quickly over, beyond, the threshold;' Æsch. Eum. 241, *ὑπὲρ τε πόντον . . . ἦλθον*, 'came over, beyond, the sea;' Herod. iv. 188, *ρπατεύουσι ὑπὲρ τὸν δόμον*, 'they cast it over the house;' Xen. Anab. i. 1, 9, *τοῖς θοράξι τοῖς ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήσποντον οἰκοῦσι*, 'that dwell above, beyond, the Hellespont,' that is, 'beyond . . . as regards the Hellespont.'

b. Of time, and of numbers: e.g. Æschin. 58, 3, *ὅσοι τι διαχειρίζουσι τῆς πόλεως ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἡμέρας*, 'as many as exercise any office in the state beyond, more than, thirty days;' Herod. v. 64, *ὑπὲρ τεσσαρῶν ἀνδρας*, 'above, more than, forty men;' Xen. Hell. v. 4, 13, *λέγων ὅτι ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη ἀφ' ἧβης εἴη*, 'saying that he was above forty years past his manhood;' Id. Cyrop. iii. 3, 47, *εἰ μὴ ὑπὲρ ἡμισυ αὐτῶν ἔσονται οἱ ἡττηθέντες*, 'above, more than, half of them;' Demosth. 141, 9, *οὐ προσήει τῇ πόλει τάλαντα ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν*, 'there did not come in to the state above, more than, a hundred and thirty talents.'

c. Generally, to express the being in excess, or the going beyond, with regard to any object, expressed in English by 'above,' 'beyond.' E.g. Æsch. Agam. 368, *φλεόντων δωμάτων ὑπέρφεν*, | *ὑπὲρ τὸ βέλτιστον*, 'when a household has excess of abundance above, beyond, what is best;' Soph. Antig. 363-4, *σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν | τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπιδ' ἔχων*, 'having art beyond expectation.' So *ὑπὲρ δύναμιν*, 'beyond, above, one's means,' *ὑπὲρ λόγον*, 'beyond what is reasonable,' *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶς*, 'beyond our capacity,' *ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν*, 'beyond what belongs to his years.' (See Passow's Lexicon.)

d. 'Beyond,' 'against,' 'contrary to.' *Υπέρ* with the accusative, in the sense of 'beyond,' may be rendered also, in certain connections, by 'against,' 'contrary to;' as, *ὑπὲρ αἰσαν*, 'contrary to what is appointed by fate,' *ὑπὲρ μοῖραν*, 'beyond, against, one's destiny,' 'contrary to a man's allotment.' E.g. Il. iii. 59, *Ἔκτορ ἐπεὶ με κατ' αἰσαν ἐνείκησας, οὐδ' ὑπὲρ αἰσαν*, 'since you have reproached me justly, and not

contrary to what is right,' literally, 'beyond what is appointed by destiny;' Il. iii. 299, *ὁπότεροι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ δρῶα πηγήναιαν*, 'whichever party shall inflict injury contrary to the oaths,' literally, 'beyond the oaths.' It is plain that, in such examples, the sense of 'contrary to,' 'against,' is equivalent to 'beyond,' modified only by the circumstances in which it is used, and that the accusative, as in the preceding cases, has the force of 'as to,' 'as regards.'

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *ὑπὲρ* WITH CASES.

Significations of <i>ὑπὲρ</i> .	Gentive: 'with respect to.'	Accusat.: 'as to,' 'as regards.'
1. 'Over,' 'above.'	1. 'Over,' 'above.'	
2. a. 'For,' 'in behalf of.'	2. a. 'For,' 'on behalf of.'	
b. 'For,' 'to the end that.'	b. 'For,' 'to the end that.'	
c. 'For,' 'instead of.'	c. 'For,' 'instead of.'	
3. a. 'Of,' 'concerning,' 'about.'	3. a. 'Of,' 'concerning,' 'about.'	
b. 'For,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' 'on account of,' 'in regard to.'	b. 'For,' 'because of,' 'by reason of,' 'on account of,' 'in regard to.'	
4. a. 'Over,' 'above,' 'beyond.'		4. a. 'Over,' 'above,' 'beyond.'
b. 'Beyond,' 'against,' 'contrary to.'		b. 'Beyond,' 'against,' 'contrary to.'

Ἵπό.

Ἵπό has also the poetical, and more especially Epic, form *ὑπαί*, like *διαί* for *δίᾳ*, and is the same with the Sanskrit *upa* and the Latin *sub*. (See Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, s. v.) Ἵπαί and διαί seem to have the same relation to ὑπό and διὰ that *præ* in Latin has to *pro*. Of the exact value of the added *ι*, with the change to the feminine form in *ὑπαί* and *præ*, whether it be the sign of the locativus or ablative of position, as in *πῇ*; 'in what way?' or a demonstrative ending, as in *τουτοῦ, οὗτος*, or *ὑπαί* and *præ* be mere augmented forms, as in *ὑπείρ* for *ὑπέρ*, it is difficult to speak positively.

Significations of ὑπό.

1. The proper signification of ὑπό is 'under,' 'beneath,' opposed to ὑπέρ, 'above,' 'over.' This signification is seen in many compounds; as, *ὑποβάλλειν*, 'to cast under;' e.g. Od. x. 353, *ὑπένερθε δὲ λίθ' ὑπεβάλλειν*, 'and placed stones underneath;' *ὑποστορεννύναι*, 'to strew or spread under;' e.g. Od. xx. 139, cited by Passow, *ἥ μὲν δέμνι' ἀνωγεν ὑποστορέσαι δμῶησιν*, 'she ordered couches to be spread under the

Ἵπό.

maidens; *ὑποδέσθαι*, 'to bind or tie under,' 'to put on one's shoes;' *ὑπόδημα*, 'that which is bound under,' 'a sandal.' (See Passow's Lexicon.) And so also in the use of the preposition with nouns: e.g. Il. ii. 784, *ἄς ἄρα τῶν ὑπὸ ποσσὶ μέγα στεναχίζετο γαῖα*, 'so the earth loudly resounded under their feet;' Od. xx. 176, *καὶ τὰς μὲν* (sc. *αἰῶας*) *κατέδρησεν ὑπ' αἰθούσῃ ἐρμούπῳ*, 'these he made fast beneath the loud-sounding corridor.'

2. a. 'Under,' in the sense of subjection. Ἵπό obtains secondarily and metaphorically a variety of meanings, among which the first place belongs to that of 'under' with the idea of subjection, or the being under dominion. E.g. Od. xix. 114, *δρετῶσι δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ*, 'the people are virtuous under him,' that is, 'under his sway;' Od. iii. 804, *... δέδμητο δὲ λαὸς ὑπ' αὐτῷ*, 'the people were brought into subjection under him;' Il. xiii. 98, *ὑπὸ Τρώεσσι δαμῆναι*, 'to be brought into subjection under the Trojans;' Od. iv. 294-5, *... ὄφρα καὶ ἤδη | ὑπνῳ ὑπο γλυκερῷ ταρπόμεδα κοιμηθέντες*, 'that even now we may have enjoyment by reposing under (the power of) sweet sleep.' (See Læwe's note on this place.) The same sense belongs to ὑπό in Demosth. 97, 4, *τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, οὓς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπὸ τοῖς νόμοις λαβεῖν*, 'whom it is not possible to get under (subjection to) our laws.' And so in some compounds; as, *ὑποπίπτειν*, 'to fall under subjection to,' *ὑπόδικος*, 'subject to an action for an injury done.'

b. 'Under,' marking the circumstances or conditions of an action. Ἵπό is used with a noun to mark the circumstances or conditions under which an action is performed, corresponding exactly to the English 'under' in such expressions as 'he did it under compulsion.' E.g. Il. vi. 171, *αὐτὰρ ὁ βῆ Λυκίηνδε θεῶν ὑπ' ἀμύμονι πομπῇ*, 'he went to Lycia under the holy conduct of the gods;' Xen. Hell. ii. 2, 23, *τὰ τεῖχη κατέσκαπτον ὑπ' αὐλητρίδων*, 'they razed the walls to the sound of the flute played by female players,' that is, 'under the accompanying music of female flute-players.'

c. 'Under,' 'for,' 'from,' 'by reason of,' marking a cause or motive. Ἵπό is further employed with a noun to express the moving cause or impelling motive under the influence of which any thing is done, and has answering to it the

English 'under,' 'for,' 'from,' 'by reason of:' e.g. Herod. vii. 22, ὤρουσσαν ὑπὸ μαστίγων, 'they dug under whips,' that is, 'under the impulse of whips,' 'impelled by whips.' Here it is to be observed that ὑπὸ μαστίγων may mean 'under whips' in a literal sense, and that the idea of moving cause is rather inferred from the nature and common office of the object under which an act is done than properly inherent in ὑπό. For ὑπό has the same sense in ὤσατε δεινὸν ὑπὸ βλεφάρων ἐξεφάνθην, 'his eyes shone terribly under his eyelids,' as in ὑπὸ μαστίγων ὤρουσσαν, 'they dug under whips.' But, in the latter case, the digging under whips suggests, in the circumstances, the idea of digging under the impulse of whips. Xen. Cyrop. i. 4, 15, καὶ τῷ Κύρῳ ἡδέτο, οὐ δύναμιν σφῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, 'and he was delighted with Cyrus, who was not able to contain himself by reason of his pleasure,' or 'for, from, his pleasure.' The sense is, that under the influence of his gratification he could not hold his peace. Id. ib. vi. 1, 35, ὥστε τὸν Ἀράσπαν πολλὰ μὲν θαυμάζειν ὑπὸ λύπης, 'so that Araspas shed many tears from distress,' 'under the feeling of distress,' influenced by it. For the natural connection between distress or grief and tears makes it obvious at once that, when a person is said to shed tears under distress, the distress is the moving cause of his tears.

d. 'By,' 'by means of.' Of the same nature very nearly with the preceding is the case in which ὑπό, corresponding to the English 'by,' 'by means of,' introduces the personal agent by whom an action is performed; the person 'under' whom, that is, under whose active power, any thing is represented as occurring, being naturally regarded as the agent 'by' whom it is done. E.g. Herod. ix. 98, ὑπὸ κήρυκος προηγόρευε, 'he proclaimed by a herald,' or 'by the agency of a herald.' If, in Herod. vii. 22, above cited, ὤρουσσαν ὑπὸ μαστίγων, 'they dug under whips,' the whips under which they dug may be regarded as the moving cause of the digging, so also, in the last example given, ὑπὸ κήρυκος προηγόρευε, 'he proclaimed by (under) a herald,' the herald under whom, that is, under whom considered in his proper character and office, the proclamation was made, may be regarded as the agent of the proclamation. In the latter

case, as in the former, the preposition shows merely that the thing done stands to some object in the relation of 'under,' and the notion of agent, just as that of the moving cause, is inferred from the character and office of the object under which the action is represented as being performed, and from its obvious natural relation to the action. Thus, as in ἐδάκρυε ὑπὸ λύπης, 'he shed tears from distress,' the nature of the feeling expressed by λύπη is such, and such its obvious natural relation to δάκρυα, that, when it is said that a person 'shed tears under grief,' it is plain that the grief is the moving cause of the tears; so, when it is said that 'a proclamation was made under a herald,' ὑπὸ κήρυκος προηγόρευε, it is readily inferred, from the character and office of a herald, and from his known relation to the act of proclaiming, that the proclamation represented as made 'under' him was made 'by' him, or by his agency.

3. 'Under,' 'near,' 'not quite,' 'hardly,' 'in part only,' 'a little;' 'about,' 'towards.' From the signification of 'under' ὑπό obtains also that of coming short of, falling below, a measure or standard of comparison, and so of being only near to without reaching it; and this is expressed in English by 'near,' 'not quite,' 'hardly,' 'in part only,' 'a little,' 'about,' 'towards.' It is distinguished from παρά, which also conveys the idea of coming short of or failing to meet a given standard of measure, by the fact that, while παρά marks the coming short or failure to meet the standard of measure simply and without qualification, ὑπό always implies, like the Latin *sub* in the like use, a mere failure to meet, a coming just under the standard, a coming short by a little. Hence it is that ὑπό, like *sub*, is translated not only by other terms involving the idea of coming nearly up to a certain measure, while failing to reach it, but also by 'about,' 'towards,' which could hardly be explained without admitting for this preposition the peculiar sense here attributed to it. This meaning is seen in quite a large number of compounds; as, ὑποβρέχειν, 'to wet a little,' ὑπογελάειν, 'to laugh a little,' 'to smile,' *subridere*, ὑπόγλυκος, 'somewhat grey,' 'greyish,' ὑπάργυρος, 'partly silver,' 'not quite altogether silver.' And so in its use

with nouns in the sense of 'near,' 'about,' 'towards:' e.g. Herod. i. 51, *μετεκινήθησαν δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ὑπὸ τὸν νῆδον κατακείμενα*, 'and these two were removed about, just before, the time when the temple was burned down;' Id. ii. 36, *οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι ὑπὸ τοὺς θανάτους ἀνέεισι τὰς τρίχας αὖξασθαι*, 'the Egyptians let their hair grow just after the death of their friends;' that is, not at the very moment of their death, but at a time that just falls short of this, and which may be properly expressed in English by 'just after,' 'immediately after,' in the same way that, in the preceding example, the rendering was made by 'just before.' Thuc. ii. 27, cited by Passow, *καὶ οἱ σφῶν εὐεργέται ἦσαν ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμόν*, 'and because they did them a service just after the time of the earthquake.' It should be observed that here, as in the second example given from Herodotus, *ὑπὸ* marks a time that is a little after, while in other examples, as in the former one cited from Herodotus, it denotes a time that is just before, a little before, a given point. The prevailing idea, in this use of *ὑπὸ*, being the coming short of a standard of measure while yet approaching very near to it, or of just coming short of the standard, the failing to meet it by a little, it is a matter of indifference on which side of a thing the failure to meet its measure occurs; or, with regard to a given point of time, whether the coming short of it, the failure to meet it exactly, occur on this side or that, before or after. *Sub* in Latin agrees with *ὑπὸ* in this peculiar use, not only in general, but in this particular also, that it means indifferently 'just before' or 'just after,' the circumstances in which the preposition is used alone determining which of the two meanings it has in any particular case.

4. 'Secretly,' 'imperceptibly,' 'a little at a time,' 'little by little.' Very nearly related to the proper signification of *ὑπὸ* is that in which it conveys the idea of secrecy or concealment, and hence of a progress in an action or motion so gradual as to be scarcely discernible, expressed in English by such terms as 'secretly,' 'imperceptibly,' 'a little at a time,' 'little by little.' This meaning of *ὑπὸ* is seen only in some compounds, and is readily suggested by the connec-

tion there is between the being 'under' a thing and the being covered and hidden from view by it. And then, again, the general notion of being hidden from view is easily applied to actions and motions so gradual in progress as to be scarcely observable, and which may, accordingly, be described as proceeding 'imperceptibly,' 'a little at a time,' 'little by little;' or, more exactly, 'but a little at a time,' 'only or just little by little,' the prominent idea being the hidden, insensible character of the action or motion. E.g. *ὑποβολή*, 'substitution by stealth,' as of supposititious children; *ὑποκλέπτειν*, 'to steal in a sly underhanded way,' *ὑποπέμπειν*, 'to send covertly,' *ὑποπιμπλάναι*, 'to fill by degrees,' 'only a little at a time,' *ὑποπίνειν*, 'to drink little by little.'

Summary of the significations of ὑπὸ.

- 'Υπό. 1. 'Under,' 'below,' 'beneath.'
2. a. 'Under,' in subjection to.
 - b. 'Under,' marking the circumstances or conditions under which any thing occurs.
 - c. 'Under,' 'for,' 'from,' 'by reason of,' marking a moving cause or motive.
 - d. 'By,' marking the agent, Latin *ab*, *per*.
 3. 'Under the standard,' coming near to, but not quite reaching it; 'near,' 'not quite,' 'hardly,' 'only in part,' 'a little,' 'rather,' 'just before,' 'just after,' 'about,' 'towards.'
 4. 'Secretly' or 'covertly,' 'imperceptibly' or 'insensibly;' 'only a little at a time,' 'only little by little.'

SIGNIFICATION AND USE OF ὑπὸ WITH CASES.

I. 'Υπό with the genitive case.

1. a. 'Under,' 'beneath,' in a local sense. 'Υπό is used with the genitive case in the local sense of 'under,' 'beneath,' the genitive marking the object with respect to which specifically another holds this relative position. E.g. Il. iv. 106, *δν ῥά ποτ' αὐτὸς ὑπὸ στήρνοιο τυχήσας*, 'having struck it under the breast,' that is, 'under, below, . . .

with respect to the breast;’ Il. xvi. 547, *δόρυ χάλκεον ἐξ-
πέρησεν | νέρθεν ὑπ’ ἐλκεφάλαιο*, ‘the brazen spear passed
beneath, under, the brain;’ Xen. Anab. vi. 4, 22, *βοῦν δὲ ὀφ’
ἀμύξης πρὶ μένουι ἐθύοντο*, ‘they bought an ox (that was)
under the yoke and sacrificed him.’ Here, however, the
sense may be ‘from under the yoke.’ Soph. Antig. 65,
αἰτούσα τοὺς ὑπὸ χθονός, ‘making request of those who are
under, beneath; the earth;’ Id. ib. 1233, *ὑπὸ στέγης ἔσω*,
‘within, under, beneath, the roof.’

b. ‘From under.’ Ὑπό with the genitive, connected
with words expressing action or motion, especially with
verbs signifying ‘to rescue,’ and the like, as *ἀρπάζειν*, ‘to
snatch away,’ *ρύεσθαι*, *ἐρύειν*, *ἐρύεσθαι*, ‘to rescue,’ ‘to save,’
is frequently to be rendered by ‘from under.’ E.g. Il. xxi. 56,
αὐτὶς ἀναστήσονται ὑπὸ ζόφου, ‘they will rise up again from
under the darkness;’ Il. xiii. 198, *ὥστε δὴ αἶγα λέοντε κυνῶν
ὑπὸ καρχαροδόντων | ἀρπάξαντε*, ‘as two lions having torn a
goat from under the sharp-toothed dogs;’ Il. viii. 543, *οἱ δ’
ἵππους μὲν λύσαν ὑπὸ ζυγοῦ ἰδρώντας*, ‘they loosed the sweat-
ing horses from under the yoke.’ In such examples, the
preposition means no more than ‘under,’ and the genitive
no more than ‘with respect to;’ neither of them contains
the idea of ‘from.’ This sense of ‘from,’ by which, to-
gether with that of ‘under,’ ὑπό is here rendered, is sug-
gested, in fact, by the obvious relation in which the action
or motion qualified by ὑπό stands to the object marked by
the genitive. Thus, in the last example, the untying or
letting loose the horses, ὑπὸ ζυγοῦ, ‘under the yoke,’ does,
under the circumstances, that is, considering the action of
untying, that horses sweating from the battle-field are the
object of the action, and that the untying the horses has
reference to the yoke under which they ran in the war-
chariot, convey the idea of letting them loose from the
yoke, although ὑπὸ ζυγοῦ does not by itself express this, any
more than ὑπὸ στέρνοιο, in the phrase ὑπὸ στέρνοιο τυχήσας,
‘striking him under the breast,’ conveys the sense of ‘from
under the breast.’ The same thing was seen to be true of
κατά; namely, that while with the genitive it signifies ‘down,’
and nothing more, it was upon occasion to be rendered by

‘down from’ and ‘down upon,’ according to the relations
of the action or motion qualified by *κατά* to the object
introduced by the genitive as that to which it refers.

2. Ὑπό with the genitive is used also in an accommodated
or metaphorical sense, of which there are several varieties.
Thus:

a. ‘Under,’ expressing the notion of subjection, the being
under one’s power or authority: e.g. Od. xix. 114, *ἀρετῶσι
δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ*, ‘the people are virtuous under him,’ that
is, ‘under his sway.’ The genitive case, which much more
rarely follows the preposition ὑπό in this sense than does
the dative, is here used in its ordinary meaning of ‘with
respect to;’ as in the above example, *ἀρετῶσι δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ’
αὐτοῦ*, the proper construction is, ‘the people are virtuous
under (subjection) . . . with respect to him;’ that is, the
condition of being under subjection in which the people are
virtuous is referred exclusively to him.

b. ‘Under,’ ‘to,’ ‘in,’ ‘with,’ marking the circumstances
or condition under which any thing takes place. Ὑπό is
used with the genitive case to denote the circumstances
or condition under which an action is performed or any
event occurs, answering to the English ‘under,’ but capable
of being rendered by other terms also, as ‘in,’ ‘to,’ ‘with.’
E.g. Il. ii. 334, *ἀμφὶ δὲ νῆες | σμερδαλέον κονάβησαν ἀυσάντων
ὑπ’ Ἀχαιῶν*, ‘the ships round about resounded terribly under
the shouts of the Achæi,’ or ‘with the shouts of the Achæi;’
Herod. ii. 45, *ὑπὸ πομπῆς ἐξῆγον*, ‘they led him forth in a
procession,’ or ‘with a procession,’ that is, ‘under the cir-
cumstances of a procession;’ Xen. Hell. ii. 2, 23, *τὰ τεῖχος
κατέσκαπτον ὑπ’ αὐληγρίδων*, ‘they razed the walls to the music
of female flute-players,’ that is, ‘under, with the accom-
paniment of, the music of female flute-players;’ Il. xviii.
492–3, *νύμφας δ’ ἐκ θαλάμων, δαίδων ὑπο λαμπομενῶν, | ἡγήνεον
ἀνὰ ἄστυ*, ‘they were conducting brides from their chambers
with flaming torches,’ that is, ‘under the light of torches;’
Pind. Ol. iv. 3, seqq., *Ζεῦ, τέαι γὰρ ὦραι | ὑπὸ ποικιλοφύρμητος
δοιδᾶς ἐλίσσόμεναι μ’ ἐπεμψαν*, ‘they conducted me to the song
of the lyre,’ ‘accompanied by the sound of the lyre;’
Hesiod. Scut. Hercul. 278, seqq., *τοὶ μὲν ὑπὸ λυγρῶν συρίγγων*

ἦσαν αὐδὴν | ἐξ ἀπαλῶν στομάτων, . . . | αἱ δ' ὑπὸ φορμύγγων ἀναγον χορὸν ἱμερόεντα | ἔνθεν δ' αὐδ' ἐτέρωθε νέοι κώμαζον ὑπ' αὐλοῦ, 'some sang (sent forth the voice from delicate mouths) to the loud pipe, . . . others led up the charming dance to the (strains of the) lyre, and hither and thither revelled young men to the (sound of the) flute;' *Æsch. Agam.* 1533, καταδύσμεν οὐχ ὑπὸ κλαυθμῶν τῶν ἐξ οἴκων, 'we will bury him without the lamentations that come from his home;' *Herod.* i. 17, ἐστρατεύοντο ὑπὸ σαλπύγγων, 'they marched to the sound of trumpets.' (See *Passow's Lex.*, and *Thiersch. Gr. Hom.* p. 445.) In such examples, the preposition has properly the meaning of 'under,' taken in an accommodated sense, and the genitive has its usual signification of 'with respect to,' or denotes the object to which specifically something is said to hold the relation of ὑπό, 'under.'

c. 'Under,' denoting the moving cause. Ὑπό with the genitive is used also to express the impelling motive or influence under which an action is performed, being rendered in English by 'under,' and corresponding to the Latin *sub*. E.g. *Herod.* vii. 22, ὤρυσσόν ὑπὸ μαστίγων, 'they dug under (the influence of) whips,' that is, 'impelled by whips;' *Id.* ib. 56, ἐθρήϊτο τὸν στρατὸν ὑπὸ μαστίγων διαβαίνοντα, 'he reviewed the army as it crossed under whips,' that is, 'driven by whips.' In such examples, the preposition, as above explained, has properly the signification of 'under,' and the notion of motive or impelling cause is suggested by the nature and character of the object introduced by the genitive and to which ὑπό refers, and by its obvious relation to the action qualified by ὑπό. The genitive has its usual signification, as in the preceding case.

'For,' 'from,' 'out of,' 'on account of,' 'by reason of,' 'of,' 'through.' To this place belongs the use of ὑπό with the genitive case of a number of nouns, chiefly such as express various emotions and states of the mind, as joy, fear, ignorance, and the like, to mark the moving cause of an action, where the English employs 'for,' 'from,' 'out of,' 'on account of,' 'by reason of,' 'of,' 'through,' and the Latin *proe, præter*; thus, ὑπὸ χαρᾶς, 'for joy,' ὑπὸ φθόνου, 'from, of, envy,' ὑπ' ὀργῆς, 'through, from, passion,' ὑπ'

ἀγνοίας, 'from ignorance,' ὑπὸ σπουδῆς, 'through, by reason of, haste,' ὑπὸ ρίγους, 'by reason of cold.' (See *Passow's Lexicon*.) E.g. *Herod.* i. 85, ὑπὸ τῆς παρεούσης συμφορῆς παρημέληκε, 'he had neglected it by reason of his present misfortune;' *Id.* iii. 129, ὑπὸ τοῦ παρεόντος κακοῦ ὁ Δαρεῖος ἀγρυπνίησιν εἴχετο, 'on account of, by reason of, his present mischance, Darius was kept sleepless;' *Xen. Cyrop.* i. 4, 11, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς πλατύτητος οὐδὲ ἀμαρτεῖν οἶόν τε ἦν αὐτῶν, 'from their breadth it was not even possible to miss them;' *Id.* ib. 15, καὶ τῷ Κύρῳ ἤδετο οὐ δυνάμενυ σγῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, 'and he was delighted with Cyrus, who was not able to contain himself by reason of his pleasure;' *Id.* ib. iv. 2, 6, ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄχλου καὶ τῶν ἀμαξῶν σχολῇ πορεύεσθαι αὐτούς, 'for that they proceeded slowly by reason of the crowd and the wagons.'

d. 'By,' 'by means of,' denoting the agent by whom an action is performed. Ὑπό with the genitive case is very commonly employed, chiefly with passive and with some neuter verbs, to express the agent by whom an action is performed, or the object by whose means an effect is produced. Thus, *Æsch. Eumen.* 95, ὅψ' ὑμῶν ὦδ' ἀπητημασμένη, 'thus dishonored by you,' ὑπὸ τινος θνήσκειν, 'to die by some one's hands,' ὑπὸ τινος πίπτειν, 'to fall by the hands of a person,' ὑπὸ τινος πάσχειν, 'to suffer at one's hands;' and so, ὑπὸ τινος ἀκούειν, 'to hear a thing from a person,' that is, 'by means of a person,' ὅψ' ἑαυτοῦ, 'of his own accord,' *sua sponte*, ὅψ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, *Thuc.* iv. 64, 'of yourselves.' Sometimes, also, with a verbal noun, as, ὑπὸ νόμου ἐπίταγμα, *Plat. Rep.* 350, A., 'an injunction of law,' that is, 'made by law.' (See *Passow's Lex.* s. v.) E.g. *Xen. Anab.* i. 1, 10, Ἀρίστας οὐ θεταλὸς ἐτύγγανε . . . πιεζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν οἴκοι ἀντιστασιωτῶν, 'chanced to be hard pressed by the opposite party at home;' *Id.* ib. i. 2, 25, οἱ μὲν ἐφασαν ἀρπάζοντάς τι κατακοπῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν Κιλικίων, 'some said that in some act of plundering they were cut to pieces by the Cilicians;' *Id.* *Cyrop.* iv. 6, 6, πολλὰ γὰρ φιλικὰ ἐπαδον ὑπ' ἐκείνου, 'for I received many acts of friendship from him,' 'was often treated with friendship by him;' *Herod.* vii. 59, φρουρὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κατεστήκει ὑπὸ Δαρείου, 'a garrison was established in it by Darius,' that is, 'a garrison had its station in it by means

of Darius;' Id. vii. 72, οἱ δὲ Σύριοι οὗτοι ὑπὸ Περσέων Καπαδόκῃα καλέονται, 'these Syrians are by the Persians called Capadocæ;' Soph. Œd. Col. 741, ἀνδρῶν ὑπὸ πάντων κελευσθείς, 'bidden by all men;' Id. Phil. 334, τέθνηκεν, ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός, θεοῦ δ' ὕπο, 'he hath perished by the hands, not of any man, but of a god.' (See Ellendt, Lex. Soph.) Herod. ix. 98, ὑπὸ κήρυκος προηγόρευε, 'he proclaimed by a herald;' Xen. Cyrop. ii. 1, 8, πολὺ γὰρ ἂν θῦττον οἱ ὀλίγοι ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν τετρασκόμενοι ἀναλωθεῖσαν ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ πολλοί, 'for the few would be much sooner consumed when wounded by the many than the many when wounded by the few;' Id. ib. iii. 3, 2, οὕτως ἂν νομίζων καὶ τὸν Κῦρον μᾶλλον ἡδεσθαι τῇ ὑπὸ πάντων τιμῇ, 'thinking that so Cyrus also would be more gratified with the honor bestowed by all;' Id. de Venat. vi. 23, ὅφ' αὐτῶν ἀναστήσουσι τὸν λαγῶ, 'they will of themselves start the hare;' Id. Hell. ii. 3, 6, οἱ δὲ Σάμοι πολιορκούμενοι ὑπὸ Λυσάνδρου, 'the Samians besieged by Lysander.'

In such examples, the preposition *ὑπό*, as has been shown above, marks the action or state which it qualifies as standing figuratively in the relation of 'under' with respect to the object introduced by the genitive, and the notion of the agent, or that the object in the genitive case is that by whom the action referred to it is performed, is inferred from the character of the object and from its obvious and natural relation to the action. When it is said, Xen. Anab. i. 1, 10, cited above, that Aristippus 'was hard pressed by the opposite faction at home,' ἐτύγχανε πιεζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν οἴκοι ἀντιστασιωτῶν, all that is actually expressed is, that 'he was hard pressed under the opposite faction;' but the act of pressing hard upon, or bringing into straits, being placed by *ὑπό* in the relation of 'under' to the opposite faction, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν οἴκοι πιεζόμενος, and the often violent hostility between the opposite political factions in Greek communities being such as to make the act of bringing the one into straits by the other a thing natural and of common occurrence, it is at once inferred that the political faction under which the other is represented as being put to straits is the agent by whom this effect of political animosity is produced.

If the preceding cases of the use of *ὑπό* be considered, it will be seen that this preposition, besides marking with the genitive the object with respect to which any thing occupies the local relation of 'under,' denotes, also, in its metaphorical sense of 'under,' the circumstances and conditions, and, further, the impelling motive or influence, the cause, ground, or reason, under or by which an action is performed or an effect produced; and that in all these cases alike, the indication of circumstances, condition, motive, ground, cause, is made by merely placing the action of which the circumstances, condition, &c. are described in the relation of 'under' with respect to the object which is to be understood as constituting the condition, circumstances, motive, &c. under which it is performed. That, when it is said, ὤρυσσον ὑπὸ μαστίγων, 'they dug under whips,' the digging is represented as occurring under the influence of whips by simply placing it in the relation of 'under' with reference to whips; and that, when it is said, τὰ τεῖχη κατέσκαπτον ὅπ' αὐλητρίδων, 'they razed the walls to (under) the sound of flutes,' the razing the walls is represented as occurring under the accompaniment of music by merely placing it in the relation of 'under' with respect to the music. And, again, that when *ὑπό* with the genitive is used to mark the agent by whom the action is performed, it does this by placing the thing effected in the relation of 'under' with respect to a person. Thus, when it is said, ὑπὸ τινος ἀπέθανε, 'he died by a person's hands,' the reference of the death suffered to the agent τινός is made by placing it in the relation of 'under' with respect to this person; 'he died under a person.' And if this be so, then it is true that when an action or effect is placed by the preposition *ὑπό* and the genitive case in the relation of 'under' with respect to any object, the precise character of this relation, whether it shall be one of merely local relative position, or, in a more general way, of the circumstances under which the action occurs, or of an influential motive, or of the effective agent, will depend upon the nature of the object introduced by the genitive and referred to by *ὑπό*, and upon the obvious correspondence of the character of the action or effect. In

each case, the mind of the hearer will assign to the noun introduced by the genitive and referred to by *ὑπό* the office which is most appropriate under the circumstances. Thus, when it is said of a fountain, Hom. Od. ix. 140-1, that 'it flows (from) under a cave,' *ῥέει ἀγλαὸν ὑδῶρ, | κρήνη ὑπὸ σπέιους*, the very nature of the object to which the flowing of the fountain is referred as being 'under' it suggests a merely local relation; when it is said of the men laboring on the canal at Mount Athos that 'they dug under whips,' *ὤρυσσον ὑπὸ μαστίγων*, the most obvious and natural office to attribute to the whips, considering the circumstances and the Persian treatment of soldiers, is that of compelling to dig, so that the sense will be, 'they dug under the compulsion of whips;' and when it is said of any one that 'he died under a person,' *ὑπὸ τινος ἀπέθανε*, the most natural character to assign to *τινός* is that of the effective agent by whom death is procured, it being most appropriate, when the death of any one is painted to the mind, and referred to a person of active powers, and otherwise suited in his character and dispositions, as being in the relation of 'under' with respect to him, to attribute to such person the action or effort by which death is procured; that is, to regard him as the effective agent.

II. *ὑπό* with the dative.

1. 'Under,' 'beneath,' in a local sense. *ὑπό* is used with the dative case in the sense of 'under,' 'beneath,' marking a merely local relation: e.g. Il. ii. 784, *ὧς ἄρα τῶν ὑπὸ ποσσὶ μέγα στεναχίζετο γαῖα*, 'so the earth loud resounded under their feet;' Il. ii. 306-7, *ἔρδομεν ἀθανάτοισι τελεέσσας ἐκατόμβας | καλῇ ὑπὸ πλατανίστῳ*, 'we offered to the immortal gods perfect hecatombs beneath a beautiful plane-tree;' Herod. vi. 105, *ἰδρύσαντο ὑπὸ τῇ ἀκροπόλει Πανὸς ἱρόν*, 'they built a temple to Pan under, that is, at the foot of, the citadel;' Æsch. Agam. 824, *ὅσονπερ οὗτος ἦν ὑπ' Ἰλίῳ*, 'so long as he was under (the walls of) Ilium;' Id. Eumen. 955, *Παλλάδος δ' ὑπὸ πτεροῖς ὄντας ἀζεται πατήρ*, 'our father (Jove) has respect to persons who are under the protection of Pallas,' literally, 'under the wings of Pallas;' Id. Pers. 186, *ἀρμασιν*

δ' ὑπο | ζεύγνυσιν αὐτῷ, literally, 'yokes them under chariots,' that is, 'puts them under the yoke of chariots;' Soph. Œd. Col. 671-3, *ἐνθα λίγεια μνύρεται | θαμίζουσα μάλιστ' ἀρθῶν | χλωραῖς ὑπὸ βόσσαις*, 'under green glades,' that is, 'beneath the shelter of green glades.' (See Ellendt, Lex. Sophocl.) Xen. Anab. i. 2, 8, *ἔστι βασιλεια . . . ὑπὸ τῇ ἀκροπόλει*, 'there is a palace under, that is, at the foot of, the citadel;' Id. ib. iii. 4, 24, *οἱ (sc. γήλοφοι) καθήκον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρους, ὅφ' ᾧ ἦν κώμη*, 'under,' that is, 'at the foot of, which was a village.'

In such examples as these, *ὑπό* has its proper signification of 'under,' and the dative has its ordinary meaning, namely, it marks that for which as its final object an action is performed, or a state or condition exists, that for which it is or is done. In this sense the dative may appropriately follow *ὑπό*, 'under,' just as it follows *ἐπί*, 'upon,' and in the same way that it attends upon various verbs, and upon such adjectives as *ἴσος*, 'equal,' *ὁμοιος*, 'like,' *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same.' That is, as the dative is conjoined with *ἴσος*, 'equal,' *ὁμοιος*, 'like,' *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same,' to show that the object which it designates is to be regarded as affected by the relation of equality, likeness, or identity in which an object stands to it, so it may be used with *ὑπό* and *ἐπί* to indicate that the object which it marks is affected by the relations of 'under' and 'upon' in which any thing stands to it. So that the dative may be said to depend, chiefly at least, upon *ὑπό*, 'under,' as it does on *ἐπί*, 'upon,' by virtue of the inherent signification of the preposition. This does not, of course, exclude the concurrent influence of the terms qualified by *ὑπό*. Thus, in *ἔστι βασιλεια ὑπὸ τῇ ἀκροπόλει*, although *τῇ ἀκροπόλει* might seem to depend chiefly upon the sense of 'under' contained in *ὑπό*, it may properly be said to follow upon the united influence of *ἔστι βασιλεια ὑπό*; and in most cases this is to be preferred.

2. 'Under,' in a metaphorical sense. *ὑπό* with the dative is used in the sense of 'under,' understood metaphorically, and, when so employed, presents a variety of meanings. Thus:

a. 'Under,' with the notion of subjection under the authority or power of any one. E.g. Od. iii. 304, *δέδμητο*

δὲ λαὸς ὑπ' αὐτῷ, 'the people had been subjected under him,' that is, 'under his power or sway;' Od. vii. 68, *ῥῥσαι νῦν γε γυναῖκες ὑπ' ἀνδράσιν οἶκον ἔχουσιν*, 'of all the women that now at least occupy a home under (subjection to) men;' Herod. vii. 11, *ἵνα ἡ τὰδε πάντα ὑπὸ Ἑλλήσιν, ἡ ἐκεῖνα πάντα ὑπὸ Πέρσῃσι γένηται*, 'that either every thing here may be under the Greeks, or every thing there under the Persians;' Id. vii. 157, *ἐν νόῳ δὲ ἔχων πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὑπ' ἑωυτῷ ποθέσασθαι*, 'having it in mind to bring all Hellas under his power;' Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 2, *εἰ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων γένοιτο*, 'if it should come to be under the sway of the Lacedæmonians.' Here the preposition ὑπό has the same meaning as in the preceding case, with the difference only of its being used metaphorically; and the idea of subjection to authority or dominion, as expressed by ὑπό, 'under,' is suggested by the character and relations of the noun introduced by the dative and by the action qualified. And the dative case, yet more clearly, perhaps, than where the mere local relation of 'under' is denoted, follows in its proper sense upon the notion of subjection conveyed by ὑπό, aided, however, in some cases by the terms qualified by the preposition. Thus, in *δέδμητο δὲ λαὸς ὑπ' αὐτῷ*, the dative αὐτῷ may be said to depend upon the combined meaning of *δέδμητο ὑπό*, 'had been brought into subjection under;' while, in the last example given, the dative ἑωυτῷ follows chiefly, if not wholly, upon ὑπό itself.

b. 'Under,' 'to,' marking the circumstances or conditions under which an event occurs or an action is performed: e.g. Il. vi. 171, *αὐτὰρ ὁ βῆ Λυκίῃδε θεῶν ὑπ' ἀμύμονι πομπῇ*, 'he went to Lycia under the holy conduct of the gods;' Hesiod. Scut. II., 283, seqq., *τοί γε μὲν αὖ παίζοντες ὑπ' ὀρχηθμῷ καὶ δοιδῇ*, | . . . *ὑπ' ἀλγυτῇρι δ' ἕκαστος | πρόσθ' ἔκινον*, 'some sporting to (under) the dance and song, . . . they advanced each to the music of the flute-player;' that is, 'they sported in measured steps to the movement of the dance and song, or under their guidance, and advanced each to (under) the accompaniment of the flute.' Æsch. Eumen. 495, *ἑυμφέρει σωφρονεῖν ὑπὸ στένει*, 'it is of advantage to be temperate in grief,' that is, 'under circumstances of grief.' In such

examples, ὑπό has the sense of 'under' taken metaphorically, as in the preceding case; and, as already explained, the peculiarity which it seems to have of indicating the circumstances or conditions under which any thing occurs is wholly owing to the nature of the object introduced by the dative case, and to the correspondence of this to the action which stands to it in the relation of 'under.' When persons are said to 'sport under the dance and song,' *παίζειν ὑπ' ὀρχηθμῷ καὶ δοιδῇ*, the very nature of the song and dance, and their familiar connection with the sports here referred to them and placed 'under' them, suggest the sense in which the phrase is to be taken, namely, that the sporting is done under the influence or guidance of the song and dance, or with these for its condition. No one could fail to see the difference between the meanings of ὑπό in *παίζειν καλῇ ὑπὸ πλατανίστῳ*, 'to sport under a beautiful plane-tree,' and *παίζειν ὑπ' ὀρχηθμῷ καὶ δοιδῇ*, 'to sport under dance and song;' and yet ὑπό, allowing merely for the difference of its being used metaphorically in the latter case, is precisely the same in both examples. It may be remarked that it is easy to see a close resemblance between the meaning of ὑπό, as here employed, and that mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The dative here occurring has the same explanation that has been given in the foregoing cases. Compare, however, with this use of ὑπό with the dative its employment with the genitive in the same sense, so far as is indicated by the rendering in English.

c. 'By,' 'through,' 'by reason of,' expressing the moving cause, the means or agency to which any thing is due. E.g. Il. xi. 121, *ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' Ἀργείοισι φόβοντο*, 'but even they themselves were put in fear by the Argives,' or 'were in fear by reason of the Argives,' literally, 'were afraid under the Argives;' Il. xv. 636-7, . . . *ὡς τότε Ἀχαιοὶ | θεαπεσίως ἐφόβηθεν ὑφ' Ἑκτορι καὶ Διὶ πατρὶ | πάντες*, 'were unspeakably frightened by (under) Hector;' Il. ii. 714, *τὸν ὑπ' Ἀδμήτῃ τέχε δία γυναῖκων | Ἀλκυστις*, 'whom the noble woman Alcestis bore to Admetus;' Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 329, *πρὸς ἀνδρὸς δ' ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ δορὶ καίνεται*, 'man is slain by man with (under) the spear;' Id. ib. 370, *φλέγονθ' ὑπ' ἀστροῖς οὐρανόν*,

'the heavens blazing with stars;' Id. ib. 808, *πέπρωκεν αἷμα γαῖ' ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φόνοψ*, 'the earth hath drunken blood from their mutual slaughter,' properly, 'under their slaughter of each other;' Soph. Œd. Tyr. 202, *τὸν . . . ὦ Ζεῦ πάτερ | ὑπὸ σφ' φθίσουν κεραυνῶν*, 'him, O father Jupiter, do thou destroy with thy thunderbolt.'

The preposition *ὑπό* here properly signifies 'under,' taken in a metaphorical sense; and the idea of moving cause, means, or agent, which, in conjunction with the noun it conveys, is referable to the character of the object introduced by the dative, and to its suitableness to the effect referred to it. What is represented as standing in the relation of 'under' with respect to an object, may be considered as subject to whatever action or influence is appropriate to it in the circumstances. When the Achivi are said to be in fear 'under Hector,' the idea suggested is that their fear was caused by Hector, or that they were in fear as being the subjects of whatever action or influence is naturally attributable to Hector in the circumstances. The scene is a battle-field; and Hector, as a man-slaying warrior and victorious over his foes, aided too by Jupiter, was fitted to inspire fear. So that, when the Achivi are represented as being afraid 'under Hector,' the most obvious sense is that they were made afraid by the prowess of Hector, or were frightened by Hector. In the same way we say in English, 'he got relief under the surgeon,' meaning 'by the skill of the surgeon.'

III. *Υπό* with the accusative.

1. 'Under,' 'beneath.' *Υπό* in the local sense of 'under,' 'beneath,' is used with the accusative case both with and without motion preceding.

a. 'Under,' 'beneath,' without motion: e.g. Il. ii. 603, *οἱ δ' ἔχον Ἀρκαδίην, ὑπὸ Κυλλήνης ὄρος αἰπύ*, 'they who occupied Arcadia under the steep mountain of Kyllene;' Od. ii. 181, *ὄρνιθες δὲ τε πολλοὶ ὑπ' αὐγὰς Ἥελιοιο | ποικῶσ'*, 'and many birds too go to and fro beneath the rays of the sun.' Here there is motion, it is true, but such that it has not the accusative as the object reached; so that this example need not be considered as thereby excluded from the present class; Il.

v. 266-7, . . . *οὐνεκ' ἀριστοὶ | ἵππων, ὅσοι ἐσιν ὑπ' ἡῶ τ' ἡέλιόν τε*, 'because they are the best of all the horses that are under the east and the sun;' Od. xx. 278, (*ἀγέροντο*) *ἄλλος ὑπο σκερὸν ἑκατηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος*, 'they were gathered under the shady grove of far-shooting Apollo;' Herod. v. 10, *τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρκτον δοίχητα δοκέει εἶναι διὰ τὰ φύχαια*, 'the regions under the north;' Id. ii. 127, *οὔτε γὰρ ὑπεσσι οἰκήματα ὑπὸ γῆν*, 'for neither are there dwellings under ground;' Æsch. Choeph. 986, *ἐξ οὐ τέκνων ἦνεγχ' ὑπὸ ζώνην βάρους*, 'beneath her girdle.'

b. 'Under,' 'beneath,' with verbs of motion, having reference to an accusative of the object reached. E.g. Il. iv. 279, *ὑπὸ τε σπέος ἤλασε μῆλα*, 'and drives his sheep under the cave;' Od. iii. 383, (*βοῦν*) *ἦν οὐπω ὑπὸ ζυγὸν ἤγαγεν ἀνήρ*, 'a heifer, which a man has not yet brought under the yoke;' Il. xviii. 383, *σεῦ ὑστερος εἰμ' ὑπὸ γαῖαν*, 'I will go beneath the earth after you;' Od. iv. 145-6, *ὅτ' ἐμεῖο κονάπιδος εἵνεκ' Ἀχαιοὶ | ἤλθεσθ' ὑπὸ Τροίην*, 'came under (the walls of) Troy;' Il. xi. 181, *ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τὰχ' ἐμελλεν ὑπὸ πτόλιν αἰπύ τε τεῖχος | ἵεσθαι*, 'but when now he was about to arrive under the lofty city,' that is, 'at the foot of its walls;' Æsch. Prom. 152, *εἰ γὰρ μ' ὑπὸ γῆν, . . . ἔχεν*, 'for would he had sent me beneath the earth;' Id. ib. 463, *ὑφ' ἄρματα ἤγαγεν φιληνίους ἵππους*, 'he brought under the yoke horses that love the rein;' Xen. Anab. i. 10, 14, *οὐκ ἀνεβίβαζεν ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ αὐτὸν στήσας τὸ στράτευμα*, 'did not ascend the hill, but posting his men under it,' that is, 'at the foot of it.'

In both these sets of examples the sense of *ὑπό* is precisely the same; and, in both alike, the accusative may be considered as having the meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards;' although, when the accusative follows a verb of motion to mark its limit, or the object with regard to which the motion is affirmed, it may conveniently be regarded as the object reached. Thus, in the last example cited, the meaning properly is, 'having posted his army under . . . as regards the hill;' the posting the army in the relative position of 'under' being affirmed to the extent of the hill, and no further; and so in the sentence *εἰ γὰρ μ' ὑπὸ γῆν ἔχεν*, the proper sense is, 'would he had sent me under or beneath . . . as regards the earth.'

2. 'Under' in a metaphorical sense. 'Υπό is also used with the accusative case in the sense of 'under,' taken metaphorically; and this in a variety of applications, in some of which it does not admit of being rendered in English by 'under,' but requires to be expressed by some other term.

a. 'Under,' in the sense of 'under the dominion or power of.' E.g. Xen. Holl. v. 2, 17, *εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνους ἔσονται*, 'if they shall be under them,' that is, 'under their dominion;' Id. Cyrop. i. 5, 3, *διαπέμψι πρὸς τοὺς ὑφ' αὐτὸν πάντας*, 'he sent to all who were under him,' that is, 'under his sway.' Id. ib. vi. 2, 11, *ἐνθα καὶ νῦν ὁ σύλλογος τῶν ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ βαρβάρων*, 'where even now is the place of gathering of the barbarians who are under the king,' that is, 'under his dominion;' Soph. Electr. 1081, *ζῴης μοι καθ' ὑπερθεῖν* . . .

| . . . *τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὅσον* | *νῦν ὑπὸ χεῖρα ναίεις*, 'may you live as much above your enemies as you are now dwelling under their power.' In this last example, however, some question the reading. (See Ellendt, Lex. Soph. s. v.) In this signification, *ὑπό* is more used with the dative, but occurs also with the genitive. When it is used with the accusative, the case has the meaning of 'as to,' 'as regards;' as in the first example above given, *εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνους ἔσονται*, 'if they shall be under, in subjection . . . as regards them;' and the difference between the use of the accusative and that of the dative or genitive with *ὑπό*, when it has this meaning of subjection under, is readily made, so far as the Greek is concerned, by referring to the appropriate relations expressed by these cases severally. The English makes no corresponding distinction, and renders *ὑπό* with all three cases by the same term.

b. 'Under,' in the sense of 'before.' Nearly related to the preceding use of *ὑπό* with the accusative is that in which it is employed to represent the relative position of a person brought 'before' a tribunal, that is, 'under its cognizance.' E.g. Herod. vi. 72, *ἔφυγε ἐκ Σπάρτης ὑπὸ δικαστήριον ὑπαγχείας*, 'having been brought before the court, he fled from Sparta;' Id. ix. 93, *ὑπαγαγόντες μιν ὑπὸ δικαστήριον κατέκριναν*, 'they brought him before a court and condemned him.' 'Υπό,

as here employed, is explained by Passow by supposing that reference is had to the elevated seats of the judges; but it is, perhaps, better to regard the court in its obvious character as having a certain jurisdiction, as kings have dominion, and that the criminal is brought under this, just as subjects are brought under the authority of the king. So understood, both the preposition and the accusative have the same interpretation as in the preceding case.

c. 'Under,' with the idea of being 'under the cover, protection, or shelter of.' 'Υπό is employed with the accusative, in a way very like that exhibited in the preceding paragraphs, to express the notion of being 'under the cover, protection, or shelter of' an object, this meaning, so far as it is peculiar, being inferred from the attending circumstances, and being sometimes suitably rendered by other terms besides 'under,' as by 'behind.' E.g. Herod. i. 12, *κατακρύπτει ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν θύρην*, 'she conceals him behind, under cover of, the same door.' In a preceding passage, chapter 9, the terms by which the same position of concealment is described are, *ὀπισθε τῆς ἀνοιγομένης θύρης στήσω*, 'I will place you behind the open door;' making it plain that, in chapter 12, *ὑπό* does not mean local position 'under' the door, but 'under' in a sense accommodated to the circumstances, namely, that of 'under cover' or 'under concealment,' such as would be afforded by standing behind a door. So Xen. Anab. iv. 7, 8, *μετὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἀπὸ τὰ δένδρα ἀνδρωποὶ ὡς ἐβδομήκοντα*, 'after this there retired under (shelter of) the trees about seventy men.' In § 6 of the same chapter, the same position of the men is described by the terms *ἀνθ' ὧν*, 'opposite to the trees,' that is, with the trees between the party of men and the danger to which they were exposed from large stones rolled down from a height above, or so that the men were behind the trees. As, in the example from Herodotus, protection from observation required that Candaules should stand behind the door, so here the shelter sought by the men from the stones rolled down from the heights above could only be had by standing 'behind,' not merely 'under,' the trees. While, therefore, *ὑπό* with the accusative does here really mean

'under the cover, shelter, or protection of,' the circumstances justify the rendering it by 'behind.' Herod. ix. 96, *ὑπὸ τοῦτον μὲν δὴ στρατὸν τὸν ἐβουλεύσαντο καταφυγόντες* x. τ. λ., 'taking refuge under the protection of this army.'

d. 'Under,' referring to the circumstances or conditions under which any thing is done, and hence to its moving cause. E.g. Herod. ii. 142, *καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν κατ' Αἴγυπτον ὑπὸ ταῦτα ἑτεροιωθῆναι*, 'and that nothing in Egypt was altered under these circumstances,' that is, under the condition of things just before described, the sun rising in the west and setting in the east, &c. To render *ὑπὸ ταῦτα*, in this place, by 'during these occurrences,' although, perhaps, in some sort allowable, is objectionable as not giving so distinct a reference to the proper sense of *ὑπὸ* as is both desirable and practicable. Here would seem to belong the expression *πάνθ' ὑπὸ μηνιμόν*, 'in all the period of my wrath,' occurring Il. xvi. 202, and cited by Passow among other passages as an example of *ὑπὸ* in the sense of 'during,' 'throughout.' It may fairly be questioned whether *ὑπὸ* has this sense in any one of the instances cited in proof; and, if really present when *ὑπὸ* is employed with the accusative, it is due to the accusative case, and not to the preposition. Here, at least, *πάνθ' ὑπὸ μηνιμόν* may better be understood as describing the whole period of Achilles' wrath as the condition of things under which the Myrmidons uttered threats against the Trojans; and, accordingly, the sense is more accurately rendered by 'in the whole period of my wrath,' that is, 'under the condition of things belonging to the whole period of my wrath.'

'Under,' 'to.' To this place belong also the examples in which *ὑπὸ* is employed with the accusative, as it is also with the genitive and dative cases, to denote that under the direction, guidance, or influence of which an action is performed; as where dancing is conducted under or to the sound of music. In this case *ὑπὸ* is rendered in English by 'to.' The Greek language used *πρός* also with the accusative in the same sense, and the Latin *ad*. E.g. Xen. Symp. vi. 3, *ἢ οὐν βούλεσθε . . . ὑπὸ τὸν αὐλὸν ὑμῖν διαλέγωμαι*; 'would you, indeed, therefore, have me to converse

with you to the sound of the flute?' The proper sense is, 'under the sound or leading of the flute,' by which Socrates talks of regulating his discourse, just as the dance was regulated by it.

e. 'Under,' 'under cover of,' 'in,' with reference to time. *Υπό* is used with the accusative to mark the circumstances or condition of time under which an action occurs, where it is to be rendered in English by 'in,' and sometimes by 'under cover of,' being, in this latter case, of the same nature precisely with *ὑπὸ* as seen in the examples considered above under paragraph c. E.g. Herod. vi. 2, *ὑπὸ τὴν πρώτην ἐπελθοῦσαν νύκτα ἀπέδρη ἐπὶ θάλασσαν*, 'in the next night,' that is, 'under the cover of the next night,' or 'under the favoring circumstances afforded by the next night;' Herod. ix. 51, *ὑπὸ τὴν νύκτα ταύτην ἐδόξε τοὺς ἡμίσεας ἀποστέλλειν*, 'they resolved to send away in this night the half of the men,' that is, properly, 'under cover of this night,' 'under the favoring conditions or opportunity of this night.' It is proper to remark that, in these and like cases, Passow and others consider *ὑπὸ* as signifying 'towards,' 'about,' 'near.' But although *ὑπὸ* is capable of this sense, as was shown above, when treating of the significations of this preposition apart, it can hardly be regarded as consistent here with the facts of the narrative. Thus, in the latter example, it is clear that the retreat to which reference is had in *ὑπὸ τὴν νύκτα ταύτην* was made in the night, under the favoring cover of darkness, that is, therefore, under the very conditions that *ὑπὸ* with the accusative, as above interpreted, would indicate. And to give to *ὑπὸ τὴν νύκτα ταύτην* the meaning of 'near,' 'about,' or 'towards this night,' would be to alter the description given by the historian. And so likewise, in the former example, the circumstances would seem to show that the flight of Histæus from Sardis, to which *ὑπὸ τὴν πρώτην ἐπελθοῦσαν νύκτα* refers, was made 'under cover of night,' and that it would scarcely convey the historian's meaning to say that 'he ran away towards, near, about, the next night.'

8. 'Near,' 'just before,' 'just after,' 'about the time of,' 'towards.' *Υπό* was seen above, when the significations

of this preposition were considered apart, to have the meaning of 'under' with the idea of falling below, or coming short of, a given point or measure, while yet there is a near approach to it; that is, of just failing to reach it; and in this sense it was found to correspond to such terms in English as 'near,' 'not quite,' 'just before,' 'just after,' 'about,' 'towards,' and the like. It was further seen that, the notion conveyed by *ὅπο* being that of just coming short of a given point or standard of measure, it was a matter of indifference whether the failure to come up to the standard fixed occurred on this side or that, before or after. That, consequently, it might mean either 'just before' or 'just after' a point of time, as well as 'near,' 'about,' 'towards,' it. In this meaning *ὅπο* is employed with the accusative case. E.g. Herod. i. 51, *μετεκινήθησαν δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ὅπο τὸν νηὸν κατακείμενα*, 'these too were removed just before the time that the temple was burned down;' Id. ii. 86, *οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι ὅπο τοὺς θανάτους ἀνείσαι τὰς τρίχας αὖξασθαι*, 'the Egyptians let their hair grow long just after the time of the death (of their friends).' This example might, indeed, be placed in a different class, above considered, and *ὅπο τοὺς θανάτους* be understood to mean 'under the circumstances of the death of their friends,' or 'on occasion of the death of their friends;' but the sense given seems the more probable. Assuming this to be the meaning, the present example furnishes an instance of *ὅπο* marking an action as done 'just after' a given point of time, while the former one, on the other hand, furnishes an instance of its marking an action as done 'just before' a given point of time. The allowing the hair to grow as a sign of grief would naturally be placed 'immediately after' the death of a friend; and the removal of offerings from a temple that was burned down would necessarily be made, if at all, and if in connection with the burning, 'just before' the time of that event. The only other possible interpretation of *ὅπο τὸν νηὸν κατακείμενα* would be to make it express, as was mentioned to be possibly true of *ὅπο τοὺς θανάτους*, the circumstances or conditions under which an action is performed; so that it would be rendered, 'these too were removed under the circum-

stances of the burning of the temple,' or 'on the occasion of the temple being burned down.' Thucyd. ii. 27, *οὗτων ἐπερρέται ἦσαν ὅπο τὸν σεισμόν*, 'because they did them a service just after the earthquake.' Here also *ὅπο* with the accusative might express the circumstances or conditions under which an action occurs, and the meaning be, 'under the circumstances afforded by the earthquake,' or 'upon occasion of the earthquake.' Xen. Memorab. ii. 8, 1, *ὅπο μὲν τὴν κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου . . . ἐκ τῆς ἀποδημίας*, 'from my sojourn abroad just after the close of the war.' To this place may, perhaps, be properly referred Il. xxii. 101-2, *ὅς μ' ἐκέλευε Τρωσὶ ποτὶ πρόλιν ἡγήσασθαι | νύχθ' ὅπο τήνδ' ὀλοήν*, 'who bade me conduct the Trojans to the city on the eve of this disastrous night.'

In a measure, 'rather,' 'somewhat.' To this use of *ὅπο* with the accusative belong also the examples, occasionally met with, in which it has with this case the sense of 'in a measure,' 'rather,' 'somewhat,' that is, conveys the idea of not quite reaching a certain measure. E.g. Plat. Gorg. 493, c, *ταῦτ' ἐπικαιῶς μὲν ἐστὶν ὅπο τι ἀτοπα*, 'this, probably, is in a measure strange;' Id. Phædr. 242, d, *εὐήθη καὶ ὅπο τι δασεβῆ*, 'foolish, and in a measure impious;' Aristoph. Vesp. 1290, *ταῦτα κατιδὼν ὅπο τι μικρὸν ἐπιδήμωσα*, 'seeing this, I flattered him a very little bit.' (See, in the notes on this place, the above and other references.) The literal rendering of *ὅπο τι* would be 'not quite somewhat,' 'just under, less than, something,' for which it is necessary to substitute the approximate expressions just given.

The signification of the accusative being the same in all the above examples, namely, that of 'as to,' 'as regards,' and its interpretation being quite obvious, it has not been necessary to repeat it for each case separately. It may be sufficient to make the general statement here at the conclusion, leaving the student to make the application for himself.

(For the table of the significations and use of *ὅπο* with cases of nouns, see the next page.)

TABLE OF THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND USE OF *ὥς* WITH CASES.

Significations of <i>ὥς</i> .	Genitive: 'with respect to.'	Dative: 'for.'	Accusative: 'as to,' 'as regards.'
1. Locally: 'under,' 'below,' 'beneath.'	1. a. 'Under,' 'beneath.' b. 'From under.'	1. 'Under,' 'at the foot of.'	1. 'Under,' 'beneath,' 'at the foot of.'
2. Metaphorically: 'under.'	2. a. 'Under,' 'in subjection to.'	2. a. 'Under,' 'in subjection to.'	2. a. 'Under,' 'in subjection to.' b. 'Under,' 'before.' c. 'Under cover, shelter, of.' d. 'Under cover of,' 'in,' of time.
b. 'Under,' 'to,' 'in,' 'with,' circumstances or condition.	b. 'Under,' 'to,' 'in,' 'with,' circumstances or condition.	b. 'Under,' 'to,' 'circumstances or condition.	d. 'Under,' 'to,' 'circumstances or condition.
c. 'Under,' 'for,' 'from,' 'by reason of,' moving cause.	c. 'Under,' 'for,' 'from,' 'by reason of,' moving cause.	c. 'By,' 'through,' 'by reason of.'	
d. 'By,' 'by means of,' the agent, means.	d. 'By,' 'by means of,' 'by the hands of,' agent, means.		
3. 'Just under the standard,' 'near,' 'just before,' 'just after,' 'towards,' 'about.'			3. 'Near,' 'just before,' 'just after,' 'towards,' 'about the time of.' 'In a measure,' 'rather,' 'somewhat.'

ὥς.

By many grammarians, *ὥς*, besides the office of a relative adverb and conjunction, is considered to discharge that of a preposition also. So regarded, it occurs with the accusative alone, and that almost exclusively of persons. The Attic writers employ it much the most frequently. Yet it occurs in Herodotus also, and an example is found in the Odyssey of Homer. Apparently it has the signification of 'to' in English, and is so rendered: e.g. Od. xvii. 218, *ὥς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὥς ὁμοῖον*, 'since god always brings like to like;' Herod. ii. 121, *ἐσελθόντα δὲ ὥς τὴν τοῦ βασιλῆος θυγατέρα*, 'having gone in to the king's daughter;' Xen. Cyrop. i. 8, 14, *ὅπῃ βούλη εἰσέναι ὥς ἐμέ*, 'whenever you choose to come in to me;' Id. Anab. ii. 6, 1, *ἀνήχθησαν ὥς βασιλέα*, 'they were carried up to the king.' Examples, however, are not wanting, in which *ὥς* is used with the names of towns and other like objects. In these, however, according to most grammarians, regard is had rather to the dwellers in the places than to the places themselves. Thus, in Xen. Cyrop. v. 3, 12, *καὶ χιμικας ὥς τὸ φρούριον ἄζοντες*, 'to bring

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ladders to the fort,' *τὸ φρούριον* is said to be properly understood of the garrison occupying the fort rather than of the fort itself; and in Thucydides viii. 36, *ἔχοντος ὥς τὴν Μίλητον*, 'when he was come to Miletus,' Miletus is considered to be put for the people of Miletus. Here, however, all the best editions, including Bekker's and Poppo's, read, on good authority, *ἐς* for *ὥς*. In other examples, allowing the reading to be true, it is more difficult to admit this interpretation. Thus, in Xen. Memorab. ii. 7, 2, *πολλῶν φυγόντων ὥς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, συνεληλύθασιν ὥς ἐμὲ καταλειμμένοι ἀδελφοὶ τε καὶ ἀδελφιδαὶ*, 'when many fled to the Piræus,' it is not easy to see how *Πειραιᾶ* can stand for the people of the Piræus. Either the reading must be altered, or *ὥς* must be admitted to occur with names of places. But see Passow's Lexicon, s. v., and Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 604.

ὥς, thus employed, is the relative adverb formed from the radical *ὅ* in *ὅς*, 'who,' just as the correlative *τῶς* is formed from the demonstrative *τό*, seen also in the compound *οὕτως* from *οὗτος*. *ὥς* corresponds both in form and signification to the English 'how,' and may be compared, in regard to its adverbial form and sense, with the numberless examples of adverbs in *ως* from adjectives in *-ος*, as *καλῶς* from *καλός*, *φίλως* from *φίλος*. Including the correlative demonstrative, which in such cases is always necessary to complete the sense, (*τῶς . . .*) *ὥς* would mean 'so . . . as,' showing that an action is to be considered as taken in one view in the same way, whether as to extent or any other accident, that the same action is taken in another view. Thus, when it is said in the example above cited, *ἀνήχθησαν ὥς βασιλέα*, 'they were carried up to the king,' the sense properly is, *ἀνήχθησαν (τῶς) ὥς (ἔστι τὸ ἀνηχθῆναι) βασιλέα*, 'they were carried up (so) as (is the being carried up) to the king,' properly, 'as regards the king.' The being carried up, in the case given, is made to answer, in the manner of it, whether as to extent or any other condition, to the absolute notion of being carried up to the king. It is set forth simply that 'persons were carried up,' and then, in answer to the question 'how they were carried up,' it is added, 'so . . . as is the being carried up to the king;' or, the proposition is, that assuming

a carrying up that is to the king, or brings men to the king, they were so carried up as is such a carrying up to the king; and this amounts to saying that they were carried up to the king. For the action or matter affirmed, namely, 'the being carried up,' being the same in both members; and the qualification of the action as to object or measure, &c., namely, 'to the king,' 'as regards the king,' introduced in the one member, being, by the force of the correlative sign, attributed to the other member as well; and the one member, namely, the relative, *ὡς βασιλέα*, involving the affirmation of the action with its qualification of object, measure, &c., and the other member, the demonstrative, (*τῶς ἀνιχθῆσαν*), by virtue of the correlative form of the proposition, repeating the affirmation of the action with its qualification as to object, measure, &c.; it is plain that, when it is said of persons, *ἀνιχθῆσαν ὡς βασιλέα*, that is (*τῶς ἀνιχθῆσαν ὡς*) (*ἔστι τὸ ἀνιχθῆναι*) *βασιλέα*, 'they were (so) carried up (as is the being carried up) to (as regards) the king,' it is meant to be declared that 'they were carried up to the king.' To those familiar with the use of the correlatives *tum . . . quum*, *tam . . . quam*, *ita . . . ut*, in Latin, with that of *οὕτως . . . ὥστε* in Greek, and with that of 'so . . . as' in English, and with the frequent omission of the demonstrative member in a correlative proposition, the seemingly strange use of (*τῶς . . .*) *ὡς* in Greek will present comparatively little difficulty. It scarcely needs to be added that the demonstrative correlative *τῶς*, above assumed, is found in common use in the compound *οὕτως*, 'so,' answering to *ὥστε*, 'as,' which, if any one choose, may be substituted for *τῶς* in the above statement.

It may not be amiss, notwithstanding this doctrine of *ὡς* seems to be so simple and obvious as little to require either confirmation or illustration, to add that *ὡς*, with its correlative sense of ('so . . .') as, is used in various connections, all to be explained in the same way, allowance being made for the difference of the objects brought into correlation by (*τῶς . . .*) *ὡς*. The office of *ὡς* remains essentially the same, whatever be the character and condition of the action or other object introduced by it. Thus it occurs with the participle: e.g. Xen. Anab. i. 1, 3, *συλλαμβάνει Κύρον ὡς ἀποκτενῶν*,

'he arrested Cyrus as if he were going to put him to death;' that is, 'he (so) arrested Cyrus as the king arrests a man when he means to put him to death.' Here it should be observed that the notion of 'going to,' 'meaning to,' do a thing, that is, of 'being on the eve of' doing a thing, is wholly due to the future participle form, and not to *ὡς*, which, although it may be rendered in this connection by 'as if,' 'as though,' has really no more than the force of 'as,' or, including the demonstrative, of ('so . . .') as. And, in fact, the notion of a conditional qualification involved in the 'if' or 'though' added to 'as' in the expressions 'as if,' 'as though,' belongs to the attributive meaning of the participle, in the same way with 'when,' 'since,' 'because.'

Ὡς is used also with the infinitive, in such phrases as *ὡς εἰπεῖν*, 'so to say,' *ὡς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν*, 'so to say,' 'so to express one's self in words,' *ὡς εἰχδῶσα*, 'to conjecture,' 'so to conceive what is likely in the future,' *ὡς συντόμως εἰπεῖν*, *ὡς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν*, 'to speak briefly,' 'to speak summarily,' *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, 'so to speak,' 'if one may use the expression.' In such instances, the correlative use of *ὡς*, though less obvious and more difficult to set forth intelligibly in English phrase, must yet be equally admitted. In all the variety of expressions in which *ὡς* is thus used with the infinitive, the object, as correctly represented by Passow (s. v. *ὡς*) and others, is to give notice to the hearer that the statement to which *ὡς* with the infinitive is attached is to be taken with some limitation; that the speaker, having used terms for which he cannot absolutely vouch, would have him understand that he employs them only as the best expression and the nearest the truth that he can find. Sometimes, however, he would convey the idea that, in what he says, he only conforms himself to the received expression, as when *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* is used in the sense of 'as the phrase goes;' and, at other times, that he ventures to make the statement, though it be bold, and may offend, as where *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* answers to the English phrase 'to venture the expression,' 'if one may dare to say so.' It would be curious to notice the way in which this variety of limitation is expressed by the same terms, as in the several uses of *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* just

referred to; but to do this, except as it may occur incidentally, does not belong to the objects of this treatise. All that these require is to show the correlative nature of such expressions. And this may be done by exhibiting the connection in which *ὥς* is used with the infinitive. Thus, Herod. vi. 95, *διὰ νήσων τὸν πλῶον ἐπορεύοντο, ὥς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκέειν δεισαντες μάλιστα πὸν περίπλοον τοῦ Ἄθω*, 'they sailed through the islands, chiefly, as it seems to me, from fear of doubling Athos,' that is, 'so to represent the matter as it seems to me,' or, 'as is the seeming to me.' The correlative demonstrative has reference to the writer's manner of setting forth the reason why the Persians sailed through the islands, and is to be supplied, either from the general terms that ordinarily stand as signs of narration, such as *εἰπεῖν*, so as to be equivalent to the English phrase 'so to state the matter,' or, in this particular instance, 'so to state the reason,' or, from the phrase itself, *ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκέειν*, so that it will mean 'so to seem as it seems to me.' The objection to the former mode of supplying the demonstrative correlative member is, that, admitting it, there would appear to be no good reason to allege why the author did not employ the expression commonly used in that very case, to wit, *ὥς εἰπεῖν*, or *ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*. The latter mode seems preferable, as being more natural and obvious, because more in accordance with the usage in *ὥς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν*, &c., and as affording quite as satisfactory a meaning, at the same time that it retains the variety in the manner of qualifying a statement which the author meant to use. The qualification here intended is not 'so to speak,' *ὥς εἰπεῖν*, but 'so to seem as it seems to me,' or 'so to think as I think;' that is, the author does not warn the reader to take his allegation of the reason for sailing through the islands with some qualification as to the mode of expressing it, but with some qualification as to his way of thinking about it. Assuming the demonstrative member to be supplied from *ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκέειν*, the most probable way of accounting for the construction is to consider the infinitive *δοκέειν*, which should properly stand in the demonstrative member, to be carried over into the relative member, and to usurp the place of *δοξεῖ*, which ought to be

connected with *ἐμοὶ* in this member. So that *ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκέειν* shall be equivalent to *τῶς (οὕτω) δοκέειν ὥς ἐμοὶ δοξεῖ*, 'so to seem as it seems to me,' or 'so to think as I think.' The whole sentence may be said, then, to contain, first, the main statement, 'the Persians sailed through the islands;' secondly, the writer's allegation of the reason for this, 'because they were afraid of the doubling of Mount Athos;' and, lastly, the qualification with which he would have his allegation of the reason taken, 'so to seem as it seems to me,' or 'so to think as I think.' The infinitive *δοκέειν*, in this construction, might possibly be explained as a nominative case in sense, being used absolutely, that is, without a verb, but more probably has the force of an accusative case, the sense being, 'as far as goes the so thinking as I think.' Herod. ii. 134, *ἐς τὴν ταλάντων χιλιάδες ἀναριθμητοί, ὥς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν, ἀναισίμωνται*, 'on which (a pyramid) countless thousands of talents, so to say, are expended;' that is, 'so to state the sum as is done in the terms used;' literally, supplying the demonstrative member from the correlative *ὥς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν*, 'so to express it as is the expressing it in words.' The author means to say, that the sum named, 'countless thousands of talents,' is not to be taken as exact, and adds, accordingly, that it is to be so understood as is such a sum conveyed in the extravagant terms used. Plat. Symp. 179, A, *οἱ τοιοῦτοι νικῶν ἂν ὀλίγοι ὄντες, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πάντας ἀνθρώπους*, 'such persons, though few in number, would conquer all men, so to speak;' that is, 'so to represent the matter as is done by the expression used,' or, more literally, 'so to speak as the word used gives utterance,' as is the expression as regards speaking, *τῶς (οὕτω) εἰπεῖν ὥς (ἔστι) ἔπος εἰπεῖν*. The reader is warned that the expression *νικῶν ἂν ὀλίγοι ὄντες πάντας ἀνθρώπους* may not be exact, and is to be accepted so, or in such sense only as, under the circumstances, the writer finds it a fit mode of utterance. In this case the demonstrative member is supplied from the correlative *ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, and the infinitive *εἰπεῖν* in the latter may have one of two different constructions. It may be the subject of *ἔστι* to be supplied, *ὥς ἔστι ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, *ἔπος* being in the accusative as the object of *εἰπεῖν*, 'as is the

speaking of a word; or it may follow *ἔπος*, which will then be the subject of *ἔστι*, as its qualification, in the same way that the infinitive follows upon many verbs, as *δύναμαι*, and a number of adjectives, as *μαλθακὸς ἀκούειν*, 'soft to hear,' in the same way too that the English employs the infinitive after some adjectives, as 'sweet to hear,' 'good to eat.' As such a qualification, *εἰπεῖν* will have the force of an accusative in the sense of 'as to,' 'as regards;' so that *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* will mean 'as a word or term is as regards, for, speaking,' that is, 'as is a word or term regarded as a means of utterance.' The former of these two constructions is at least questionable, even if it be admitted that *εἰπεῖν* may be so used without the article; and the latter is every way to be preferred, both as affording a more satisfactory meaning, and as being altogether consistent with the common use of the infinitive. The same interpretation is to be given of *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* when it signifies 'as the saying goes,' the meaning being, 'so to speak as the saying is;' only, here, the qualification which the speaker gives of some expression he has used by adding *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, 'so to speak as the saying is,' 'as the expression is for speaking,' 'as a term is as regards speaking,' has reference to other parties than the speaker or writer. Instead of giving notice that he does not absolutely affirm what he has said as being so by adding 'so to speak as I have spoken,' he does it by saying 'so to speak as the terms I employ are used for speaking,' namely, by others, by men generally. Whether the qualification is intended in the one sense or in the other, the expression *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* being capable of being used either way, and the Greeks making, therefore, no distinction in the form of expression, can only be gathered from the nature of the case in which the phrase is employed. Herod. ii. 8, τὸ ὦν δὴ ἀπὸ 'Ηλιουπόλιος οὐκέτι πολλὸν χωρίον, ὡς εἶναι Αἰγύπτου, 'now the region after Heliopolis is not any more a large one, considering that it belongs to Egypt;' or 'for Egypt;' in another and less extensive country it might be accounted large, but for Egypt, and counted as a part of it, it is not large. Considering *εἶναι* to have the force of an accusative, in the sense of 'as regards being,' the construction would be, 'it is not a

large country, so being as is a region considered with regard to its being a part of Egypt,' or, 'so to be as a region is in regard to being a country of Egypt,' which is the same as to say, 'for, to be, a country of Egypt;' just as *μαλθακὸς ἀκούσαι*, 'soft to hear,' is the same as 'soft for hearing,' and as *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, 'as a word is with regard to speaking,' means 'as a word is for speaking,' or 'considering what a word is for expressing one's self.' Thus would result the meaning above given, and which seems to be altogether consistent with the author's narrative, and with the use of *ὡς* with the infinitive elsewhere.

Ως, again, is used with the superlative, and has, here also, a correlative sense, the demonstrative being supplied from the relative: e.g. Xen. Anab. iv. 2, 2, καὶ ὡς μάλιστα λᾶθουν οἱ περιιόντες, 'that those who were making the circuit might escape observation as much as possible,' that is, 'might escape observation so as is the escaping observation the most.' Compare the corresponding Latin expression *quam maxime*, 'as much as possible,' which likewise is correlative, being equivalent to *tam . . . quam maxime*.

To mention one other instance, *ὡς* is used in a correlative sense with the accusative case attended by *εἰς*, *ἐπὶ*, *πρὸς*: e.g. Thuc. vi. 61, ἀπέπλεον μετὰ τῆς Σαλαμνίας ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας ὡς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, 'they sailed away as if they were sailing to Athens,' that is, 'they so sailed away as if they were sailing to Athens,' or 'as is the sailing to Athens.' This case of the use of *ὡς* is by some considered to furnish an explanation of that in which it is employed with the accusative without a preposition. They regard the preposition as having been omitted in this latter case, and as being properly supplied; so that *ὡς βασιλέα* would be fully expressed by *ὡς πρὸς βασιλέα*. (See Passow's Lex. s. v. *ὡς*, Rost's Gram. § 104, Anm. 19, and compare Kühn. Ausfüh. Gr. § 604, and Anmerk.) But if it be considered that the preposition is not necessary to the signification expressed by the accusative, namely, that of the measure or extent of the object reached, or of the object as to which, as regards which, any thing is affirmed; that elsewhere, as in poetry very frequently, the accusative without a preposi-

tion is used as the measure or as the object of the action or motion of verbs; that the introduction of the preposition would not render it less necessary to admit and explain the correlative use of $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$; that $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ is used precisely in the same way where no one would think of supplying a preposition, as with the participle and infinitive and superlative; and, finally, that a proper attention to the correlative nature of $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ furnishes an adequate explanation of all the other cases and of this one as well; it will hardly be deemed necessary or proper to supply a preposition with $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, as it certainly is wrong to call $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ itself a preposition.

The above-given explanation of $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ assumes it to be a correlative adverb, and, if satisfactory, needs not the aid of doubtful etymologies. All that is required is that it shall be shown to be the relative answering to the demonstrative form $\tau\acute{\omega}\varsigma$; and this has been done above. Hartung, cited by Kühn. Ausführ. Gram. § 598, in the foot-note, considers $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ to be identical with the Latin *ar* for *ad*, as seen in *arcessere*, *arcere*, *arbiter*, (the two last words, however, not containing *ad* at all,) and with $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, 'until.' But, even if the etymology were worth any thing, it leaves the interpretation of the actual use of $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ just where it found it. Pott, Etym. Forsch. ii. p. 270, referring to this speculation of Hartung, indirectly rejects it; but, admitting the claim of $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ to be counted among the prepositions, so far at least as may be inferred from his giving it the name without question, does not say what he esteems $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ to be.

THE END.



